

A
C O U R S E
O F
L E C T U R E S

On the PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS in
PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS,
AND
D I V I N I T Y:
WITH
REFERENCES to the most considerable AUTHORS on
each Subject.

By the late Reverend PHILIP DODDRIDGE, D.D.

The SECOND EDITION, Corrected.

L O N D O N,

Printed by Assignment from the Author's Widow,

For J. BUCKLAND, J. F. and C. RIVINGTON, W. CLARKE and R. COLLINS,
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R. BALDWIN, and W. OTRIDGE.

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C O U R S E
O F
L E C T U R E S

ON THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF

BRITAIN AND THE BRITISH ISLES

D I V I N I T Y



ADVERTISEMENT

By the EDITOR.

THIS work was originally drawn up for the use of the students under the Author's care; but it appears by a clause in his will, that it was his intention it should be published after his decease. And though it would, no doubt, have appeared to much greater advantage, if the Author had prepared it himself for the press; yet it is hoped that it will not be thought even in its present form unworthy of the public view.

The transcript from which it was printed, I have carefully compared with the original short-hand copy; and the public may be assured, that the Author's sentiments have been every where scrupulously preserved; no other alterations having been made, than such as are necessary in all posthumous works, that have not had the Author's last hand. A few references have been added, particularly to some books published since the Author's death, and others omitted, that seemed less important.

If the reader should think the references under the same head are sometimes too much alike; he will please to consider, that though the sentiments in each may be nearly the same, yet the different manner of expression will often serve more fully to explain and illustrate the subject: besides, that one Author may be at hand, when the other is not.

In order to assist the reader in consulting particular passages referred to, the reference is always made to the chapter and section, where that could be done: and as in many cases it could only be made to the page, an account is added at the end, of the Editions, to which such references are made, (where the books could be procured) with the number of pages in the volume, which, by the rule of proportion, may be some direction to find the passage in any other edition.

As to the work itself, it may be proper to acquaint the public, that the mathematical form, into which it is thrown, was taken from a work of the same kind, in manuscript, drawn up in Latin, by the Author's Tutor, the Reverend Mr. John Jennings of Hinckley, from whom he

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has borrowed some of the propositions and demonstrations, especially in the former part. But he has so much enlarged and improved upon the original plan, that the whole may properly be considered as a new work.

As my regard to the Author's memory, and my apprehension of the usefulness of the work itself, led me to comply with the request of the Author's widow, to inspect the publication of these Lectures, I thought it necessary to give this general account of what has been done in relation to them, for the satisfaction of the public; and heartily wish they may subserve the cause of learning, religion, and moderation.

Birmingham,
Jan. 31, 1763.

S. CLARK.

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INTRODUCTION*.

IT may be not improper, in the entrance of this work, to give some general account of the plan of it, and some directions for studying it in the most useful manner.

The work itself contains an abstract of the most important and useful thoughts I have any where met with, on the chief subjects which can be supposed to come under consideration, in the review of *Pneumatology*, *Ethics*, and *Divinity*. And as these sciences do insensibly run into each other, I judged it not proper to treat of each *separately*, and so to divide the whole into three distinct parts, the first Pneumatological, the second Ethical, and the third Theological; but have chosen to consider them in such a *connected* view, as might convey to the mind, with the greatest ease and advantage, the principal truths relating to each. The whole work is divided therefore into ten parts, and contains in all 230 Lectures. The *first* part, (Lect. 1—22.) considers the powers and faculties of the human mind.—The *second*, Lect. (23—51.) the being of a God, and his natural perfections.—The *third* (Lect. 52—90.) treats of the nature of moral virtue in general, and of the moral attributes of the Deity: of the several branches of virtue, and the nature of civil government.—The *fourth* (Lect. 91—100). of the immortality and immateriality of the human Soul, with its original; as also our general obligation to virtue, and the state of it in the world.—The *fifth* (Lect. 101—110.) considers the reason to desire and expect a revelation, and the external and internal evidence with which we may suppose it should be attended.—The *sixth* (Lect. 111—153.) asserts and vindicates the genuineness, credibility, and inspiration of the Old and New Testament.—The *seventh* (Lect. 154—163.) contains an account of the scripture doctrine, relating to the existence and nature of God, and the Divinity of the Son and Spirit.—The *eighth* (Lect. 164—187.) treats of the fall of human nature, and our recovery by the mediatorial undertaking of our Lord Jesus Christ, with the nature of faith in him, and of the covenant of grace established through him. So that the doctrine of Christ's atonement, and the Spirit's in-

* This introduction is to be considered as the Author's address to his own pupils, when they entered upon this course of Lectures, which will shew the propriety of some of the directions, which might otherwise appear too particular and minute.

INTRODUCTION.

fluences are also comprehended in this part.—The *ninth* (Lect. 188—209.) is a survey of the chief duties which the gospel requires; and more particularly of the positive institutions; in which the doctrine of the christian sabbath, the sacraments, and the constitution of the church are considered.—The *tenth* and last part, (Lect. 210—230.) contains the Scripture Doctrine of angels, and of the future state, including the resurrection, and the most remarkable events to precede or attend it.

These are the great subjects of the work, and I believe the very mention of them is sufficient to shew, how important a part of an academical course it must make, and how much it must be the concern of every prudent and judicious student to give it a large share of his application.

For the more profitable studying this course of lectures, it will be adviseable, that, as soon as possible after the lecture has been given, it be carefully reviewed, and the chief *references* read and contracted. But in contracting them, it will be unnecessary to transcribe those passages, the substance of which is already inserted in the lecture: it will be sufficient to take some general hints of their contents; and to transcribe only those parts, which are very peculiar and observable. And here some distinction is to be made, between those books, which may very probably be always at hand in reviewing the lectures, and those which may not so probably be within your reach.

A diligent attendance on the course will, I hope, be both a pleasure and improvement: yet I would advise every pupil, (if he can) to go over it *twice*; for though the subjects themselves, at the second review, will want the advantage of novelty, yet more thoughts will often arise in lecturing, and the whole will be made more familiar to the mind: besides, that the student will by this means have an opportunity of reading and studying some things, which accidental causes might have obliged him before to pass over without due attention.—And for this purpose, it may be very convenient to keep a catalogue of those lectures, which by absence, illness, or any other accidental circumstance, were not studied so carefully as might be wished; as likewise of those things, which did not, in the course of lecturing, appear solved and explained in a satisfactory manner. And if any difficulties arise, which seem peculiar, let them be drawn out in writing, to be lodged in the tutor's hands, or made the subject of a thesis, to be canvassed at large. In the mean time, full liberty will be given to
make

INTRODUCTION.

make any objection or inquiry, from time to time, which will be examined in the hours of lecture, so far as the limits of time and other employments will allow.

Yet let it be remembered, that the student is supposed to be already acquainted with many things here brought into question. It would be a most fatal mistake, to act as if nothing were known of God and Christ, till the chief doctrines relating to both come to be examined in this course. Many small treatises, which may be read in a few hours, contain evidence enough, both of the being of a God, and the truth of the christian religion, to satisfy an upright mind: though it may be convenient, that those who are to be the teachers and guardians of these truths, or those who may be exposed to peculiar temptations to doubt or disbelieve them, should be acquainted with their evidence in a larger extent. Let the great vital truths of christianity taught in scripture, be constantly regarded. As to matters of *controversy*, let them be referred to their proper place, without any eagerness to anticipate them; which often produces great bigotry and error, as well as a neglect of what is proposed to immediate inquiry. And may it never be forgotten, that matters of abstruse speculation and laborious inquiry, are not, even to *Theological* students, the *one thing needful*, though they may be important in subordination to it.

I would remind you, dear Sir, (whoever you are that are going over these lectures) that you may enter into eternity, long before you can have attended, or even transcribed them: and therefore, I would beseech and charge you, by all your hopes and prospects there, that it be your daily and governing care, after having solemnly devoted your soul to God through Christ in the bonds of the christian covenant, to live like his servant, to keep yourself in the love of God, and to endeavour in all things to adorn his gospel. So will you be most likely to succeed in your inquiries, through the communication of light from the great Father of lights: and so will you be prepared for the infinitely nobler discoveries, enjoyments and services of the future state; even though you should be deprived of the residue of your days here, and cut short, (as many of your brethren have been) in the intended studies and labours of this course.

LECTURES

ON

PNEUMATOLOGY, ETHICS, and DIVINITY.

PART I.

Of the Powers and Faculties of the HUMAN MIND.

AXIOM I.

EXISTENCE is a simple idea, which we get both by consciousness and observation. LECT. I.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 7. l. iv. c. ix. § 3.

*Burnet at Boyle's Lect. vol. i. p. 2, 3.
Grove's Posth. Works, vol. iv. p. 3, 4.*

DEFINITION I.

Whatever our thoughts are immediately employed about, whether as simply perceiving it, or as asserting or denying any thing concerning it, is called an **IDEA**.

SCHOLIUM.

The definition more frequently given is, that an *Idea* is the representation of a thing in the mind, which the mind immediately perceives; and the thing itself supposed to exist without our thoughts is called the *Archetype* of the idea. But we do not yet chuse to assert or deny any thing concerning the external existence of such supposed archetypes, and for this reason have not thought it so proper to use this definition.

DEFINITION II.

Whatever exists is called a **BEING**.

SCHOLIUM.

We do not here enter largely into the distinction, which the metaphysicians make between *Ens reale*, which exists without any dependence upon our thoughts, and *Ens rationis*, which owes its existence to its being the object of them; nor

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into

into the question between the *Realists* and *Nominalists*; but by *Being* in the process of this discourse we mean *Ens reale*.

Watts's Ontology, c. xvi.

| *Watts's Logic*, p. 27, 28.

DEFINITION III.

Whatever is contained in the adequate idea of any being, is called its PROPERTIES.

COROLLARY I.

A being is the same with all its properties taken together. And therefore

COROLLARY 2.

We can have no conception of any substance distinct from all the properties of the being in which they inhere; for this would imply that the being itself inheres, and so on to infinity.

Jennings's Log. Def. 15.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 18. *ib.* l. ii.

| c. xiii. § 19, 20. *ib.* c. xxiii. § 2, 3, 6. *

| *Watts's Philos. Eff.* ii. § 1.

DEFINITION IV.

BODY is an extended solid being.

Gravesend's Phys. l. c. ii, iii. § 9, 12, 18.

| *Le Clerc's Phys.* l. v. c. iii. § 1—3.
| *Locke's Eff.* l. ii. c. iv.

AXIOM II.

THOUGHT is a simple idea which we get by reflecting on what passes in our own minds.

Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 277, 278.

| *Crouzaz's Log.* vol. i. p. 10.

DEFINITION V.

SPIRIT is a thinking being, or a being which has the power of thought.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 18.

COROLLARY I.

We have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of body; the essential properties of each being equally known; and the inward constitution equally unknown.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 15.

| *Proced. of Understand.* p. 74—78.

COROL-

COROLLARY 2.

We are at least as certain of the existence of spirit as of body; the former we know by consciousness, which is always infallible; the other by the senses, which may be mistaken.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 7 & 11. — Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 31.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The *Cartesians* thought that those primary and essential properties of body and spirit, mentioned *Def. 4 & 5*, were the respective substances from whence all their other properties flow: and Dr. *Watts* maintains the same opinion; urging that they agree with the received definition of substance, as they support the accidents of figure, size, colour, &c. in bodies, and doubting, fearing, willing, &c. in spirit; and both subsist independent on human power. He further pleads, that we have no idea of the support of these properties, and that if these be destroyed, nothing will remain.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 53. | Watts's Ess. ii. præf. § 2, 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

A power of being moved by impulse is improperly mentioned by Mr. *Locke* among the essential properties of body, and that of moving body by volition among those of spirit.

DEFINITION VI.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY is that branch of learning, which relates to *body*, giving an account of its various phenomena, and the principles on which the solution of them depends.

DEFINITION VII.

PNEUMATOLOGY is the doctrine of *spirits*, or that branch of science which relates to them.

DEFINITION VIII.

ETHICS is that branch of learning by which our faculties are directed to that manner of acting, by which we may obtain the highest happiness, *i. e.* the supreme enjoyment of which our natures are capable.

DEFINITION IX.

The HUMAN Mind is that in or of a man which thinks.

Watts's Ess. ii. p. 59.

B 2

LECT.
II.

COROL.

COROLLARY.

The human mind is a spirit. *Comp. Def. 5.*

SCHOLIUM.

Des-Cartes in his definition calls it "a thinking, incorporeal, inextended substance, which shall survive the body to which it is united, and with which it was immediately created by God, in order to form a perfect man." It is evident that on this definition it will be matter of much controversy, whether man has a mind or not. Yet he defines it something otherwise in his *Principles*.

Des-Cartes Princ. part i. § 8.

AXIOM III.

It is evident that men have not one COMMON CONSCIOUSNESS.

COROLLARY.

Every one has a mind peculiar to himself.

More's Immort. of the soul, l. iii. c. xvi. | Ditton on the Resurrect. p. 467—471.
p. 212—216.

AXIOM IV.

VOLITION is a simple idea, which we get by reflection.

DEFINITION X.

ACTION signifies volition with the effect which we will.

COROLLARY I.

Nothing can act but spontaneously.

COROLLARY 2.

Nothing but a thinking being can act; for spontaneity implies an idea of the action to be performed.

SCHOLIUM.

Action is in a less proper sense applied to irrational, and even inanimate beings, when the body, immediately employed in producing a new effect, is said to act upon that in which it is produced, as the sun-beams upon the earth, the fire upon fuel.

Watts's Ontology, p. 342.

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DEFINITION XI.

As that being which acts is called the AGENT, so that which is acted upon is called the PATIENT, whether sensible or insensible, or whether the action produced be a pleasing or displeasing effect.

DEFINITION XII.

Pleasure and *Pain* are simple *Ideas*: that which tends to produce the former is called NATURAL GOOD, and that which tends to produce the latter, NATURAL EVIL.

COROLLARY.

The loss of good is evil, and the removal of evil is good.

SCHOLIUM.

See an unnecessary description of *Pain* in

Collier's Eff. part iii. p. i.

AXIOM V.

POWER whether ACTIVE or PASSIVE is a sensible idea, which we get by observing the changes produced in the beings about us by agents and patients.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 1, 2.

DEFINITION XIII.

Those properties or powers of any spirit, whereby it is rendered capable of action, enjoyment, or suffering, are called FACULTIES.

PROPOSITION I.

To take a survey of the principal faculties of the human mind.

SOLUTION.

I. We find within ourselves a power of perceiving, abstracting, compounding, comparing, discerning, judging, reasoning, which all lead us on in the pursuit of truth, *i. e.* in the right apprehension of the nature of things, and are called by the common name of *Understanding*.

Duncan's Logic, ap. Preceptor, vol. ii. l. i. c. i. § 4. ib. l. ii. c. i. § 1. ib. l. iii. c. i. § 1, 2.

2. The

2. The power of retaining and recollecting our ideas in the absence of their archetypes is what we call *Memory*. But when ideas or trains of ideas occur, or are called up by Memory in a lively manner, and without regard to the order of former actual impressions and perceptions, it is said to be done by the power of the *Imagination* or *Fancy*.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. *Introd.* p. 3. | *Balguy's VI. Sermon.* p. 44—46.

3. We perceive on many occasions various commotions in our minds; (which also produce changes and impressions not only on the nerves of the brain, but in the exterior parts of the body) which commotions we call *Passions*. Pleasure and pain are the great hinges on which they turn, and the more particular modifications of them will be considered *Prop.* 13.

Dr. *Watts* describes them thus: "They are sensible commotions of our whole nature, both soul and body, which are occasioned by the perception of an object according to some special property that belongs to it." (*Watts on the Passions*, p. 5.) To excite them it must appear rare and uncommon, good, *i. e.* agreeable, or evil, *i. e.* disagreeable.

4. A power of forming *volitions*; which *Locke* defines to be the act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in or with-holding it from any particular action: but what that *exerting its dominion* is, can only be known by consciousness. *Ax.* 4.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 15.

5. A power of moving some parts of the body. Others it has no immediate power over, the motion of some being always involuntary, as that of the heart. In other parts it is sometimes voluntary and sometimes otherwise, as in the lungs and intestines.

Des-Cartes de Pass. l. i. § 13. 16.

DEMONSTRATION.

We find by experience that these faculties are in our own minds, and we perceive by their effects they are in the minds of others.

COROLLARY 1.

Man is a being of great abilities and excellencies; so that if it shall hereafter appear that he was produced by any other intelligent being, it may reasonably be concluded, that he was designed for great and important purposes.

COROLLARY 2.

While these faculties continue in a degree of vigour, he must be capable of great and noble improvements; so that much of the difference between persons

PROP. II. *Of the Power of the Mind over the Body.*

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sons in other respects equal, will depend upon the degree in which this natural furniture is cultivated or neglected.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It is not proper to speak of the understanding and other faculties of the soul as if they were distinct principles of action: the understanding is the *soul* understanding, the will is the *soul* willing: and to represent them as distinct agents produces confusion in our ideas.

Witsii Econ. Fed. l. iii. c. vii. § 4, 5. | *Crouzaz's Logic*, vol. i. part i. c. viii.
Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 17—20. | § 6. p. 144.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The power which the mind evidently has of moving the various parts of the body by nerves inserted in the muscles is truly wonderful, seeing the mind neither knows the muscles to be moved, nor the machinery, by which the motion in it is to be produced: so that it is as if a musician should always strike the right note on a very complex instrument, which he had never seen before. That no laws of mechanism can produce this, is proved by its being voluntary, as well as by other considerations.

Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 12. p. 29—35. | *Matho*, vol. i. p. 359, &c.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is questioned whether there be any motion in the human body, which depends upon the mind, and yet is involuntary.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Berkeley entirely denies the power of *abstraction*, as an evident absurdity and inconsistency, and says we have only a power of making one particular idea a representation of all the rest. But this is all grounded upon an unwary expression of Mr. *Locke*. The truth is, that we don't positively exclude, but only overlook a part of the idea from which we abstract: *v. g.* when I conceive of a line by abstraction, I do not deny that it is either straight or crooked, but only think of the flowing of a point without determining its direction.

Locke ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 9.

Berkeley's Princ. Introd. § 6—20.

Proced. of Underst. p. 186—188.

PROPOSITION II.

To survey those phænomena observable in BRUTE ANIMALS, which seem to bear some resemblance to the faculties of the human mind.

LECT.
III.

SOLUTION.

They seem to have a power of *perception*; *v. g.* to see, to hear, to smell, to taste, and to feel; and it seems that it is by this power, that those bodies, which we call animal, are distinguished from those that are inanimate.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. ix. § 11.

2. They

Phænomena in Brutes like those in the Human Mind. PART I.

2. They seem also to have *memory*; which appears by the marks of their recollecting a train of ideas, when one that has a relation to the rest is by sensation presented anew; and especially by birds perfecting themselves by practice in tunes they have imperfectly learnt.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 10. | *Proced. of the Underst. p. 158—162.*

3. They appear capable of exerting *volitions*, and of putting them into execution by correspondent motions of their bodies.

4. They appear to be impressed with *passions*, as joy, sorrow, fear, hope, desire, gratitude, anger, &c. and sometimes in a very violent degree.

5. They appear not to have a power of *abstraction*, because they do not use articulate sounds as the signs of their ideas, tho' the organs of some are capable of pronouncing them.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 10, 11. | *Proced. of the Underst. p. 188, 189.*

Gr. 5. 6. They are incapable of any high degree of *reasoning*, since that evidently depends upon abstract ideas.—*Object.* Many of their actions seem rational. *Ans.* They are, and in so high a degree, that if they were governed by any reason of their own, they would exceed the sagacity of the generality of men: yet in other instances they appear mere idiots; and in the actions of the same species there is so little variety, that we cannot imagine this to be the case. This must therefore be granted to be a very strange phænomenon.

Speulat. N^o. 120. vol. ii. p. 139. | *Collib. Inq. into the Exist. p. 86, 87:*
Specl. de la Nat. vol. i. part ii. p. 70, 71. | *Ed. 1. p. 100, 101. Ed. 3.*

COROLLARY 1.

The *Cartesian* hypothesis, that Brutes are mere machines, is very incredible, since these phænomena can by no means be accounted for on any mechanical laws, nor upon any principles, which will not prove it possible, that those which appear to us human creatures may be mere machines, and not only irrational, but insensible too.

Des-Cartes de Method. § 5. p. 34—36. | *Proced. of Underst. p. 170—174.*
Le Clerc's Phys. l. iv. c. xii. § 9—13. | *Ess. upon Hunting, p. 52—92.*
Ray's Wisdom of God, p. 54—57. | *Reg. Philos. Conv. vol. iii. p. 83—85.*

COROLLARY 2.

It is evident that man is a creature superior to the brutes, though some authors have endeavoured to sink him to a level with them. *Vid. Prop. 1.*

Blount's Anima Mundi, p. 40—46. | *Gelli's Circe by Layng, pass.*
Orig. adv. Celsum, l. iv. p. 217—222.

SCHOLIUM.

That *Plants* are a species of animals, and have some sort of sensation, is strongly maintained, though with no appearance of reason, by

Redi de Generat. Insect. p. 245—249, | Edwards's Exercit. N^o. viii. ad finem.
257—260.

DEFINITION XIV.

That may be called a man's own BODY, which is the animal system over which his will exercises an immediate power, and by the organs of which, ideas are transmitted to his mind; and that is to be accounted a VITAL part of it, which partakes of its vegetation. LECT. IV.

PROPOSITION III.

To enumerate the principal phænomena of the dependence of the human mind on the body.

SOLUTION.

1. When the nerves of the body are moved, ideas are presented to our minds whether we will or no, according to the different senses to which those nerves serve, which are put into agitation; that is, certain ideas in the mind succeed to certain motions in the brain.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 25. | Des-Cartes de Pass. § 34.
Cheyne's Princip. c. iii. § 39. p. 228, 229. | —Prin. part iv. § 197. p. 216.

2. Passions are often excited by bodily motions; and on the other hand, when raised, produce changes in the body, sometimes even contrary to our volitions; v. g. in anger and blushing.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xx. § 17. | Des-Cartes de Pass. § 97—106, 113—135.

3. When the body is indisposed, the mind is often disabled from using its faculties; v. g. the understanding is disabled by drunkenness and sleep, motion by the palsy, memory by diseases, &c.

4. When the senses are gently and naturally shut up, and the command over the body intermitted, as in sleep, if we think at all we are said to dream; and generally wander through airy tracks of thought, which have no agreement with each other, nor are at all corrected by the judgment. Ideas fetched out of the memory, seem to us to be produced anew; and out of mere simple ideas laid up in the memory, new imaginary ideas of substances are formed, and seem to be produced by external objects. When the senses are obstructed in

a violent and unnatural manner, as in a swoon, if we think at all we may observe the same phænomena, but in a still more languid degree.

<i>Lime-street Lect.</i> vol. ii. p. 442, 443.	<i>Lucret.</i> l. iv. ver. 905—1024.
<i>Des-Cartes Dioptrics</i> , c. vi. § 17.	<i>Herv. Med.</i> vol. ii. p. 43. note.
<i>Robault's Phys.</i> l. iv. c. xix.	

5. In a frenzy, though the senses be not shut up, nor the command of the mind over the body suspended, yet the same phænomena are found as in sleep, only in a more vivid and pathetic degree.

Aretæus de Morb. Acut. l. ii. c. iv, v. p. 17. *Boher. Ed.* Vid. *Boher. Not. in loc.*

6. Sometimes by very intense thinking, we do not attend to impressions made on the organs of sensation, nor receive ideas from them. This in a very high degree may be called a trance or extasy.

<i>Plutarch's Lives</i> , vol. ii. p. 435, 436.	277. <i>Edin. Ed.</i> Vol. i. p. 475, 476.
<i>Locke's Ess.</i> l. ii. c. ix. § 3, 4. <i>lb.</i> c. ii.	<i>Lond. Ed.</i>
§ 19. p. 1—3.	<i>Gualperius in Acts</i> x. 10.
<i>Flavel's Pneumat. ap. Opera</i> , p. 276,	<i>Col. Gardiner's Memoirs</i> , § 30—32.

COROLLARY.

Man is a very feeble creature, and we have little reason to boast of those intellectual powers, the exercise of which, by the very constitution of our nature, does not only depend upon an animal system, but is necessarily subject to frequent long interruptions, as in the state of sleep.

<i>Burnet's Theory</i> , vol. ii. p. 164.	<i>Herv. Contempl.</i> vol. ii. p. 39, 40, 48—50.
<i>Camb. sur l'Exist.</i> p. 176, 177.	

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. V. It is queried to what we are to ascribe the difference to be found in the intellectual capacities of men.

ANSW. The principles of physiognomy, the decay of the faculties in old age, the destruction or restoration of them by corporeal accidents, and many of the phænomena mentioned in the proposition, may convince us, that the temperature and constitution of the body, has a great influence on the mind. It must also be allowed, that the circumstances of education and conversation, may make a considerable difference between persons in other respects equal. Yet if we attend to the variety there is in all the works of nature, we may be inclined to think there is a like variety in the internal constitution of human souls: which conjecture is confirmed by observing, that no visible difference has yet been discovered between the brain of the weakest and the most sagacious

sagacious of mankind; as well as that persons in the same circumstances, and with the same opportunities, often make very different improvements.

Des-Cartes de Method. sub. init. p. 1. | Watts's Death and Heaven, p. 97—102.

S C H O L I U M 2.

Some have distinguished between the *rational* and the *animal* soul, as if they were two distinct Beings, calling the former the *Spirit*, the latter the *Soul*. They suppose the intellect and will are seated in the former, the passions and appetites in the latter; and that the *Soul* is a principle common to brutes, which therefore they sometimes call by very contemptible names, as the *horse*, the *brute*, &c. whereas they think the *Spirit* is peculiar to man. *Vid. Prop. 1. Sch. 1.*

<i>Proced. of the Underst. l. ii. c. x. p. 367,</i>	<i>Pope's Iliad, l. xxiii. ver. 122. vol. vi.</i>
<i>370—377.</i>	<i>p. 61, 62.</i>
<i>Marc. Anton. l. ii. § 2. l. iii. § 16.</i>	<i>Mason on Self Knowledge, l. i. c. ii.</i>
<i>l. xii. § 3. with Dac. Notes.—</i>	<i>p. 14.</i>
<i>Des-Cartes de Pass. part i. § 47.</i>	<i>Vitring. Obs. l. iii. c. iv. præf. § 2—8.</i>

D E F I N I T I O N XV.

The SOUL is said to be SEATED in that part of the body, where sensation terminates, and voluntary motion begins.

P R O P O S I T I O N IV.

The Soul is seated in the *Brain*.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. The nerves, on which sensation and motion evidently depend, terminate in the brain, or in the *medulla spinalis*, which is derived from thence, and whose fibres are probably all continued to it.

2. If a strait ligature be made on any nerve, or it be cut asunder, sensation continues in that part nearest the brain, and ceases in that which is more remote.

3. In men, and in most other animals, death immediately ensues, if the head be cut off, or the brains taken out, or the *cerebellum* wounded.

4. All known distempers that immediately take away sensation, are seated in the head.

Grad. 1—4. Def. 14. 15. The soul is seated in the brain. Q. E. D.

Keil's Anat. c. vii. § 1.

More's Immort. of the Soul. l. ii. c. vii. § 10.

Watts's Eff. iii. p. 78—80.

COROLLARY.

The ancients were mistaken in placing it in the *heart*; and *Van Helmont* in the *mouth of the stomach*. It may be observed by the way, that *Philo*, who with many ancients supposed the sensitive soul to be subdivided into the irascible and concupiscible, placed the former in the heart, the latter in the belly, while he thought the rational was seated in the head.

Vitringa ubi supra, § 4. *sub fin.* | *Des-Cartes de Pass.* § 38.
More, Ibid. l. ii. c. vii. § 5—10. |

SCHOLIUM 1.

It must still be a matter of controversy, in what part of the brain the soul is seated. There is no reason to think, as some have imagined, that it is in the *meninges*; but whether it be in the *pineal gland*, as *Des-Cartes* supposes; or as *Dr. More* thinks, among the animal spirits in the *fourth ventricle*, or in the *corpora striata*, as has been lately maintained in *France*, or in some part different from any of these, we cannot certainly say.

Des-Cartes de Pass. § 32. | *More, ibid. l. ii. c. vii.* § 12—18. *c. viii. per tot.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

The constitution of some animals, may perhaps be different from that of men in this respect. It is certain the phænomena mentioned *gr. 3.* are not always to be found in them; for wasps will live a long time after their heads are cut off; eels are soonest killed by striking them on the tail; and vipers will live some hours after their heads are cut off, and their bowels taken out.

More, ibid. l. iii. c. xv. § 1, 2. | *Bacon's Nat. Hist. Cent. 4. N^o. 400.*

DEFINITION XVI.

LECT. VI. Any idea or proposition is said to be *INNATE*, when it is not acquired by the use of the faculties, but so implanted in the mind from its original, as to be common to the whole species, independent upon any circumstances in which individuals may be placed.

PROPOSITION V.

There are no innate ideas in the human mind.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. There can no *simple* idea be assigned, but may be traced up to *sensation* or *reflection*, or *both*: v. g. to *one sense* alone; as seeing green, hearing the ^{found}

The doctrine of Locke on Innate Ideas is strongly controverted by the learned Buddeus in his "Institutiones Theologicæ Morales", Par II. c. II. §. V.

found of an organ, smelling a rose, tasting a peach, feeling solidity, &c. or more; as extension, motion, rest: to *reflection* only, as perception, volition, duration: or *sensation* and *reflection* both, as existence and various kinds of pleasure and pain. *Ax.* 1.

Locke, l. ii. c. iii. v—vii. Ibid. c. i. § 2, 7—9.

2. We see that simple ideas are acquired gradually, and the furniture of various persons differs according to their various circumstances in life.

Locke, l. ii. c. i. § 2, 5, 7, 20—23.

3. When the organs of sensation are destroyed, simple ideas proper to them are no more acquired; and those, who from their birth want proper organs, want correspondent ideas, even though they be ever so important to the comfort and usefulness of life.

Locke, l. i. c. iv. § 20. Ibid. l. ii. c. iii. § 1.

Grad. 1—3. 4. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose, that any *simple* ideas are innate.

5. *Compound* ideas are made up of simple ones, nor can we by any operation of the mind produce any idea how chimerical soever, the materials of which we are not already possessed of.

Locke, l. ii. c. ii. § 2. Ibid. c. xii. § 8.

Grad. 4, 5. 6. It is needless and unreasonable to suppose any of our ideas innate. *Q. E. D.*

Proced. of Underst. p. 382—384. | More's Philos. Works, l. i. c. 5, 6.

SCHOLIUM I.

Dr. *Watts* supposes there are three sources of our ideas, viz. *Sensation*, *Reflection*, and *Abstraction*, but since he grants the materials of the last are derived from the two former, this cannot be reckoned a third primary source, any more than *compounding*.

Watts's Phil. Ess. iii. § 16. p. 93—97.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Brown, in his *Procedure of the Understanding*, maintains that we have all our ideas originally from *Sensation*: but his proof depends entirely upon his definition of the word *Idea*, which he takes for a picture or representation of some *sensible* object laid up in the imagination; which is different from our definition of it. *Vid. Def. 1.*

Proced. of Underst. p. 55, 63—66.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

Most of those ideas which arise from reflection, come into the mind later than those which arise from sensation.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Many errors in our ideas of sensation are rectified by reflection.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. ix. § 8, 9.

Smith's Optics, vol. ii. Append. p. 27, 28.


Locke's Fam. Lett. p. 134—138.

PROPOSITION VI.

There are no innate propositions in the human mind.

LECT.

VII.



DEMONSTRATION.

1. All propositions consist of ideas: therefore innate propositions would imply innate ideas, contrary to Prop. 5.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 19.

2. If any propositions could be supposed innate, it must be those that are intuitively discerned; but these, though assented to as soon as proposed, are not known before such proposal, even by those whose minds are least corrupted by education and custom: which shews (by the way) that they cannot be the principles of all our knowledge, not being themselves first known.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. ii. § 4, 16, 21—27.

3. All propositions relating to *identity* and *diversity* of ideas may be intuitively discerned, and consequently must be innate, if intuitive discerning were the mark of an innate proposition. But this would imply, that all our ideas were innate, which is evidently absurd.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 4, 5. Ibid. l. iv. c. vii. § 4.

4. Propositions supposed innate cannot be distinguished from others, so that a complete catalogue of them should be made: yet this might reasonably be expected if any were so, and would be necessary to render them useful.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iii. § 14. Ibid. c. iv. § 21.

5. Several of those propositions, which are of greatest importance in morality, and seem most evident, and are therefore most likely to be innate, are unknown to some, and expressly contradicted by others, and all need proof.

Locke's

PROP. VII. *yet there are some practical principles.*

15

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iv. § 4—13.

| Watt's Eff. iv. § 1.

Sale's Pref. to the Koran, p. 131, 132. | Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 381.

Gr. 1—5. Valet propositio.

SCHOLIUM I.

It may be granted, that there are certain circumstances, in which it is impossible for the mind to avoid receiving certain ideas, and assenting to certain propositions, and even taking them for granted in all its reasonings: and this is the necessary consequence of its constitution. It may also be granted, that there is something in natural temper disposing to gratitude, compassion, &c. as effectually as if propositions recommending them were inscribed upon the soul. But this is by no means inconsistent with what has been said above: and in this sense Mr. *Locke* owns innate practical principles, as the *desire of happiness*.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iii. § 3. | Watts's Eff. iv. § 2—4. p. 100—102, 104—107.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The dream of innate ideas, seems to have arisen on the one hand, from the desire of teachers to impose their own sentiments upon their disciples, as sacred truths stamp'd on their minds by the Author of nature; and on the other, from the ease with which such principles have been early received, and the assurance with which they have been assented to, so that people cannot remember that they have ever doubted of them.

Locke's Eff. l. i. c. iii. § 21—26. Ibid. c. iv. § 24.

PROPOSITION VII.

The same external qualities in objects, may excite different ideas in different persons.

LECT.
VIII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If the organs of sensation be at all different, the ideas of the same object must be proportionably so, while the same laws of nature prevail.

2. It is probable, there may be some degree of difference in the organs of different persons; *v. g.* in the distance of the *retina* and *chrystalline* humour of the eye; in the degree of extension in the *tympanum* of the ear, in the acrimony of the *saliva*, &c. And the variety which is observable in the faces, the voices, and the bones of men, and almost through the whole face of nature, would lead us to suspect that the same variety might take place here.

3. Those things which are very pleasing to one, are extremely disagreeable to another.

4. Those

4. Those things which are at one time very agreeable, are at another very disagreeable to the same person, when the organs of his body are indisposed, or when other disagreeable ideas are associated with those that had once been grateful.

Gr. 1, 2, and 3, 4|5. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOLIUM.

Tho' the causes mentioned above may probably produce ideas which differ in *degree* in the minds of different persons, there is no apparent reason to suppose they differ in their *kind*; v. g. that what appears green to one, should constantly appear red to another, and *vice versa*.

Malebranche's Research. l. i. c. xiii. § 5, 6. | *Robault's Physf. part i. c. xxvii. § 6. vol. i. p. 197.*

PROPOSITION VIII.

To survey the phaenomena of the human memory with the solutions that have been given of some of them. See *Prop. 1. gr. 2.*

SOLUTION.

1. A vast stock of ideas are treasured up in the memory, which it easily produces on various occasions.

The *Cartesians* say, that objects coming in by sensation and ideas got by reflection, make traces in the brain.—But how exquisitely fine must these be, when in so small a compass the names and images of so many objects, as well as so many propositions and arguments are inscribed. Who can sufficiently admire it, not only in such extraordinary cases as are mentioned by *Derham*, &c. but in those cases which are most common?

Derham's Physf. Theol. l. v. c. i. p. 262. | *Rollin Maniere, &c. vol. i. p. 275—277.*
Des-Cartes de Passf. § 42. | *August. Confes. l. x. c. 7.*
Cicero's Tusculan Disp. l. i. § 24, 25. | *Senec. Controv. l. i. sub init.*
Watts's Eff. l. iii. § 13, 14. |

2. We can distinguish ideas brought out of the memory from those that come in by sensation or reflection; perhaps by the liveliness of the impression, or by the train of relations.

Locke's Eff. l. v. c. vi. § 5, 6. | *Des-Cartes de Passf. § 26.*

3. Ideas of which we have but a general and imperfect remembrance may often be recovered by recollection.

Watts's Eff. l. iii. § 15. | *Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. x. § 7.*

4. Memory in a great measure depends upon the body, and is often much injured by a disease, and afterwards recovered with recovering strength, which on the *Cartesian* hypothesis is accounted for, by supposing that those parts of the brain, on which these characters are written, are by such disorders relaxed,
in

in the same manner as the nerves in the other parts of the body are liable to be weakened or disabled.

5. The memory differs at different ages. Children soon forget, as they soon learn: old people learn with difficulty, and remember best what they learnt when young. That is, say the *Cartesians*, because the brain growing by degrees more dry retains old characters, but does not easily admit new.

6. Dreams generally make little impression on the memory: because, say some, the animal spirits are then but gently moved.

Watts's Eff. No. v. § 2.

7. An idea attended with great pleasure or pain makes a deep impression on the memory, *i. e.* a deep trace on the brain, the spirits being then violently impelled.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. x. § 3.

8. The power of recollecting differs extremely at different times: and it is generally strongest, when we are most brisk and lively.

9. We remember that best in the morning, which we learnt just before we went to sleep: because, say the *Cartesians*, the traces made then are not apt to be effaced by the motions of the spirits, as they would, if new objects of sensation had presented themselves; and during this interval, they have (as it were) time to stiffen.

10. Sensible ideas gradually decay in the memory, if they be not refreshed by new sensations; the traces perhaps wearing out: yet they may last many years.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. x. § 4, 5.

11. When a train of ideas is very familiar to the mind, they often follow one another in the memory without any laborious recollection, and so as to arise almost instantaneously and mechanically; as in writing, singing, &c. the traces between them being worn like beaten roads.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxxiii. § 6.

12. The memory is a faculty which is almost incessantly exercised while thought continues; (tho' the instances of laborious recollection are comparatively few;) nor do we ever find the human mind entirely stript of it, tho' it be often impaired.

DEMONSTRATION.

The probability of the *Cartesian* hypothesis will appear from considering,

1. How well it agrees with the various phenomena mentioned above.
2. The analogy upon this hypothesis between sensation and memory, the one arising from impressions made on the brain, the other depending on traces continued there.

D

3. The

LECT.
IX.

3. The instances in which memory has been almost wholly lost at once by a sudden violent blow upon the head; insomuch that a great scholar has entirely lost the knowledge of letters by it, and has been forced with infinite labour to begin again from the elements of them: and in other instances the recollection has been gradual, and the events of childhood and youth have been recovered first.

COROLLARY.

The memory is a useful faculty, which deserves to be carefully cultivated by attention and exercise, frequent reviews and conversation.

Free-Thinker, No. 72.

Rollin's Man. &c. vol. i. p. 277—279.

Watts's Improv. of the Mind, part i. c. xvii.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The artificial methods which some have proposed must be allowed to be very ingenious; but perhaps are rather calculated to improve a memory already good, than to help a bad one.

Rollin's Maniere, &c. vol. i. p. 279,
280.

Grey's Memoria Technica.
Bruen's Life, p. 56—58.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The excellency of the memory consists partly in its strength of retention, and partly in its quickness of recollection.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 3.

If the *Cartesian* hypothesis should be admitted, memory will still continue a great mystery: for it must be acknowledged impossible thoroughly to explain how either that or sensation should be affected by any impression on the brain, or what connection there can be between such impressions and thought in any of its modes.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Locke* accounts for the association of ideas, which is the cause of antipathies and many errors, with other strange phenomena, by memory; supposing such traces are worn on the brain as unite ideas, so that when the mind turns to one it should almost necessarily fall on the other to. See *Solution*, gr. 11.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxxiii. § 7—18. | *Hartley on Man*, Prop. X, XI. vol. i. p. 65—72.

SCHOLIUM 5.

If the *Cartesian* hypothesis be admitted, it must be owned that nothing gives a greater idea of the minuteness of the parts into which matter may actually be divided,

vided, than the smallness of those traces, by which so many dictionaries, histories, poems, &c. are transcribed, and so many pictures exactly drawn in miniature.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is probable the weakness of memory in infants may be one chief cause of their being so long before they come to the use of speech, as well as the want of dexterity in using the organs of it.

AXIOM VI.

We get our ideas of SUCCESSION, by observing the train of ideas passing through our minds one after another.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xiv. § 4.

LECT.
X.

PROPOSITION IX.

The swiftneſs and ſlowneſs of the ſucceſſion of ideas in the human mind have certain limits.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Some motions are ſo ſwift, and others ſo ſlow, that they cannot be ſeen.
2. Motion is always ſucceſſive.
3. Could our ideas ſucceed each other as faſt as the bodies move in one caſe, and as ſlow as they move in the other, the motion would become viſible.
- 1, 3. 4. The ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs of ideas coming in by ſight have their limits.
5. There is equal reaſon to believe it with regard to other ideas; as ſome of the like phænomena may be obſerved concerning ſome ideas that come in by hearing.
6. We are not able to retain one idea long in the mind without any variation; nor can we call up any given number of ideas, in any given time; v. g. we cannot think over ten verſes between one vibration of the pendulum, and another.

Gr. 4 and 5, and 6. 7. Valet propositio.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xiv. § 6—14.

SCHOLIUM.

It is evident there are various degrees of velocity in the ideas of different perſons, and of the ſame perſon at different times; partly according to the temper in which he is, and partly according to the degree in which he exerciſes his volitions: and where the velocity is the ſame, it will ſeem greater in proportion as the kinds of ideas are more various.

Watts's Eff. No. xii. § 2.

AXIOM VII.

DURATION is a ſimple idea, which we get by reflecting on the ſucceſſion of our ideas.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 1—3.

COROLLARY.

When we are insensible of the succession of our ideas we are also insensible of duration.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 4, 5.

DEFINITION XVII.

TIME is a part of duration measured by some supposed equal succession, a certain number of which makes a *Period* or *Epocha*.

Locke ib. § 17.

August. Confess. l. ii. c. xiv. apud Jack- | *son's Works, vol. i. p. 883.*

SCHOLIUM I.

The revolutions of the heavenly bodies serve for a convenient measure of time, seeing they are long, various, publicly visible, and nearly equable. Yet any phenomena returning periodically and regularly, (v. g. the freezing of water, the blowing of flowers, a fit of the ague, &c.) might with regard to any particular person answer the same end.

Locke ib. § 19, 20.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless, in the absence of such assistance, the train of ideas passing through a man's mind may be to himself the measure of time: though neither this nor any other measure can be demonstrated entirely equable.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 21.

SCHOLIUM 3.

When the duration of any being is said to be either long or short, it is only as compared with that of other beings.

Free Thinker, vol. iii. N^o. 114.

| *Le Clerc's Logic, part i. c. iv. § 6.*

COROLLARY I.

The same part of duration may appear of different lengths to different persons, and to the same persons at different times. See *Prop. 7. Schol.*

Spectator, vol. ii. N^o. 94.

COROLLARY 2.

Hence we may learn the reason why years (*ceteris paribus*) appear longer to us while very young, than as we grow up to riper age; because the objects being newer, strike the mind more forcibly, and so the succession is more observed than when they grow more familiar to the mind. The like may be observed

served of the day we spend in a strange place, or a road we are not used to travel. Yet if by frequent repetition a thing is grown tedious to us, it appears of a longer duration; because we mingle many other ideas with it, and therefore on the whole there is a greater succession.

COROLLARY 3.

If an almighty power be supposed, it may make that part of duration, which appears but a moment to one, appear a thousand years to another, or a much greater period, and *vice versa*; which is indeed an amazing thought.

COROLLARY 4.

Time is not (as it has often been said to be) the measure of motion, but motion is one, tho' not the only measure of time: for if there were no material world, and so no motion, there might still be time, if there were any intellectual beings whose ideas succeed each other. See *Schol. 1.*

Locke's Eff. ib. § 22, 23. | Jackson's Works, vol. i. l. v. c. xiii. § 2. p. 881, 882.

DEFINITION XVIII.

Those PROPERTIES or QUALITIES of bodies, are called PRIMARY, which are in them, whether we perceive them or not: (*v. g.* bulk, number, figure, situation of their solid parts, motion, rest, &c.) But those ideas, which by means of these primary qualities are excited in our minds, as colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. (being vulgarly but falsely supposed to be in bodies) are called SECONDARY QUALITIES.

LECT.
XI.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. viii. § 8—22. | Watts's Eff. N^o. iii. p. 81—85.

SCHOLIUM.

Mr. *Locke* further divides secondary qualities into those that are *immediately* perceivable, *i. e.* by the ideas which the bodies themselves produce in us; and those that are *mediately* perceivable, *i. e.* by the changes which we see them produce in other bodies.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 23—26.

PROPOSITION X.

To enumerate several instances and causes of the imperfection of human knowledge.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. We are ignorant of many things for want of ideas; perhaps wanting proper organs for such kind of ideas, and certainly wanting such an intenseness of those organs which we have, as would be necessary to discover many things which are
now

now concealed from us by their distance or minuteness. This occasions great imperfections in our knowledge both of body and spirit.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 23—27.

2. We are not able to discern the connection between many of those ideas which we have, particularly that between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, which is a great impediment to physical inquiries.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 9—17. ib. c. vi. § 11—15. | Watts' sEss. N^o. iii. § 9.

3. Few important propositions are intuitively known; and all demonstrative knowledge depends upon the memory, which being fallible brings some degree of uncertainty on what we learn by it.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. ii. § 4—7. ib. c. iii. § 3. c. xi. § 9—11.

4. We are often obliged to judge by analogy, the particulars of which are generally very imperfect and come vastly short of a complete induction.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. xii. § 9. c. xvi. § 12.

5. The various avocations of life, an indolent temper, and wrong methods of pursuing knowledge, hinder our attaining what might otherwise come within our reach.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 30.

COROLLARY.

Since our knowledge is so limited, it must be of great use and importance to know the limits of it.

Locke's Ess. l. i. c. i. § 4—6.

Mason on Self Knowledge, p. 62.

| Butler's Serm. N^o. xv.

SCHOLIUM I.

Nevertheless, we are not destitute of capacities and opportunities for coming to the knowledge of those things on which our happiness most evidently depends.

Locke's Ess. l. i. c. i. § 5. ib. l. iv. c. xi. § 8.

| Jonval's Lett. in Nat. Displayed, vol. i. p. 277—290.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The question, whether there be any material world or not, will come in with greater advantage hereafter: yet were the negative to be granted, (which Bishop Berkley maintains, the same difficulties with those above-mentioned would occur, with a little alteration of phrase.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XI.

To inquire wherein PERSONAL IDENTITY consists.

LECT.
XII.

SOLUTION.

1. Mr. *Locke* supposes it consists in a *continued consciousness of the same actions*; and from thence infers, that, if the consciousness of one spirit were to be transferred to another, they would both make but one person; and that, if any spirit should lose all consciousness of its former actions, it would from that time become a different person. To confirm this, he pleads that, when it is evidently apparent that consciousness is lost, *i. e.* in case of phrenzy, when a man is besides himself, the sober man is not punished for the actions of the mad-man, nor the mad-man for the actions of the sober man. But I think this may be accounted for another way, without supposing that the law looks upon them as different persons.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxvii. § 9—27.

2. To this Dr. *Watts* very justly objects, that fancied memory might make two men born in the most distant places and times the same person, or real forgetfulness might make the same man different persons: *v. g.* *Lee* the tragedian when distracted might be successively *Alexander, Socrates, Tully, Virgil, Luther, Queen Elizabeth*; and therefore *Lee* when distracted might justly be rewarded or punished for all the different actions which he ascribes to himself: and finally, several men might become the same persons. This he thinks is contrary to the common forms of speech and to true philosophy.

Watts's Eff. N^o. xii. § 7. p. 294—308.

3. He therefore concludes, that *the same person*, in an incomplete sense, is *the same intelligent substance or conscious mind*, but in a more complete sense, is *the same soul united to the same body*; or in other words, that, while a spirit is united to a body, the same continued animal life, in union with the same spirit, generally attended with the same consciousness, goes to constitute the same person. If the question be started relating to a supposed resurrection, it is answered, that if the resurrection precedes the dissolution of the body, it does not alter the common forms of speaking; but if the body be dissolved, we may refer it to an after inquiry how far and in what cases it may be said to be the same. Mr. *Locke* also acknowledges this to be most probable: so that the chief question between them is only about the application of the word *person* in a case that is never like to happen, *i. e.* of transferred consciousness. Yet for this very reason I think Dr. *Watts's* notion is to be preferred. And to conclude, if God should utterly destroy the soul and body of any man whom we know, and afterwards create a new spirit united to a new body and in form resembling the other, and give to it the exact consciousness of the man whose body and soul was destroyed, and should reveal

to us what he had done, we could not converse with this new produced man as the same man we formerly knew, or approve that as an equitable conduct, by which he should be rewarded or punished for the actions of the annihilated man. This abundantly shews the impropriety of Mr. *Locke's* manner of stating the question, and how much Dr. *Watts's* is to be preferred to it.

Watts's Eff. ib. p. 301—306, 308—

Le Clerc's Ontology, c. ii. § 7.

313.

Butler's Analogy, Diff. i. p. 439—450.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 25.

Off. Ed.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Mr. *Locke* seems to have been led into this mistake, by considering what we commonly call *ourselves*, rather than what we call *the same person* when speaking of *another* (*Vide Locke ubi supra, § 16.*) Yet it is plain we do not make consciousness the *only* rule even here, since no one is conscious of his having been born, nor of many other events and actions of his life, which nevertheless upon the evidence of reason and testimony, without consciousness, he would not at all scruple to apply to himself.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If we have two ideas of *body* in all respects the same, for instance, of a book, or watch, we judge that they have the same archetype, if each of the ideas have the same relation to certain times and places; for we know that two bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place. As for the question, whether two *spirits* may or not, it depends upon the doctrine of the immateriality; and it is proper to defer the examination of it, till we have proved that there is some immaterial spirit.

PROPOSITION XII.

To inquire whether men think always without intermission.

LECT.
XIII.

COMPARISON OF ARGUMENTS.

SECT. I. For the AFFIRMATIVE.

If there be a time when the soul does not think, the existence of it as a spirit is destroyed: and we can imagine nothing to remain, unless it be something merely material. Now there is no apparent reason to think the soul thus exists by intervals; and therefore we must conclude it always thinks.

To this it is replied, that such a definition of the soul, as implies continual actual thought, is begging the question in dispute. When *actual thought* is suspended, there may remain some secret *power of thinking* resulting from the constitution of the soul, which will exert itself when the obstruction is removed. As a bow when bent, has a disposition to straighten itself again, or a clock to strike, though the hammer be held back.

To this it is answered, we can have no idea of this power. If the power of thinking be not the very substance of the soul, there must be some unknown substance in which the power inheres: nor can we imagine how it awakes itself again to actual thought.

It is farther objected, that the various degrees of intenseness of thought, which we all perceive, seem to prove that thought is not the essence of the soul; for then it must be uniform and constant. (*Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xix.*)

But it may be replied, that the least degree of thought is thought, as the finest particle of matter is matter. On the whole it must be granted, that, if it be hereafter proved without this proposition, that the human soul is immaterial, there will be some considerable weight in the argument; if the contrary be proved, there will be very little.

Watts's Ess. N°. v. § 1. p. 116—118. | Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 10—19.

SECT. II. For the NEGATIVE.

Arg. 1. If we think in our sleep, we think in vain; and it is not to be thought we are so constituted as that this should be necessary.

Answer. If all our forgotten thoughts are in vain, many of our waking thoughts are so; for how few can we perfectly recollect. We may as well argue against our existing at all without thought, as a useless thing. Besides, there is perhaps in sleep, some continued sense of pleasure, which the wise Author of nature might connect with so necessary a support of life as sleep is. To which we may further add, that the uninterrupted thought of every rational spirit, whether remembered or forgotten, may make a part of a scheme, in the general right and useful, though the advantage of it in some particular instances may not appear. As we may suppose with respect to those minerals or metals in the bowels of the earth, which are never in fact discovered.

Locke, ib. § 15.

| Watts's Ess. ib. § 3. p. 127, 128.

Arg. 2. Infants, who have but few ideas, sleep much; probably before, and to be sure after their birth: but is it to be imagined they are all that while necessarily employed in thinking?

Ans. 'Tis allowed they have few, or no ideas by *reflection*: (for the thought of a learned *Scotch* Anatomist, who pretends they are then forming the heart and lungs for their respective offices, seems too extravagant to be particularly examined.) But ideas of *sensation* they have early; perhaps some strong sensations of the mother communicated to them before the birth: but when the soul is first united we know not.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 17. 21, 22.

| Watts's Ess. ib. p. 129—131.

Arg. 3. As we fall asleep we seem gradually to approach to a state of insensibility; it is therefore probable that at length we arrive at it.

E

Ans.

Ans. If by insensibility be meant incogitation, the phaenomenon is denied: the same kind of argument may prove, that matter might be annihilated by continual division.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xix. § 3, 4.

Arg. 4. We do not remember that we think in many of our sleeping hours, therefore how can we know that we do?

Ans. Dreams may be entirely, or but imperfectly, or not at all remembered, according to the various degrees in which the nerves are impressed by the motion given to the animal spirits in sleep. Besides, daily experience shews us, that occurrences of the day bring to mind dreams, which in the morning we had forgotten: and we have often a general remembrance that we have dreamed, tho' we know not of what: to which it may be added, that people sometimes in their sleep discover marks of great emotion, when, if asked in the morning what it was that disquieted them, they do not perhaps know; so that though it would be very ridiculous to argue from universal experience that we always think in our sleeping hours, this will not be an unanswerable objection against any other argument; nor can it possibly prove that we ever cease from thinking, any more than breathing, which we also forget; or than forgetting the circumstances of our birth will prove we were never born.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. i. § 13, 14, 18. | *Watts's Eff.* ib. § 2. p. 120—125.

Arg. 5. It might be expected that those operations of the soul should be most rational, in which it is most abstracted from the body; whereas, by what we remember of our dreams, we perceive the contrary.

Ans. It may be a law of the creation, that, during our union with the body, a certain disposition of the nerves generally wanting in sleep, should be necessary to rational and connected thought; and that such a wild play of the animal spirits as arises from the obstruction of the nerves should cause roving imaginations, which therefore by the way it is no dishonour or detriment to forget.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 16. | *Watts's Eff.* ib. § 3. p. 126, 127.

Arg. 6. If a man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two different persons.

Ans. If by *knowing* it, be meant *remembering* it, (which it must mean if it be at all to the purpose) they cannot be different persons, according to Mr. *Locke's* principles of identity, unless every instance of forgetfulness makes a man a new and different person: and then how many thousands and millions is every man. This objection would suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting in the same body by intervals, as in sleeping and waking; which none ever maintained.

Locke's Eff. ib. § 12. c. xxvii. § 23. | *Watts's Eff.* ib. p. 125, 126.

Arg. 7. If the soul always thinks, there must be some innate ideas, contrary to *Prop.* 5.

Ans. There must be some one idea at least or perception; but that it is this rather than that, does not arise from the original constitution of the soul, but from the circumstances in which the body to which it is united is placed: (thus it might have been the idea of *colour* as well as *heat*.) So that supposing the soul at the first moment of its union with the body to have the idea of *heat*, this would not prove heat to be an innate idea. *Def.* 16.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 17, 20, 21.

See on this subject, *Baxter on the Soul*, | *vol. i. p. 330—346. and note (a) Oct. Ed.*

S C H O L I U M.

It may not be amiss here to mention the argument which Mr. *Baxter* has drawn from the phænomena of dreams, to prove the existence of some immaterial spirits by which they are suggested; though the particular manner, in which that strange and seemingly inconclusive argument is managed, cannot here be largely represented, and need not be particularly confuted.

Baxter on the Soul, c. x. passim. Oct. Ed. vol. ii. § 1.

P R O P O S I T I O N XIII.

To take a more particular survey of the PASSIONS of the human mind, according to Dr. *Watts's* distribution of them. See *Prop. 1. Sol. gr. 3.*

LECT.
XIV.

S O L U T I O N.

An object may be considered as *rare* and uncommon, as *good* or *evil* in the general, or with respect to the various *kinds* of good or evil, and the particular *circumstances* that attend it.

1. If an object be in the general considered as *rare*, it excites *Admiration*: sudden wonder is *Surprise*, great wonder is *Astonishment*. This passion has no opposite. If an object appear *good* in the general, it excites *Love*; if *evil*, *Hatred*.

N. B. These are primary passions, and those under the next head are derived from the two last of these.

2. As to the various *kinds* of good and evil; considering an object merely and absolutely as valuable, it excites *Esteem*, which in a very high degree is *Veneration*, and in a supreme degree is *Adoration*. If it be considered as worthless, it excites *Contempt*, especially if it be proposed as excellent. If it be considered as fit to receive good from us, it is the object of *Benevolence* or Good-will; if fit to receive evil, of *Malevolence* or Ill-will. But it is to be observed that this passion centers only on sensible objects, *i. e.* on objects capable of perception. If the object be considered as fit to do me good, or afford me any present pleasure, it produces *Complacency*, if the contrary *Displeasure*. Complacency in any very high degree towards an inferior, or on considerations not adequate to that degree of regard, is *Fondness*; the opposite to which is *Disgust* or Loathing.

N. B. There may be benevolence where there is no complacency, but a high degree of complacency without benevolence is hardly conceivable.

3. As to the various *circumstances* in which the good or evil object is considered, it may be either *present* or *absent*.

(1.) Future good considered as possible excites *Desire*, which is the great spring of action: if evil be considered as possible, it excites *Aversion*.

(2.) If there be a probable prospect of obtaining absent good, it excites *Hope*; if evil be likely to come upon us, it produces *Fear*. The highest degree of hope is *Confidence* or *Security*; when little remains, there is *Despondency*; and when hope is entirely banished, *Despair* succeeds. Fear joined with foresight, is *Anxiety*; with careful contrivance to avoid it, is *Solicitude*; mingled with surprise and rising to a violent degree on a sudden, is *Terror*; and a high degree of aversion attending the idea of any object we apprehend or reflect on, is *Horror*.

(3.) Good obtained awakens *Joy*: evil actually endured brings *Sorrow*. Moderate joy is *Gladness*: sudden and high joy is *Exultation*: habitual joy is *Cheerfulness*. Moderate sorrow is *Trouble*: great sorrow is *Distress* and *Anguish*: habitual sorrow is *Melancholy*. *Congratulation* is the sentiment and expression of joy arising from the happiness of another. *Pity* and *Compassion* is sorrow arising from the distress of another. *Sympathy* comprehends both: *Envy* is the contrary of both. *Jealousy* is a species of envy, arising from an apprehension of preference given to another person in the affections of one for whom we have a peculiar regard. *Shame* may be reckoned as a species of sorrow, attended frequently with blushing, arising from a consciousness, imputation, or apprehension of any thing that appears to be matter of disgrace, in ourselves, or others we are concerned for, *i. e.* when likely to expose us or them to the contempt of others.

(4.) When any intelligent being designedly brings good upon us, it excites *Gratitude*; when evil, *Anger*. With respect to our fellow-creatures, gratitude is a mixture of complacency and benevolence; anger is displicency with some degree of malevolence. When anger rises to an excessive degree, it is *Rage* and *Fury*; when it is deeply rooted, it is *Rancour* and *Spite*; when arising on trifling occasions, and expressed in little tokens of resentment, it is *Peevishness*.

When an affront is apprehended, beneath us or any other person to whom it is offered, it excites *Indignation*; and when anger is attended with a desire of hurting another it is called *Malice*; and when this is in consequence of an apprehended injury, *Revenge*.

Watts on the Passions, § 2. p. 4—9. | Pope's Ethic Epist. ii. ver. 93—204.
Ed. 2. | Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xx.
Fordyce's Moral Philos. b. i. § 2—4. |

SCHOLIUM I.

Des-Cartes divides the primary passions into six, *viz.* Admiration, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy and Sorrow: And though this is by no means an accurate distribution, yet his description of the passions contains many excellent passages.

Des-Cartes de Pass. part ii. § 69. p. 81.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

As pain is useful for preserving the animal body from those injuries which might prove fatal to it, so many of the passions, which are disagreeable in their present operations, are useful and even necessary, both to individuals and societies.

Watts on the Pass. p. 85—88.

Butler's Sermon. N^o. viii. p. 150—154.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 4.

Foster's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 122—125, and 128.

PROPOSITION XIV.

To inquire into the Original of our passions.

LECT.
XV.

SOLUTION.

1. They may either arise from the motion of the body, impressions on the senses, or operations of the mind by which ideas are produced: as the sight of beauty, hearing of musick, or understanding a proposition.
2. From ideas recollected by the memory, which may be accompanied with some degree of pleasure or pain, which they at first gave. (*Prop. 8. gr. 7.*)
3. From the exercise of reason, which apprehends a probability of approaching good or evil.

Des-Cartes de Pass. part ii. § 51.

Watts on the Pass. § 3. p. 10—17.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The second and third source arise from the first; since there could have been no memory nor reasoning, without ideas presented to the mind as the groundwork of its operations.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some think the passions may be raised by means of the body, when no particular idea is presented to any one of the senses; that is, only from the temperature of the body: *v. g.* when we find ourselves cheerful or sad, and cannot assign any reason for it: which if it be admitted, may in the judgment of some make it dubious, whether the first idea in the human mind be (as *Mr. Locke* maintains) an idea of sensation. But it may perhaps be answered, we have a sense of the temperature of the body; and that we are seldom in our waking hours destitute of some sensible impressions, which are at different times painful or pleasant, in different degrees, according as our organs are disposed.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. i. § 23, 24.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

The passions cannot be immediately excited or suppressed by our volitions, but consequentially they may; especially those arising from the third spring, by which some arising from the two former may be balanced.

Des-Cartes de Pass. § 45—47.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is queried why objects are often found to affect the passions less when they are grown familiar, than they did before.—To this it may be answered, that admiration in a great measure proceeds from the novelty of objects. Perhaps in other instances it may be owing to some unknown connection between making the *first* impression on the brain and the excitation of the passions. Yet it is observable, that the degree in which we are impressed, is by no means proportionable to the novelty of objects alone; it depends much more upon the temperature of the body, and a variety of other particulars.

AXIOM VIII.

We find by experience that our minds are so constituted, that some degree of passion or desire is necessary to action; so that an entire suspension of them would be attended with a stagnation of all our faculties.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. vii. § 3.

| *Des-Cartes de Pass.* § 40.

COROLLARY.

It must be of the greatest importance, in order to influence men to a due course of action, to know how to awaken or moderate their passions by proper application to them; and those, who act as if they desired entirely to eradicate the passions, are ignorant of the constitution of human nature, and can expect but little success in their attempts to work upon the mind.

Doddridge's Dedication of x Serm. p. 10.

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. *Locke* maintains that *desire* is always a state of uneasiness: but it is certain, that in many cases the uneasiness is abundantly overbalanced by a probable prospect of the immediate enjoyment of good: and if some degree of uneasiness be universally necessary to action, it is very difficult, if not impossible to conceive, how any active being can be perfectly happy.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 32—34.
Watts on Liberty, p. 23—25.

| *Grove's Posthum. Works*, vol. iv. p. 136,
137.

SCHOLIUM 2.

We cannot mistake in judging of present pleasure or pain, as the incentives of desire or aversion; but in judging of future we often do.

Locke's Ess. ib. § 61—65.

DEFINITION XIX.

When a being is determined to the performance of any action, not by a view of the beneficial consequences that may attend it, but merely from a strong impulse leading to the action itself, that being is said to act by INSTINCT. LECT. XVI.

COROLLARY I.

There are many remarkable instincts in mankind, which greatly tend both to the good of individuals and the species. Those which are called natural appetites plainly come under this class; to which may be added parental affection, and some workings of compassion and gratitude: though it must be granted the force of all these is very different in different persons.

Baxter's Works, vol. i. p. 379. col. 2. | *Hutcheson's Enq. p. 143—147, 195—199.*
Andry apud Mem. of Literat. vol. i. p. 15.

COROLLARY 2.

Brutes are governed by instinct in many of their actions, as was observed above, *Prop. 2. gr. 6.* The reason upon which many of their actions depend, could not be discovered without a penetration far beyond what is to be found in the generality of men. See particular instances of this in the Bee (*a*), in the Ant (*b*), in the Wasp (*c*), in the Raven (*d*), in the Formica Leo (*e*), in the Galli Sylvestres (*f*), in the Bohaques (*g*), in the Fox (*h*), in the Beaver (*i*), in the Turkey Hen (*k*), in the Common Hen (*l*), besides many others (*m*).

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| (a) <i>Ray's Wisdom of God, p. 132, 133.</i> | (g) <i>Derham, Ib. p. 212.</i> |
| 2 Ed. p. 122—124. | (h) ——— <i>Ib. p. 204.</i> |
| <i>Nat. Displ. vol. i. p. 168—178,</i> | (i) <i>Nat. Displ. part ii. p. 106—114.</i> |
| 182—184, 194—202. | (k) ——— <i>Ib. p. 23, 24.</i> |
| (b) <i>Guardian, vol. ii. N^o. 156, 157.</i> | (l) <i>Specul. vol. ii. N^o. 120.</i> |
| <i>Plin. Nat. Hist. xi. 30.</i> | (m) <i>Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. ii. § 48—50.</i> |
| (c) <i>Nat. Displ. part i. p. 126—148.</i> | <i>Cambray sur l'Exist. § 23. p. 46, 47.</i> |
| (d) <i>Albert. Magnus, apud Crad. Harm.</i> | <i>Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 211—220.</i> |
| part ii. p. 67. note in the margin. | <i>Essay on Hunting, p. 53, 54.</i> |
| (e) <i>Nat. Displ. part i. p. 234—240.</i> | <i>Pope's Ethic Epist. iii. ver. 172—198.</i> |
| (f) <i>Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 229.</i> | |

SCHOLIUM 1.

That instinct is not mere imitation, see proved by a remarkable story in
Galen, apud Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 349—353. 2 Ed. p. 133—135.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is probable, that in most instances if not in all, the actions to which any
 being is determined by instinct, are accompanied with immediate pleasure.

DEFINITION XX.

LECT. XVII. A MENTAL HABIT is a facility of thinking or willing any action acquired by
 frequent acts.

PROPOSITION XV.

Mental habits do very much depend upon the memory.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Memory, furnishing us with ideas and relations, makes it easy for us to think upon any subject.
2. Furnishing us with motives, it makes it easy to will it.
3. When memory ceases, we see that mental habits are destroyed.
- 1 and 2, and 3. 4. *Valeat propositio. (Def. 20.)*

Clerici Pneum. l. i. c. iv. § 18—22.

COROLLARY 1.

Mental Habits must very much depend on the body, since memory plainly does so. *Prop. 8. Sol. gr. 4.*

COROLLARY 2.

The facility with which the body obeys the command of the mind, is a thing different from mental habit; yet it may have some affinity to it, as bodily motion depends upon volition.

COROLLARY 3.

No habits can in strict propriety of speech be said to be *infused*; since it is impossible the first act of any kind should be the effect of habit, according to the definition. Yet a disposition may be given to perform acts at first with as much readiness, as if they had been learnt by long practice. Neither can any habit be properly said to be *hereditary*: yet there may be, and it is plain in fact that there
 6 are

are certain hereditary dispositions towards contracting habits of one kind rather than another.

SCHOLIUM 1.

On these principles some account for the phænomenon which has frequently been observed, that a great degree of wit and judgment seldom meet in the same person; because wit is an habit of finding out the resemblance of ideas, and making an agreeable assemblage of them; whereas judgment is the habit of distinguishing accurately between those that have some resemblance, though they really differ. It is not to be wondered at, if two such different habits do not ordinarily occur in the same mind. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged highly probable, that habit is not the only thing that makes the difference between various persons in this respect, though it may serve very much to increase it. See *Prop. 3. Schol. 1.*

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 2.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Idiots reason very little, and make few propositions; whereas the mad man reasons very much, and often justly, but upon very precarious and false principles.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xi. § 12, 13.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The force of habit both mental and corporeal is so great, that it is an evident part of wisdom to take care how habits are formed; and it is worth our while to use great labour to turn and fix them on the right side.

Tillotson's Serm. vol. i. No. 29. p. 301 | *Dodley's Præcept. vol. ii. p. 516—526.*
—304.

DEFINITION XXI.

Those properties of any Being are called PERFECTIONS, which directly tend to promote its happiness.

COROLLARY.

Only spirits are capable of perfection, since a capacity for happiness implies perception, *i. e.* thought.

SCHOLIUM.

Nevertheless, in an inferior sense, or by analogy, insensible Beings may be called perfect, *i. e.* as they are fitted to answer the purposes intended by them.

Watts's Ontol. c. v. p. 354, 355.

DEFINITION XXII.

LECT. XVIII. That mind is said to be possessed of NATURAL LIBERTY, or liberty of choice, which is so constituted, as that its volitions shall not be invincibly determined by any foreign cause or consideration whatever offered to it, but by its own sovereign pleasure.

COROLLARY I.

If any instance occurs, in which the mind can chuse no otherwise than it does, it is not in that instance naturally free; though it chuses with the greatest delight, and executes its volitions without any restraint.

Watts on Liberty, p. 8, 9.

Collins on Liberty, part ii. Ed. 2.

Limborck's Theol. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 20.

COROLLARY 2.

Natural liberty, as before defined, includes what some have called a liberty of contrariety, as well as of contradiction; *i. e.* supposes the mind able to chuse the contrary, as well as to defer its choice: if indeed these two expressions do not signify in fact the same thing, which in some connections at least they may.

Hutchinson's Metaph. p. 22.

DEFINITION XXIII.

EXTERNAL LIBERTY, or liberty of action is opposed to a constraint laid on the executive powers; and consists in a power of rendering our volitions effectual.

COROLLARY.

There may be external where there is not natural liberty, and *vice versa*.

Watts on Lib. p. 4, 5.

SCHOLIUM.

The liberty of which Mr. *Locke* generally treats, is a liberty of action not of choice, and that *Collins* expressly allows.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 7—13, 21—30, 71. | Collins on Lib. p. 115—118.

DEFINITION XXIV.

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBERTY consists in a prevailing disposition to act according to the dictates of reason; *i. e.* in such a manner, as shall, all things considered, most effectually promote our happiness. A disposition to act contrary to this is

PROP. XV. *Moral and compleat Freedom defined.*

35

is MENTAL SERVITUDE: and when the mind is equally disposed to follow reason, or act contrary to it, it is then said to be in a state of INDIFFERENCE.

Tillot's Serm. vol. ii. p. 617, 618.

Perfius Sat. v. ver. 124—191.

Clarke's Serm. vol. iii. No. 1. p. 5—13.

Ed. 12mo.

COROLLARY.

Philosophical liberty is a perfection of the mind; (*See Def. 21.*) since much of our happiness depends on our conduct, and by acting according to reason much good may be obtained, and much evil avoided.

DEFINITION XXV.

A man is said to be MORALLY FREE, when there is no interposition of the will of a superior being, to prohibit or determine his actions in any particular under consideration.

Watts on Liberty, p. 4.

COROLLARY.

As the same man may be subject to the controul of various superiors, one of which may allow what another prohibits, he may as to the same action be said to be or not to be morally free, according to the persons whose will is in question. Nevertheless, where there is one who has a much greater power and authority over him than any of the rest, it is proper to judge of his moral freedom by considering the will of such a superior person.

DEFINITION XXVI.

Complete liberty consists in the union of natural, external, moral, and philosophical liberty, without any struggle or difficulty.

Watts on Lib. p. 9—12.

Collier's Enq. p. 47—59. Ed. 3.

COROLLARY I.

Complete liberty on the whole is a perfection. (*See Def. 24. Cor.*)

COROLLARY 2.

Complete liberty seems to consist in a certain symmetry or subordination of the faculties; and, when applied to such beings as ourselves, supposes a serene understanding, moderate passions rising in proportion to the nature of objects, the will chusing to follow such regular impressions, and the executive powers readily and vigorously performing its dictates.

COROLLARY 3.

When we speak of complete liberty, it is not so proper to inquire whether the *will* be free, but rather whether the *man* be so. (See *Prop. 1. Schol. 1.*) Yet natural liberty evidently belongs to the will.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 14—19. | *Watts's Eff. N^o. xii. § 5.*

SCHOLIUM.

What some call a *liberty of spontaneity*, consists merely in *chusing* to perform any particular action: nor does it at all enter into the question, whether we can chuse or perform the contrary. But since this is nothing more than *willing*, it does not deserve the name of liberty.

For the *Cartesian* notion of it, see

Des-Cartes Princ. i. § 37—39. | *Watts on Lib. p. 6.*

PROPOSITION XVI.

LECT.
XIX.

The mind of man is possessed of natural liberty, *i. e.* liberty of choice.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We are conscious to ourselves, that we have a power of chusing otherwise than we do in a multitude of instances.
2. We universally agree that some actions deserve praise and others blame; and we sometimes condemn ourselves as conscious of the latter for which there could be no foundation at all, if we were invincibly determined in every volition, and had it to say, we had done the best we possibly could.
3. The laws of all nations agree to punish some actions in a man who is master of his reason, for which they would not punish one whom they knew to be distracted.
4. When equal objects are proposed to our choice, we sometimes determine to chuse one of them rather than another, without being able to assign any reason for such a preference.

1, 2, 3, 4. | 5. *Valet propositio.*

Grove of Hum. Lib. § 13—16.

| *Religion of Nature, p. 63, 64. Ed. 4to.*

Watts on Liberty, § 3. p. 28—39.

| *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 85—89.*

COROLLARY.

The will is not determined (as some have asserted) by the last dictate, or rather assent of the understanding, nor the greatest apparent good, nor a prevailing uneasiness, which last seems to coincide with the former.

Watts on Lib. p. 17—23, 25—27.

| *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 97—100.*

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 35, 36.

| *Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 403—415.*

SCHO.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that we are formed with a necessary desire of happiness, and consequently cannot chuse any thing but what in present circumstances appears most conducive to it: and experience is appealed to as confirming the assertion, since we are always in fact most inclined to what we chuse.

Answer. This must be acknowledged a considerable difficulty.

It is granted that what we chuse must have some appearance of good: but the mind appears in fact, as well as from the reasoning in the proposition, to have a power of preferring a smaller present to a greater absent and future good, though at the same time it condemns itself of folly in such a choice; which it could never do, if what it chose always appeared to be the greatest good; since then in every choice it would act according to the necessary impulse and constitution of its nature. And though we allow that there is always a greater inclination to what we chuse than what we refuse, yet till this inclination be proved invincible, the proposition may hold good.

<i>Turretine, vol. i. Loc. x. Qu. ii. § 7.</i>	<i>Grove on Lib. § 18, 19.</i>
15, 16.	<i>Grove's Mor. Philos. vol. i. p. 205.—214.</i>
<i>Collins on Lib. p. 40—44.</i>	<i>Maclaurin's Newtonian Philos. p. 81—84.</i>
<i>Burnet on the Art. p. 117, 118.</i>	<i>Clarke and Leibnitz, Append. N^o. 3.</i>
<i>Watts on Lib. p. 70—74.</i>	<i>Cato's Letters, vol. iv. N^o. 3.</i>

SCHOLIUM 2.

To the argument from self-accusation *Collins* replies, that it is only the sense of having acted against some rules, which on reflection we apprehend it would have been better for us to have followed, though it did not appear so when we did the action.—But how then could conscience condemn us, not only in our after reflections, but in the act itself? or how could we condemn ourselves for having done foolishly in chusing what did appear to us the greatest good, and could not but so appear?

<i>Collins, ib. p. 105, 106.</i>	148, <i>præf.</i> § 3—7, and § 21.
<i>Grove's Post. Works, vol. iv. p. 93—</i>	

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is objected to the argument, *gr. 3.* that punishments are often inflicted where it is granted there is no liberty at all, as on lunatics, drunkards, and brutes.

Ans. It may be debated how far it is proper to call the severities used with them in some cases punishments, or how far they may be destitute of all natural liberty. But as for *Collins's* argument, that were man a free creature, rewards and punishments would signify nothing, because it would lie in his own breast to slight them; it is most evidently weak: for nevertheless they would be a probable

ble means of answering their end, and that they are not always effectual is evident in fact.

Collins, ib. p. 86—88, 91—98.

SCHOLIUM 4.

LECT. XX. To the fourth argument (which is generally called *choice ἐν ἀδιαφορίᾳ*) it is answered by the opposers of natural liberty, that no such case can occur that two objects should appear entirely equal: and if there did, then a choice would be impossible; for that would imply an effect without a cause, or a balance turning when the weights are equal.—But this is evidently taking the question for granted: for it will not be allowed that *willing* is a necessary effect, which must imply a compelling efficient cause; or the mind like a balance to be moved with weights. And as to the fact in question, a cause which we *cannot assign* is to us *no* cause: and yet in many such cases we determine.

Collins, ib. p. 44—52, 57—59.

Watts on Lib. p. 68—70.

Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 38. § 1. p. 93

—95, 121—123, 169, 173—

177, 291. Append. N^o. 4, 9. p. 165. §

14, 15. p. 281—287.

Cicero de Fato. § 24, 25.

Jackson on Liberty, p. 193—196.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is further pleaded that such a liberty would be an imperfection to the human soul; because it would suppose it in some instances to act without reason.

Ans. Our scheme of liberty supposes a power of chusing rationally in all instances; of seeing and preferring a greater good; and chusing of two objects equally good, one where there is reason for taking *one*, though not for taking *this* rather than *that*: whereas to deny this is plainly to limit the mind in its power of choice and capacity for happiness in some instances. Yet I think (though we allow that some particular pleasure may arise from the consciousness of having used this natural liberty aright, when it might have been abused) it must be granted, that a power of chusing worse rather than better is not necessary to the happiness of any being. But is mankind in such a perfect state, that we are under a necessity of maintaining that it could not have been greater or happier than it is?

Collins, ib. p. 62—83.

Watts, ib. p. 70—74.

Colliber's Enquiry, p. 50, 51.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxi. § 48—52.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 119—121.

SCHOLIUM 6.

The sentiments of many considerable moderns may be seen in *Collins on Lib. p. 14—31.* and those of several antients in

Collins, ib. 59—62.

Jackson on Lib. p. 82—91, 98—113.

Lucas's Enquiry, vol. i. p. 163—185.

130—135.

Hutch. Metaph. Syn. c. iv. p. 22, 23. compared with p. 57.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 7.

What Mr. *Locke's* notion of liberty on the whole was, is much debated. The truth of the matter seems to be, that he changes his idea of it; sometimes meaning external liberty, of which he generally speaks, (see *Def. 23. Schol.*) sometimes philosophical, (as in the place quoted above, *l. ii. c. xxi. § 49.*) and sometimes he seems to recur to the notion of natural liberty again, especially when he says in so many words, that freedom consists in not being under a necessary determination of our will in any particular action, (§ 51.) and in a power of suspension: (§ 52.) by which last manner of stating it, he seems not to throw any light upon the question; since all the difficulty attending a possibility of determining to act one way or another, will attend a possibility of determining to act or not to act.

Locke's Fam. Epist. p. 474, &c. præfert. p. 480.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Those who believe the being and perfections of God, and a state of retribution, in which he will reward and punish mankind according to the diversity of their actions, will find it difficult to reconcile the justice of punishment with the necessity of crimes punished. And they that believe all that the scripture says on the one hand of the eternity of future punishments, and on the other of God's compassion to sinners, and his solemn assurance that he desires not their death, will find the difficulty greatly increased. But as many of the words here used are not yet strictly defined, nor the evidence of the propositions stated, it may suffice briefly to have suggested the thought.

Cato's Letters, vol. iv. N^o 110.
Jackson's Reply, passim.

Hartley on Man, vol. i. p. 500—511.

PROPOSITION XVII.

The philosophical liberty of the mind is much impaired, and we are obnoxious to a lamentable degree of servitude. (*Def. 24.*)

LECT.
XXI.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The understanding is often so far influenced by the passions, as to be unwilling to enter on reasonings, which may seem to lead to a conclusion contrary to our interest.

2. The passions and prejudices of our minds insensibly mingle themselves with the whole process of reasoning when it is undertaken, leading into many embarrassments and inconsistencies, obscuring truth and gilding error; so that frequently

quently the judgment is formed upon a very unfair hearing, agreeably to the bias the mind is under, and contrary to the evidence that might have been obtained.

3. We often find it difficult to excite our passions at the command of reason, and to fix them on objects which appear to our understanding most worthy of regard: on the contrary, they are often excited by such objects, as the understanding has been by irresistible evidence compelled to disapprove, and thereby we are led to commit actions, which, while we do them, we condemn ourselves for.

4. Bodily constitution and appetite have sometimes almost a constraining power to hinder the execution of the wisest volitions. Yet it must be acknowledged, this impulse is not invincible: we may stop ourselves in the career; and enter upon a contrary course: so that upon the whole, the way to happiness is rather difficult than impossible. See *Prop. 15. Sch. 3.* and *Prop. 16.*

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 47. 56—69.

C O R O L L A R Y.

It is plain from these phænomena, of which experience may convince us too surely, that the symmetry of the soul and subordination of its faculties mentioned *Def. 26. Cor. 2.* in which complete liberty consists, is in a great measure violated in the human soul. But whether it were originally in the same state, cannot be determined till we have examined other previous propositions.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xxi. § 53—55. | Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 339—344.

S C H O L I U M I.

It is greatly debated, how far the will has in our present state any influence on the judgment, in assenting to any proposition in question. Some maintain that it cannot have any influence at all, but I think experience proves the contrary: and though there must be some shew of argument to determine the judgment, yet it seems to be the consequence of that natural liberty asserted *Prop. 16.* that the mind can divert itself from examining proofs which are likely to establish a disagreeable proposition; and by labouring to confirm and embellish arguments on the favourite side of the question, can bring itself to assent to what it wishes to find true, though vastly superior evidence on the contrary side were fairly within its reach. Yet it must be acknowledged, that this remark only takes place in propositions which have some certain limited degree of evidence, since there are some cases in which the truth will invincibly force itself upon the understanding, and no artifice can be sufficient to evade it.

Collins on Lib. p. 33—36.

Clerici Pneumat. l. i. c. iii. § 14.

Watts on Lib. p. 13—16.

Locke's Eff. l. iv. c. xx. § 6, 12—16.

Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 403—415.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many actions of brutes seem to discover some degree of liberty; but how far they are possessed of it seems impossible for us to determine, since all the principal proofs of the natural liberty of the human mind arise from what passes within ourselves, and what we learn by discoursing with other men; and not merely from what we observe in their most rational or capricious actions.

Reynault's Philos. Convers. vol. iii. p. 82—87.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

There are many particulars, in which the knowledge we have of our own minds, is very imperfect, and we are as it were a mystery to ourselves.

LECT.
XXII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We know not what our soul is, otherwise than by its operations; but are not able to determine what that constitution is, from whence those operations proceed, or what particular and distinct idea is to be affixed to the word *principle*, if we call it, as many do, an intelligent or conscious principle. See *Def. 3. Cor. 2. Def. 5. Schol. 1. Def. 9.*

2. We know not how the soul is united to the body, or what connection there is between impressions made upon the organs of sensation and the ideas arising in our minds, or between the volitions of our minds and the consequent motions of our bodies. *Prop. 1. Schol. 2.*

3. We know not certainly how ideas are laid up in the memory: it is not demonstrably evident that there are traces in the brain correspondent to those ideas: (*Prop. 8.*) but if it were, how recollection is performed, and in many cases why one idea is recollected rather than another, is not possible for us to say. *Prop. 8. Sch. 3.*

4. It still remains in some degree an uncertain question, whether we think always or only by intervals. *Prop. 12. Dem.*

5. It is extremely difficult to remove all the objections against liberty of choice, especially against that which is stated *Prop. 16. Sch. 1.*

6. The question wherein personal identity consists, how plain soever it may have appeared to some, has been differently determined by different persons of great learning and abilities; and is after all attended with some perplexities, perhaps chiefly arising from what is mentioned above *grad. 1. (Vid. Prop. 11.)*

7. The phænomenon of dreams does also contain some very unaccountable things. How ideas are then suggested to the mind, in the reception of which we are entirely passive; how dialogues are formed; and how the moral principles of action seem to be suspended, even while we continue to reason, (though

often after a wild and inconclusive manner) upon circumstances and events in which we imagine ourselves to be engaged. (*Vid. Prop. 3. gr. 5.*)

Baxter on the Soul, vol. ii. § 1. 8vo Ed.

8. The phænomenon of phrensy is likewise very unaccountable, and how the state of the nerves and juices of the body at that time should so strangely affect our rational powers, and make us creatures so very different from ourselves. *Prop. 3. gr. 6.*

1—8. | 9. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

The like may in some degree be said of the imperfection of the knowledge we have concerning our own bodies: in which, though great improvements and discoveries have been made, some very important questions still remain undecided, *v. g.* By what mechanism animal secretion, respiration, and muscular motion are performed: whence the systole and diastole of the heart arise: what is the use of the spleen and the cœcum: not to mention the rationale of many distempers, about which many celebrated physicians are much divided; and almost the whole doctrine of the nerves.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The phænomena mentioned in the proposition and the preceding scholium serve to illustrate *Prop. 10.* and add a very important article to it.

COROLLARY 1.

It becomes us to maintain a deep and constant sense of the ignorance and weakness of our own minds, when we always carry about in the very constitution of them and our bodies, such affecting demonstrations of it.

COROLLARY 2.

Since such a modest sense of our weakness and ignorance will have a great tendency to promote the honour and happiness of our lives, by teaching us to avoid many instances of arrogance and self-conceit, which expose men both to enmity and contempt; therefore Pneumatology, which leads us into this humbling view, is a noble and useful study, (*Compare Prop. 3. Cor. Prop. 10, and 17.*)

COROLLARY 3.

If we should hereafter prove the existence of any being vastly superior to us, and especially of a being possessed of infinite perfections, it must be expected that there will be many things relating to him, which it is not possible for us fully to explain or comprehend; and our inquiries concerning such a being ought to be pursued with great modesty and humility.

Butler's Serm. p. 303—305
Speclator, vol. viii. N^o. 590.

| *Jonval's Letter, apud Nat. Displ. vol. i.*
| *part 2. p. 293, &c.*

The END of the FIRST PART.

PART

P A R T II.

Of the BEING of a GOD and his NATURAL PERFECTIONS.

A X I O M IX.

IT is impossible that any thing should of itself arise into being; or that it should be produced without some producing cause, existing in order of time, as well as of nature, prior to the thing so produced: or in other words, which must not only be *considered* before the effect, in order to understand it thoroughly, but must also be supposed to have *existed* before it. LECT. XXIII.

D E F I N I T I O N XXVII.

That is said to be a SELF-EXISTENT, OR NECESSARILY EXISTENT BEING, which does not owe its existence to any other being whatsoever, either as its cause or its support, but would exist, or be what it is, were there no other being in the whole compass of nature but itself.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 17, 18. | Burnet, ib. vol. i. p. 7, 8.

S C H O L I U M.

It seems safer, in this momentous argument on which we are now entering, to acquiesce in this general and simple idea of self-existence, gradually deducing from thence other ideas connected with it, than to state it, as Dr. Clarke has done, "That which cannot so much as be imagined not to exist, or that which has a necessity for the cause of its existence;" since if there be any self-existent being at all, it seems not proper to ascribe its existence to any cause whatsoever.

Law's Enquiry, p. 147—150. | Dubl. Ed. p. 203—205. Lond.
Abernethy's Serm. vol. i. p. 191—193.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

If any self-existent being does now exist, it has existed from all eternity: for if it ever began to exist, it must (by the 9th Axiom) have owed its existence to some prior being as its cause, which is plainly contradictory to the notion of self-existence stated above.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

If there be or ever has been any self-existent being, it is also *everlasting*, i. e. it will never cease to be. For dissolution must arise from something external or inter-

internal: but nothing external can dissolve that which depends upon no other being for its support: and no imaginable reason can be assigned, why there should be any internal cause of dissolution in that being which has (by *Cor. 1.*) existed from eternity, or which was indeed in any single past moment self-existent and independent: which is so plain, that, whoever may have denied the existence of a self-existent being, none have ever asserted, that there was such a being, and that his existence is now extinguished and lost; or that there is some self-existent being, which, though now subsisting, will at length be destroyed or dissolved of itself. Yet it must be owned that a late writer, who seems determined to carry scepticism to the greatest excess, has presumed to call this matter into question.

Hume's Philos. Essays, p. 253.

COROLLARY 3.

If there be any self-existent being, it is also *immutable*. For since a being is the same with all its properties taken together, (*Def. 3. Cor. 1.* if any property were taken away from it, a part of the being would perish, which is inconsistent with its being necessary; (*Cor. 2.*) or if any properties were added, the being itself would not be eternal, and therefore not necessarily existent. (*Cor. 1.*)

Crouz. Log. vol. i. p. 426.

Abern. vol. i. p. 196—200. Dub. Ed. | p. 209—213. Lond.

COROLLARY 4.

There is no medium between a self-existent and derived being: or in other words, whatever exists at all is either self-existent or derived.

COROLLARY 5.

The existence of every derived being may at length be traced up either mediately or immediately to what is self-existent, which in order to its producing it must according to the *Axiom* have existed before it. (*Cor. 4. Axiom 9.*)

COROLLARY 6.

From the Corollary above it will follow, that whatever is eternal is self-existent.

COROLLARY 7.

To maintain a *series* or succession of derived beings from eternity is most absurd: for every series supposes some first, and to suppose that first to be derived is self-contradictory, (as above, *Cor. 5.*) with this further absurdity, that the greater the series, the greater support it will need, as a chain consisting of many links will need a greater support than one consisting but of a few such links: and should a *circle* of causes be supposed, instead of solving, it will if possible increase the

PROP. XVIII. *Self-existence implies infinity of perfection.*

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the absurdity; since this would suppose every cause in the circle to have produced itself, and all the other causes too.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 11—17. | Woolaston's Rel. of Nat. p. 65—68.

DEFINITION XXVIII.

That is said to be *simply infinite* in its kind, which has no bounds; or than which nothing in its kind can be conceived greater: but if it be conceived as bounded in some respects and unbounded in others, than it is said to be only infinite *secundum quid*, as a line infinitely produced one way from a given point: but this is a very improper sense of the word.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 1—3.

COROLLARY.

Whatever is self-existent, has all its properties infinite. (See Def. 27.) For if it be necessary in any time or place, (if it be its nature to exist in time and place) it must be necessary at all times and in all places; and since, whatever its other properties are, to set bounds to them, is to assert its non-existence beyond those bounds, whether of power, wisdom, &c. it seems extremely probable, not to say certain, that what hinders its existence beyond those bounds might hinder its existence entirely. But it could not be a self-existent being, if its existence might have been hindered, or could be destroyed.

Clarke, *ib.* p. 458, 459, 462, 463, 465, 466, 469—476.

SCHOLIUM I.

On much the same principles, Mr. Grove directly infers, that a being necessarily existent must be infinitely perfect. Some perfections it must have, or it could not be any thing at all; and for the same reason that it has any one perfection, and in any one degree, it must be possessed of all possible perfections, and in all possible degrees. But this is a point of so great importance, that we chuse rather to infer it from other mediums of argument, than to rest the whole stress of it upon such a deduction: especially as upon the principles of Def. 21. Cor. this argument can have no place, till it be proved that every thing self-existent is percipient, or endued with thought.

Grove's Post. works, vol. iv. p. 7. | Howe's Living Temple, part 1. c. iv. § 2, 3.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is disputed, whether our idea of infinite be a *negative* or *positive* idea. Some have pleaded, that *bounds* imply a negation of continued existence beyond them, and consequently by removing this negation we form a positive idea.

Cambray sur l' Exist. p. 379—383. | Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 13, 16—19.

SCHOLIO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

It may also be queried, whether our idea of infinite be a *simple* or *compound* idea: yet I think it may more properly be said to be a simple idea, as no addition of finites can make up an infinite. It will be difficult to find out any idea more simple.

PROPOSITION XIX.

Something has existed from eternity.

DEMONSTRATION.

Ax. 1. 1. It is evident that something does actually exist: *v. g.* we know that we ourselves do.

2. If something has not existed from eternity, the things which now are must have arisen absolutely from nothing, and without any producing cause, contrary to *Ax. 9.*

1, 2. 3. We are certain something has existed from eternity.

Clarke at Boyle's Lett. p. 8, 9.

Ed. p. 195—198. Lond.

Abern. Serm. vol. i. p. 184—187. Dub.

SCHOLIUM.

It must be acknowledged extremely difficult to conceive of any thing having existed from eternity; yet since there are such evident proofs of it, we learn that a thing may be true, the manner of which is intirely inconceivable to our limited minds, or against which some objections may lie which to us are unanswerable.

Clarke at Boyle's Lett. p. 9—11.

PROPOSITION XX.

There has from eternity existed some self-existent or necessary Being.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 19. 1. There has from eternity existed something, either self-existent or derived. See *Def. 27. Cor. 4.*

Def. 27. 2. If there were not so evident an absurdity as there seems to be, in supposing a derived being eternal, yet its existence, (even granting its eternity, and much more evidently supposing it not to be so,) may be traced up to a self-existent being, which as self-existent is eternal.

1, 2. 3. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOL

SCHOLIUM.

The proposition follows directly from *Def. 27. Cor. 6.* but we chuse to keep it in its present form; that if any should think there may be an eternal necessary emanation from a self-existent principle, as many have maintained, the foregoing proposition might rest on a foundation not to be affected by such an apprehension.

PROPOSITION XXI.

The system of things which we call the material world, did not exist from eternity in its present form, but had a beginning.

LECT.
XXIV.

DEMONSTRATION.

Arg. 1. We may not only conceive of many possible alterations which might be made in the form of it, but we see it incessantly changing; whereas an eternal being, for as much as it is self-existent, is always the same. *Def. 27. Cor. 8.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 22, 23.

Arg. 2. We have no credible history of transactions more remote than six thousand years from the present time: for as to the pretence that some nations have made to histories of greater antiquity, as the *Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phœnicians, Chinese, &c.* they are evidently convicted of falshood at large in

<i>Stillingfleet's Orig. Sacr. p. 15—106.</i>	<i>p. 4—11.</i>
<i>Millar's Propag. of Christ. vol. i. p. 100</i>	<i>Allix's Reflections, vol. i. p. 95—120.</i>
<i>—112.</i>	<i>Winder's Hist. of Knowledge, vol. ii. passim.</i>
<i>Pearson on the Creed, p. 58—60.</i>	<i>Lucretius, l. v. ver. 325—330.</i>
<i>Jenkins of Christianity, vol. ii. preface,</i>	

Arg. 3. We can trace the invention of the most useful arts and sciences; which had probably been carried further, and invented sooner, had the world been eternal.

<i>Plin. Nat. Hist. l. vii, viii.</i>	<i>p. 45—51. Oet.</i>
<i>Lucret. l. v. ver. 331—339.</i>	<i>Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 24. p. 63—68.</i>
<i>Nichols's Conf. vol. i. p. 76—87. 12mo.</i>	<i>Burnet's Theory, vol. i. p. 54—59.</i>

Arg. 4. The origin of the most considerable nations of the earth may be traced; *i. e.* the time when they first inhabited the countries where they now dwell: and it appears that most of the western nations came from the east.

<i>Newton's Chronology, passim.</i>	<i>Pearson on the Creed, p. 60, 61.</i>
<i>Patrick on Genesis, c. x.</i>	<i>Perezon. Cumberland, de orig. Gent. &c.</i>
<i>Wells's Geog. of the Old Test. vol. i. c. iii.</i>	<i>Bochart's Phaleg, passim,</i>

SCHOLIUM.

If it be said that deluges, pestilences, conflagrations, &c. destroy men with their inventions, it may be answered, (1). If the world were eternal, there must have been an immense number of these devastations, and it is amazing (if there be, as this hypothesis supposes, no superior being that presides over them,) that they should not have destroyed the whole human race. (2). If any had survived, the most useful arts would have been preserved.

Lucretius, l. v. ver. 339—352.

Pearson on the Creed, p. 61. margin.

Religion of Nat. p. 91, 92.

LECT.
XXV.

Arg. 5. The projectile force of the planets is continually diminishing, by the resistance of the fluid through which they pass, *i. e.* the rays of light; which are every where diffused through all parts of their orbits in so vast a quantity, that multitudes of them fall on bodies too small to be discerned by the naked eye, as appears by microscopical observation. Now if we allow this diminution in the projectile force in one year or age to be ever so small, there must be a finite time in which it will be utterly destroyed; and consequently had the present system of things been eternal, (since on this supposition the same laws of nature must have prevailed) the planets would long ago have fallen into the sun.

Watts's Eff. No. x. § 1. p. 242—245. | Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 20. p. 53—56.

Arg. 6. The sun is continually losing some of its light, and consequently must long ere this time have been reduced to utter darkness, if the world had been eternal. If it be said, that every ray of light after a certain elongation falls back into the sun; we answer, some of them must in their return strike on the planets, falling on their dark hemisphere, by which means they would be absorbed, and the decay would be real though more gradual, according to the reasoning above. If it be answered, that there may be some kind of fuel provided, as suppose comets, by which the sun is fed; we reply, that fuel is or is not exactly adjusted to the expence of his flame; if it is not exactly adjusted, if too little, the consequence urged above will at length though still more slowly follow; if too much, the sun growing continually hotter, the earth and other planets must have been burnt up, and so an argument against its eternity will arise in another form, from the ever growing heat of the sun: but if the adjustment be exact, it will be such a proof of design and government in the works of nature as would be so greatly serviceable in another view, that any friend of religion might willingly spare this argument against the world's eternity, when there are so many others unanswerably strong. And it may be observed, that a similar train of reasoning may take place as to some following particulars.

Cheyne's Princ. c. i. § 42. p. 95—98. c. ii. § 19. p. 51, 52.

Arg. 7. Since it is probable that the fixed stars and the sun attract each other, had they been eternal, they must long ere this have met in the centre of gravity
common

common to the whole universe. And near akin to this, is the argument which may be drawn from the effect of the nearest access of the earth to *Mars*, or any other superior planet; in consequence of which it might be supposed to be drawn by such attraction a little from its orbit; the excentricity of which would by this means be continually increased, till the earth were utterly destroyed. The like argument may be applied to the other planets, and especially to *Saturn*: but the thought is in general so much the same, that it has not been judged necessary to insist upon it.

Cheyne's Princ. c. i. § 22. p. 58—60.

Arg. 8. Sir *William Petty* has attempted to prove that the number of mankind doubles in 360 years: but though the exactness of his computation should be doubted, if there be any periodical and constant increase at all, it will prove the world not to be eternal; as from a limited distance of time it must ere now have been over-run with human inhabitants. Some have indeed maintained a decrease since the *Augustan* age: but if it could be proved that mankind do actually decrease periodically, or that the increase is exactly balanced, this argument will stand on the same footing with *Arg. 6.* As for plagues, by which some suppose the balance to be made, if we may judge by what we know of their history, the diminution of mankind by them bears but a very small proportion to its increase, as computed by *Petty*.

<i>Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 62—76. OEt.</i>	<i>Pers. Lett. vol. ii. p. 148—153.</i> <i>Refl. on Polyg. Diff. vii.</i>
<i>Ed. p. 36—44.</i>	
<i>Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 25. p. 68—72.</i>	

Arg. 9. Many substances are continually petrifying and ossifying: so that, had the world been eternal, the whole earth would have been but one stone, or the petrification must have ceased of itself. But if it be said that these stones dissolve, and so there may be a kind of circulation; it is answered, that stones grow in one year which do not dissolve in many centuries.

The argument from the waste of fluids by the growth of animal and vegetable bodies is much the same as this, so far as there is any solidity in it: but it may be queried, whether the dissolution of those bodies, and separation of their consistent fluids in a series of years, may not answer this.

Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 51—55. OEt. p. 30—32. | Clare on Fluids, p. 271, 272.

Arg. 10. Hills are continually subsiding, which will in some finite time reduce the world to a level. If it be objected, that this is balanced by earthquakes, &c. which raise mountains; it is answered, the number of these so raised is comparatively small, and they being hollow would soon be washed away.

<i>Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 55—62. OEt.</i>	<i>Mountfaucon's Trav. p. 377, 378.</i> <i>Burnet's Theory, vol. i. p. 51—53.</i>
<i>p. 32—36.</i>	
<i>Ray's 3 Disc. N°. iii. p. 344—364.</i>	

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Arg. 11.

Arg. 11. According to the best calculations which have been made, comets appear on an average at least in 30 years; but whether this account be exact or not, if their return be periodical, there would within an imaginable time have been more than a thousand millions cutting the earth's orbit in various directions; in consequence of which the earth must have been exposed to such danger, either of being drawn into the sun or separated from it, that, without a particular providence, which this hypothesis opposes, its destruction must have happened long since.

Arg. 12. If the world be eternal, it is hard to account for the tradition of its beginning, which has almost every where prevailed, though under different forms, among both polite and barbarous nations.

Hale's Orig. of Man, § 2. c. xii. § 3. c. i. | *Grot. de Ver. l. i. § 16. p. 26—40.*
| *Burnet's Arch. l. ii. c. i. p. 273—285.*

COROLLARY I.

LECT. XXVI. There must have been some great and excellent Being, superior to this whole material system, by which it was reduced into that beautiful order, in which it now appears.

COROLLARY 2.

From hence we may infer the vanity and falshood of *Spinoza's* doctrine, who asserts, that the whole and every part of the material world is a self-existent being: for he expressly says, that one being or substance could not be produced by another, and that all things could be in no other order and manner than they are, *i. e.* that all things in their present form are necessary, and therefore eternal. *Def. 27. and Cor. 1, 3.*

<i>Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 26—29.</i>	<i>Orph. Carm. ap. Apul. Op. (de Mundo,) p. 190.</i>
<i>Camb. sur l' Exist. p. 202—207. part ii. c. 2.</i>	<i>Ramsay's App. to Phil. Princ. vol. i. p. 497, &c.</i>
<i>Toland's Pantheisticon, p. 5—8, 54, 55.</i>	<i>Campbell's Necess. of Rev. p. 368.</i>
<i>apud Sykes's Connect. c. iv. p. 64—83.</i>	

SCHOLIUM I.

Those arguments which *Redi*, *Malpighius*, and several modern philosophers have advanced against the doctrine of equivocal generation either of animals or plants, have often been urged as conclusive against the eternity of the world: and if they will prove that every animal or plant of the present generation was not only contained in its immediate parent, but together with that parent in the remoter generation, and so on perpetually, it might indeed prove, that, how small soever the bodies now grown up might be at any given time, there is a certain distance of generation, at which the organized body containing them and all intermediate generations, each bigger than the embryo in question was at that time, must have

PROP. XXI. *Other arguments for the non eternity of the world.*

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have been bigger than even the whole mass of the earth. But it may be an-
existed, that allowing no animal or plant to rise into visible form but from pre-
suerent parents of the same kind, it may nevertheless in its first stamina be form-
ed anew, from some fluid before making an unorganized part of the adult pa-
rent; and in that case there will be no peculiar force in that argument, as lying
against the eternity of the world; for that which arises from the exquisite work-
manship of an animal body, and the absurdity of supposing it produced from any
fluid or solid merely by mechanical laws, properly belongs to another question.

Redi de Gen. Insect. pass.

Nieuwentyt's. Rel. Phil. vol. i. c. xvi. § 9.

Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. iv. p. 127,

ad finem.

Cheyne's Princ. c. ii. § 23. p. 60—63.

Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 298—326.

Varen. Geog. vol. i. p. 226. Engl.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Neither do we argue from the probability that the Torrid Zone would have ta-
ken fire; which is examined in

Ray's 3 Disc. p. 381—388.

SCHOLIUM 3.

We likewise wave those arguments which are taken from the supposed absur-
dity and impossibility of the world's having been actually eternal, or having ex-
isted through an infinite succession; because the same objection seems to lie against
every thing which is said to be eternal, and the argument turns on the supposi-
tion, that an infinite is made up of a number of finites.

Burnet on the Art. p. 19, 20.

| Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 35—37.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Some of the *Ancients*, who speak of the eternity of the world, do not seem to
intend it in the sense in which *Spinoza* asserts it. The arguments are designed to
prove either that something must be eternal, which is all that those of *Ocellus Lu-*
canus amount to, or that the world is a necessary eternal effect flowing from the
energy of the divine nature, which *Aristotle* seems to have thought; or that it
was an eternal voluntary emanation from a supreme and infinitely perfect cause,
which was the opinion of *Plato's* followers. Nevertheless there is reason to be-
lieve, that some of them were properly *Pantheists*, in the same sense in which
the term may be applied to the present followers of *Spinoza*. Compare *Cor. 2.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 29—35.

| vol. i. p. 12—20.

Nichols's Conf. vol. i. p. 22—36. Off.

SCHOLIUM 5.

If any objection should be brought against the seventh argument, from the
supposed infinite number of celestial bodies, which would occasion an equal at-

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traction

traction every way; we must refer the examination of that till we have proved that matter is not infinite, to which we shall quickly proceed.

DEFINITION XXIX.

LECT. XXVII. That is said to be an ESSENTIAL QUALITY, which cannot cease, unless the being itself should be supposed to be destroyed.

Watts's Log. p. 17, 18.

PROPOSITION XXII.

Motion is not essential to matter.

DEMONSTRATION I.

1. It is evident that when we have abstracted the idea of motion from any particle of matter, there will still remain the idea of extended solid substance, *i. e.* it will still be matter. See *Def. 4, and 29.*

2. If motion be essential to matter, then motion must either be an equal tendency every way, or a prevailing tendency one way.

3. An equal tendency every way would certainly produce rest.

4. A prevailing tendency one way rather than another must arise from some external cause; and if these motions were various, from causes that act in various manners, and not from the necessary nature of body or matter itself.

1 and 2, 3, 4. | 5. Motion is not essential to matter. *Q. E. D.*

Toland's Lett. to Serena, No. 5. p. 186 | *Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 24, 25.*
—202.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

Another proof may be drawn from the *vis inertiae*, which *Baxter* has proved to be essential to matter, and which is directly contrary to necessary motion. This argument is stated at large in *Baxter on the Soul*, and as it cannot conveniently be contracted here, we chuse to refer to the author himself.

Baxter on the Soul, c. i.

COROLLARY.

Since it appears that matter does move, (still supposing the reality of the material world) it is evident there must be some first mover, *i. e.* some superior immaterial Being, from whom its motion is derived.

SCHOLIUM.

The argument which *Toland* brings, in the passage cited above, to prove motion essential to matter, amounts to little more than the universal gravitation observed to prevail in it; but this may be sufficiently accounted for, by supposing it always impressed upon it by the Creator, and that it might at his pleasure be suspended, though no single particle of the whole material world should be now exempted from the influence.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

Matter is not self-existent or necessary.

DEMONSTRATION.

Def. 4. | 1. Tangibility, solidity, or resistance is essential to matter.

2. | 2. If all space were full of matter, how fine soever the particles were, there must be on every side an invincible resistance to the motion of any one of those particles.

3. But we plainly see that there is motion in the corporeal world.

2, 3. | 4. There is therefore a vacuum; as will be further illustrated in the scholium.

Def. 28. Cor. | 5. But if matter were self-existent or necessary, there must be an universal plenum.

6. Matter is liable to continual changes in its place, contexture, situation, &c. which is inconsistent with its being self-existent. Def. 27. Cor. 3.

4, 5 and 6. | 7. Matter is not self-existent. Q. E. D.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 503, 504.
25, 26.

Colliber's Enq. p. 258—261. Edit. 3.

Bent. at Boyle's Lect. § 6. p. 211—213.

Howe's Living Temple, part ii. c. 2. § 5.

Baxt. on the Soul, vol. ii. § 3. præf. p. 345.

—351, 356—359, 373—383.

COROLLARY.

There must be some immaterial self-existent Being, by whom matter was at first created, supposing it now really to exist. See Prop. 22. Cor. Def. 27. Cor. 5

SCHOLIUM.

A vacuum may further be proved from the different specific gravity of bodies, compared with the vibrations of pendulums of unequal bulk and equal length in equal times: *v. g.* one of ten pound, vibrates just as fast as another of one pound whose rod is of the same length; it has therefore just ten times the momentum or force of motion, *i. e.* ten times the gravity; for here it is gravity that

that gives it the force; or in other words, the gravity is as the quantity of matter: when therefore the gravity under the same bulk is unequal, it proves there is more matter in one mass than in the other, and consequently pores (at least) in the lighter, though the heavier were to be supposed entirely solid: and the experiment of the feather and guinea descending together in the exhausted receiver establishes the argument on the same principles.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 503, 504.

A X I O M X.

LECT.
XXVIII.

If any being be the producing cause of another being, not merely occasionally, but by its own power, it is very reasonable to suppose, that it was more excellent or perfect than its production, or at least equally so.

C O R O L L A R Y.

Seeing a thinking substance as such is more excellent than a substance destitute of thought, it is not to be imagined that spirit should be produced by a being which is not possessed of thought.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXIV.

It is in the nature of things utterly inconceivable and incredible that thought should necessarily arise from matter.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. If thought could proceed from matter, it must either arise from the general nature of it, or must be peculiar to matter in some certain configuration and agitation.

2. Thought cannot arise from the nature of matter in general; for then every particle of matter would have thought, which is evidently false and ridiculous to affirm.

3. Any supposed alteration in the figure of the particles of matter, *v. g.* from squares to cubes, or cones, &c. has no apparent influence on the production of thought.

4. Motion in general added to matter cannot produce thought; for then almost all matter known to us, being actually though not necessarily in motion, and some of it in a wonderful swift agitation, must be cogitative, contrary to fact.

5. The change of its motion, *v. g.* from a straight line to any kind of curve, or *vice versa*, or its collision against other particles of matter, seems to have no tendency to produce thought.

1—5. 6. *Valet propositio.*

Abernethy's. Sermon. vol. i. p. 107—117.

Clarke ib. p. 52—57.

Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. 2. p. 15

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 10.

—26. Oct. Ed. p. 52—68.

C O R O L-

COROLLARY.

Since we are sure there is such a thing as thought, (*Ax. 2.*) this is another argument independent on *Prop. 23. Cor.* to prove that there is some immaterial being. See *Ax. 9.*

Bentley ib. p. 29—36. Os. p. 68—74.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It is to no purpose to object, that there may be some unknown connection between certain modifications of matter and thought, from which thought may necessarily result, or that it may be produced from some unknown properties of matter, though not from those which are known; seeing many things are utterly incredible, which cannot be proved to be absolutely impossible.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be further objected, that it is as inconceivable that matter should arise from thought, as thought from matter; it may be answered, that we are sure in fact, that, if there be any material world, matter is moved by thought, though we know not how it is done, and that it was actually produced by some immaterial being, (*Prop. 23. Cor.*) but it cannot be proved in fact that thought is necessarily produced by matter, or that any thinking being has been mechanically produced from matter itself; though we allow that according to the constitution of some superior being thought is occasioned by it, *i. e.* that there is a certain wonderful harmony between impressions made on the material parts of our frame and thought; and that thinking beings are produced by a superior cause on certain concurrences in the material world.

Shaftsbury's Char. vol. ii. p. 296. | Baxt. on the Soul, vol. ii. p. 350. note.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It may not be improper here to collect the proof we have had of the existence of an immaterial Being, which arises partly from the motion of matter, *Prop. 22. Cor.* and its existence, *Prop. 23. Cor.* and also from the existence of thought, which mere matter could not produce, *Prop. 24. Cor.* compared with *Ax. 10. Cor.*

PROPOSITION XXV.

We are not ourselves necessary or self-existent beings.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is evident we are lately born into this world and there is no proof of our existence before.

2. We

2. We evidently appear to be dependent on every thing about us.

3. The capacity and sentiments of our minds, as well as the powers of our bodies and our external circumstances, are almost continually changing.

Def. 27. Cor. 1, 3. 4. But every self-existent being is eternal, independent, and immutable.

1, 2, 3, 4. 5. We are not self-existent. *Q. E. D.*

Cambray sur l'Exist. p. 185—188.

COROLLARY I.

There is some self-existent Being, from whom we mediate or immediately derive our existence, and to whom ultimately we owe all the faculties of our nature and all the enjoyments of our lives. *Def. 27. Cor. 5.*

COROLLARY 2.

There is great reason to believe that this Being is naturally much more excellent than we.

COROLLARY 3.

It is evident that as we are already under great obligations to this Being, so we have a constant dependence upon him for every future period and circumstance of our existence.

COROLLARY 4.

It must be of the greatest importance for us most attentively to inquire after him, and to study his nature and properties, that we may if possible secure an interest in his favour.

Cambray sur l'Exist. p. 188, 189.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

That self-existent Being, from whom our existence was ultimately derived, (*Prop. 25. Cor. 1.*) is a spirit.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Originally and primarily to produce a being is an action.

Grad. 1. Def. 10. Cor. 2. 2. That must be a spirit, whereby any being whatsoever is originally and primarily produced.

Prop. 25. Cor. 1. 3. Our spirits were produced by some self-existent being.

Ax. 10. Cor. 1. 4. To suppose a thinking being produced by an unthinking cause, would be more evidently absurd than to suppose an unthinking being so produced.

2, 3, 4. | 5. That self-existent Being, from whom our existence was ultimately derived, is a spirit. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 49—52. | Abernethy, vol. i. Serm. iv.

SCHOLIUM.

Though it seems more proper to state the evidence of this important proposition thus largely, it is in effect contained in *Prop. 25. Cor. 2.* since nothing that is not a spirit can be more excellent than our minds.

DEFINITION XXX.

That self-existent spiritual Being, by whom we and the material world about us were originally formed, we call GOD.

LECT.
XXIX.

Vanini Amph. p. 8—10. apud

Collib. Inq. p. 243, 244.

| Shaft. Char. vol. ii. p. 10, 11.

COROLLARY.

It appears from this definition that our idea of God is very complex, and is made up of many ideas arising both from sensation and reflection.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 33—36.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

There is a God.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 23. Cor. | 1. The matter, of which this world or system consists, was originally created by a self-existent immaterial Being.

Prop. 22. Cor. | 2. This matter was first put into motion by some superior, *i. e.* self-existent Being. See *Def. 27. Cor. 5.*

Prop. 21. Cor. 1. | 3. This material world was reduced into the beautiful form wherein it now appears by some Being superior to it.

4. There is no reason to assert, nor has it ever that we know of been maintained by any, that the Being, by whom the matter of our world was at first produced, was a different Being from that by which it was first moved and brought into the order in which it now appears.

Prop. 25. Cor. 1 and 2. | 5. Our spirits were also derived from some self-existent spirit of superior excellence and perfection.

6. There is no apparent reason to believe that the Spirit, by whom our spirits were originally produced, is a Being different from that, by which this material world about us was created and formed.

1—6. 7. There is some self-existent spiritual Being, by whom we and this material world were formed; *i. e.* there is a God. *Def.* 30. *Q. E. D.*

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 1—6.

COROLLARY 1.

God is a Being more excellent than the material world, or than we, or than any other spirit, which may hereafter appear to be derived from him. See *Av.* 10.

COROLLARY 2.

There is something so great and excellent in self-existence, joined with a degree of other perfections superior to those which we can discover in any derived Being whatsoever, that it seems most safe and reasonable, in all our further inquiries into the nature of God, to ascribe to him what appears to us most noble and excellent, and to separate from our ideas of him whatever is defective or contemptible; *i. e.* in other words, to conceive of him as a being of infinite perfections: but of this more fully hereafter. See *Def.* 28. *Cor.* & *Schol.* 1.

Howe's Liv. Temp. part. 1. c. iv.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

The being of a God proved from universal consent.

1. Almost all men of every place and age have acknowledged a God, learned or unlearned, polite or barbarous, pious or wicked, fearful or courageous; and nations that have differed most in their genius and customs have generally agreed in this important point.

2. This opinion must arise from prejudice or from right reason.

1. 3. It is exceeding difficult or rather impossible, to find any prejudice common to all who have embraced this opinion. Fear could not affect the courageous, nor the invention of politic princes, princes themselves, or barbarous nations; blind credulity would not affect the most philosophic inquirers, nor religious hopes men of impious characters; and as for the authority of one person affirming it, how could the notion have been so universally propagated, or merely on this authority so universally believed? If education infused it through succeeding generations, why has it been so much more uniform than any thing else which is supposed to be so transmitted?

4. It does not appear that particular prejudices can be assigned to suit the case of all particular persons.

3, 4. 5. This opinion does not appear to arise from prejudice.

2, 5. 6. It seems founded on right reason: *i. e.* there is a God. *Q. E. D.*

Wilkins of Nat. Rel. p. 41—49. p. 52
—61.

Tillotson's Works, vol. i. p. 14—17.

Locke's Ess. l. i. c. iv. § 8, 9.

Loubiere's Siam, part 3. c. xxii, xxiii.

p. 130—132.

Burnet on the Art. p. 17, 18.

Gastrel of Nat. Relig. p. 26—38.

Ridgley's Divin. vol. i. p. 12—14.

Millar's Prop. of Christ. vol. ii. p. 161.

SCHOL.

SCHOLIUM.

The different notions that men have maintained of the Deity, and the opinion of many concerning a plurality of Gods, is urged as an objection against the argument stated above: but it may be answered, their difference in other things makes their agreement in this great principle so much the more remarkable; and it is certain there is not such an agreement in any false notion of the Deity, or plurality of Gods, as there is in his existence in general: to which we may add, that the wrong notions particular persons have entertained concerning him may often be accounted for by the variety of their genius, condition, education, &c.

Wilkins on Nat. Rel. p. 49—52.
Burnet on the Art. p. 18, 19.

Tillotf. Works, vol. i. p. 17, 18.

DEMONSTRATION 3.

In which the being of a God is proved from a brief survey of the works of nature.

LECT.

XXX.

LEMMA.

This system of things, which we call the visible world, is full of beauty, harmony, and order.

DEMONSTRATION of the LEMMA.

1. This appears by a survey of the heavenly bodies: in which we may distinctly consider their magnitude, number, due situation, that they may not interfere with one another, and may lay a foundation for certain astronomical discoveries, which would otherwise have been impossible, had there been a perfect similarity in situation and size: especially in our system we may remark the sun, that glorious fountain of light and vital influence, by which most of the other beauties of the creation around us are discovered; and the various planets with which he is surrounded; in which we may more particularly observe the correspondence between their distance from the central body about which they revolve, and the times in which their revolutions are performed, *i. e.* that the squares of their periodical times are as the cubes of their distances; the supply of moons to most of the distant planets, with the addition of a ring to *Saturn*; the agreement both of primary and secondary planets in a spherical figure; as well as the agreeable variety that is observable in their size, and other phenomena relating to them.

Derham's Astr. pass.
Nieuwentyt's Rel. Phil. vol. iii.
Ray of Creat. p. 61—68.

Nature Displayed. vol. iv.
Baxt. Mathe.
Abern. vol. i. Serm. i.

2. The proposition appears from a view of the globe of the earth: in which, not to urge the gravitation of bodies on or near its surface towards its centre, which is common to our whole system at least, if not to the whole material world, and is the great cement of it, we may more distinctly consider its diurnal and annual motion; the atmosphere with which it is surrounded; its constituent parts, as it is a terraqueous globe, and composed of bodies of very different kinds, lodged upon or beneath its surface.

Bentley at Boyle's Lect. p. 264—273. | *Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 4—18.*
Nieuw. Rel. Phil. vol. ii. Cont. 17. p. | *Keil's Astron. Lect. xxi. sub init. 298, 299.*
 367—413.

3. The vegetable productions, with which the earth is furnished, so various, beautiful, and useful.

Nature Disp. vol. i. Dial. 14, 15. part | *207—212.*
2. p. 158—248. | *Derb. Phys. Theol. p. 404—424.*
Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 100—114, | *Denne's Serm. on Veget.*

4. The animal inhabitants of it: in which we can never sufficiently admire the organs of sensation, especially the eye and ear, the organs of respiration, of motion, those for receiving and digesting the aliment, and those intended for generation and the nourishment of the foetus. In the inferior animals, it is wonderful to observe, how their different organs are fitted for those different circumstances in life for which they are intended, and especially to the elements in which they are chiefly to live. To this head may be referred what was before said of their various instincts, *Def. 18. Cor. 2.* to which we may further add the limitation of their instincts, as well as animal sensations, within such degrees, as the convenience of the animal requires. (*Vid. Ess. on Man, part 1.*) But above all, in human creatures we may justly admire the faculties of the mind, as well as the structure of the body, both which have been largely considered elsewhere.

Monro's Compar. Anat. pass. | *Derham's Phys. Theol. pass.*

5. On the whole it may be observed, that the more philosophy is improved and inquiries pursued, the more is the harmony and regularity of the works of nature illustrated, and the more evidently does it appear, that objections formerly made against them were owing to the ignorance of those that advanced them.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 57, 58, 108 | *Nature Disp. vol. i. p. 13—15.*
 —111.

6. As these things are wonderful when considered apart, so when the whole is considered as a system, and in reference to man, for whose use this earth and what it contains seems principally to have been designed, many comparative beauties arise, which in a separate view, could not have been discovered.

Skaft. Char. vol. ii. p. 285—290.

SCHOLIUM I.

These arguments are set in so strong and beautiful a light in the works of Ray, Derham, Nieuwentyt, Baxter in his *Matho*, and in *De la Pluche's Nature Displayed*, especially in the first and fourth volumes, that they deserve a most attentive perusal at leisure.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As to those objections, which are brought from the noxious qualities of some vegetables, animals, or exhalations, from the limitation of our senses, from the helpless circumstances in which human infants are born; as well as from our being subject to diseases and death; besides those arising from the asperities of the surface of our globe, and the inclination of the axis of the earth to the plane of the ecliptic; they are most of them so evidently weak, and capable of being retorted as beauties rather than defects; and they are all so well considered and confuted in the following references, that we shall not more distinctly examine them here.

Lucret. l. v. ver. 196—235.

Blackm. on the Creat. p. 78—92.

Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. iii. p. 10

—17. Oct. Ed. p. 83—90.

Ibid. Sermon. viii. p. 22—40. Oct. Ed. p.

83—90.

Shaft. Char. vol. ii. p. 298—309.

Ray on the Creat. p. 196—204.

Keil's Exam. of Burnet's Theory, pass.

Pope's Ess. on Man, Epist. i. ver. 165—198.

Wilkins's World in the Moon.

Colliber's Enq. p. 92—94.

Polign. Anti-Lucret. pass.

Clarke on the Origin of Evil, p. 160. ad

fin. præf. p. 160—202, 233—264.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The noble powers and properties of the human mind are well worthy of being mentioned here, as a production incomparably more glorious than any thing in the vegetable or brutal creation. It may something assist our thoughts here, to consider how the face of nature is embellished and improved by the arts which mankind have introduced into life, and how much entertainment is given mankind by producing them as the effect of their own art and labour, beyond what they could find them merely as the product of nature.

Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 226 & 61—65. | Locke on Government.

PROPOSITION 27. DEMONSTRATION 3.

Proof of the being of a God from the Works of Nature.

Prop. 21. 1. Seeing the world was made, it is universally allowed that it must have been produced by chance or design.

LECT.
XXXI.

2. Chance

2. Chance is entirely an unmeaning expression, unless we ascribe that to it which is produced by mechanical laws, without the contrivance and purpose of the thinking being, whose agency may be the means of producing it.

Watts's Ontol. p. 332.

Bentley at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. v. d. 9—

12. Oct. Ed. p. 147—153.

2. 3. It may generally be expected, that whatever is thus produced should be very confused and imperfect, especially when the effect is very complex.

Lem. 4. This world, though a very complex system, is full of beauty, harmony, and order, incomparably superior to any work which we see produced by the design of the most curious artist.

3, 4. 5. It is most incredible that it should be produced by chance.

1, 5. 6. It was produced by the design or counsel of some intelligent agent.

Prop. 20. Cor. 7. If any derived being were supposed the immediate former of the world, he must ultimately owe his wisdom and power to some original and self-existent being.

6, 7. 8. The frame of the world proves that there is a God. *Q. E. D.*

Lucret. l. v. ver. 417—449.

Cambray sur l'Exist. p. 4—6. § 5—8.

Bent. ib. Sermon. v. p. 12. and fine, Oct.

Ed. p. 153—177.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 29—34.

Collib. Inq. p. 74—84.

Rel. of Nat. p. 79—85.

DEMONSTRATION 4.

A Deity proved from the marks of divine interposition which appear in the support and government of the world.

LEMMA.

The author of *Matho* has illustrated this topic of demonstration with incomparable strength and beauty: but some of his arguments are of such a nature as to be more properly mentioned in another place.

1. This appears in the continuance of the centripetal and projectile force of the planets, as a mutual balance to each other; neither of which appears necessary in itself, though a failure of either would be attended with a general ruin; and this thought appears with a force greatly increased, when we consider the various composition of that four-fold motion, by which a secondary planet revolves about its primary, while both revolve about the sun.

Baxter's Matho, vol. ii. Conf. vii. p. 4—18.

Coll. Inq. p. 119, 120. Ed. 3. p. 143, 144.

Baxt. on the Soul, § 2. N^o. 6. p.

46, 47, 4to, vol. i.

2. In preventing the alteration of the obliquity of the earth's axis, or its receiving any other detriment from the approach of comets or any other cause; and

and likewise in preventing the inclination of the moon's orbit from becoming greater, or the moon itself from being brought nearer to or carried farther from the earth; any of which alterations would be attended with fatal consequences, especially the two last of them, which might be most easily affected by a comet's approach.

Matho, vol. ii. § 118, 119. p. 143, &c. § 110. p. 91, &c. | *Collib. Ib.* p. 144.

3. In regulating the winds, so as may be for the preservation and benefit of the earth; though we are not able to assign any certain laws by which it is effected.

Clarke's Robault, part 1. c. xii. § 41. Note.—*Collib. Inq.* p. 144.

4. In the due proportion which is observed between males and females in the several species of animals, and especially in mankind.

Nieuwentyt, *ib.* vol. i. p. 351—363 | *Derb. Phys. Theol.* p. 176, 177. Note.

5. In preserving the balance of the several species of animals, so that none should over-run the earth and none be lost.

Collib. ib. p. 123. Ed. 3. p. 147. | *Nature Disp.* vol. i. part 1. p. 44—46.
Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 168—179.

6. In keeping the species of animals and vegetables the same through succeeding ages, and preventing their being corrupted by undue mixtures.

Collib. ib. p. 122, 123. Ed. 3. p. 148, 149.

7. In keeping the faces, voices, and hand-writing so wonderfully distinct as they appear to be.

Weems's Works, vol. iv. p. 12, 13. | *Ray's Wisd.* p. 245—247.
Derham, *ib.* p. 308—310.

8. The regularity and steadiness with which the world is governed by the same laws in the most distant ages, is a further noble argument of the divine interposition; and is perhaps in nothing more conspicuous than in this, that the instincts of animals are still the same.

Shaftesbury, vol. ii. p. 337.

9. If in any instance these laws have been interrupted, and effects have been produced beyond the common course of nature; as these instances do not appear to have been so frequent as to overthrow the argument gr. 8. so they afford a further argument of a Being superior to this system of things, and prove that he attends to the affairs of his creatures.

Limb. Theol. l. i. c. ii. § 17, 19, 25. | *Crellius de Deo*, p. 23.

1—9. 10. It appears that the world is under the government of some being of great power and exquisite contrivance, art, and conduct; who is himself either necessarily existent, or derived from some other who is so.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

LECT. XXXII. To give a view of those other arguments in proof of a deity, which seem not of equal force with the former, and yet are urged by persons of considerable note.

SOLUTION.

1. *Cartesius* argues that there must be a God, because necessary existence is contained in the idea of a God, as three angles are in the idea of a triangle; so that though essence and existence are in other things distinct, yet when considered with regard to the deity they are the same.

To this it is answered, that there is a difference between the notional truth of propositions and the real truth of ideas. In plainer terms, the fallacy lies in the ambiguity of those words, *God is a necessary existent being*: If the meaning of them be, *q. d.* "By the word GOD, I understand a being that is supposed to be self-existent," they will be allowed; but then they prove not his real existence: but if they signify, "It is most certain there is such a being," the sense is changed, and the proposition may still be disputed.

Cartes. Princ. l. i. § 14—16.

Camb. Exist. p. 197—199.

Voyage to the world of Cart. p. 159—164.

Collib. Inq. p. 130—132. Ed. 2. p. 156—159.

2. *Cartesius* further argues, "The greater the objective perfection of any idea is, the more perfect must its cause be: but we have the idea of a being infinitely perfect, therefore there must be some infinitely perfect being to cause and produce it."

But this seems still to take for granted the thing to be proved, *i. e.* the objective reality of the idea, or the reality of the object supposed to be represented by it. And it may be pleaded, that, without any such archetype at all, an idea of an infinitely perfect being, might be produced by the operation of our minds upon ideas arising from inferior objects, seeing we do not comprehend infinity, but only deny the bounds of an object which we suppose infinite.

Cartes. ib. § 17, 18, 22.

Camb. ib. p. 189—191.

Voyage to the World of Cart. p. 166—169.

Collib. Inq. p. 132, 133. Ed. 3. p. 159, 160.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 20—22.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. x. § 7.

3. *Epicurus*, and many others, particularly Lord *Shaftesbury*, have argued, that the idea of God is universal as being innate, and therefore that his existence is certain. *Epicurus* therefore supposes it natural to admit it; and those who believe

lieve man to be God's work, argue from his having stamp'd this character of himself upon all his human creatures. But the foundation of this argument has been removed in *Prop. 8. 6. gr. 5.* and the references.

Coll. Inq. p. 128—130. Ed. 3. 154—156. | Skafe'sb. Lett. to a Clergyman.

4. *Tillotson* argues thus, "The idea of a God is possible, seeing it involves no contradiction to suppose a Being of all possible perfections, therefore it is necessary: for if there be no God now, there never can be a God, seeing eternity is a part of our idea of him; so that on this supposition the existence of a God is impossible, contrary to the hypothesis." But this argument, which seems nearly equal to the first in a plainer dress, may be sufficiently answered by the known distinction between an *hypothetical* and an *actual* possibility: *v. g.* It may be said to be *hypothetically* possible that the first man should have been created with wings, but since he was in fact created without wings, it is not *actually* possible: and this seems to be an instance parallel to the other.

Tillotson's Works, vol. i. p. 19. | Collib. Inq. p. 133, 134. Ed. 3. 161, 162.

DEFINITION XXXI.

Those arguments which are brought from the existence of some of the attributes of God to prove the existence of a God, are called proofs *A PRIORI*: those taken from the phænomena observable in the works of nature, are called proofs *A POSTERIORI*.

SCHOLIUM 1.

The question, whether there be any proof of the being of a God *a priori*, depends upon the reality of space and duration, and their being the properties of some substance, which will be examined hereafter.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The proof of the *attributes* of a God *a priori*, is the arguing them from self-existence, shewing them to have a necessary connexion with it; and in this sense some have denied there can be any proof *a priori*; because nothing can be prior to a self-existent Being, and because all our proofs of the attributes of such a Being are ultimately drawn from the consideration of some Being derived from him. But this objection is evidently founded on a mistake of the sense in which these words are used by the most accurate writers.

SCHOLIUM 3.

On the whole, it may be proper to distinguish the various ways of proving the being and attributes of God thus:

K

1. *Both*

Both are proved *a priori*, when from the real existence of space and duration we infer the existence of a self-existent Being whose properties they are, and from necessity of existence prove his wisdom, power, goodness, &c.

2. *Both* are proved *a posteriori*, when we argue from a survey of the system of nature, that there must be a wise, powerful, and benevolent author.

3. The proof is *mixed*, when from the observed existence of any one derived being, whether material or immaterial, more or less perfect, we argue the existence of a self-existent Being, and thus infer his attributes from a necessary connexion with self-existence, as in the first case.

Clarke at Boyle's *Leſt.* p. 494—498. | *apud Law's Inq. ad Fin. præf.* 51—54,
and p. 501, 502. | 56—60.
Waterland's *Diff. on the Arg. a priori*, |

PROPOSITION XXIX.

LECT. XXXIII. To take a survey of the chief sects of ATHEISTS amongst the ancient Grecian philosophers.

SOLUTION.

SECT. 1. They all agreed in asserting, that there was nothing but *matter* in the universe : but differ as to the question, whether it was animate or inanimate.

SECT. 2. Those who held matter to be *animated*, were in general called *υλοζωικοι* ; who, (as they darkly expressed it) maintained that matter had some natural perception, but no animal sensation, or reflection in itself considered ; but that this imperfect life occasioned that organization, from whence sensation and reflection afterwards arose.

SECT. 3. Of these, some held only *one life*, which they called a *plastic nature* ; and these were called the *Stoical* atheists, because the *Stoics* held such a nature, though they supposed it the instrument of the Deity : others thought that every particle of matter was endued with life, and these were called the *Stratonici*, from *Strato Lampſacenus* : and *Hobbes* seems to have been of this opinion.

Clarke at Boyle's *Leſt.* p. 57. marg.

SECT. 4. Those atheists who held matter to be *inanimate* were called *ατομικοι*. Of these, some attempted to solve the phænomena of nature, by having recourse to the unmeaning language of *qualities* and *forms*, as the *Anaximandrians*, who thought they were produced by infinite active force, upon immense matter, acting without design : others by the figure and motion which they supposed to be essential to those atoms : these were the *Democritici* ; whose philosophy differed but very little from the *Epicureans*, who evidently borrowed many of their notions from *Democritus*.

SECT.

SECT. 5. *Diagoras* and *Theodorus* among the ancients, as *Vaninus* among the moderns, are reckoned martyrs for atheism.

Collier or Bayle in Nom.

Buddæi Hist. Phil. c. iv. § 43—46, & 48.

Cudworth's System, l. i. c. iii. præf. § 34—36, 105, 134—136.

Cyrus's Trav. vol. ii. p. 27, 28, 31, 32.

Fenel. Phil. Lives, p. 110, & 253, 254.

Hale's Orig. of Man, § 4. c. iv. p. 340—342.

Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 17—25. fol.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Sir *William Temple* is said to have been an atheist of a kind different from any of these, and to have thought the present system of things necessary and eternal; consequently his notion has been confuted, by all the arguments brought to prove the world in its present form not to have been eternal, and that matter is not self-existent, nor motion essential to it, or thought producible from it alone.

Burnet's Hist. vol. ii. p. 670. OEt.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The *Chinese* have been represented by some as a nation of atheists; and *Burnet* represents it as the opinion of Sir *William Temple*, that *Confucius* and his followers are to be reckoned amongst those who were atheists themselves and left religion to the people. But *Couplet* (in his *Declaratio Proemialis, p. xxxviii.*) has largely endeavoured to prove, that though their modern writers, *i. e.* those from about the tenth century of christianity, have entertained and propagated atheistical notions among the philosophers of that nation, *Confucius* and their earlier teachers were notwithstanding votaries to pure religion. But it is very observable, that *Confucius* (if the writings, which *Couplet* and his brethren have published as his, do really contain a just representation of what he taught,) says little of those branches of duty which immediately relate to God; which leaves too much room for suspicion: though he does indeed speak of spirits surrounding men when they sacrifice, in such a manner, as to agree very well with the heathen notion of good dæmons, which perhaps differs not much from the christian doctrine of angels. (*Conf. Morals, l. ii. p. 50—52.*) Yet I have not been able to find any part of his work in which he speaks expressly of God: for that very remarkable passage, (*l. ii. p. 88—90.*) in which he says so many sublime things of *him who is supremely holy*, must (when the whole of it is taken together) be understood of his *wise man*, and in that view is so impious and prophane, as to leave a great deal of room to imagine, that Sir *William Temple* was not mistaken in the judgment he formed concerning him; nor will what he says of *the great spirit of heaven and earth* be sufficient wholly to remove the suspicion; as it is most probable, that it coincides with the notion of a plastic power, which some of the *Grecian* atheists held.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Besides the objections against design in the universe, (*Prop. 27. Lem. to Dem. 3. Schol. 2.*) other objections against a Deity have been urged; the chief of which

amount to this, that there is something in his nature, operations and conduct which we cannot fully comprehend: but if this argument be allowed as conclusive, we might be brought even to doubt of our own existence. See *Prop.* 18. *Cor.* 3.

Many other arguments or excuses brought for atheism do not deserve a particular place here, as will appear by consulting the passages here referred to.

Cudworth's Syst. c. ii. § 5—22.

| *Gastrel of Nat. Rel. p. 187,—212.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

It seems reasonable to conclude, that the fear of punishment from a divine Being, and a desire of seeming wiser than others, have been the chief causes of atheism; and perhaps the absurd notions which some have entertained of the Deity, and the unworthy manner in which those who profess to believe in him have acted, may be reckoned among the most fatal occasions of it.

Gastr. ib. p. 230—248.

| *Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 84, 85.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

It may not be improper here to hint at the strange conduct of *Tully* in his celebrated book *De Natura Deorum*, who only slightly touches on the opinion of *Anaxagoras*, that all things were produced by one infinite mind, and gives no patron to that opinion, nor so much as spends one page or section in discussing it; though he assigns proper advocates to defend at large the *Stoical* and *Epicurean* principles, as well as the *Academical*; and after all, leaves his reader under the impression of the *Epicurean* objections against providence; only coldly telling us, that they were not on the whole in his opinion so probable as the contrary doctrine. It is observable that the most religious passage in all *Tully's* works is only a fragment preserved by *Lactantius*.

Middleton's Life of Cic. vol. iii. p. 350, 351.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Having thus established the proof of the existence of God, we now proceed in the following propositions to consider the chief of his perfections.

PROPOSITION XXX.

God is eternal, *i. e.* he has existed and will ever exist.

DEMONSTRATION.

Def. 27. *Cor.* 1. | 1. Whatever is self-existent is eternal.

Def. 30. | 2. God is self-existent.

1, 2. | 3. God is eternal. Q. E. D.

Wilkins's Nat. Rel. p. 120—123. | *Abern. vol. i. p. 182—191.*

COROL-

LECT.
XXXIV.

COROLLARY.

God is immutable. Vid. Def. 26. Cor. 3.

Wilkins, ib. p. 115—117.

Collib. Inq. p. 56, 57. Ed. 3. 66, 67.

Abern. ib. p. 198—200.

SCHOLIUM.

It must be acknowledged there is something to us incomprehensible in the divine eternity, in whatever view we attempt to conceive of it. — A *successive* eternity is what the mind can form no consistent idea of: for it seems, that, if there have been a fifth, a tenth, or hundredth, there must have been some first; and there can be nothing absolutely infinite, to which a continual addition is making. On the other hand, it is impossible for us to conceive of an eternity so *instantaneous*, as to exclude all past and future, and to be but one point of duration: this would make that space of time, to which millions of years are as nothing but a small part of an hour or a minute, and is in effect declaring that God is now creating the world, and also now destroying it, supposing it ever to be destroyed. Indeed if all that were meant by an instantaneous eternity when applied to God were this, that all things whether past or future are as open to his view, as those things which exist in the present moment, this would be intelligible, but would not remove the difficulty of a successive eternity: and to reply (as some have done) that this eternity is not to be considered as duration at all, but as necessary existence, to which neither succession nor instantaneousness have any relation at all, more than colour to sound, leaves the question I think under the same darkness as before.

Nevertheless it is to be remembered, that this difficulty does not arise from the doctrine of the deity alone, but is common to every scheme that supposes any thing eternal, as something must certainly be; (*Prop. 19.*) and it would follow from supposing one atom to be so, besides all the other absurdities arising from the denial of an intelligent self-existent cause.

Camb. sur l'Exist. p. 469—499.

Clarke's Serm. vol. i. p. 81, 82. Oct.

Collib. Inq. p. 204—211. Ed. 3. p.

245—253.

Rel. of. Nat. p. 69, 70.

Watts's Hymns, l. ii. N^o. 17 & 67.

Abernethy, vol. i. p. 201—207.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

God is omnipotent; *i. e.* no effect can be assigned so great, but he is able to produce it.

DEMONSTRATION.

Def. 30 | 1 The very act of creating any being out of nothing, implies a power so great, that we can imagine nothing impossible to a Being who can perform it by his own power.

Prop.

Prop. 27. Dem. 3.|2. The amazing greatness and variety of the works of nature serve still more sensibly to illustrate the power of the Creator.]

3. We see nothing which betrays any marks of impotency or weakness in the deity.

1, 2, 3.|4. We have no reason to believe that any *internal* defect limits the divine power.

5. If there were any other Being capable of controuling him, in the execution of his volitions, this being must be superior to him, and might (for any thing that appears) have prevented or destroyed his being as well as his operations, which would be inconsistent with the idea of God (*Def. 30.*) as a self-existent Being.

5.|6. There is no *external* power to limit the operations of the divine Being.

4, 6.|7. His power is unlimited, and consequently can produce any effect, be it ever so great. Q. E. D.

Wilkins of Nat. Rel. p. 145, 146.

Clarke's Serm. vol. i. p. 119, 120, 206.

—216.

| *Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 106, 107, 67—*

69.

| *Abernethy, vol. i. N^o. 8.*

COROLLARY.

If God be omnipotent, then nothing can be necessary to the production of any Being in any supposed circumstance of time or place, but that God should will its existence in this circumstance.

Jennings's Pneum. Prop. 30.

Ralphs. de Spat. Reali. p. 67.

| *Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 23. Note.*

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT.
XXXV.

Another argument to prove that God is infinite in power is drawn from *Def. 28. Cor.* for it is certain he has some degree of power. A third from *Prop. 27. Dem. 1. Cor. 2.* since it is evident that to conceive of God as omnipotent, is much more honourable than to conceive of him as a being of limited power.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be objected to the fifth step of the preceding demonstration, that a power merely equal to that of God's, might be sufficient to controul him in the execution of his volitions, and that we have not yet proved there is no being equal to him; it may be replied, that in some cases to controul the acts of another must argue some superiority; v. g. if A will that a creature should exist, and B that it should not exist, if it does not exist, then B in that instance triumphs over A, and appears superior to him. But if this answer should not be judged satisfactory, then it must be remembered, that we have shown that God's power is not limited by any internal defect, and that no external limiting power has yet been proved; and if it should hereafter be proved, by any argument not depending upon

PROP. XXXII. *The continued energy of God upon his creatures.*

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his omnipotence, that there is but one such self-existent Being as we call God, then this proposition will be demonstrated in all its extent.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It must be owned we have no conceptions of a creating power otherwise than by its effects: nevertheless that will not prove that there is no such thing; a blind man might as well argue against the existence of light.

Collib. Inq. p. 60—64. Ed. 3. 70—75.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is no limitation of the divine power, not to assert that God is able to do what implies a contradiction, for that is in effect to do nothing at all, and consequently, a pretended power of doing it, is no power at all.

Coll. Inq. p. 180, 181. Ed. 3. p. 217, 218. | Clarke's Serm. vol. i. p. 216—219.
Crouz. Log. vol. i. p. 403, 404. | Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 104.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

All the creatures of God, whether they be corporeal or incorporeal, sensible or spiritual, owe their efficacy for producing any effect to the agency of a divine power in and upon them, at the very time when such effect is produced.

LECT.
XXXVI.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Def. 27. | 1. Whatever is derived from another does not necessarily exist in the first moment of its being.

2. Whatever does not necessarily exist in the first moment of its existence, cannot necessarily exist in the second, or in any following moment; but must owe its continued existence to the will of the being by whom it was at first produced: for by supposing its existence to continue when that will ceased, we should suppose it to be without the cause of its being. Q. E. D.

1, 2. | 3. All the creatures of God do every moment depend upon God for the continuance of their existence.

Collib. Inq. p. 64, 65. Ed. 3. p. 75, 76. | Ib. N°. xi. p. 267, 268,
Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 65. | Cheyne's Princ. part. i. § 9.
Burnet on the Art. p. 30. | Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. p. 225—
Watts's Eff. l. ix. § 2. p. 201—208, 213. | 227.

4. The power of action implies something more than continued existence.

3, 4. | 5. Whatever is created by God depends continually upon him for the continuance of its active powers.

6. If

6. If from any constitution of nature whatsoever, there could necessarily arise any act of power independent on the concurrent volition of God, it is difficult to say where that independent power would stop; and for ought appears that being might be omnipotent.

7. The wisest and greatest philosophers have not been able to trace any connection between solidity and gravitation, or motion and thought: therefore a perpetual omnipotent agency seems to be the most probable way of accounting for those otherwise unaccountable phenomena.

<i>Baxter's Matho</i> , vol. i. Conf. iv. § 44	94—101. & note, p. 101—108, 128
—49.	—139.
<i>Baxter on the Soul</i> , vol. i. § ii. præf.	<i>Clarke at Boyle's Lect.</i> p. 300.
p. 5, 6 and 7. 8. <i>Valet propositio.</i>	
<i>Virg. Æn.</i> vi. ver. 724, &c.	<i>South's Serm.</i> vol. iii. p. 461.
<i>Owen on Sp.</i> p. 138—140. p. 77. p.	<i>Reynolds's Works</i> , p. 7.
465, 466.	<i>Jenkins' Reason. of Christianity</i> , vol. ii. p.
<i>Camb. Exist.</i> p. 111.	484.
<i>Clarke's xvii. Serm.</i> No. 7. p. 171.	<i>Marc. Anton.</i> l. v. c. 40.
<i>Baxt. Works</i> , vol. ii. p. 15. B. p. 27.	<i>Abern.</i> vol. i. Serm. vii. p. 240—244.
A. p. 183. A. p. 100. B.	<i>Lond. Ed.</i> p. 225—229.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

To those who allow the universality of divine providence on principles independent on this proposition, which many do, another argument has been proposed; which will stand thus.

1. God must will that any creature should, or should not exist, with any given power, in any given moment; for not to will that it should so exist, would on the present supposition be in effect willing that it should not.

2. If he will that it should not so exist, it will not: otherwise God would not be omnipotent, contrary to *Prop.* 31.

1, 2, 3. | 4. Therefore its existence in such circumstances, *i. e.* its efficacy for producing any effect in question, is owing to the divine volition, *i. e.* to the agency of God in and upon it *. *Q. E. D.*

COROLLARY 1.

LECT. XXXVII. What we generally call *second causes*, are not causes in the strict propriety of speech; and what we call the *laws of nature*, are only certain rules and methods, by

* N. B. I lay but little stress upon this *second demonstration*, though it once appeared plausible: for perhaps the universality of divine providence cannot be demonstrated on principles independent of this proposition; so that at best it is but *argumentum ad hominem*: and the force of this reasoning may be so probably retorted with respect to the irrational volitions of free creatures, that it seems on the whole best to wave it, and to allow, that even while providence is attentive to an event, there may be a medium between absolutely willing either that it should, or should not exist, which is inconsistent with the first step.

PROP. XXXII. *Corollaries from the doctrine of the divine energy.*

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by which God generally proceeds, in those of his actions which fall under our cognizance. Nevertheless, creatures may in an inferior sense be called causes, as certain events commonly follow certain changes in their condition and will.

<i>Boyle's Inq. into Nat. apud</i>		<i>Nat. Disp. vol. iv. p. 50—52.</i>
<i>Ray's Wisd. of God, p. 50.</i>		<i>Ramsay's Princ. vol. i. p. 251—255.</i>
<i>Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 132—134.</i>		<i>Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. p. 179—181.</i>
<i>Cheyne's Princ. part i. § 4. p. 4—6.</i>		

COROLLARY 2.

It evidently appears the providence, *i. e.* the notice and care of God extends itself to all events, even the smallest as well as the greatest. *Vid. Prop. 27. Dem. 4.*

<i>Religion of Nat. p. 95—98.</i>		<i>Baxter on the Soul, p. 182, 183.</i>
<i>Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 162—166.</i>		

COROLLARY 3.

We learn from hence, into what we are to resolve the power which our minds have of moving our bodies, *viz.* into a divine volition in such and such instances to produce motions in our bodies, correspondent to the volitions of our minds. To this agrees the ease and swiftness with which those motions are performed on the act of our will, and the constancy of other involuntary, but always needful motions, which cannot be solved by any mechanical laws. *Prop. 1. Sch. 2.*

<i>Clarke and Leibnitz, N°. v. App.</i>		<i>Mattho, vol. i. Conf. 6. § 79.</i>
<i>Clerici Pneum. § 1. c. vi. § 12—16.</i>		<i>Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 150.</i>
<i>Camb. Exist. l. i. § 46, 47.</i>		

COROLLARY 4.

The wonderful instances of instinct in brutes may most probably be accounted for this way: God, by some unknown impression upon them, moving them to and assisting them in such actions, as on the whole are most convenient; though the rationale depends on principles, which they cannot know. *Def. 19. Cor. 2.*

<i>Speet. vol. ii. N°. 120. sub fin. N°. 121.</i>		<i>p. 197, 198.</i>
<i>sub init.</i>		<i>Mattho, vol. i. Conf. vi. § 82, 83.</i>
<i>Camb. Exist. l. i. § 23. p. 46—48.</i>		<i>Origen adv. Cels. l. iv. p. 217.</i>
<i>Nat. Disp. vol. i. p. 285, 286. Ed. 2.</i>		<i>Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 153—156.</i>

COROLLARY 5.

From hence we infer the absurdity of the doctrine of a *Plastic nature*, which some have thus described. “It is an incorporeal created substance, endued with
“ a vegetative life, but not with sensation or thought; penetrating the whole

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“ created universe, being coextended with it ; and under God moving matter,
 “ so as to produce the phænomena, which cannot be solved by mechanical laws :
 “ active for ends unknown to itself, not being expressly conscious of its actions,
 “ and yet having an obscure idea of the action to be entered upon.”

As the idea itself is most obscure, and indeed inconsistent, so the foundation of it is evidently weak. It is intended by this, to avoid the inconveniency of subjecting God to the trouble of some changes in the created world, and the meanness of others : but it appears from this proposition, that even upon this hypothesis he would still be the author of them ; besides that to omnipotence nothing is troublesome, nor those things mean, when considered as a part of a system, which *alone* might appear to be so.

<i>Cudworth's Int. Syst.</i> p. 149—172. præf.	<i>Ray's Wisd. of God</i> , p. 51, 52. <i>Cheyne's Princ. c.</i> 1. § 3. p. 3, 4.
178—181.	
<i>More's Imm. of the Soul</i> , l. iii. c. 12.	

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XXXVIII.

It is objected, that if God be thus the author of all our ideas and of all our motions, then also of all our volitions, which would be inconsistent with that liberty of choice asserted, *Prop.* 16.

Ans. On the principles laid down above, the will is not properly an effect of any necessary efficient cause ; but rather a tendency towards the production of an effect, so far as we apprehend it to be in our power ; (*Prop.* 1. gr. 4.) and for any thing which appears in the objection, or is asserted in the proposition, when all the requisites to volition are supposed, it lies in our own breasts to determine one way or another : and though God, upon such a determination of ours, adds efficacy to the volition, even when it is most foolish and pernicious, that does not properly make him the author of the action. (*Vid. Def.* 10.) And they who suppose a stock of power lodged in the hand of the creature by virtue of its original constitution, (God at the same time knowing in every particular how it will be used,) will labour under the same difficulty in this respect with us ; nay, their hypothesis at last will be found equivalent to ours : and if we allow that universal presence and inspection of God, which all who are not atheists admit, it will be nearly as difficult to account for his not interposing to prevent such actions, as for his adding efficacy to them in a natural way.

<i>Camb. Exist.</i> § 67.	<i>Mandeville's Free Thoughts</i> , p. 108, 109. <i>Baxter on the Soul</i> , p. 205—210. <i>Collib. Enq.</i> p. 195—198. <i>Ed.</i> 3. p. 235 —238.
<i>Howe of Prescience</i> , § 6, 7. <i>Op.</i> vol. ii.	
p. 500—503.	
<i>Watts's Diff. on Trin.</i> N ^o . 5. p. 142, 143.	

S C H O L I U M 2.

It is further objected, that if God produce all our ideas by his own impression on the mind, then a material world was not necessary, and consequently it would be unbecoming the nature and character of God to produce it. *Vid. Prop.* 31. *Cor.*
Ans.

Ans. 1. The denial of any material world at all, according to *Berkley's* and *Collier's* scheme, would remove the foundation of this objection: nevertheless, for reasons which will afterwards be mentioned, we do not chuse to have recourse to that solution; but add,

2. Allowing the creation of a material world to be to us utterly unaccountable on this supposition, we cannot therefore certainly say that it was in vain: and as for its not being absolutely necessary, it will not easily be granted, that any thing that God does, is so.

3. If we grant that God has a power of producing any idea in our minds without an external archetype, (of which dreams seem to be an evident proof, and which is so certainly included in omnipotence that few deny it) then it will be as hard to account for the creation of the material world, as if we admit the proposition to be true.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is further objected, that it is a dishonour to the divine Being, to suppose him immediately concerned in the most mean and trifling events; and that it would be exceeding ridiculous, were our discourse commonly to be formed upon the principles of this proposition.

Ans. We before (*Cor.* 5.) observed the usefulness and beauty of many things on the whole, which, when considered in themselves, may appear mean and vile: (of which the discharge of the fœces from animal bodies is a remarkable instance) and we may further add, that there is no occasion at all for introducing a change in our common forms of speech. seeing there is a sense, in which those things may be said to be the actions of the creatures, which are done by the inter-mediation of their volition, though not by an active force of their own, at that time independent on the concurrent volition of God: (*Cor.* 1.) so that upon the whole, they may be sufficiently distinguished from those, which are, with full propriety and in the highest sense, called the actions of God.

Crouz. Log. vol. i. p. 436—440, 442. | Watts's Eff. c. iii. § 10—15. p. 87—90.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is further objected, that it would be a dishonour to the divine Being, that, whereas a common workman can make a machine, which shall go on for some time without his interposition, God should not be able to produce what can operate without his perpetual agency. LECT.
XXXIX.

To this it is answered, 1. | All human arts are but the means of altering some circumstances in the form and disposition of matter, which before existed under certain laws, entirely independent on the will of the artist: but it is the peculiar glory of God, to have a whole world of creatures, in a perpetual dependence on himself.

2. That when we assert a perpetual divine agency, we readily acknowledge that matters are so contrived, as not to need a divine interposition in a different

manner, from that in which it had been constantly exerted. And it is most evident, that an unremitting energy, displayed in such circumstances, greatly exalts our idea of God, instead of depressing it; and therefore by the way is so much the more likely to be true. *Vid. Prop. 27. Cor. 2.*

3. We may add, that this argument tends to prove, contrary to the opinion of most who have advanced it, that God might make a creature, which should subsist without his supporting presence and agency.

Burnet on Art. p. 33.

Watts's Eff. N°. ix. § 2. p. 201—208.

Collib. Inq. p. 195—198. Ed. 3. p. 235—238.

Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 3—7. § 4. p. 13

—17. § 4. p. 27—31. § 6—9. p. 43

—47. § 6—9. p. 363—365.

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

God is a being of perfect KNOWLEDGE: *i. e.* he knows in the most certain and perfect manner whatever can be the object of knowledge, *i. e.* whatever does not imply a contradiction.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Def. 30. Prop. 27. 1. God is a spirit, *i. e.* a thinking being.

1. 2. God must have some degree of knowledge.

2. *Def. 28. Cor.* 3. There is no reason for setting bounds to his knowledge, *i. e.* he knows all things in the most perfect manner. *Q. E. D.*

DEMONSTRATION 2.

Def. 30. Prop. 27. Prop. 32. 1. God has made all the creatures, and continually actuates and supports them.

1. 2. He must know all that relates to them.

3. He must by consciousness know himself.

2. 3. 4. He must know all things. *Q. E. D.*

SCHOLIUM.

To this it may be objected, that there may be some other self-existent creator, and that this being with his creatures may be unknown to God: and it is allowed, that the argument of this second demonstration cannot appear in its full evidence, till we have proved the unity of the Godhead: nevertheless the second step alone would be sufficient to prove, that he knew all things that belong to us; which is that in which we are chiefly concerned.

DEMONSTRATION 3.

1. Knowledge is an attribute of so great importance, that without it, whatever conceptions we could form of the Deity, would be very low and imperfect.

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PROP. XXXIV. *The divine omniscience farther proved.*

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Prop. 27. Cor. 2. 2. It is reasonable to conceive of God in the most honourable manner.

1, 2. 3. It is reasonable to conceive of God as a being of great knowledge; and to remove from our idea of him, as much as possible, all degrees of error, ignorance and uncertainty.

4. There is no apparent reason for limiting his knowledge, so as to exclude from it any thing which can be the object of intelligence, to us or any other being.

3, 4. 5. It is reasonable to conclude that he is a being of perfect knowledge.
Q. E. D.

<i>Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 248—</i>	<i>609—611.</i>
<i>252. N^o. 11.</i>	<i>Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 102, 103.</i>
<i>Wilkin's Nat. Rel. p. 124—128.</i>	<i>Abernethy, vol. i. N^o. 9. p. 290—306.</i>
<i>Tillot's vol. ii. p. 599, 600. 602, 603.</i>	

SCHOLIUM.

That God is a being of boundless knowledge as well as power, was the opinion of the wisest heathens; as appears from the custom of swearing, as well as from many passages quoted from their writers in the references above.

COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears that God knows all the secrets of the heart, and therefore is most able to judge of the real characters of men.

COROLLARY 2.

It appears that any hypocrisy, when we are dealing with him, or addressing to him, is very great folly, though it may be most artfully disguised.

DEFINITION XXXII.

A SPIRIT is said to be PRESENT IN ANY PLACE, when it is capable of perceiving and immediately operating upon the body which fills that place, or on spirits united to such bodies, *i. e.* spirits perceiving and acting by them.

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PROPOSITION XXXIV.

God is OMNIPRESENT, *i. e.* present in every place.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 33. 1. God perceives the changes of bodies in whatever place they are, and of all spirits united to them.

Prop. 31. | 2. He is capable of operating upon them.

3. It is much more honourable to God, to conceive of him as present in all places, than as excluded from any.

1, 2, 3. *Def.* 32. and 28. *Cor.* 2. | 4. God is omnipresent. Q. E. D.

Howe, ib. vol. i. p. 108—110.

Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 756, 757.

Collib. Inq. p. 71, 72. Ed. 3. p. 84, 85.

Abern. vol. i. Serm. vii.

Speet. vol. viii. No. 565. 571.

SCHOLIUM I.

The first of these arguments only proves that God is where any of his creatures are; and it is only on supposition that there is *but one* God, that it will follow from hence, that he is every where. But it is to be remembered, that the argument, *Def.* 28. *Cor.* 2. if allowed, will prove, that what can by a necessity of its own nature act upon a body in *any* place, may by a necessity of its nature act upon bodies in *every* place; which will be so far a proof of God's omnipresence, independent on his unity: and if it be his property to fill space he must for the same reason fill all space.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is a great question, whether God be so present as to fill space. This depends upon another question, whether it be the property of an immaterial spirit to fill space: with reference to which I must confess, that when I conceive of spirit as diffused through any part of space, I immediately conceive of it as something *corporeal*; and consequently cannot conceive how it can be asserted of the divine being, by those who grant his immateriality, as most of the patrons of this doctrine do. But this will be more largely considered below.

Newton's Princip. p. 483.

| *Watts's Ess. No. vi. § 5. p. 165—169.*

Saurin's Serm. vol. ii. p. 60—64.

| *Ramsf. Phil. Princ. Prop. 8. vol. i. p. 57—72.*

DEFINITION XXXIII.

An event not come to pass is said to be **CONTINGENT**, which either may, or may not be. What is already done, is said to *have been contingent*, if it might or might not have been.

COROLLARY I.

Contingency is opposed to *necessity* not to *certainty*: for that is said to be certain, which will be without considering whether it be necessary or not.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 100.

COROLLARY 2.

There are in fact various things which are in their nature contingent; for such are all the actions of free creatures, considered as free. *Vid. Def. 22. and Prop. 16.*

Watts's Ont. c. iii. p. 331—333. | Hutcheson's Metaph. p. 23—25.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

Future contingencies are known to God.

N. B. Though this be comprehended in *Prop. 33.* yet we shall here give a distinct demonstration of it, because it has been so much controverted, and so much of what follows depends upon it.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. So much depends upon future contingencies, that if they be unknown to God, almost every thing relating to those of his creatures which are free agents must be unknown to him too; so that our ideas of the divine knowledge and perfection will by this means be very much diminished.

2. Wise and sagacious men are capable of making very probable conjectures of future events: and therefore it seems dishonourable to deny that God has a power of forming an unerring judgment concerning them.

3. If God does not foreknow future contingencies, he is daily growing more and more knowing, in a prodigious and incomparable degree beyond any of his creatures; which would be inconsistent with his immutability, and therefore contrary to *Prop. 3. Cor.*

1, & 2, & 3. 4. *Valet propositio.*

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 102—104.

Rel. of Nat. p. 199—102.

Tillot's vol. ii. p. 605, 606.

Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. i. N^o. 10. p. 258—268.

Abern. vol. i. Serm. ix. p. 313—323.

COROLLARY.

God always wills the same thing; for whatever appears to him eligible in any circumstances which actually are, must always have appeared eligible on the fore-sight of those circumstances, *i. e.* he must always have willed it; supposing, what we shall hereafter endeavour to prove, that his will is always agreeable to reason, and never changed without it.

SCHOLIUM 3.

If it should hereafter be proved on the one hand, that God has foretold the evil actions of his creatures, and on the other, that he could not have made them

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them necessary; then it will appear that this proposition is true in fact, whatever plausible objections may be raised against it.

S C H O L I U M 2.

The principal objection to the proposition is, that certainly to foreknow contingencies is a contradiction; since nothing can be the object of knowledge, but what exists in itself or in its necessary cause: and consequently to deny their being known to God is no more limiting his knowledge, than it limits his power to own he is not able to do what is self-contradictory.

To this we answer, that the *certainty* of an event does not imply *necessity*; (*Def. 33. Cor. 1.*) and consequently, that there may be a foundation for certain foresight, where the event itself is contingent; or in other words, the thing will not be because God foresees it, but God foresees it because it will certainly be. It may be added, that not to be able to do a contradiction, is in effect no limitation of the power of God, because a power to effect a contradiction is indeed no power at all: (*Prop. 31. Schol.*) but not to know what the will of a free creature will determine, is indeed a limitation of knowledge, or in other words, a difficulty, with which the divine understanding (if the proposition be denied) is puzzled and confounded.

It must be acknowledged, that the method, by which God foresees these contingencies, is unknown: for I think it not safe to say, as some do, that the mind is so constituted, that it does always in fact, though not necessarily, determine itself according to the preponderancy of the motive offered to it; which, if it were granted, would not be a certain foundation of prescience; since if this scheme could be reconciled with the doctrine of liberty as stated *Prop. 16.* yet it would subject the divine Being to a possibility of error in every particular, and in all the schemes depending upon each. We are sure by *Prop. 33.* that God knows all things that actually are, whereas our own knowledge is limited to a very narrow sphere: and therefore, since we are sure the divine understanding does in that instance entirely exceed our comprehension, why may we not as well allow that it may exceed it in the manner of foreknowing future contingencies; or where is it we may more reasonably suppose the human mind to be puzzled, than when it would attempt to explain the method of divine knowledge?

<i>Crellius de Deo</i> , p. 67, 68. <i>ap. Op. vol.</i>	<i>Tillotf. vol. ii. p. 606—608.</i>
iv.	<i>Howe's Works</i> , vol. i. p. 104—106. <i>vol.</i>
<i>Collib. Inq. p. 91. Ed. 3. p. 106—109.</i>	ii. p. 503, 504.
<i>Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 100—104.</i>	<i>More's Enchir. l. iii. c. ii. § 2.</i>
<i>Rel. of Nat. p. 102, 103.</i>	<i>Lettres Pers. vol. i. N^o. 56.</i>

S C H O L I U M 3.

To the second step it is answered, God may indeed form very probable conjectures, vastly beyond the reach of any human sagacity, though he cannot certainly foreknow the event.

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To this the principal reply is, that to suppose God always in doubt, and ever liable to be mistaken, seems inconsistent with the perfections of his nature, and is a less honourable way of conceiving of him; especially if we consider, that as an event lies more and more distant, the possibility of an error in each intermediate circumstance will so much affect the rest, that in a little time there may be upon complicated schemes almost a total darkness. But should it ever appear, that he has actually and positively without any hesitation foretold future contingent events, and that he has even put the evidence of his true divinity upon such predictions, that would abundantly confirm the second argument: nor would the hypothesis of a constant though not necessary determination of the will according to motives, (*Schol. 1.*) be sufficient to vindicate such a conduct; since still there was in every instance at least a possibility of mistake.

SCHOLIUM 4.

To step the third it is objected, that such a change as is there supposed is not inconsistent with the immutability of the divine Being; seeing his nature and attributes are still the same, though his ideas are supposed to be different at different times. But it is answered, this is only a partial immutability: whereas the arguments that prove the immutability of God in general will not admit of such a change in the divine views and purposes, as must be involved in the ignorance of future contingent events.

Collib. Inq. p. 56, 57. Ed. 3. 66, 67. | Ridgley's Div. vol. i. p. 62.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It seems strange, that many who grant the universal foreknowledge of what *will actually be*, should deny what they call *scientia media*, or hypothetical prescience, *i. e.* the knowledge of what would follow upon some certain suppositions, which are not fact; *v. g.* how king *George* would have acted, if he had been emperor of *Germany*; or the emperor, if he had been king of *Great-Britain*; or how any child who died in infancy would have behaved, if he had grown up to manhood. To object, that this would suppose the divine mind filled with a variety of vain speculations, is very inconclusive; for it is difficult to say, how God could in any instance select any scheme as best, if he had not a view of others with which it might be compared.

Le Blanc's Thes. p. 454—458.

| Juvenal's Sat. x. ver. 350—354.

DEFINITION XXXIV.

That being is said to be SPECULATIVELY WISE, who is able rightly to determine and judge of the relation of means to their respective ends, and the value and importance of those ends with respect to the person by whom they are pursued: and that being is said to be PRACTICALLY WISE, who determines his

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XLII.

own choice in a manner agreeable to such right views, so as that his own greatest happiness may be most effectually promoted, if it be not yet perfect, and maintained, if it be.

COROLLARY I.

A being of great sagacity, who in some instances chuses excellent ends and right means, yet neglects the greatest of all, may be said to have a partial practical, as well as speculative wisdom, yet must on the whole be accounted foolish.

COROLLARY 2.

Speculative wisdom is a part of knowledge.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

God is possessed of the highest degree both of speculative and practical wisdom.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 27. Lem. to Dem. 3. and Dem. 4. 1. We can conceive no more exquisite degrees of wisdom, than are displayed in the formation and preservation of the world, where we evidently see a most astonishing subordination of means to ends, rising through numberless degrees, in which the most penetrating human understanding is soon swallowed up.

2. We see nothing upon which we can with certainty pronounce that it is on the whole foolish, because we know not what its connection may be, and what end it may subserve.

Pope's Essay on Man.

1, 2. 3. So far as we can judge from fact, God is speculatively wise.

Def. 34. Cor. 2. Prop. 33. 4. Speculative wisdom being included in knowledge, which was before proved to belong to God, another argument arises independent on the former.

3 and 4. 5. God is possessed of the highest degree of speculative wisdom.

6. To chuse and act, with an utter disregard to his own felicity, when known, (as by the preceding step he must know the most certain methods of maintaining it,) would be a character in a rational agent so unaccountable, and in so peculiar a manner unworthy of deity, that nothing could be more dishonourable than to ascribe it to him.

5, 6. 7. *Valet propositio.*

Wilkins's Natur. Rel. p. 128, 129.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 106, 107.

Tillotson, vol. ii. p. 617, 618.

Collib. Inq. p. 65, 66. Ed. 3. p. 77, 78.

Abernethy, vol. i. Sermon. x.

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COROLLARY.

Philosophical liberty belongs to God in the most perfect degree; for that is indeed no other than the practical wisdom here defined: *Vid. Def. 24.* and that liberty of action belongs to him, appears from comparing *Def. 23.* with *Prop. 31.*

SCHOLIUM.

It may be objected, that it is dishonourable to the Divine Being, to suppose that one thing can be more congruous to his happiness than another. To this we reply, that we most readily acknowledge, that it would be very absurd (for reasons afterwards to be mentioned) to suppose, that the divine felicity depended on the existence of his creatures, or any action of theirs. Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe, that the divine nature is such, that unspeakable delight must arise to himself from some methods of acting, which so perfect an understanding cannot but approve; and that on the other hand, different methods of acting must appear to him the objects of aversion, as being in themselves absurd, contemptible, and mean; *v. g.* for him to do homage to any of his creatures, as more excellent than himself; or to make a creature merely to torment it. It is so far from being dishonourable to God, to suppose his happiness inseparably connected with certain methods of acting rather than others, that we could think of nothing more reproachful, than to represent him as so arbitrary a being, that of all possible methods of acting which might be proposed to him, it would be as congruous to his nature and happiness, to chuse one as the other.

Foster's Sermons, vol. i. N^o. 5.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

To inquire how far natural liberty belongs to God. *Vid. Def. 21.*

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1. Whenever any thing is more congruous to the divine felicity than another, God certainly chuses it, nor can we suppose him to do otherwise, for that were inconsistent with his wisdom, and therefore contrary to *Prop. 36.*

2. Nevertheless, when of many things which might be proposed any one is equally congruous to his felicity with the rest, in this he has a natural freedom of choice; and it seems that many things are indeed of such a nature. Now that this liberty is to be ascribed to him, appears from its being found in the human mind, and its being a perfection in its degree. *Prop. 16. Schol. 5.*

Watts on Lib. p. 41, 42, 44—48. | Grove on Wis. p. 24—26, 30—37.

S C H O L I U M.

It is objected, that it is a reflection upon infinite wisdom, to suppose that God does not always chuse that one scheme which is of all others the best, *i. e.* the most congruous to his felicity.

It is replied, the objection goes upon the supposition that there is one fitter than the rest, which is begging the question. If it be inquired, whether God could not contrive such a scheme; it is answered, that we most readily allow, that he might form a scheme, fitter than the best which any created understanding could contrive; but to say, he could not form another equal to that, is speaking without proof: nor does it appear, that it would be any honour to divine wisdom to maintain it, more than to say, that having made one human face exceeding beautiful, it should be impossible for him to make another, whose beauty should on the whole be equal to it, even though some of the features were different: and when God chuses one of those many things than which nothing could be fitter and nothing better, he may agreeably to the common forms of speech be said to chuse the fittest and the best. Nevertheless we must acknowledge, that when we weak creatures speak of the divine wisdom, we speak of what is to us an unsearchable thing.

P R O P O S I T I O N XXXVIII.

God is infinitely happy.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Prop. 36. 1. His wisdom always enables him to know, and engages him to chuse what is most conducive to his happiness.

Prop. 31. 2. Being omnipotent, he is always able to do whatever he chuses, and above the possibility of being disturbed or hurt by any being whatsoever.

To suppose the divine happiness dependent on any creature, would be most absurd; for then, before that creature was produced, he must have been unhappy: and as he had eternally existed before the production of that creature, he must have been eternally unhappy, *i. e.* of all other beings the most unhappy, which it would be most dishonourable and groundless to imagine.

1, 2 and 3. 4. God is infinitely happy. Q. E. D.

Tillotson, vol. ii. p. 586—588.

| *Collib. Inq. p. 57—59. Ed. 3. p. 67—69.*

S C H O L I U M.

It may be asked, why does God act at all, if he be, as the proposition supposes, perfectly happy previous to action.

To

To this we may answer, that the Divine Being may find some unknown delight in those volitions, by which he communicates being and happiness to his creatures: nor does this suppose any change in him, since it is reasonable to believe he always wills the same thing; (*Prop. 33. Cor.*) viz. that at such times and in such circumstances beings should exist; and being secure of the execution of his volitions, (*Prop. 31. Cor.*) whatever delight he can be supposed to have in the actual production and happiness of those beings, he must have had in the purpose of producing them: so that in this respect, things that are not, are to him as if they were. And if it is said, that there is a change in him, when in consequence of his volition those creatures are produced, he being now their creator, supporter, benefactor, &c. which he was not before, it is answered, this is no change in *him*; a change of relations necessarily arising from the very idea of a creator, and being perfectly consistent with the highest conceivable immutability; else God is changing in numberless instances every moment, as the relations of his creatures change.

And if it were to be allowed, that we find some degree of *uneasiness* attending the desire necessary to produce action in *us*, which however seems not to be wholly the case, yet we could not from thence argue, that it must be so with regard to *all* created beings; much less can we assert it of God, in whose volitions and motives of action, we must after all acknowledge there is something, which we cannot fully explain.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 505.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

There is no self-existent being besides that, whose existence and attributes we have demonstrated above.

LECT.
XLIV.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If there were any other self-existent being besides that whose existence we have demonstrated, he must in all respects be equal to him; for otherwise it would be natural to suppose some derivation or dependency, inconsistent with self-existence, and consequently with the hypothesis.

2. To suppose such another being, is to limit the omnipotence of God; for (not to plead God's supposed incapacity to annihilate or change him; because it may be said, that admitting him to be self-existent, this would be a contradiction, and therefore an incapacity of effecting it no limitation of power; nor to insist upon his inability to control him on account of the supposed omnipotence of this other being, to which the same thought may be applied,) it seems he would be unable to act without his consent, at least tacitly implied. And if their volitions should in any respect contradict each other, which in things indifferent they might at least very possibly do, the one would be a restraint upon the other, and so neither would be omnipotent.

1. 3. it would be impossible for God to conceal any of his counsels or purposes from the knowledge of such a being, which would in some degree derogate from his majesty: or if it were allowed, that he might conceal any thing from that other being, that other being might by a parity of reason conceal some things from him, and consequently he would not be omniscient; nay, supposing this being to be infinite, the number and variety of things so concealed might surpass any expression or imagination of ours.

4. It is a much greater glory to be the highest of all beings, than to be only one of a number of equals; now this supremacy of God would be destroyed by the supposition of an equal, especially when it is considered, that no one can say how many they might be, for we might allow two millions as well as two.

2, 3, 4. 5. It would be much less honourable to God, to suppose any such other being as himself, than to suppose the contrary.

6. The unity of design, which seems to prevail in the works of nature, makes it reasonable to believe it had but one author, and that he operated in an uncontrolled manner.

7. There is no reason from the light of nature to conclude, that there are any more deities than one, or indeed to *imagine* there are any more; since one almighty and all-wise Being can do as much as a thousand such beings can do; and if any revelation of it be pretended, it will be examined in its proper place.

Gr. 5. Prop. 27. Cor. 2. gr. 6 and 7. 8. It is reasonable to believe, there is no self-existent being, besides that one, whose existence and attributes we have already demonstrated. Q. E. D.

Wilkins's Nat. Rel. p. 113, 114.

Burnet on the Art. p. 23, 24.

Clerici Pneum. l. iii. c. x. § 2—4.

Locke's Fam. Lett. p. 412—415.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 72, 73.

Grot. de Verit. l. i. c. iii.

Laëtant. Instit. l. i. c. iii.

Abern. vol. i. Sermon. v. præ. p. 164—177.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. XLV. It is readily acknowledged, that these arguments, as well as many by which the foregoing proposition has been proved, do not arise to full demonstration; yet they carry a very strong degree of probability in which the mind must acquiesce, till further proof can be offered from other principles.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Limborch objects, that this proof is built on the supposition, that God is a Being of all possible perfections: we reply, it goes on the supposition, that we are to conceive of him in the most honourable manner that we can; and it seems enough, if we can prove that it is dishonourable to the Deity to suppose a plurality.

Locke's Lett. p. 424—428.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To the argument *gr.* 6. it is objected,

1. That we cannot see how far the unity of design is preserved, unless we knew the whole system.

2. That so far as we can judge by the specimen we have, it seems that unity of design is not preserved, since there is a mixture of good and evil; which makes it probable, there must be at least two self-existent beings, the one evil, and the other good.

To the first of these we answer, that we must judge by analogy in this respect as in many others; and particularly, that the unity of the Divine Being stands thus far on the same footing with his wisdom, which can only be proved from a comprehensive view of the whole scheme, and must be left an uncertain thing, by all created understandings, if the reasoning in the objection be admitted. As to the second, it would be more fully answered below: for the present it may be sufficient to observe, that the quantity of good, being so much greater than of evil, there is no reason to believe two equal beings, one entirely benevolent, the other entirely malevolent; which yet must be the hypothesis, if the phenomena referred to could grow into an objection against the proposition.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Grove* argues the truth of the proposition, from our having no revelation of more deities than one; whereas if there were more, every one of them would be the reasonable object of veneration from all other beings, even though no benefits were conferred; and consequently any one wise self-existent being would reveal to all his creatures the general knowledge of his associates, that they might pay them all due veneration. But we do not chuse to insist upon this, because it depends upon those moral perfections of the deity, which we have not yet demonstrated; and might be liable to some objection, even if those moral perfections were granted.

Grove's Post. Works, vol. iv. p. 27—29.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It seems not improper here to mention some other arguments, which have been urged by writers of considerable note, which yet appear not to carry along with them equal conviction with the former.

Arg. 1. *Clarke* and *Colliber* argue from the nature of *self-existence*, which is *simple, uniform, and universal*; whereas all *variety* must arise from some external cause, be dependent on it, and proportionable to the efficacy of it. But to this it is objected, that if it were allowed that extension and duration were not, (as *Dr. Clarke* supposes,) properties of God, (which if they are, they are undoubtedly *distinct* properties,) yet *intelligence* and *volition*, which all allow in the deity,

Deity, may be considered as various things; how then shall we account for this variety in him? or if we say he is, what the schoolmen called, *purus putus Aëus*, what idea shall we fix to those hard words?

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 46. | *Collib. Inq. p. 26, 27. Ed. 3. p. 30—32.*

Arg. 2. Tillotson and Clarke both argue, that if there were another self-existent being, then the existence of God would not be necessary, nay, that this would introduce atheism; for no one of the supposed number would be necessary, i. e. there would be no God: for you might suppose any one of them not to exist, if the other would suffice to account for all the phænomena of nature. But I confess this argument seems to me to arise from the ambiguity of the word necessary: in one place, it signifies what is hypothetically necessary, i. e. necessary in order to solve some apparent phænomena; in the other, it signifies underived.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 46, 47, 459 | *Tillotson, vol. i. p. 491, 492.*
—*461, 463, 464, 466, 467, 470.* |

Arg. 3. Wollaston argues, (as Mr. Locke has done in the preceding references) that if two or more such Beings as we have described be supposed, their natures must be supposed either the same or different; if different, they must be contrary, or various; if contrary, each must destroy the operations of the other; if various, one must have what the other wants; both therefore cannot be perfect: but if their nature be perfectly the same, then they would coincide, and indeed be but one, though called two. But this latter branch of the argument seems not to be self-evident: for ought appears, they might be specifically, though not identically the same: and if it be self-evident, it supersedes all the former part of the argumentation, amounting indeed to nothing less than an assertion, that the existence of two all perfect beings is a contradiction in terms.

Religion of Nature, p. 70, 71.

All these arguments, with those mentioned in the proposition, are stated and urged in

Cambray of Exist. p. 236—246.

SCHOLIUM 6.

If upon the whole that God, whose existence and attributes have been the subject of our former inquiries, were only a co-ordinate deity; and the God of our own system, he would nevertheless be the supreme object of our reverence, gratitude, and obedience.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 100, 101.

SCHOLIUM 7.

That several of the wiser heathens, notwithstanding the tales of their priests and their poets, believed the existence of the Supreme Deity, appears from many
pai-

passages in their writings: and if the word *God*, wherever we find it used, were always to be considered, as signifying a Being of all possible perfections, it would be difficult to prove, that there ever was such a thing as polytheism in the heathen world. It is the opinion of the learned and ingenious Dr. *Warburton*, that the mysteries of the *greater initiation*, among the heathens, was the discovery of the doctrine of the divine unity to the wiser part of the people: agreeably to which he supposes, that the song ascribed to *Orpheus*, preserved by *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Eusebius*, was the very hymn used upon that occasion. That of *Cleanthes* (See *Cudworth's Int. Syst.* p. 432, 433, and *West's Pindar*) must be allowed in the strongest sense to speak this language; and is perhaps the finest piece of pure and unadulterated natural religion, to be found in the whole heathen world.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. ii. § 4. p. 131—160. Ed. 1.

Tillard's Reply to Warb. c. iv. p. 248—272.

Ab. Taylor of Faith, Not. p. 12—17.

Syke's Connect. c. xiv. p. 364—383. præf. 364, 365.

Cud. Int. Syst. c. iv. § 10—31. præf. § 19—28. p. 184—186.

Lat. Inst. l. i. § 5.

A X I O M XI.

Our idea of SPACE is a simple idea, which we get by observing the distance of one body from another.

LECT.
XLVI.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xiii. § 2—4.

| *Collib. Inq.* p. 213. Ed. 3. p. 256, 257.

D E F I N I T I O N XXXV.

The PLACE of a body, is its situation with respect to some other body, with which it is compared.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

According to the different surrounding bodies brought into comparison, any body under consideration, may be said to continue in the same place, or be removed from it.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xiii. § 7—9.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

The universe has no place.

Locke, ib. § 10.

P R O P O S I T I O N XL.

Space is a mere abstract idea; and does not signify any thing which has a real and positive existence without us.

N

D E M O N-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Space is either something real and existing without us, or a mere abstract idea.
2. If space be something really existing without us, it is either a mode or a substance.
3. If space be a mode, it must be a mode of some substance, and this substance must be coextended with space; and the great question will be, how space differs from the substance whose mode it is said to be, or how that can be said to be a mode which, if it exists at all, exists necessarily, and is so far from depending upon any support, that it is itself the support of accidents, such as length, breadth, capacity, &c.
3. 4. Space is not a mode.
5. If space be a substance, it must be God: for those who assert its reality maintain, (as they needs must do) that it is self-existent, infinite, and immutable; and we have already proved (*Prop. 39.*) God to be the only self-existent, infinite, and immutable Being.
6. Space cannot be God; since mere space has neither wisdom nor power, and we have already proved God to be both omniscient and omnipotent. *Prop. 31, 33.*
- 5, 6 | 7. Space is not a substance.
- 1, 2, 4, 7 | 8. Space is a mere abstract idea, and does not signify any thing real and positive existing without us. *Q. E. D.*

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xiii. § 17, 18.

Collib. Inq. p. 218. Ed. 3. p. 261—

263.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 39, 40.

Watts's Ess. l. i. § 2—5. p. 4—18. §

7. p. 23—25.

Religion of Nat. p. 74, 75.

SCHOLIUM I.

By what operation of the mind, Dr. *Waterland* apprehends the idea of space to be formed; and what he thinks the foundation of our mistaking it for something real, see in

Waterland, ap. Law's Inq. p. 14—16. | Law, ib. p. 26, 27, 30—33.

Jackson's Exist. p. 75, 76.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To the proposition it is objected, that space is a simple idea, and therefore must have an *objective* reality.

To this some have answered, by denying that the idea of space is simple; since we necessarily conceive of it, as having *partes extra partes*: but it is more justly replied, that bare *privation* is sufficient to suggest positive ideas, as darkness and silence, though they have nothing of an objective reality.

Jackson on Exist. and Unity, p. 63—69. | Law's Inq. p. 33, 34.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is said, that space forces its actual existence upon us.

Ans. If its idea forces itself upon us, it is only as mere emptiness: nor can we certainly argue the real existence of a thing, merely from our not being able to avoid the idea of it, or to suppose it not to be.

Jackson, ib. p. 69—73.

| *Law, ib. p. 44—46. & p. 8—12.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is further objected, that *nothing* has no properties; whereas we talk of the properties of space, and settle its dimensions as well as those of body.

We reply, (as above, *Schol. 2.*) that we sometimes talk of mere abstract ideas, as if they were real beings; and though a shadow be only a privation of light, yet we often speak of it as a positive thing.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 16, 17.

Watts's Eff. l. i. § 8. p. 25—28. and
§ 10. p. 31—39.

| *Jackson, ib. p. 77—81.*

| *Law's Inq. p. 48—50.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is further argued, that space is necessarily infinite, and therefore real.

Ans. This takes the question for granted: for this infinity supposes its reality; else, wherever body is, space is excluded: nor do we allow that our idea of space is *infinite*, though it may be *ever growing*: the same argument would prove number to be infinite, which seems a great absurdity at first view.

Jackson, ib. p. 81—88.

| *Law's Inq. p. 54—65.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

If space were not real, it is said there could be no *motion*, because no space to move in.

Ans. A body might move on to infinity; for there would be nothing to stop it; and since motion is only a change of place, *i. e.* in the situation of bodies with respect to each other, (*Def. 35.*) there needs no such medium through which the change should be made.

Jackson, ib. p. 88—92.

| *Law, ib. p. 65—88.*

To this Mr. *Jackson* answers, that according to this account of motion, God could not move the whole material creation in a straight line. To which Mr. *Law* replies, with *Leibnitz*, that this would not be real motion, since it is neither going to nor from any thing, but is still in the centre of infinite space. If it be said, it relates to the various parts of real space, the body going from one point of it to another;

ther; it is answered, that this is evidently taking the whole question for granted; and that a motion in a mere void is as conceivable, as a motion in a void space supposed ever so real. After all, the whole seems to amount to little more than a controversy about the definition of *motion*.

Jackson, ib. p. 93—95.

Law, ib. p. 68—70.

Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 57. § 5. p. 79.

§ 4. p. 99. § 13. p. 133. § 13. p. 307.

§ 52, 53.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It is further objected, that supposing two bodies a yard asunder, and all intervening bodies annihilated, if space be nothing, they would be contiguous, since in that case there would be nothing between them.

Ans. To be *contiguous*, and to have *nothing between them*, are not synonymous terms. To be *contiguous*, signifies to *touch* one another; which is not a necessary consequence of their having nothing between them.

Watts's Eff. N°. 1. § 11. p. 39—43. | *Law, ib. p. 50—53.*

Jackson, ib. p. 92.

COROLLARY.

It is matter of humiliation, to think that there should be such weakness and darkness in the mind of man, that some of the greatest geniuses should dispute whether space be *God*, or whether it be *nothing*.

Watts, ib. N°. i. § 6. p. 20—23.

| *Ramsf. Phil. Princ. Prop. 24. Schol. 2.*

SCHOLIUM 8.

It seems that *time* is an abstract idea, as well as space: having gotten the idea of it from some things in a constant succession, we conceive it to flow uniformly on, and to take in all existences; thus it becomes a kind of common receptacle, as well as space. But many of the same arguments brought for and against the reality of space, may also be applied to that of time. Vid. *Ax. 6, 7. Def. 17.*

Law's Inq. p. 79, 80.

| *Jackson, ib. p. 76.*

AXIOM XII.

It is impossible for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time. Vid. *Def. 3.*

LECT.
XLVII.

PROPOSITION XLI.

God is incorporeal or immaterial.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 23. 1. Materiality has already been proved incompatible with self-existence, therefore God being self-existent must be incorporeal.

Prop. 32. Ax. 12. 2. If God were corporeal, he could not be present in any part of the world where body is: yet we have proved his presence to be continually necessary for the support and motion of body.

1, 2. 3. God is incorporeal. Q. E. D.

Clarke's Sermons, vol. i. p. 98. Oñ. | *Taylor of Deism, p. 259, 260.*

COROLLARY.

God is invisible.

Abernethy's Sermons, vol. i. N^o. iv.

SCHOLIUM I.

The chief objection which has been urged against the proposition is, that unless God were corporeal, we could not imagine that he should produce body, since nothing can give what it has not. It is answered, that we grant nothing can produce an effect more excellent than itself; (*Ax. 10.*) but to be corporeal is not a greater excellency and perfection than to be incorporeal, but rather the contrary: nor would our conceptions of God's producing matter be at all helped by conceiving of him as material; unless that production were only making some alteration in the form and situation of some parts of himself, which is far from being the idea of creation: and indeed on the whole, creation is a thing of which we can form no distinct idea, whether we suppose the creator on the one hand, or the creature on the other, corporeal or incorporeal.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some who allow the immateriality of the Divine Being contend, that though it is impossible one body should penetrate another, yet it is not impossible that an immaterial being should penetrate body, for their natures will still be distinct; and the pre-eminence of the divine nature above all corporeal or derived natures is such, that there is not an equal reality in both, as there is in two particles of matter, which hinder them from coming into the same place.

Ans. Though we easily perceive what it is for a subtil fluid to penetrate a body rarer than itself, v. g. for water to fill the pores of a sponge, yet this does not help our ideas, when we apply penetration to an incorporeal substance; and it seems altogether as reasonable to suppose that an immaterial being moves bodies by contact, as that it does in a proper sense penetrate them. If that penetration mean no more, than that God can act in and upon every particle of matter where or however situated, this will be readily granted, but this seems not to be

be what is contended for by Mr. *Colliber*. On the whole, considering the immateriality of God, if any thing be asserted concerning his omnipresence, beyond what is expressed, *Def.* 32, it is to us mysterious and incomprehensible.

Collib. Inq. p. 218—221. *Ed.* 3. p. 263—265. | *Watts's Ont.* c. xii. p. 377—379.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Notwithstanding what has been asserted in the former corollary, it may be allowed possible for God to manifest himself to his creatures, by presenting some material phænomenon to their senses, and thereby communicating ideas to them: yet in this case, it is only in a secondary and less proper sense, that we may be said to see God, or hear his voice.

Burnet on the Art. p. 25.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Some who have maintained that God is so present as actually to fill space, have differed in explaining the extent of that presence. Sir *Isaac Newton* and Dr. *Clarke* argue, that infinite space is possessed by him; but *Colliber* denies it: and though he maintains that the Divine Being penetrates all space, yet, as he denies the infinity of real space, he also denies the infinite extension of the Divine Being, and by a parity of reason, the infinity of the other properties of his nature: and as many of his thoughts are uncommon, it will not be amiss to subjoin some account of the arguments on both sides.

Newton's Princ. p. 483. | *Cockburne's Works*, vol. i. p. 400—
Collib. Inq. p. 141, 142. *Ed.* 3. p. 170, 171. | 402.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It appears, by the forementioned references to *Colliber*, that he denies God to be *infinite*, in our sense of infinity; for to have no bounds, is to be in its own nature incapable of end, which is the explication he gives of *positive* and *absolute* infinity. (Vid. *Def.* 28.) How far he is consistent with himself, in denying this, while he grants what he calls a *negative* infinity, may be afterwards considered. It is however apparent, that if he keeps to his own idea, in denying the infinity of God, he in effect asserts, that there are certain bounds, beyond which the extension, power, knowledge, &c. of the Divine Being do not exist: and indeed in his late treatise, which he calls, *The knowledge of God*, he very evidently avows it, when he confesses that the Deity must have some figure, and intimates it may probably be spherical.

Collib. Knowledge of God, p. 22—24.

PROPOSITION XLII.

To propose and examine some of the most considerable arguments, brought to prove the absolute infinity of the Divine Being.

LECT.
XLVIII.

LEMMA.

The solution will consist of two parts: in the first, we shall produce the arguments brought to prove that *something* is actually infinite: and in the second, shall consider the arguments to prove that infinity belongs to the *Divine Being*.

SOLUTION. PART I.

Arguments to prove that *something* is actually infinite.

Arg. 1. Some have argued from the nature of space, which (supposing it to be, as Mr. *Colliber* does, a real thing) is certainly infinite, and cannot be bounded so much as in thought. *Colliber* grants we can have no idea of the end of it; yet maintains there may be an end of universal space, as we know there is of particular: and if it be asked, what bounds it? he answers, *nothing*; but will not allow that it is therefore infinite. But it is plain he conceives of space only as the interstice betwixt bodies; and how this is more real than the void which lies on the other side the remotest body, I cannot imagine. But if *Prop. 40.* be true this can be no solid argument: for nothing would be more absurd, than to ascribe infinity to *nothing*, or to a mere abstract idea.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xvii. § 4, 21.

Collib. Inq. p. 150—153. Ed. 3. p. 185—193.

Arg. 2. It is pleaded that the Divine Being is allowed to be eternal: now eternity, *i. e.* infinite duration, is as incomprehensible as any other kind of infinity.

Colliber answers, eternity is not and cannot be an infinite duration, being limited on the one side by the present moment; and he adds, that *duration* does not belong to God. Yet still, if we consider him as a being without a beginning, (which surely we must confess him, or something to be) I see not how it is possible to separate duration from our idea of him: and if we cannot, surely here is an infinite in one respect, indeed in that respect in which it is most difficult to conceive of it.

Locke's Eff. l. ii. c. xvii. § 5. 20.

Collib. Inq. p. 149, 150, 153, 154. Ed. 3. p. 180—185.

Arg. 3. Another argument is taken from the infinite divisibility of matter, since it is certain division can never annihilate.

This Mr. *Colliber* is obliged to admit. But he pleads, that this infinite divisibility does not imply an infinite number of parts in every particle of matter, but rather the

the contrary; for else the subject must be of an infinite bulk. Some have replied, these parts may be infinitely small; but he denies that any thing can be so; and if they were, matter could not be infinitely divisible. If it be said, that this infinite divisibility proves that there is an infinite distance between the smallest beings and nothing, he says, that creation proves the contrary. Nevertheless it may be answered, that we maintain the Creator to be omnipotent, and that an almighty power may overcome that infinite distance; or rather, that when we talk of an infinite distance in this sense, we only mean a very great distance; so that nothing certain can be concluded from this argument.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 12.

Collib. Inq. p. 161—165. Ed. 3. p. 194—200.

Arg. 3. Others have pleaded that no limits can be set by our thoughts to the number and extent of *possibilities*, but more may be conceived to be produced, and still more without bounds; there must therefore be an actual infinity, in proportion to this possible one.

Colliber answers, this only proves that our imaginations may be perpetually going on in their operations; but that there is no reasoning from imagination to fact, without confounding possibilities and realities: and indeed it must be confessed, that all the utmost efforts of imagination will always be finite, though they be ever growing.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 63, 64, 67.

Collib. Inq. p. 176—179. Ed. 3. p. 213—216

SOLUTION. PART 2.

LECT.
XLIX.

Arguments to prove the infinity of *the Divine Being*.

Arg. 1. Some have argued, that if God be limited, it must either be by himself, or by another; but no wise being would abridge himself, and there could be no other being to limit God.

Colliber answers, that no cause can bestow absolute infinity upon its effect; and therefore there needs no cause of the finiteness of any created, why then of an uncreated being? And further, the argument supposes it to be matter of choice with God, whether he would be finite or infinite, which it is unreasonable to suppose; and would indeed imply (what *Plato* and *Cartesius* are said to have maintained) that the Deity produced himself by a proper causality; whereas not to abridge itself, can never make any being infinite. Thus it may be said, that as God did not make himself wise, nor did another being make him wise, yet he is wise; so he may not limit himself, nor be limited by another, and yet he may be limited. If in answer to this it be urged, that as he is wise, so he is also unlimited by the necessity of his nature, which is all that can be replied, this argument thus founded will coincide with the next.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 193, 194.

Collib. Inq. p. 145—147. Ed. 3. p. 175—178.

Arg.

Arg. 2. Others plead that infinity follows from self-existence; for a necessity that is not universal, must depend on some external cause, (Vid. *Def. 28. Cor.*) which a self-existent being does not.—To this Mr. *Colliber* replies,

1. That though necessary existence has no relation either to place or limit, any more than to variety, yet as there is some sort of variety in God, (*Prop. 39. Schol. 2.*) so there may be limits.

2. That to be finite is not properly the effect of any cause, and therefore may consist with necessary existence.

3. That finiteness is in itself necessary; because every being has a complete and positive nature, whereas our idea of infinite is negative.

4. That how absolute soever the necessity of a supposed infinite Being can be, that of a finite may be equally so. He adds, we must not argue too much from abstract ideas to things: that may be necessary in its own nature, which we may conceive as not existing, *v. g.* perfect wisdom; and that may not be necessary in its own nature, which we may not be able to conceive not to exist, *v. g.* space.

It seems that the third of these answers is inconsistent with the first: that any being should be the less complete, and the less positive, because it is infinite, I own I cannot conceive; though our idea of infinite should be allowed to be a negative idea.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 43.

Collib. Inq. p. 168—174. Ed. 3. p.

203—211.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xvii. § 12—14.

Arg. 3. It is urged that creation is so great an act of power, that we can imagine nothing impossible to that Being who has performed it, but must therefore ascribe to him infinite power.

Colliber answers, the distance between being and not being may be said to be finite, because it has been passed over; and is indeed no other than between thinking and not thinking, moving and not moving: though they are irreconcilable with each other, there may be a possibility of passing from one to the other, without an infinite degree of power. Yet he adds, nothing on this side a contradiction can be imagined less possible than a production from nothing, and therefore allows a proper omnipotence in God, which he takes to be infinite power: so that this argument seems to be given up. *Prop. 31. Schol. 4.*

Colliber's Inq. p. 147—149. Ed. 3. p. 178—180.

Arg. 4. It is more honourable to the divine Being to conceive of him as infinite than finite.

To this *Colliber* answers, by endeavouring to prove, that to conceive of him as infinite leads us into many absurd and dishonourable notions of him, which will be surveyed in the next proposition: yet he is forced after all to acknowledge a negative infinity, *i. e.* that there is nothing too great for the power of God, that nothing which can be the object of knowledge is unknown to him, and

and that no being can bound God, or even human imagination itself. Vid. *Prop.* 41. *Schol.* 5.

Colliber's Inq. p. 180—183. *Ed.* 3. p. 217—221.

SCHOLIUM I.

I have not here mentioned the argument taken from the supposed innate idea of infinity, nor from the immensity of matter; both which appear to me so evidently inconclusive, as not to deserve so large a survey as the former.

Colliber, ib. p. 144, 145, 154—161. | *Cambray sur l'Exist.* p. 191—197.
Ed. 3. p. 174, 175, 200—203.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The argument from the fulness of being supposed in God, if it import any thing at all, must coincide with some of the former arguments, especially the fourth.

Colliber, ib. p. 175, 176, *Ed.* 3. p. 212, | *Scott's Christian Life*, vol. ii. p. 344, 345.
213.

PROPOSITION XLIII.

LECT. L. To review and consider the arguments which Mr. *Colliber* has urged against the divine infinity, and by which he has endeavoured to prove it a pernicious doctrine.

SOLUTION.

He asserts it to be attended with pernicious consequences, whether we consider the Deity *in himself*, or *with respect to us*.

PART I.

With respect to the *Deity itself*, he maintains that it leads us into the following absurdities.

1. To assert his inextension; for all extension naturally implies bounds, therefore the *Platonists*, asserting the infinity of God, said he was a *mathematical point*, thereby making him infinitely less than the least grain of sand; yet at the same time they asserted him to be *all in all*, and *all in every part*; than which nothing can be more absurd.

To this it is answered, 1. That many maintain that extension does not imply limits.

2. That a mathematical point being only an abstract idea, God cannot properly be represented by it.

3. That when it is said he is *all in all*, and *all in every part*, nothing more may be meant than this, that his Almighty power can operate in every place, and is the support of all other beings; which *Colliber* himself allows.

But he replies, if we do not allow this way of speaking, we must go into the scheme of the *Nullibists*, and affirm that God is no where.—And what if it should be asserted, that it is not his property to be present in any place, by a diffusive presence?—It will be said that therefore he is not at all.—But this pretended axiom will require proof. *Prop. 41. Schol. 2.*

Colliber's Inq. p. 184—187. Ed. 3. p. 222—229.

2. From the doctrine of God's infinity arises that of *absolute simplicity*; else each attribute would be infinite, whereas it is said there can be but one infinite.

Ans. This objection arises from an absurd confounding the idea of attribute with that of being. *Def. 12. Cor. 1.*

Colliber, ib. p. 190, 191. Ed. 3. p. 229—231.

3. From infinity is inferred absolute omnipotence, which includes a power of working contradictions.—But it is sufficient to answer that this is not properly a power, as has been observed above. *Prop. 31. Schol. 4.*

Colliber, ib. p. 192. Ed. 3. p. 231, 232.

4. From infinity follows absolute omniscience, which would establish the doctrine of decrees, inconsistent with liberty and therefore with virtue.

Ans. We have endeavoured to shew that the foreknowledge of God is not inconsistent with liberty. *Prop. 35. Schol. 2.*

Colliber, ib. p. 193, 194. Ed. 3. p. 232—235.

5. Hence some have inferred, that God not only *does*, but *is* all things. This is *Spinoza's* scheme; who argues that an infinite Being must comprehend all particular finite Beings.—But it may be replied, that this argument arises from mistaking the word *infinite*, which implies, that the Being to whom it is ascribed, has no bounds: now God is not at all bounded by the existence of creatures, whose natures are entirely different from his own. And how, on *Colliber's* own scheme, can God be where the creatures are, without a confusion of his being with theirs, if the foundation of *Spinoza's* argument, even on his own principles, be just.

Colliber, ib. p. 198—200. Ed. 3. p. 238—241. | Works of the Learned, for 1738. Jan. Art. iv.
Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 69—72.

SOLUTION. PART 2.

With respect to *ourselves*, Mr. *Colliber* asserts,

1. That the doctrine of the divine infinity discourages our inquiries into the nature of God; because we must for ever despair of attaining to the knowledge of him.

LECT.
LI.

Ans. On Colliber's own principles, we must acknowledge it to be impossible perfectly to know him; nor is it any wonder that it should be so. (Vid. *Prop.* 18. *Cor.*) But supposing him to be infinite, we may know as much of him as if he were finite, though more will continue unknown.

Colliber's Inq. p. 200. *Ed.* 3. p. 241—243.

2. It is said this doctrine raises prejudices against his existence, because it makes it impossible to conceive clearly of him.—To this we may reply,

1. There can be no scheme, on which there will not be some difficulties: those of atheism will be still greater than would follow from supposing an infinite Deity.

Gurdon at Boyle's Lect. pass. præf. p.

Abadie Verité de la Rel. part i. c. xvi, xvii. vol. i. p. 117—132.

2. If *one* finite Being could be supposed necessary, why may not *any other*? *i. e.* Why may not the doctrine of the finiteness of God, be a shelter for atheism in one view, as well as that of his infinity in another?

Colliber's Inq. p. 201—203. *Ed.* 3. p. 243.

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. Colliber seems chiefly to have opposed the doctrine of the infinity of God, in order to establish his scheme of denying the divine decrees and foreknowledge, which must indeed suppose him a limited being.

SCHOLIUM 2.

On the most accurate survey and examination of these two last propositions, we may perhaps see reason to remark,

1. That many arguments which have been brought to prove the infinity of God are inconclusive.

2. That to suppose him finite, would not free the mind from all difficulties in conceiving of him, especially those which are the consequences of his eternity; but would plunge us into some new difficulties.

3. That though it be most honourable to the divine Being, to suppose him infinite, yet if we conceive of him only as superior to all other beings, and possessed of perfections beyond the investigation of our minds, there will be a foundation laid for religion and virtue, in the several branches in which we shall afterwards endeavour to open it.

The END of the SECOND PART.

APPEN-

A P P E N D I X.

Concerning Dr. BERKELEY's Scheme, That there is no material World.

IN considering this scheme, we shall

I. Propose the scheme itself, and the arguments by which it is supported.

II. Examine the objections brought against it.

III. Consider how far our inquiries into natural philosophy are affected by it.

SECT. I. The scheme itself is not, that sensible objects have *no real existence*; or that all is but a waking dream: he disclaims both these, his principle is, that no sensible object exists *unperceived*; or more plainly, that *there is no material world*, and that *primary*, as well as secondary qualities, do only exist in the mind perceiving them; so that if all minds were annihilated, all bodies would be annihilated too; and the difference between dreaming and perceiving, is only that the latter is more active, regular, and vivid, than the former.

The arguments by which the Doctor supports this system are these.

1. The existence of a material world cannot be demonstrated; because an almighty power can always produce such sensations without any archetype, and it is plain in dreams he does so.

Ans. This will not prove that he *has* done it. We assert not that matter is a necessary being; but its actual existence may nevertheless be proved, as well as that of a created mind.

2. It is an useless incumbrance; because a divine influence is necessary to produce ideas from material archetypes.

Ans. The divine power may be illustrated in such a harmony; and the actual support of bodies seems an act of great power, as well as the union of the soul and body, of great wisdom.

3. The supposition of it is very inconvenient; as it introduces disputes about the production and subsistence of bodies, the infinite divisibility of matter, the union of body and mind, &c.—But it may be replied, that if giving occasion to disputes could disprove the thing disputed about, we must also give up the existence of spiritual and immaterial beings.

4. It implies a contradiction. Sensible objects are the things we perceive by our senses; but we can perceive only our own ideas and sensations: now it is plainly repugnant, that any of our own sensations should exist unperceived, and therefore that sensible objects should so exist.

Ans. This is plainly taking the question for granted; yet he triumphs greatly in this argument, and says the bare possibility of the existence of any extended

moveable substance, or in general any idea, or any thing like an idea, but in a thinking mind, is absurd. But this triumph is extremely ill grounded; because if it were granted him, that sensible objects are in fact only the things which our senses immediately perceive, *i. e.* that they are our own ideas, (which is, as we observed above, begging the question) it will not follow from thence, that it is impossible there should be, or should have been, any external archetypes of them,

Berkeley's Princ. § 22.

5. The various appearances of the same object to different persons at the same time, prove that it exists only in a perceiving mind; else the same thing must have different magnitudes, colours, &c.

Ans. The various circumstances in which it is, seems to account for its different appearance; and if the object were material it must be so.

6. The best philosophers have granted it as to *secondary* qualities, but the case is the same as to *primary*.—This is denied.

SECT. II. The objections against it are these:

1. To deny the possibility of matter, is plainly limiting the power of God.

2. This hypothesis which supposes us under a continual deception, reflects upon the divine veracity.—He answers, the same objection will lie against supposing the earth to move about the sun.

3. The senses give us such an evidence, that if it is possible they may be true notices of what passes without us, we must certainly believe they are so.

4. Our ideas can have no parts; but the objects of them have parts: therefore the objects are something different from the ideas themselves.

5. Every thing real is banished out of the world.—This *Berkeley* expressly denies.

6. Things on this supposition are continually annihilated and created anew.

—He answers, the school-men allow a continual creation. But that is a weak reply. If *Adam* and *Eve* both slept, the sun for that time was annihilated: if it be said, it existed in the divine mind; it may be answered, so it did from all eternity, and at that rate all creatures must be eternal.

7. It makes all the apparatus of nature in the organization of plants and animals vain.

Ans. Not vainer than upon the supposition of a continued divine concurrence, asserted *Prop. 32.* they are rules which God has laid down, according to which he directs his own operations.

8. This doctrine destroys all the evidence of the existence of other created spirits; some also add, of the divine existence; but I think not: yet it certainly weakens some proofs of it, especially that taken from the *vis inertiae* of matter.

SECT. III. How far our inquiries into natural philosophy are affected by it.

1. It cuts off a great part of our present inquiries.

2. In a strict sense, it would change a great part of our language.

3. Never-

3. Nevertheless, it leaves room for the observation of the phænomena of nature, and the connection between causes and effects, in many instances. On the whole, it is a scheme destitute of proof; the most we can assert is, that it is *possible*; and we are led every moment, whether we will or no, into an apprehension of the contrary. If we believe it to be true, we ought to act in every instance, and on every occasion, just as if it were false.—We conclude with observing, that as some have denied all *material*, and others all *immaterial* substances, each asserting one or the other *only* to be real, we may reasonably believe them *both* to be so.

Berkeley's Princ. & Dial. pass.

Collier's Immaterial World.

Baxter on the Soul, vol. ii. § 2. Oct.

*Hume's Ess. on the Princ. of Morality and
Nat. Rel. part ii. Ess. iii.*

P A R T III.

Of the Nature of MORAL VIRTUE in general, and the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of GOD. Of the several BRANCHES of VIRTUE, and the Nature of CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

A X I O M XIII.

LECT. FROM the *essences* of things (the ideas of which immutably exist in the divine
LII. mind) arise certain DIFFERENCES, and from the circumstances in which they
are placed, certain RELATIONS, inseparable from those essences or circumstances.

A X I O M XIV.

The actions of an intelligent being may *agree* or *disagree* with the *nature, circumstances, and relations* of things; or in other words, they may with respect to them be FIT or UNFIT: *v. g.* Evil is as unfit to be returned for good, as a cubical case is unfit exactly to contain a globe.

D E F I N I T I O N XXXVI.

The *agreement* of the actions of any intelligent being with the nature, circumstances, and relation of things, is called the MORAL FITNESS, or the VIRTUE of that action; the *disagreement* is therefore the MORAL UNFITNESS, or VICE.

C O R O L L A R Y.

There is really and necessarily a moral fitness in some actions, and a moral unfitness in others. Vid. Ax. 14.

<i>Wishart's Reform. Sermon. p. 5, 6.</i>	} <i>Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 5—11.</i>
<i>Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 174—179.</i>	
181.	
	} <i>Chand. Ref. Sermon. p. 5—7. 14—19.</i>
	} <i>Benson's Sermon. N^o. ii. p. 40—45.</i>

S C H O L I U M.

To this some have objected the various opinions of learned men, and the difference in the laws of various nations concerning right and wrong.

We answer, that it does indeed from hence follow, that all the moral fitnesses of things are not self-evident; and we readily allow, that in some cases it may be

be very difficult to pronounce concerning them, and in others the judgments of men may be so prejudiced by corrupt affections as to err, though the cases themselves are very clear. Nevertheless, there are some things so plain, that they were never denied to be more fit than their opposites: nor was it ever commanded or allowed by any known law, that every man might plunder or murder his fellow-citizens as he pleased; that no faith should be kept, or compacts performed, &c.

Locke's Ess. l. i. c. iii. § 9—12.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 181—183.

Passer. Phil. Inq. pass.

AXIOM XV.

The actions of an intelligent being appear to have a BEAUTY or excellency, when they are morally fit, and a TURPITUDE and deformity, when they are morally unfit.

SCHOLIUM I.

This answers the question, "What are moral fitnesses fit for?" Their mutual congruity and harmony is as fit to gain the approbation of an intelligent mind, as music to please an ear that is rightly formed.

Grove's Wisd. of God, p. 29.

Wishart's Ref. Sermon. p. 11—15.

Chandler's Ref. Sermon. p. 27—31.

Benf. Sermon. N^o. ii. p. 48—50.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The apprehension of that beauty or deformity, which arises in the mind by a kind of natural instinct, previous to any reasoning upon the remoter consequences of actions, has been with great propriety called by many elegant writers the *Moral sense*: but what is peculiar in some of their notions will be afterwards stated and examined.

Hutcheson on the Pass. p. 245—253.

DEFINITION XXXVII.

An intelligent agent is said to be OBLIGED IN REASON, to that which appears to him on an impartial inquiry most *honourable* and decent; and to be OBLIGED IN INTEREST, to that which on an impartial inquiry shall appear most conducive to his *happiness* on the whole.

Balguy, Law. of Truth, p. 4—12.

SCHOLIUM.

Though an obligation in reason and interest may seem distinct, yet they are, at least in a great measure, if not entirely, connected: for on the one hand, the

obligations of reason, honour, and decency cannot be broken through, without some *uneasiness* to a mind conscious of the violation of them; and on the other, it is a reasonable, decent, and honourable thing, to be influenced by a regard to our own happiness.

DEFINITION XXXVIII.

The MORAL RECTITUDE OF VIRTUE of any being consists, in acting knowingly and designedly in a manner agreeable to the moral fitness of things; and VICE, in acting contrary to them, when they are or might have been known to him.

Balguy Inq. into the Nat. of Moral Goodness, part i. p. 30, 31.

COROLLARY I.

There is a beauty inseparable from virtue of character, and a deformity from vice. Compare *Ax. 15.* and *Def. 36.*

Shaftesbury, Char. vol. ii. p. 28—36.

COROLLARY 2.

Every intelligent being capable of discerning this beauty and deformity, is in reason obliged to the practice of virtue in every instance. Compare *Def. 37.*

COROLLARY 3.

The foundation of virtue and vice cannot depend upon the mere will of any being whatsoever. Vid. *Ax. 13, 14.*

Letters to Dr. Clarke, p. 11—15.
Grove of Wisd. p. 23—26.

| *Mole's Serm. of Moral Virtue, p. 21—24,*
27.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. LIII. Nevertheless, as the circumstances of things vary, the fitness of actions will proportionably vary; and therefore the will of a superior may make some things fit, which otherwise would not be so; (*v. g.* a general's command to a soldier to march any particular way, or a magistrate appointing an execution, &c.) but while the same circumstances continue, the moral fitness of things will always be the same.

Mole on Mor. Virtue, p. 27, 28.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To what is said *Cor. 3.* some have objected, that this is setting up something different from, and independent on the Divine Being, to be the rule of his actions.—But it is replied, that as nothing can be prior to God, so nothing distinct from

from his nature is here asserted to be a law or rule of action to him. We cannot suppose the divine mind ever to have been without ideas; (for then God would have been without knowledge, and without volitions, and consequently without action; all which are most inconsistent with what we have before proved concerning him :) now perfectly discerning every idea, (*Prop. 33.*) he must have perfectly discerned all their relations, and therefore among the rest the moral fitness of some, and unfitness of other actions, in such and such supposed circumstances: so that on the whole, it is no more injurious to the Divine Being to assert, that he cannot alter his own sense of some moral fitnesses, than that he can not change his nature, or destroy his being.

Limestreet Lect. vol. ii. p. 579—581.

S C H O L I U M 3.

Some have thought themselves, on the premises laid down above, authorized to say, that supposing God to change his mind concerning these things, the things themselves would nevertheless continue the same.

But it may be observed with regard to such a manner of expression, that if we consider God as existing alone and prior to all creation, and by a change of *mind* mean only a change of *will*; then to say, the things themselves would nevertheless continue the same, is only saying, that God would still continue to discern what is right, though his own actions were contrary to his judgment; which is a trifling proposition, as well as a blasphemous hypothesis. But if the supposition be, that his *ideas* are likewise changed, this would suppose the former ideas totally destroyed, seeing there would be no other mind in which they could exist; and then all the *relations* and *fitnesses* would be destroyed with them. But if we were to consider other minds as existing, and to suppose God either to change his ideas, or to act contrary to rectitude, while any one of his creatures retained this sense of it; it is granted that virtue would still be the same: but if it be hereafter proved, that God is a being of perfect rectitude, (since we have already demonstrated his immutability,) it will follow, that all these suppositions are in effect no other, than that God should cease to be God; and are so unreasonable and indecent, that they ought not to be made.

Lett. to Dr. Clarke, p. 14, 15.

S C H O L I U M 4.

If it should be hereafter proved to be the will of God, that all rational creatures should prosecute virtue; and also be proved, that the will of God lays an obligation on his rational creatures; then from hence it will evidently appear, that no man, capable of knowing God, is obliged to any thing by the moral fitness of things, to which he is not also obliged by the will of God.

SCHOLIUM 5.

If it be further inquired, whether our obligations arising from the fitness of things, be *antecedent* to those arising from the will of God, we answer

1. If God will the universal virtue of all his rational creatures, he must will it from the first moment of their existence; and taking the matter in a general view, no obligation in order of time can be prior to that arising from his will, nor reach further, since universal virtue comprehends all moral fitnesses.

2. It must be acknowledged, that our sense of the fitness of some things may be prior to our discovery of the existence and nature of God; and that in proportion to the degree in which that sense is more or less strong, there will be a correspondent degree of obligation: nay it is hard to say, how any one could know that he *ought* to do a thing, which he knew to be the will of God, unless he had some previous sense of obligation in reason or interest, on which such a conviction should be founded.

3. Nevertheless, as children apprehend the ideas of *things*, sooner than they learn the names of *complex, moral modes*, the easiest and best way of forming them to a sense of virtue will be, to give them an early sense of the being and perfections of God, according to their feeble capacities of apprehending them; representing it as his command, that they should do every thing they know to be good, and forbear every thing they know to be evil. But

4. As to the order of our conception of things, when we come to examine them in riper years, if the rectitude of God should hereafter be proved to us on the one hand, and our obligation to obey him on the other; then when we know any thing to be *fit*, we know it to be the will of God; and when we know it to be the will of God, we know it to be fit for us to do in present circumstances: and therefore we need not be very nice in adjusting, on which of these things the greatest stress is to be laid; since we should then consider the will of God not merely as an arbitrary thing, but as the will of a wise and a righteous being. And it is certain, that whatever might be conceived as fit from other abstract considerations, will appear yet more fit, when considered as the will of such a being: so that a regard to the divine authority, in doing a thing, can never diminish the degree of virtue in an action, but will always increase the sense of obligation to it.

Wright against Mole, p. 41—43.

SCHOLIUM 6.

On the whole it is proper to observe, that great care should be taken, especially in popular discourses, that we do not make any false suppositions of God's being changed from what we know him immutably to be, that we do not represent him as under the restraint of something superior to himself, nor ourselves as under greater obligations to something else than we are under to God. It is much more proper to say, (if the rectitude of the Divine Being be proved) that
his

his unerring judgment is the rule of *his* actions, and his will as directed by it, (however that will may be known,) the rule of *ours*; and the foundation of moral good and evil should be asserted, not to be *previous* to, or merely consequent upon, but inseparably *connected with* the immutable will of God.

Wright against Mole, p. 27—30, 44

—51.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxviii.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 36—53.

Bott's Answer to Warb. p. 228, *ad fin.*

pref. p. 232—239.

DEFINITION XXXIX.

Moral rectitude is generally called HOLINESS, when applied to God; VIRTUE, when applied to the creature.

Jos. Mede's Works, p. 8, 9.

LECT.
LIV.

SCHOLIUM.

Virtue is sometimes taken in a more limited sense, for the duties we owe to *ourselves* and our *fellow-creatures*: and then *Religion* is put to signify the duties we owe more immediately to God.

AXIOM XVI.

Where there is any moral turpitude in the actions of a rational being, it is (*ceteris paribus*) proportionable to the degree, in which such a being understands the relations of things, and is free from temptation to act contrary to them.

PROPOSITION XLIV.

God is a being of perfect HOLINESS, *i. e.* of the highest moral rectitude.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 33. | 1. His infinite understanding must enable him to discern all the relations of things as they really are.

Prop. 31. | 2. He is almighty, and therefore has nothing to fear.

Prop. 38. | 3. He is perfectly happy, and therefore has nothing to hope.

2, 3. | 4. He is infinitely removed from all temptation to act contrary to moral rectitude.

1, 4. *Ax.* 16. | 5. It would be highly dishonourable to the Divine Being, to suppose him in any respect to deviate from the exactest rectitude in his actions.

6. Without any temptation or advantage to deviate from moral rectitude, must fill the mind of the Divine Being with uneasy reflections upon it. *Def.* 37. *Schol.*

6. | 7.

6. 7. It would be inconsistent with the divine felicity.

5, 7, 8. *Valeat propositio.*

Lett. to Dr Clarke, p. 15—28.

Scott's Christ. Life, vol. ii. p. 361—364.

Tillotson's Works, vol. ii. p. 662.

COROLLARY 1.

It is reasonable to believe that it is the will of God, that all created beings, that are capable of virtue, should make it the great object of pursuit.

COROLLARY 2.

Since God is a being of almighty power, and has the final happiness or misery of all creatures in his hands, every creature capable of virtue must be obliged in interest, as well as reason to cultivate the practice of it: (Vid. *Cor. 1.*) and thus it appears, that virtue and self-love can only be perfectly reconciled by religion. See *Dr. Watts's* pamphlet on the subject.

COROLLARY 3.

Whatsoever shall hereafter be proved a branch of virtue, and does not imply some degree of weakness and dependence in the being by whom it is to be practised, is undoubtedly to be found in God.

COROLLARY 4.

If we see God in fact doing any thing, we may assure ourselves that it is agreeable to the reason of things that it should be done, though we cannot shew how it agrees; and though there may be some objections to it, which, in consequence of the imperfection of our views, we are not able to answer.

Butler's Anal. part i. c. vii.

SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be queried, whether this rectitude of the Divine Being be necessary, *i. e.* whether God can do what is morally unfit.

Ans. God has a natural power to do what is most unfit for him to do, if we consider merely the action itself; *v. g.* to put a period to the existence of the most excellent creature, &c. but considering all the circumstances of an evil action, which cannot but be known to him, he cannot so oppose and contradict himself as to do it: for it is as impossible for a free agent, of perfect immutable rectitude, to act contrary to reason, *i. e.* to destroy its own rectitude, as for necessary existence to destroy its own being; and if the rectitude of God were not immutable, then he might be changed from a most benevolent to a most malevolent

levolent being, from a most faithful to a most perfidious being; which surely is as inconsistent with self-existence, as a change from knowledge to ignorance, or from power to weakness. Nevertheless God may freely chuse this or that action, out of many others equally good and fit.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 115—119.

Grove on Wisdom, p. 30—33.

Mole's Found. of Virt. p. 24.

Wright against Mole, p. 8, 9, 22—25.

DEFINITION XL.

That being, may be said to be perfectly GOOD or BENEVOLENT, who promotes the happiness of others so far as it is fit to be promoted.

LECT.
LV.

PROPOSITION XLV.

God is perfectly good.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. We see a great deal of happiness in the creation, of which God is the author; and generally speaking, those things which contain displays of art and wisdom, are calculated to promote the happiness of his creatures: under which head we are to rank the benevolent instincts which he has implanted in the human mind.

2. We see no mixture of evil, from whence good may not proceed; and are sure that in many instances good does actually proceed from those things which have the appearance of evil.

3. The greatest part of those evils which we here observe, arise from the abuse of human liberty, and therefore are not directly to be charged upon God. *Prop. 16.*

1, 2, 3. 4. If we judge by the phenomena of nature, *i. e.* by the divine works of creation and providence obvious to us, it seems that God is a good being.

5. God is so great, as to have no need of seeking his own happiness in the causeless misery of his creatures; nor is it a conceivable thing how he should take any pleasure in it, or how he could be happy with a supposed malignant disposition.

6. Benevolence is the great glory of a rational being, and without it, no other perfection can appear amiable and honourable.

Gr. 4. and 5. Prop. 38. and Gr. 6. Prop. 27. Dem. 1. Cor. 2. 7. We have reason to believe that God is perfectly good. *Q. E. D.*

Wilkins, Nat. Rel. p. 135—139.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 113.

Collib. Inq. p. 68—71. Ed. 3. p. 81—84.

Clarke's Post. Works, vol. i. p. 321—327.

337—341. Oct.

Bayes on Div. Benev. p. 20—29.

Abernethy's, Sermon. vol. ii. N^o. 2.

SCHOLIUM I.

The great objection to this, is the mixture of evil in the world, natural evil, *i. e.* pain, and moral evil, *i. e.* vice: (Vid. Def. 38.) and it is questioned, how far the existence and prevalence of it in so great a degree can be reconcileable with what has been said of the divine goodness, since God has already been proved an Almighty Being.

Ans. 1. We cannot possibly judge as to the proportion there is between the quantity of happiness and misery in the creation, merely from what we observe in this part of it, which is our own abode. There may perhaps be regions incomparably more extensive and populous, in which neither natural nor moral evil are known, at least by experience.

2. It is possible there is no evil of any kind, from which a degree of good may not proceed, more than sufficient to counterbalance it.

3. When moral evil has been introduced, (which, as was observed above, *gr.* 3.) might be by the abuse of liberty in free creatures, then penal evil is on the whole good, and well suited to a state of discipline, which may possibly in those circumstances be intended as a proper introduction to a state of enjoyment.

4. The scheme of things which we now see may perhaps be continually growing better and better; not to say, that for ought certainly appears by the light of nature, the time may come, when all natural and moral evil may cease.

Rel. of Nat. p. 71, 72.

Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 37—39, 90, 91.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 245—249.

Balg. on Div. Reet. p. 31—33, 38—40.

Leibnitz Theod. vol. i. p. 83—85.

Mandev. Free Thoughts, p. 99—102.

Maim. More Nevoch. part iii. c. xii.

Travels of Cyrus, p. 248—258. 12mo.

Hallet on Script. vol. ii. p. 310—318.

Abernetky's, Sermon. vol. ii. N^o. 3.

Clarke on the Orig. of Nat. Evil, *præf.* p. 60—77 & p. 160, *ad fin.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

LECT.
LVI.

It will still be demanded, why was moral evil permitted? To this it is generally answered, that it was the result of natural liberty; and it was fit, that among all the other classes and orders of being, some should be formed possessed of this, as it conduces to the harmony of the universe, and to the beautiful variety of beings in it.

Yet still it is replied, why did not God prevent this abuse of liberty? One would not willingly say, that he is not able to do it, without violating the nature of his creatures; nor is it possible that any should prove this. It is commonly said, that he permitted it, in order to extract from thence greater good. But it may be further queried, could he not have produced that greater good without such a means? Could he not have secured among all his creatures universal good and universal happiness, in full consistency with the liberty he had given them? I acknowledge I see no way of answering this question, but by say-

saying, he had indeed a natural power of doing it, but that he saw it better not to do it, though the reasons upon which it appeared preferable to him are entirely unknown to us.

<p><i>Pope's Ethic Epist. N^o i. ver. 43—</i> <i>60. & 123—172.</i> <i>Foster's Serm. vol. ii. N^o. 2.</i></p>	<p><i>Clarke on the Orig. of Mor. Evil, præf. p.</i> <i>122—140. & p. 182—198.</i></p>
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SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought it more for the honour of the Divine Being to say, that the nature of things is such, that the happiness of the whole system will be more effectually promoted by the misery of some part of it; and therefore, that perfect benevolence would induce the Creator to chuse such a mixed scheme, rather than another in which there should have been unmixed virtue and happiness.—But granting that there is no evil, from which an equal or greater degree of good may not proceed, (*Schol. 1. gr. 2.*) yet it may justly be asked, what is here meant by *the nature of things*, or how can it possibly be imagined or believed, that a greater sum of happiness should arise from the mixture of evil, than omnipotence could have produced some other way; or how can the view or experience of misery be necessary to give a virtuous being a more exquisite relish of happiness?

SCHOLIUM 4.

If we still remain dissatisfied with the reply given to the objection, *Schol. 1.* it seems that the chief reason is, that we are apt to go on the mistaken principle, that God must needs raise the happiness of the universe to the highest possible degree. But we are to remember, on the one hand, that God is a being of infinite power, (*Prop. 31.*) and on the other, that to be *created* implies to be *limited* in point of *happiness*, as well as of *power*; and to be possessed of some limited degree of happiness, necessarily implies a possibility of receiving some higher degrees of it from an Almighty power; so that it can never be said, that God has done his utmost for the happiness of any particular creature, or of the universe in general: and this is so far from being a reflection on him, that it is indeed his glory. Whatever the number of creatures be, it might have been multiplied to and beyond any given degree; there might have been as many beings of the highest order of all, as there are of them and all the subordinate classes; and whatever were supposed to have been done, there would still have been room for the inquiry, why was not more done? and if the answer is not to be resolved into mere sovereign pleasure, as perhaps it may, then it must be referred into some reason unknown to us; for the reason cannot be, that the happiness of the whole would have been less, which in this case it is a contradiction to assert.

<p><i>Boyle on Venerat. p. 88, 89.</i> <i>Bays on Div. Benevolence p. 65—70.</i> <i>Fenelon's Phil. Works, vol. ii. p. 70—</i></p>	<p><i>82. præf. § 9, 10. p. 72—76.</i> <i>Leibnitz Theod. vol. ii. p. 251, &c.</i></p>
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SCHOLIUM. 5.

To this way of stating the Divine goodness, as pursuing the happiness of the creation so far as it is fit to be pursued, it is objected, that nothing can be fit, but what tends to produce happiness; and that no being can be perfectly good, unless he does all the good he can possibly do. But this last principle cannot for the reason above mentioned be allowed, when we speak of an Almighty agent.

On the whole, it must be owned a considerable difficulty. Nevertheless, we are sure there is a mixture of evil in the world; and it becomes us seriously to consider, whether it be more honourable to God, or decent in us to say, that he could have prevented it, though for some wise but unknown reason he did not chuse to do it: or to say, he could not have prevented it, without chusing a scheme, in consequence of which his creation might have been less happy than it now is.

Balguy on Div. Rect. p. 23—30.
Bays on Div. Benev. p. 29—33.

Grove on Wisdom, p. 59—80.

SCHOLIUM 6.

LECT.
LVII.

It may not be improper here to take some notice of the celebrated controversy between Mr. *Balguy*, Mr. *Bays* and Mr. *Grove*, concerning the *Spring of the divine actions*. *Balguy* refers them all to *Rectitude*, *Bays* to *Benevolence*, and *Grove* to *Wisdom*. There is something which well deserves an attentive perusal in their writings on this subject, of which we shall give a short abstract in the following scholia, so far as they relate to the present question.

Balguy maintains, that God always does that which is right and fit, and that all his moral attributes, viz. justice, truth, faithfulness, mercy, patience, &c. are but so many different modifications of *rectitude*. He thinks it most agreeable to the divine simplicity, and most honourable to God, to conceive of him as always influenced by this uniform principle; and that this manner of conceiving of him would prevent much confusion in our ideas, which arises from considering his different attributes as having different interests and claims.

Div. Rect. p. 3—8.

He grants that the *communication of good* is one great and right end of the Creator; but maintains that it is not the *only* end: he ultimately aims at *his own glory*, i. e. the complacential approbation of his own actions, arising from a consciousness of having inviolably preserved a due decorum, order, and beauty in his works: and if ever the happiness of any particular creature, or of the whole system interfere with this, (as he thinks it sometimes may) it must so far give way to it.

Div. Rect. p. 10—15.

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This leads him into some reflections on the nature of *beauty* and *order*, in which he maintains that they are real and absolute in themselves, and are not merely relative to our faculties; otherwise, why this wonderful apparatus, this profusion of art and skill in the universe? He contends that Dr. *Hutcheson* grants this, when he places all beauty in *uniformity amidst variety*. Now whatever is beautiful in the universe, the creator must see it, and have a perfect view of all that is amiable and delightful in it. He concludes this part of his discourse with observing, that to suppose all the beauty, order, and harmony of the universe subservient to the happiness of living creatures, is hardly to be reconciled with the appearance of things: so that on the whole, the increase of *happiness*, and love of *order*, being both agreeable to the rectitude and perfection of the divine nature, are joint ends, blended together both in the works of creation and providence.

Div. Rect. p. 16—23.

SCHOLIUM 7.

To this Mr. *Bays* objects, that to consider God first in general as doing all that is right, and then to deduce his particular moral attributes, as branches of this universal rectitude of his nature, is going farther about than is necessary, and leaves particular attributes entangled in just the same difficulty as before. But if it were otherwise, he says, that as nothing can be *fit* but what tends to promote happiness, the best idea we can entertain of the rectitude of God, is a disposition in him to promote the general happiness of the universe; and that we may as well consider all the other moral attributes as comprehended in this, and different modifications of it, as to consider them united in *Balguy's* view of rectitude; but with this advantage, that here we shall have something certain to depend upon; whereas it must throw the mind into perpetual perplexity, if (for ought we know) God may have some ends in his actions and dispensations, entirely different from and perhaps opposite to the happiness of his creatures.

Bays on Div. Benev. p. 7—19.

As for the ideas of *order* and *beauty*, he seems to query whether those objects which appear beautiful to us may appear so to the divine mind. He thinks that the only glory, which God can propose as the end of his actions, is the approbation of his own benevolent mind, as acting always in such a manner as shall be most for the happiness of the creation. He urges several objections against *Balguy's* notion of beauty, which it is not necessary to contract here, lest we deviate too much from the principal question.

Bays ib. p. 33—44.

| *Relig. of Nat. p. 116—119.*

On the whole, he concludes that the divine benevolence is not to be stated, as “an unbounded inclination to communicate the highest degree of happiness,”

which is a contradiction, as it would be to suppose the greatest possible triangle actually described; (Compare *Schol.* 4.) but "as a kind affection towards his creatures, inclining him to confer upon that universe which he has made (and which he might have created or not, or have created with inferior or superior capacities for happiness) the greatest happiness of which it is capable." But if it be asked, why it was not made capable of more, he supposes that must be referred into the will and pleasure of God.

Bays, ib. p. 70, 71.

SCHOLIUM 8.

LECT. LVIII. Mr. *Grove* refers all into the *wisdom* of God, which he says is "the knowledge that God has of what is fitting or unfit to be chosen in every imaginable circumstance;" and taking it for granted that he is under no wrong bias, concludes that he always chuses according to this fitness. He adds, that nothing can be fit to be chosen by any being, but what has some reference to *happiness*, either that of the agent or some other; and that *beauty* and *order* are nothing any further than as they tend to communicate pleasure to percipient beings: therefore the end of God in the creation must be *happiness*; as to the degree and manner of attaining it, suited to the faculties, dependencies, and freedom of his rational creatures. On the whole, he supposes it must be apparently fit, that no reasonable creature should be made miserable, before he deserves it. He further adds, that he should be made for happiness; but that he should be obliged as reasonable and free to chuse reason as his guide to it: and if he will not be persuaded to take the right way, it is fit he should be left to the ill consequences of his own wrong choice. All this therefore he supposes God must will.

Grove on Wisdom, p. 1—7.

[*Rel. of Nat. p. 116.*

As *Bays* and others have maintained, that benevolence is a *kind inclination* or affection in God, *Grove* endeavours to prove, that properly speaking, there is no inclination in him; and maintains, that to suppose such an inclination as depends not on the previous act of the divine understanding, will be in effect imputing to him a blind and irrational propensity; and that nothing could be more dishonourable to the divine Being, than universally to assign this reason for his conduct in any instance, "that he was inclined, or had a mind to do it." But he further maintains it, as probable at least, that there are no inclinations in God at all distinct from his actual volitions, but that the actings of the divine will are immediately and inseparably connected with those of his understanding: to suppose the contrary, he thinks would in effect be supposing, that reason would not be sufficient to determine the divine mind. If any determination be said to have proceeded from such inclination, that coincides entirely with the former exploded hypothesis of blind inclination; but if it be said, the action

action proceeded partly from reason and partly from inclination, he asserts, that it may as well be supposed to proceed entirely from reason.

Grove, ib. p. 14—23.

| *Balguy's Div. Reel. p. 9, 10.*

From hence Mr. *Grove* infers in the process of his discourse several things, relating to the divine liberty, the origin of evil, the divine happiness, and the duties of natural religion, which have been or will be referred to, so far as there appears any thing peculiarly remarkable in them.

SCHOLIUM 9.

From the survey we have taken of this controversy, it may be natural to make the following remarks.

1. That each of these ingenious writers discovers a pious temper, a concern for the honour of the divine Being, and the advancement of virtue in the world.

2. That they all acknowledge that God does always what is right and good : nay, that when one thing is on the whole more fit than another, he invariably chuses it.

3. That both Mr. *Grove* and Mr. *Balguy* acknowledge the communication of happiness, a noble and excellent end, which the Deity in some measure has always in view ; and which he prosecutes, so far as to bring happiness at least within the reach of all his rational creatures ; never inflicting any evil upon them out of caprice, or without some just and important reason.

4. That there is very little difference between the foundation of *Grove's* discourse, and that of *Balguy's* ; wisdom in the former being so stated, that to be always governed by it coincides with the notion of rectitude, maintained by the latter.

5. That Mr. *Bays* himself does not assert, that it would have been impossible for God to have produced a greater sum of happiness ; and by granting the contrary, seems to overturn the foundation of those arguments, by which he attempts to prove, that God has made the creation as happy as its present capacity would admit.

6. It seems that a virtuous mind may be as easy, in considering God as a being of universal rectitude, as if we were to consider him as a Being of unbounded benevolence : nay it seems, that in some respects the former will have the advantage ; as it is impossible for us confidently to say, what will be for the greatest happiness of the whole ; but on the other hand, we may naturally conclude, that rectitude will on the whole incline God to treat the virtuous man in a more favourable manner than the wicked.

7. That the scheme of universal benevolence in the highest sense seems evidently to imply fatality : for if all the sin and misery of the creatures were necessary to produce the greatest possible sum of happiness, and if the perfection of the divine nature determined him to produce this greatest sum, then sin and misery would be necessary : whereby the doctrine of liberty is destroyed, and such a seeming reflection thrown on the divine character, as few would be able to digest.

8. It

8. It seems therefore on the whole best to keep to that in which we all agree, and freely acknowledge, there are depths in the divine councils unfathomable to us; so that though we may justly believe God has his reasons for suffering evil to be produced, we cannot certainly determine what those reasons are; and when we go about particularly to explain them, we find it difficult, according to the different schemes we embrace, on the one hand to vindicate his goodness, or on the other his omnipotence.

PROPOSITION XLVI.

GOD IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE.

DEMONSTRATION.

LECT.
LIX.

1. This would follow merely from his being a spirit, endued with perfections vastly superior to our own. Vid. *Prop. 27. Cor.* and *Prop. 18. Cor. 1.*

2. There may be (for any thing we certainly know) attributes and perfections in God, of which we have not the least idea.

3. In those perfections of the divine nature, of which we have some idea, there are many things to us inexplicable, and with which, the more deeply and attentively we think of them, the more we find our thoughts swallowed up; v. g. his self-existence, his eternity, his omnipresence, whether it be conceived of as diffusive or not diffusive; his producing effects by mere volition, the creation of matter or even of spirit: his omniscience, where his knowledge of what is past from the creation of the world (how long soever you suppose it to have been) bears no given proportion to the knowledge of what is yet to come, if any creature be supposed immortal; especially his knowledge of future contingencies; how being perfectly happy, and consequently having nothing to wish or desire, he was excited to act: how being perfectly good and omnipotent, he permitted evil to enter into the world; besides many other particulars touched upon in the preceding lectures.

1, 2, & 3. 4. God is incomprehensible. Q. E. D.

Abern. Sermon. vol. ii. N^o. 6, 7.

COROLLARY 1.

We have reason to believe, that as the perfections of God are infinite, if there be any orders of intelligent creatures superior to us, these perfections must also be incomprehensible to them.

Tillotson's Ser. vol. ii. p. 768.

| *Rel. of Nat. p. 93, 94.*

COROLLARY 2.

It certainly becomes us to use great modesty and caution, when we are speaking of the divine perfections.

King of Predest. § 30, 31.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

It ought to be remembered, that the incomprehensible nature of the divine Being is no sufficient reason for our allowing ourselves in self-contradictory language, when we are speaking of him; as some of the ancients did, when they spoke of him as *more than unknown, without existence, without substance, a super-divine divinity*, and as *terminating infinity* itself, so that infinite space is but a small corner of his productions, and *beyond perfection*; which, though probably designed only as strong hyperboles, tend to expose the persons that use them to ridicule, rather than to exalt our ideas of the divine glory.

Divine Analogy, p. 65, 66.

| *Frasier's Life of Nadir Schah*, p. 12—18.

PROPOSITION.

The passions and affections of human nature are not in any degree to be ascribed to God: Compare *Prop. 1. Gr. 3.* and *Prop. 13.*

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Many of those passions are grievous and troublesome, as anger, envy, fear, shame, &c. and consequently there can be no room for them in a being perfectly happy, as God is. *Prop. 38.*

2. Others of them, which afford more pleasing sensations, are founded on some degree of weakness, and plainly imply a defect of happiness, as desire, and hope, &c. and consequently are inconsistent with the omnipotence, as well as the felicity of God.

3. The workings of the passions in us are always attended with some commotions in animal nature, and therefore imply corporeity; but God being incorporeal, such passions can have no place in him. *Prop. 41.*

1, 2, & 3. 4. God is free from human passions. *Q. E. D.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Nevertheless in a *figurative* sense, love and joy, anger and pity, &c. may be ascribed to God; when we mean no more, than that God does such acts, as in us would be at least probable indications of such passions in our mind, *v. g.* supplying the necessitous, relieving the sorrowful, punishing the vicious, &c. Yet strictly speaking, we are to conceive of all these, as performed by him with the utmost calmness and serenity; and even that complacency, with which God contemplates his own perfections, and the actions and character of the best of his creatures, is of a nature very different from, and vastly superior to, those sallies of joy, which we perceive in ourselves, in the most agreeable situations of life, and when our enjoyments are most refined.

Limborch Theol. l. ii. c. x. § 3.

| *Burnet on the Art. p. 24—27.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be proper here to mention the scheme, which Mr. *Brown* advances in his *Divine Analogy* as of so great importance, and which is built upon a hint in Archbishop *King*.

He pretends, that all we know of God is merely by *Analogy*; *i. e.* from what we see in ourselves and observe in others, compared with events produced by the Divine Being, we conclude, that there is something in God, in some degree *answerable* to those phænomena, though indeed very *different* from them. This analogy, as he maintains, differs much from *metaphor*, which is a mere figure, *v. g.* when we speak of the eye of God, the hand of God, it is a metaphor, God being entirely incorporeal; but when we speak of the knowledge and power of God, it is by analogy.

If he means by this, that the divine manner of knowing and acting is different from ours, or that whatever degree of knowledge and power we possess, bears no proportion to that of the supreme Being, it is what every one will very readily allow, and has generally been asserted by all who believe the existence and infinite perfections of God: but if he intends any thing else, his meaning seems either very unintelligible, or very absurd; so that the scheme, in either of these views, seems utterly unworthy of that vast parade, with which he introduces it, as if the whole of nature and revealed religion depend upon such an explication of the matter.

Archbishop *King* of *Predest.* § 3—6, 8,

9, 37.

Grove on *Wisdom*, p. 42, 43.

Proced. of Understanding, p. 3—6. &c.

132—143.

Divine Anal. c. i.

Law's Notes on King, on the *Orig. of Evil*,
p. 67—70.

PROPOSITION XLVIII.

LECT. LX. To consider some of the most celebrated definitions of virtue, and accounts of the foundation of it, and to compare them with that given, *Def.* 38.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Dr. *Clarke* and Mr. *Balguy* have the same notion with that stated above; as evidently appears from the references to them *Def.* 38. and 36. *Cor.* And those of the *ancients*, who defined virtue, to be *living according to nature*, seem to have meant much the same.

2. Mr. *Wollaston* has placed it in a regard to *truth*: *i. e.* he supposes that not only our words, but our *actions* have a language; when this language is agreeable to the nature of things, then the action is virtuous, but when it implies a false assertion, then it is vicious. This account, though it differs in words,

words, seems entirely to coincide with the former, or evidently to depend upon it.

Rel. of Nat. p. 8—13. & 20—24. | *Grove's Works*, vol. iv. p. 50—54.
Hutcheson on the Pass. p. 253—274.

3. Dr. *Hutcheson* defines *moral goodness*, “to be a quality apprehended in some actions, which produces approbation and love towards the actor, from those who receive no benefit from the action;” and supposes what he calls a *moral sense*, implanted in our natures, or an instinct, like that of self-preservation, which, independent on any arguments taken from the reasonableness and advantage of any action, leads us to perform it ourselves, or to approve it when performed by others.

Hutcheson Inq. Pref. p. 6—8. & p. 101—106.

That there is indeed such a sense, as to some branches of virtue, though in many persons and instances much impaired, is not to be denied, and is well illustrated and proved in

Hutcheson's Inq. p. 107—124. | *Specul.* vol. viii. N^o. 588.

Nor does it imply any innate idea, as some have supposed; any more than the intuitive discerning of self-evident propositions, implies the ideas connected with them to have been innate. *Watts's Ess.* N^o. iv. § 5. p. 108—113.

But Dr. *Hutcheson* has made this instinct to be the very foundation of virtue; and expressly says, that “every good action is supposed to follow from affection to some rational agent;” and that “the true spring of virtue is some instinct, which influences to the love of others, as the moral sense determines us to approve actions flowing from this principle.”

Hutcheson's Inq. p. 143. 153.

But Mr. *Balguy* pleads that this makes virtue an *arbitrary* thing, which might have been contrary to what it is, had the instinct been contrary: that it implies that a creature with intelligence, reason and liberty could not have performed one good action, without this affection: that it makes brutes capable of virtue, since they are capable of affections: that it estimates the excellency of characters by the strength of passions, by no means in our own power; and on the whole, gives us a much less honourable idea of virtue, than the method of stating it, which is taken above: to which we may add, that if we do not conceive of God as an *affectionate* being, such an idea of moral goodness as this, would be inconsistent with that of the divine rectitude.

It may be observed by the way, that though Lord *Shaftesbury* uses many expressions, which Dr. *Hutcheson* has adopted, yet it seems that he in the main falls in with the account given above; since he considers virtue as founded on “the *eternal measure* and immutable *relation of things*,” or in other words as consisting

sisting "in a certain just disposition of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong."

Shaftesbury's Char. vol. ii. p. 36. 40.

We conclude this head with observing, that Dr. *Hutcheson's* definition is liable to some exception; as there may be room to question, what he means by the expression, "those who receive no advantage from the action:" if it be only *the generality of mankind*, it is evidently a vague, uncertain manner of speaking, and for that reason to be declined in so important a definition; but if he means *all rational beings*, then it will remain to be proved, that all these, or even the human species, do necessarily approve and love virtue in all its branches, and all that practise it.

Balguy's Found. of moral Goodness, part i. p. 7—15. 20—22.

LECT.
LXI.

4. Many writers both ancient and modern, have placed virtue in *the imitation of God*: and it must be allowed to be a very noble view of it. Now as it has already been proved, *Prop. 44.* that God is a being of perfect rectitude, it follows, that taking virtue on our definition, it will also be an imitation of God.—But on the whole, this definition did not seem preferable, for two reasons, 1. Because it is difficult to prove the moral perfections of the Divine Being, otherwise than by the medium of an immutable difference in actions, the conformity to which shall be honourable, and the contrary dishonourable. 2: Because, when virtue is said to be an imitation of God, great allowance must be made for the different nature and relations of that blessed Being and ourselves: since there are some things, in which it would be impossible or impious for us to attempt to imitate him; and others, in which it is impossible that he should be an example to us; *i. e.* in all those branches of duty, which suppose either dependence, corporeity, or guilt. There is indeed in these branches of virtue, a *correspondence* between the nature of God and our temper and conduct, but that cannot in strict propriety be called a *resemblance*.

Plato ap. Howe's Blessedn. &c. Tit. | Howe, ib. p. 69—79. Ap. Op. vol. i. p.
Page. *471—475.*

Tillotson, vol. ii. p. 581.

Evans's Christian Temp. vol. i. p. 59—66.

5. Others, and particularly Dr. *Cumberland*, in his *Law of Nature*, have placed the whole of virtue, as in men, in the *love of God*, and *our fellow-creatures*; or to express it in his own words, "The foundation of all natural law is this, the greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all, forms the happiest state of every and of all the benevolent, so far as it is in their power; and is necessarily requisite to the happiest state which they can attain, and therefore the common good is the supreme law."

This is an amiable view of it, and well expresses that principle of gratitude and benevolence, from whence all true virtue in us must flow: but it nearly

coincides with Dr. *Hutcheson's* notion *gr.* 3. and in a great measure with *gr.* 4. for to love God, is to regard him as the centre of happiness, whom therefore we must in all things study to resemble and to please: and thus it is an universal principle, of which the love of our neighbour is a very important branch: and when we are required, to do to others as we would have them do to us, the meaning is, that we must treat them as we could reasonably desire they should treat us, were they in our circumstances and we in theirs. So that here is a reference to the fitness of things according to present circumstances; which plainly shews that precept to be founded on the definition of virtue which we have advanced.

Cumberland's Law of Nat. c. i. § 4. | *Evans's Christian Temper, vol. ii. p. 186*
Hobbes's Leviath. p. 140, sub fin. | —194.

6. *Aristotle*, and other ancient moralists have placed virtue in a *mediocrity*; supposing vice to consist in extremes. But it is evident, that merely from this definition none could know what virtue is; nor can it be determined what is an extreme, till we know what is agreeable to the nature of things: besides there are some branches of virtue, which cannot be carried to an extreme, *v. g.* resignation to the will of God, belief of his promises, &c.

Aristotle's Ethic. l. ii. c. vi. | *Relig. of Nat. p. 24, 25.*
Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, Prol. § 43—45. |

7. Some have placed all virtue in a *wise regard to our own interest*; which seems to have been the opinion of Dr. *Waterland*, Mr. *Clarke* of *Hull*, and Dr. *Rutherford*. Concerning which it may be observed, that the question is not, whether virtue be always most for our interest; (*Vid. Prop. 44. Cor. 2.*) nor whether there be any such thing in nature as disinterested benevolence; (which we shall afterwards examine, *Prop. 50. Schol.*) or whether, supposing there is, all virtue consists in it, so that our own interest should be disregarded; but whether a wise regard to it is the clearest, the most rational and amiable view of virtue in general; which, from what has been said above, evidently appears not to be the case.

C O R O L L A R Y.

From a survey of all these it may appear, that the most considerable writers, whose notions we have examined in the five first steps, have differed from each other, more in expression, than in meaning, in the different views they have given of moral virtue.

P R O P O S I T I O N XLIX.

To estimate the degree of virtue in any given action.

R 2

LECT.
LXII.

SOLU- 

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. There can be no virtue at all in any action, if the agent by whom it is performed has not some idea of the moral fitness of things. Vid. Def. 38.

2. There can be no virtue at all in it, if there be not an ultimate purpose of acting agreeably to that fitness, or from an end, which it is upon the whole virtuous to propose: for if the action be designed merely as a means of obtaining an end which it is vicious to desire and pursue, in that connection it participates of the meanness of the end, how excellent soever it might otherwise have been; and the nobler the motive is, *cæt. par.* the more virtuous is the action.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. i. c. iv. p. 251—258. | *Speet.* vol. iii. N^o. 213.

3. The action must on the whole be *chosen* by the agent, in order to its being virtue in him; otherwise it is not so properly his action, as the action of some other being, whose instrument or organ he at that time is. Vid. Def. 10.

4. It is much debated, whether it be necessary that the being acting should have a *liberty of choice*, (Def. 22,) *i. e.* be able to chuse otherwise. It must be owned, this does not follow from our definition of virtue: nevertheless it may be allowed, that the virtue of a being in a *state of probation* must be founded in a liberty of choice.

Balg. Div. Reet. p. 26—28. | *Grove Div. Wisd.* p. 61—63.

5. It cannot be necessary, that there should be in the general some degree of *affection* in every agent, to render his actions virtuous; for then the Divine Being, if he be free from affections and passions, would be incapable of virtue, contrary to *Prop.* 43. But when passions are wrought into the constitution of any being, as in us, it is indeed very desirable that they should concur with the volition; but if they do not, and a fit action is performed, without any passionate impressions at all, from a rational principle of gratitude to God and regard to the happiness of man, it is still a virtuous action. Vid. *Prop.* 48. gr. 3.

Balguy's Inq. part i. p. 57—60.

Though the degree of virtue in any action is lessened by the degree in which it proceeds from a regard to any private advantage, distinct from virtue itself, (Vid. gr. 2.) yet if any be excited to virtuous actions, in hopes thereby of attaining to a state of complete virtue, the degree of virtue in such actions is not thereby lessened; but this is properly loving virtue for virtue's sake.

Shaftesbury's Char. vol. ii. p. 58—66. | *Balg. Moral Goodn. part ii.* p. 33—38.
Balg. Lett. to a Deist, N^o. i. p. 33—36.

7. When the passions work in a powerful manner on the side of virtue, the force of virtue is in that case less seen, than when they work strongly against it,
and

and a regard to the fitness of things surmounts them. Nevertheless, there may be as great virtue in a being, where there is no struggle at all, as where virtue triumphs over the most violent opposition; otherwise the deity would be incapable of virtue: nay there may be virtue, where the passions plead strongly on its side; otherwise a man would daily grow less capable of exalted degrees of virtue, as he gained a conquest over the irregularities of his passions, which is all most evidently absurd.

Shaftesbury's Char. vol. ii. p. 36—38. | Balguy of Moral Good. part ii. p. 88, 89.

COROLLARY 1.

On nearly the like principles, (*mutat. mutand.*) the degree of *Vice* in any given action may be estimated. The matter is largely stated on both sides in

Hutcheson's Inq. p. 150—168.

LECT.
LXIII.

COROLLARY 2.

It is impossible certainly to pronounce on the degree of moral good in any action, unless we exactly knew the heart of the agent, and also knew the whole of his circumstances and relations, so as to be able confidently to determine, what he could, and what he could not have known concerning the moral fitness, or unfitness of the thing in question. Vid. *Def. 38.*

COROLLARY 3.

God alone can certainly and infallibly judge of the degree of virtue or vice in any given action: much more may this be affirmed concerning the whole of any character.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Dr. *Hutcheson* has attempted to introduce mathematical calculations into these subjects of morality; of which it may not be improper to give a little specimen. It is to be observed, that he undertakes to shew the method of stating the importance of a character, rather than the degree of virtue in any particular action; and his rules are these. Let *M* signify the *moment*, or degree of good produced by the person, whose character is under consideration; *B* the *benevolence* of his temper, and *A* his *ability*: then $M = B \times A$, i. e. in a compound ratio of his benevolence and ability: when in any two beings their abilities are the same, $M = B$: when their benevolence is equal, $M = A$. On the other hand, it appears from the former view, that $B = \frac{M}{A}$ i. e. directly as the moment of good, and inversely as the ability.

When present interest lies on the side of virtue, if *I* express it, then $B = \frac{M - I}{A}$; but if it lies against virtue, then $B = \frac{M + I}{A}$. He adds, that it is the perfection of goodness, when $M = A$, for then the virtue of any two beings com-

compared will be equal, *i. e.* :: 1:1 whatever their abilities are. This he supposes the *Stoics* meant, when they said, the virtue of a wise man was equal to that of the Gods. Yet here by the way, they took it for granted, that a wise man had no regard at all to his own interest, otherwise the assertion on these principles would be false: and if the reasoning *Prop. 45. Schol. 4.* be allowed, this canon cannot be applied to the Divine Being; since A expresses an infinite quantity, and M can only express a finite.

To express the degree of *moral evil* in any character, let μ signify the *degree of evil* produced, and H *hatred* or ill-will; and the former canon (*mut. mutand.*) may be applied.

Hutch. ib. p. 168—174. 177, 178.

SCHOLIUM 2.

How right soever this may be in the general, yet when particular circumstances and characters come to be examined by it, it will be found of little use; since it is hardly possible to express by proportional numbers, the degree of benevolence, the degree of ability for virtuous actions, and the degree in which interest is apprehended and considered for or against them: which must all be exactly adjusted before the preceding canons can be applied.

DEFINITION XLI.

LECT.
LXIV.

Those branches of virtue which more immediately respect God, are called DIVINE, those which respect our fellow-creatures, are called SOCIAL, and those which respect ourselves, HUMAN OR PERSONAL VIRTUES.

PROPOSITION L.

To inquire into the principal branches of divine virtue.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is fit we should often contemplate the Divine Being; since he appears by the foregoing propositions possessed of such illustrious perfections, as well deserve our most attentive thoughts; and since the knowledge of his nature must be of great use, to direct us in the methods of pleasing him, and securing our own happiness.

Wright's, Great Concern, p. 158—163. | Scott's Christian Life, vol. i. p. 85—90.
Ed. 1. p. 151—157.

2. On account of those perfections, it is fit we should humbly adore him, as infinitely superior to all other beings; and that both our souls and bodies should concur in the expression of such adoration.

Wright, ib. p. 182—185. Ed. 1. p. 174—177. | Scott, ib. p. 91—96.

3. For-

Wright, *ib.* p. 200—205. Ed. 1. p. 194—198.
 Scott, *ib.* p. 96—105. | Colliber's *Inq.* p. 11—17.
 Evans's *Serm.* vol. i N^o. viii. p. 167—173.
 Abernethy's *Serm.* vol. ii. N^o. x.

4. Forasmuch as God is the author and disposer of all events, it is fit we should observe, acknowledge, and consider his providential interposition, in all the various occurrences of life.

Wright, ib. p. 163—169. Ed. 1. p. 157—163.

5. In consequence of this his universal providence, in conjunction with his wisdom and goodness, it is fit, we should acquiesce in the determinations of his will, when most contrary to our present interest, or natural inclinations.

Wright, ib. p. 196—199. Ed. 1. p. 189—194. | Scott, ib. p. 115—126.

6. Considering on the one hand his power, and on the other his evident and experienced wisdom and goodness, it is fit, we should trust ourselves to his providential care, as to what is still before us.

Wright, ib. p. 206—208. Ed. 1. p. 200, 201. | *Scott, ib. p. 126—135. Abernethy, vol. ii. N^o. xi.*

7. Seeing all our happiness does entirely depend upon his favour, it is fit we should make it our highest care to please him, by complying with all the intimations of his will, and by imitating the moral perfections of his nature, so far as we are capable of such imitation; which, as was before observed, implies a regard to all the known branches of virtue: (*Prop. 48. gr. 4.*) nevertheless, when considered in this particular view, it is a branch of that duty which we immediately owe to God, and a regard to it should run through the whole of our lives; that even our minutest actions may as far as possible be dignified and sanctified by it.

Wright, ib. p. 192—195. Ed. 1. p. 185—192. | Scott ib. p. 105—115.

See also on this subject the following writers,

Amory's Dial. on Devotion.

Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 4.

Grove's *Ethics*, part ii. c. xix.

! Butler's Serm. N^o. xiii, xiv.

Xenoph. Mem. l. i. c. 4. l. iv. c. 3.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

Faith in the divine declarations is also a branch of divine virtue; but cannot so properly be considered here, as we have not yet examined the evidence of the divine veracity: and we may add, that a diligent inquiry into whatever bears any striking and probable marks of a declaration from heaven, will be a natural consequence of that veneration for God, that love to him, and that care to please him, which were specified in the 2d, 3d, and 7th steps, as branches of divine virtue.

COROLLARY 1.

It is vicious to ascribe supreme divine honour to any other than God alone. Vid. *Prop.* 39.

COROLLARY 2.

It is also vicious to worship God by images, since it tends to sink our conceptions of him, *gr.* 2 & 3.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. 33—36.

| *Crellii Ethic.* l. iii. c. 6. p. 329, 330.

COROLLARY 3.

The desire of foreknowing future contingencies, and all such astrological and magical arts, as some pursue in order to the discovery of them, are to be avoided; as not only tending to vex and disquiet the mind, but also, as in a degree inconsistent with the reverence, submission, and dependence, which we owe to the Divine Being.

<i>Howe's Works</i> , vol. ii. p. 137—144.	<i>More's Theol. Works</i> , p. 240—255.
<i>Turret. loc.</i> v. <i>quæst.</i> 7. § 18.	
<i>Prid. Connect.</i> vol. ii. p. 329—331.	
	<i>Welwood's Memoirs</i> , p. 105—107.

COROLLARY 4.

Great care should be taken, that our inquiries into the nature of the blessed God be made with a becoming reverence, and not in as loose and indifferent a manner, as if we were examining the properties of a mathematical figure, or a mechanical engine.

Nieuwentyt Rel. Phil. vol. i. *Pref.* § 24. | *Boyle on Venerat.* p. 1, 2.

COROLLARY 5.

To blaspheme the name of God, *i. e.* to speak of him in a manner signifying contempt, or hatred, must be a most horrible degree of wickedness.

Wits. Ægyp. l. i. c. v. § 4. l. ii. c. xvi. § 1. | *Barrow's Works*, vol. i. p. 133—137.

COROLLARY 6.

Forasmuch as our obligation to these branches of *divine virtue* is plainly founded on the nature of things, it is evident they give a very defective account of virtue, who confine it, (as the ancients generally did, and those who reject revelation often do,) to *sobriety*, and *benevolence*: and there is great reason to believe, that God as indispensably requires those regards to *himself* before described, as he does *social virtue*: for though on account of the infinite perfections of his nature he cannot require them for his own sake, *i. e.* to advance his own happiness, yet his love to rectitude and order on the one hand, and his regard to the truest happiness of his rational creatures on the other, must engage him absolutely to insist upon them.

Leland against Tind. vol. i. p. 236— | *Leechman's Serm. on the Duty of a Min. p. 36.*
243. | —39. *Glasg. Ed.*

PROPOSITION LI.

To take a general survey of social virtue. *Def. 41.*

LECT.
LXV.

SOLUTION.

The universal rule here is, that virtue obliges us to avoid whatever would be grievous to any of our fellow-creatures, if it be not necessary to procure some greater good; and that we labour to promote the happiness of all about us to the utmost of our power.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Our natures are so constituted, that we cannot but approve of kind and benevolent actions, and abhor those which are malevolent and cruel.

1.2. Every man, by an ill-natured conduct, must expose himself to the hatred and contempt of others.

1.3. By an ill-natured conduct, a man would be exposed to the upbraidings of his own mind.

4. Mutual ill-offices naturally circulate; and it is exceeding probable, that they will at last come home to the man who allows himself in them.

Lettres Persannes, vol. i. N^o. viii.—xi.

Prop. 45. and Prop. 50. Gr. 7. 5. God is good, and therefore a benevolent conduct is an imitation of him, and consequently a branch of virtue.

Gr. 2, 3, 4 & 5. 6. It is reasonable therefore, and consequently virtuous, to avoid doing what is grievous to others, and to do them all the good that we can *i. e.* to, be as benevolent as possible. *Q. E. D.*

Hutcheson's, Inq. Eff. ii. § 5. p. 195— | *Religion of Nat. p. 128, 129.*
222. | *Puffend. de Off. l. i. c. viii. § 1—6.*

COROLLARY I.

Hence it appears, that the rule of loving our neighbour as ourselves, is a summary view of social virtue; which at the same time that it gives the *rule*, suggests the *reason*, as it is most apparent, that our conduct is to be determined, not by considering who the person is, with regard to whom we act, but what the circumstances of his case are.

Religion of Nat. p. 41.

Evans's Christian Temper, vol. ii. p. 168—176.

Butler's Serm. N^o. xi, xii.

COROLLARY 2.

Since life is the foundation of happiness, virtue requires that we should not only forbear taking away the lives of our fellow-creatures, (unless when the good of the whole requires it,) but that we should be ready to preserve their lives, when we can do it without exposing our own, and in our own exposing the whole, to damage at least equal to the advantage that would arise from the preservation of the life or lives supposed to be secured at the expence of ours.

Cic. de Offic. l. iii. c. xxiii. p. 167. Tooley's Ed.

COROLLARY 3.

The law of universal benevolence extends also to *ourselves*; and consequently obliges us to take care to secure our own lives, and to furnish ourselves with the necessary supports of them, if it lie in our power, that we may not be burthensome to others. It also obliges us to act in such a manner, as to preserve our characters fair and untainted; for if they be damaged, our capacity of being useful to others will be proportionably impaired.

COROLLARY 4.

This law of universal benevolence extends itself even to the *brutes*, supposing them capable of sensation, and consequently of pleasure and pain. And though there should be reason to suspect, that the arguments *Prop. 2.* are not conclusive, yet since it is difficult, if not impossible, certainly to prove, that they are mere machines, a virtuous man would be cautious how he abuses them, (especially since they are generally supposed to have sensation,) lest by any degree of cruelty towards them, an habit of cruelty might be contracted or encouraged: nevertheless, as they are capable of but small degrees of happiness in comparison with man, it is fit that their interests should give way to that of the human species, whenever in any considerable article they come in competition with each other.

Puff. Law of Nat. l. iv. c. iii. § 6.

Guardian, vol. i. N^o. 61.

Hale's Contemp. vol. i. p. 293—295.

Foster's Serm. vol. i. N^o. iii.

SCHOLIUM.

As we here dismiss the consideration of benevolence in general, and proceed to particular branches and effects of it; this seems to be the proper place to touch upon the celebrated question, whether, and how far benevolence is to be conceived as *disinterested*. With respect to which, the following remarks seem just and rational.

1. That every man cannot but desire his own happiness, whenever he thinks of it.

2. That this happiness will be more effectually obtained, by a due regard to the public, than by seeking a separate interest; as appears by principles laid down above.

3. That when the connexion of self advantage with benevolent actions is thought of, it seems impossible that it should not also be intended and considered: (gr. 1.) and the principle of universal benevolence, instead of forbidding, will require that some regard should be paid to it, in such a circumstance.

4. That it would be very mean and ungenerous, if it were possible, to seek the happiness of the public, without any affection to it, but merely as an instrument of private good.

5. That when a man feels the highest pleasure in doing good to the public, and even sacrificing his own separate interest to it, he must certainly have a real love for it, which may with some considerable propriety be called *disinterested*, if it be not so in the highest possible sense.

6. That as the happiness of *one* is of little importance, when compared with the happiness of *all*, it seems reasonable, that so far as it is regarded, it should not be made the chief end of actions profitable to the public, nor considered in any other view, than as subordinate to the good of the community, of which each is but one.

7. That the benevolent affections may be so strong, as to prevent any reflection upon the present pleasure, and much more the future advantage of a benevolent action to ourselves.

8. That the mind is so formed, as to reflect with great pleasure and delight on characters and actions, the consideration of which does not immediately affect our own personal interest; and to say, that our complacency in them arises from an apprehension, that the prevalency of such a temper in us would be advantageous to ourselves, seems asserting an evident falshood.

Hutcheson, on Pass. p. 13—26. Inq. p. 160—162.

PROPOSITION LII.

It is consistent with benevolence, and therefore with virtue, that brute animals should be slain for the food of men.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. If animal food be used with moderation, it seems that hereby the happiness of mankind is promoted: this more generous kind of food may afford brisker spirits than a vegetable diet used alone; at least it seems that those who have from their infancy been accustomed to eat flesh, would be exposed to considerable trouble and inconvenience if not to distempers, by entirely leaving it off.

2. The happiness of the brutes is not on the whole diminished but rather promoted by this means: for a violent death does not seem to be near so painful as a natural death, coming upon them by the slow advances of a disease: their life, though it be shortened, yet is not embittered with fear and expectation of death, of which they seem not capable: to which we may add, that out of regard to our own advantage, we take care to feed and defend them, which renders their lives much happier than they would otherwise be; whereas, were they not to be used for food, we must either destroy them without eating their carcases, to prevent their multiplying too fast upon us, or they would destroy each other, consume the vegetable creation, and perhaps grow dangerous to us for want of sufficient food.

3. It is also to be remembered, that where the custom of eating flesh has long prevailed, it ought not to be laid aside without great and important reasons; considering what great numbers of mankind are subsisted, by keeping cattle, and trafficking in them alive or dead.

S C H O L I U M I.

Whereas some have objected, that it is an invasion of the rights of God, as the great Lord of life, to make such havock of the lives of brute-animals, it may be answered,

1. That by appointing it in the course of his providence, that they should multiply so fast, God has made it necessary that many of them should be slain, from whence we may reasonably argue, that he allows us to kill them for food.

2. That in the various classes of animals, it seems that the greater are generally supported by eating the less: not to say, (what yet some have urged,) that the teeth and stomachs of men are so formed, as to intimate that they were intended to feed upon flesh.

3. The agreeable variety of tastes, which God has given to the flesh of many birds, beasts, and fishes, is a further presumption that he designed them for our food, and consequently meant to give us a liberty of taking away their lives.

4. Most vegetables, when they come to be examined by microscopes, swarm with multitudes of small animals, which live in and upon them; so that a man, who should scruple destroying animals, would hardly be able to find a subsistence,

at

at least not without resigning some of the finest vegetables, and so frustrating the kind purpose of providence in creating them.

<p><i>Reynolds's Lett. to a Deist</i>, N^o. i. <i>præf.</i> p. 24—61. <i>Thomson's Spring</i>, ver. 336—378. ——— <i>Autumn</i>, ver. 1089—1124. <i>Ovid's Met.</i> l. xv. ver. 50—152.</p>	<p><i>Puffend. Law of Nat.</i> l. iv. c. iii. § 4, 5. <i>Nature Displayed</i>, part i. p. 44—49. <i>Fitzosborne's Let.</i> N^o. viii. <i>Clarke's Orig. of Evil</i>, p. 266—295.</p>
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SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless care should be taken, not to add any unnecessary circumstances of terror and pain to their death, nor should we accustom ourselves to sport with their lives.

Doddridge on Education, p. 22, 23. | *Delany on Rel. Dut.* p. 92.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have objected, that several of the arguments used in the proposition extend not to *fish*. But it is answered, that if a right of killing terrestrial animals for food be established, there seems little reason for scrupling to use fish in the like manner; it seems a part of the scheme agreeable to the rest: and the instinct, which brings them in shoals at certain times to the shore, seems an intimation that they are intended for human use.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It seems an instance of the goodness of the Divine Being, that he has in the course of his providence appointed the greater part of animals to die by some sudden violence, rather than by a lingering decay, in which on the whole they would suffer a great deal more, than they can do in the few painful moments which generally attend their death, when slain by men, or when devoured by each other, in which perhaps surprise and astonishment take off much of the sense of pain.

PROPOSITION LIII.

To inquire how the parts and fruits of the earth ought to distributed for the use of its inhabitants, before any mutual agreement is made between them, *i. e.* considering things in a *state of nature*. LECT. LXVII.

SOLUTION.

1. If there be enough of each, every one may take what he first lights on.
2. When he has thus taken it, another person ought not to seize upon it without his leave, but should rather take some other part not so occupied.
3. Never-

3. Nevertheless, if there be not enough for each, he who has possessed himself of more than is necessary for his own subsistence, ought to impart some of it to him who is not capable of thus providing for himself. Vid. *Prop.* 51.

4. If necessary supplies be denied to a person incapable of providing otherwise for himself, he may seize on the possessions of another; nevertheless with this proviso, that no one shall be destroyed by such a seizure, whose life is of more importance to the whole community than that of the person who makes the seizure. Vid. *Prop.* 51. *Cor.* 2.

5. Nevertheless, it is not requisite that an equal distribution should be made; since on the one hand, each has in common cases a right to the fruits of his own industry, on the principles laid down above, *gr.* 1, 2. and on the other, it is for the good of society in general, that some should be richer than the rest, seeing there are many civil offices to be performed in life, which might become matter of dangerous debate, if some persons were not by the straitness of their circumstances induced voluntarily to perform them.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

The demonstration appears from *Prop.* 51. *Sol.* and *Cor.* 2. for it is evident, that these rules will promote the happiness of mankind in general.

Locke on Gov. l. ii. c. v.

Grot. de Jure Belli & Pac. l. ii. c. ii. § 2.

| *More's Utopia*, p. 78—98.

S C H O L I U M I.

It seems that *usury* is not in general to be condemned, provided it be no more than is proportionable to that gain which the person borrowing receives from the loan; especially among men, who subsist not merely by agriculture and grazing and manual arts, but by trade or merchandise; since it is evident that among such, the money might turn to better account to the owners, than in the former case; and consequently the owners would have a just claim to some equivalent, for the advantage they forego in favour of the borrower. Nevertheless, in exacting this, virtue requires a compassionate regard to any calamitous circumstances, which may render the borrower incapable of paying interest, or perhaps the principal.

Puff. Law of Nat. l. v. c. vii. § 8—12. | *Grot. de Jure*, l. ii. c. xii. § 21.

S C H O L I U M 2.

Many things continue yet common, and are not become the property of any, there being enough to suffice all; some of them not being capable of occupation by one person alone, and others such that the property of them would not be useful to any, *v. g.* wild beasts and birds, air, insects, sea-water. Whether the sea can come into property, has been warmly disputed: *Grotius* denies it in

in his *Mare Liberum*, and Selden asserts it in his *Mare Clausum*: but it would be tedious and unnecessary to give a view of their arguments here.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. ii. § 3—5. | *Puff. ib. l. iv. c. v. § 5—10.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

Property in any degree ceases, when the thing is abandoned by the former possessor: and the security of mankind seems to require, that when any thing has been long in the possession of a person, family, or nation, it should continue with them, if for a considerable time the original possessor has entered no claim upon it. Perhaps hereby that former possessor may suffer some damage; yet there would be so much room for fraud and litigation, were antiquated claims often to be revived, that on the whole, they would undoubtedly occasion greater trouble than advantage to mankind; and it is impossible to lay down any general rules, which would not in some instances bear hard on the innocent and virtuous.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. iv. § 3—9 | *Puffend. ib. l. iv. c. xii. § 8.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

Perhaps upon these principles, that kind of theft, which was permitted by the *Spartan* law, might be justified; as by making such a law, the proprietors seemed voluntarily to have relinquished their property to those who could seize it in such circumstances: but how far it was on the whole prudent to do it, is difficult to determine, without stating the matter more largely than would be convenient here.

Rollin Man. vol. iii. p. 340—347.

DEFINITION XLII.

That verbal proposition is said to be ETHICALLY TRUE, in which we join those relations, attributes, or properties, which *seem to us* to belong to any idea, and separate those, which *seem to us* not to belong to it; but it is then LOGICALLY TRUE, when we join those that *do really* agree, and separate those which *do not*. LECT. LXVIII.

COROLLARY I.

A proposition *logically* true, may be *ethically* false, and *vice versa*.

COROLLARY 2.

Propositions directly contrary to each other, in the mouths of different persons, may both be *ethically*, though not *logically* true.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM.

Ethical truth is sometimes divided into *veracity*, *i. e.* a conformity of our words to our thoughts, and *faithfulness*, *i. e.* a conformity of our actions to our words: the last seems to be limited to words expressing a purpose of doing good to another.

DEFINITION XLIII.

That proposition, in which we culpably violate ethical truth, is said to be A LIE.

Puffend. ib. l. iv. c. i. § 8.

PROPOSITION LIV.

Virtue requires that ethical truth should be preserved among men in their discourses with each other.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Speech may be useful in spreading the knowledge of those things, which may advance the happiness of mankind.
2. In order to render it thus useful, it is necessary that a person should be believed.
3. If ethical truth be not regarded, the person speaking cannot be believed.
4. The violation of ethical truth has generally been regarded as infamous, and persons who allow themselves in it, do thereby necessarily subject themselves to great contempt, and so greatly impair both their comfort and usefulness.

1, 2, 3 & 4 | 5. *Valet propositio.*

Puffend. ib. § 7, 10.

Watts's Serm. vol. ii. p. 168—170.

| *Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 11.*

| *Grove's Ethics, vol. ii. part ii. c. xi.*

COROLLARY I.

It is injurious to virtue, to allow ourselves to abuse the ambiguity of words, in such a manner as thereby to lead others into a mistake, since most of the ill consequences which follow from direct lying, do also follow from such equivocations and mental reservations.

Puffend. ib. § 13, 14.

Grot. ib. § 10.

| *Burnet's Ess. on Queen Mary, p. 63, 64.*

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue forbids our deceiving others by *actions*, as well as by words; since the reasoning of the proposition does not depend upon making use of articulate

culate sounds, or written characters, but upon any method taken to communicate our ideas to each other.

Puffend. ib. § 2.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this some have added a further argument, taken from the *nature* of ethical truth, which separate from all its *effects*, seems to imply something in it so sacred, that a violation of it is dishonourable and contemptible, and therefore vicious, though no damage should arise to ourselves or others from such a violation; especially considering, that God is the witness of every falshood, and consequently it is a kind of indignity offered to him, to utter any thing in his presence which he knows to be contrary to our own knowledge. This some have expressed by saying, God has given us a *sense*, by which we unavoidably delight in the truth, nor is it in our own power, so far to reconcile ourselves to falshood, as to approve of a scheme, in which any given degree of happiness should be produced by falshood, so well as one, in which it should be produced by truth.

Balg. Law of Truth, p. 4—12. | Butler's Anal. p. 316—318. 4to Ed.

SCHOLIUM 2.

From hence arises a question of considerable difficulty and importance; whether it may be in any case lawful, to speak what is ethically false.

Those who maintain the principles of the former scholium must deny it: but those who place the obligation to ethical truth merely on the principles laid down in the proposition, affirm, that if in any case, the happiness of mankind may be more effectually promoted by falshood than truth, in that case, falshood ceases to be a vice and becomes a virtue; and they suppose that many such cases actually occur; and that on these principles, it is lawful to use falshood in our discourses with persons that are distracted, with infants and sick men, with a melancholy man, and those who inquire after the truth, with a design of doing that injury by the knowledge of it, which without it they would not have been able to effect.

This must be acknowledged a controversy of very great difficulty. Perhaps it is not possible for any human or finite understanding to determine, whether the universal observation of truth would be more for the advantage of the rational creation, than the violation of it in some imaginable particulars: but as it is certain that the generality of mankind are too prone to artifice and deceit, and would be ready to abuse the doctrine of the innocence of falshood in any case, we should be very cautious of maintaining it; and an honest, generous, and religious man, if he errs at all, would rather chuse to err on the side of truth. And perhaps a regard expressed to it, even in circumstances, where it could not be maintained, without great danger and seeming ill consequences

to ourselves, might make such impressions on the minds of very bad men, as might prove of service to the cause of virtue and the happiness of mankind; especially considering the unlimited power which God has over all the thoughts of mens hearts, and all the circumstances and occurrences of their lives: and it will be seen, when we come to inquire into the evidence of the divine veracity, that this attribute of the Deity is incapable of being proved, if the opinion which we are here opposing be admitted. To all which we may add, that the supposed lawfulness of speaking falsely in great emergencies for the preservation of life, might also be extremely mischievous to mankind, by depriving them of all instances of martyrdom for religion; and is indeed a maxim so dangerous to human society, that it seems, that a wise and benevolent man, who firmly believes it, would on his own principles teach the contrary. And after all, if the principle itself were granted, yet many of the instances mentioned above, seem of too trivial a nature, to justify having recourse to a falsehood; and in particular, nothing can be more dangerous to children, than to be taught to lie, by the example of their parents and governors.

Puffend. ib. § 9, 10, 15, 16, 18.

Barberac's Notes, ib. l. iv. c. i. § 7.

Grot. ib. l. iii. c. i. § 12—14.

Watts's Serm. vol. ii. App. p. 207—219.

Religion of Nat. p. 29, 30.

Cambray's Telemach. l. iii. p. 57—59.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, allowance is to be made for the change which custom may have introduced into the signification of words, which has brought some expressions of complaisance and kindness, in most civilized nations, to so loose an import, that a man has no room to imagine, they will be interpreted rigorously, according to their utmost literal extent, and therefore need not be scrupulous about the use of them; *v. g.* as if he could not say, "he was at a friend's service," unless he intended thereby to make himself a *slave*.

Puffend. de Jure, l. iv. c. i. § 6.

Spectator, vol. viii. No. 557.

Tillotson, vol. ii. p. 5, 6.

DEFINITION XLIV.

LECT. A PROMISE is any speech, or other sign, by which we signify to another person a present determinate purpose, of transferring to him a part of our property or liberty, which nevertheless he is not actually to possess, till after some time.

DEFINITION XLV.

A mutual promise, or agreement of two or more persons with each other, may be called a COVENANT, whether the performance of one of the parties, be, or be not the condition of obliging the other: but it is in the former case, called a conditional covenant.

COROLLARY.

There is some foundation for distinguishing between *conditional promises*, and *pacts* or *covenants*; not only, as each party in a covenant may be absolutely bound to the performance of his part, without waiting to see whether the other will perform his, but also, as there may be a *conditional* promise, which is not *mutual*, whereas every covenant must necessarily be mutual.

Puffend. de Jure, l. iii. c. viii. § 8.

PROPOSITION LV.

Virtue requires that promises be fulfilled.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 54 | 1. Ethical truth, and therefore virtue requires, that when I declare a fixed purpose of giving or doing any thing, I should really intend it.

Gr. 1. Def. 44. | 2. The promisee, *i. e.* the person to whom the promise is made, acquires a property in virtue of the promise.

3. The uncertainty of property would evidently be attended with great inconvenience.

4. By failing to fulfil my promise, I either shew, that I was not sincere in making it, or that I have little constancy or resolution, and either way injure my character, and consequently my usefulness in life.

1, 3 & 4. *Prop. 51. Cor. 4.* | 5. Virtue requires that promises should be fulfilled.

Watts's Serm. vol. ii. p. 146.

| *Grove's Ethics, vol. ii. part ii. c. xii.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

A man is not bound by a naked *assertion*, as he is by a promise; nevertheless, when he makes such an assertion, he ought to intend to act according to it, (*Prop. 54.*) and when publickly made he should not lightly change it, lest his character for wisdom and resolution should thereby suffer.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 2—4. | *Puffend. ib. l. iii. c. v. § 5—7.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless there are some excepted cases, in which virtue does not oblige us to fulfil our promises, because the reasons mentioned in the proposition do not extend to them, *v. g.*

1. If a promise was made by us, before we came to such exercise of reason, as to be fit to transact affairs of moment; or if by any distemper, or sudden surprise,

Excepted cases in which a promise is not binding. PART III.

we are deprived of the exercise of our reason, at the time when the promise is made.

Locke of Educ. p. 192—195.

Puffend. ib. l. iii. c. vi. § 5.

| *Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 5—7.*

2. If the promise made was on a false presumption, in which the promiser, after the most diligent inquiry, was imposed upon, especially if he were deceived by the fraud of the promisee.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xi. § 6. l. ii. c. xiii. § 4. | Puffend. ib. l. iii. c. vi. § 6—8.

3. If the thing itself be vicious; for virtue cannot require that vice should be committed.

Puffend. ib. l. iii. c. vii. § 6, 7.

| *Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 8.*

Under this head, we may rank the giving a reward for an evil action.

Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 8.

| *Puffend. ib. l. iii. c. vii. § 8.*

4. If the accomplishment of the promise be so hard and intolerable, that there is reason to believe, that had it been foreseen, it would have been an excepted case.

Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xvi. § 27.

| *Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. x.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

If the promise be not accepted, or if it depend on conditions not performed, the non-performance of the promise is so evidently justifiable, that it seems hardly worth while to insert this among the catalogue of excepted cases.

Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xi. § 14, 15. ib. l. iii. c. xix. § 14.

DEFINITION XLVI.

LECT.
LXX.

AN OATH is a solemn appeal to God, as the witness of the truth of some facts asserted, or of our sincere resolution to perform some promise made, renouncing our claim to the divine favour, or imprecating his displeasure upon ourselves either implicitly or explicitly, in case of falshood.

COROLLARY.

It is vicious to swear by any creature, since that is in effect ascribing to such a creature a degree of knowledge and power, which seems peculiar to God. Nevertheless, if without the express mention of the name of God, there be a secret appeal to him, in that case we swear by him ultimately, and not so much by the creature we mention, v. g. if I swear by my head, or my child,

meaning thereby, "may the divine vengeance fall on my head or my child, if I swear falsely."

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 11. | *Puffend. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 3.*
Puffend. de Offic. Hom. l. i. c. xi. § 3.

SCHOLIUM.

A *vow* is a promise made to God: if any express or implicit imprecation attend it, it is evidently an *oath*: but as vows are made with different degrees of solemnity, some of them may, and some of them may not be oaths. Yet as an address to God is made by them, they necessarily approach nearer to an oath than a promise made to our fellow-creatures.

DEFINITION XLVII.

PERJURY is the use of an oath in confirmation of an assertion, known, apprehended or suspected to be false; or the wilful violation of a promise, which by an oath we had bound ourselves to perform.

COROLLARY.

As when a person swears that a thing is so and so, he is in all reason to be understood to assert, that he certainly knows that it is so; the guilt of perjury may be contracted, even where a man believes a thing is as he asserts, if he has not a competent and determinate knowledge of the thing.

PROPOSITION LVI.

Perjury is a very heinous crime.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. It is plainly inconsistent with the reverence due to the Divine Being; as it implies, either that we do not believe his omniscience, or fear his displeasure, either of which is contrary to *Prop. 51*.

2. Mankind have in all ages professed some peculiar reverence for an oath, so that it has been used to determine controversies, and seal the most solemn mutual engagements.

2. 3. Faith among men would be still more injured by perjury, than by a false assertion, or promise uttered without an oath; since therefore these have been shewn to be detrimental to mankind, (*Prop. 54, 55.*) this must be yet more so.

4. Perjury has always been esteemed a very detestable thing, and those who have been proved guilty of it have been looked upon as the pests of society.

1, 3 & 4, 5. Perjury, being thus dishonourable to God, injurious to others, and to ourselves, is a great crime. Q. E. D.

Occasional Paper, vol. i. N^o. vii. p. 5—12. | *Barrow's Works*, vol. i. Sermon. xv.
Puffend. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 2.

COROLLARY I.

Care should be taken, that we do not impair the reverence due to an oath, by using or imposing oaths upon trifling occasions, or administering them in a careless manner.

Occasional Paper, *ib.* p. 22—24.

COROLLARY 2.

The reverence of an oath requires, that we take peculiar care to avoid ambiguous expressions in it, and all equivocation and mental reservation. Vid. *Prop.* 54. *Cor.* 1.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 3. | *Tully de Offic.* l. i. § 13.
Puffend. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 12—15.

SCHOLIUM I.

Something of this kind may be said of *subscription to articles of religion*, these being looked upon as solemn actions, and nearly approaching to an oath. Great care ought to be taken, that we subscribe nothing that we do not firmly believe. If the signification of the words be dubious, and we believe either sense, and that sense in which we do believe them is as natural as the other, we may consistently with integrity subscribe them: or if the sense in which we believe them be less natural, and we explain that sense, and that explication be admitted by the person requiring the subscription in his own right, there can be no just foundation for a scruple. Some have added, that if we have reason to believe, (though it is not expressly declared,) that he who imposes the subscription, does not intend that we should hereby declare our *assent* to those articles, but only that we should pay a compliment to his authority, and engage ourselves not openly to contradict them, we may in this case subscribe what is most directly contrary to our belief: or that if we declare our belief in any book, as for instance the bible, it is to be supposed that we subscribe other articles, only so far as they are consistent with that; because we cannot imagine, that the law would require us to profess our belief of contrary propositions at the same time. But subscription upon these principles, seems a very dangerous attack upon sincerity and public virtue, especially in those designed for public offices.

Burnet on the Art. p. 6—9. | 20—26. *Ed.* 2. p. 23—29.
Clarke on the Trinity, *Introd.* *Ed.* 1. p. | *Conybeare's Sermon on Subscript.* p. 24—31.

SCHOLIUM 2.

If we have bound ourselves by an oath to do a thing detrimental to our interest, we ought to submit to great inconveniencies rather than violate it: but if the nature of the oath be absolutely and evidently unlawful, we are not bound by it: and it is certain, that in some of the cases mentioned above, in which virtue allows the violation of promises, it may also permit our acting contrary to our oaths; with this proviso, that in proportion to the greater solemnity of the latter, the case should be more weighty and urgent.

Grot. ib. l. ii. c. xiii. § 4.

Baxter's Works, vol. i. p. 572.

Puffend. de Jure, l. iv. c. ii. § 9, 10.

SCHOLIUM 3.

If a conditional covenant, (*Def. 45.*) be mutually confirmed by an oath, the breach of the condition on one side evidently dissolves the other party from his obligation; which by the way justifies the *Revolution* in *England* in 1688, though many of the persons principally concerned had sworn allegiance to King *James*.

Occas. Paper, vol. i. N^o. vii. p. 12—16.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Grotius is mistaken, if he maintains, (as some have asserted he does,) that by an oath we always promise something to God, and that for this reason an oath must in no case be violated. It appears from the definition of an oath, that the former of these propositions is false, and from the second scholium, that if it were true, the inference drawn from it would be inconclusive: but the following passage, which some have quoted to prove this to be his opinion, is far from containing it.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 14, 15.

DEFINITION XLVIII.

MARRIAGE is a covenant between man and woman, in which they mutually promise cohabitation, and a continual care to promote the comfort and happiness of each other.

LECT.
LXXI.

PROPOSITION LVII.

Virtue requires that mankind should only be propagated by marriage.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. A more endearing friendship, and consequently a greater pleasure arises from continued cohabitation, than could arise from the promiscuous use of

of women; where there could be little room for a tender, generous, and faithful friendship between the sexes.

2. The promiscuous use of women would naturally produce a great deal of jealousy, bitter mutual contentions, and a variety of other passions, from which marriage when preserved inviolate very much secures.

3. Experience teaches that a promiscuous commerce between the sexes is very unfavourable to propagation, at least for producing a healthful offspring; and would prove the means of spreading to a fatal degree the venereal infection.

4. The weakness and disorders, to which women are subject during pregnancy, require, that both out of regard to them and the future race of mankind, they should be tenderly taken care of; and that during their confinement they should be comfortably maintained: now there is none, from whom these offices of friendship can be so reasonably expected, as from the person who apprehends himself the father of the child; but without marriage, no man could ordinarily have the security of being so.

5. The education of children is much better provided for by this means, both with respect to maintainance, instruction, and government, while each knows his own, and the care and authority of both parents concurs in the work; to which that of the father is generally on the whole of the greatest importance.

6. The regular descent of patrimony, being the consequence of fathers knowing their children, is better provided for by marriage, than it could be without it; which by the way is a great encouragement to industry and frugality.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6. 7. The happiness both of men and women, and of the rising generation, is on the whole more effectually secured by marriage, than it would be by the promiscuous use of women; therefore mankind ought only to be propagated this way. *Q. E. D.*

Puffend. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 5.

Wits. Ægypt. l. ii. c. vi. § 13—15.

Baxt. Works, vol. i. p. 314. A. vol. ii. p. 31. B.

Ostervald of Unclean. § 1. c. i. p. 4—10.

Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 3. c. ii.

Mil. Parad. Lost, l. iv. ver. 750—770.

COROLLARY 1.

Those unnatural lusts, commonly known by the name of bestiality and sodomy, are to be greatly detested, not only as actions, whereby the dignity of human nature is in the most infamous degree debased, but also as alienating the mind from marriage, which is so important a band of society.

COROLLARY 2.

Those who seduce single women to violate their chastity, are guilty of a very great crime; as thereby they discountenance marriage, and bring on persons so debauched, and the families to whom they are related, great calamity and indelible infamy.

Guardian, vol. ii. N^o. 123.

COROL-

COROLLARY 3.

All those things, which tend to cherish wandering lusts, are for that reason to be avoided, as lascivious actions, and unclean words, which generally lead on by a strong impulse to greater irregularities.

Speet. vol. iv. N^o. 286. | Ofterv. of Unclean. Pref. p. 16. ib. § 1. c. vii. p. 60—72.

COROLLARY 4.

Since marriage is of so great importance to the happiness of mankind, it is plain that it ought not to be dissolved upon any trifling consideration; since uncertain marriages would be attended with many of the same inconveniencies, as the promiscuous use of women, and would differ from it little more than in name.

Puffendorf de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 20.

PROPOSITION LVIII.

To enumerate the principal duties of the married state.

SOLUTION.

LECT.
LXXII.

1. Virtue requires that both parties preserve their fidelity to each other inviolate.
2. They should study in every instance to promote each other's comfort and happiness.
3. They are to contribute their respective parts towards the maintenance and education of their children.

Delany on Relat. Dut. N^o. ii, iii.

DEMONSTRATION.

The obligation to perform these several duties arises, from the nature of the engagements into which the parties have entered; (*Def. 48.*) and from the tendency which such a conduct will have to secure their mutual happiness and that of their families.

PROPOSITION LIX.

Virtue requires that no man should at the same time have more than one wife, and no woman more than one husband.

PART I.

No man should have more than one wife at a time.

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DEMONSTRATION.

1. The number of females, so far as we can judge by the best computation, is not entirely equal to the number of males, in the human species. Vid. *Prop.* 27. *Dem.* 4. *gr.* 4.

Derham's Phys. Theol. p. 175, 176. | *Reflect. on Polyg.* p. 4—7.

1. | 2. Should polygamy prevail, there would not be females enow to supply all the males, consequently many of them must be deprived of the advantage of marriage: not to mention, how far it might be the occasion of those hateful and destructive practices, of sodomy and eviration.

Reflect. on Polyg. p. 32—34.

2. | 3. Quarrels would probably arise between those men, who endeavoured to possess themselves of more women than one, and those who were by this means deprived of partners in life; which might be attended with fatal consequences on both sides, should polygamy very much prevail.

4. The jealousy of the wives would probably make them very unhappy, were several women to share among them the affection and care of the same man; and it would occasion many caballings, and mutual endeavours to supplant each other in his affections, by which the peace of families would be greatly disturbed; not to mention the frequent adulteries that might be expected, if there was not a strict guard. Vid *Gen.* xxix, xxx.

5. The discords of the mothers might be communicated to the children; and so not only alienate their hearts from the father, and thereby prevent the efficacy of his care for their education, but also prevent a due harmony between them in riper years, and lay a foundation for quarrels to be transmitted to the next generation.

6. The master of the family would have his part in all this uneasiness; and would find it hardly possible to preserve his own quiet in any tolerable degree, without sacrificing the peculiar pleasure of having one intimate and best beloved friend, with whom to converse with the highest endearment: and if he had any true taste of the sublimest pleasures of friendship, the gratification of appetite with a variety of women must appear but a poor equivalent for such a sacrifice.

7. The practice of polygamy may leave room to a married man to be continually entering upon new amours, and treaties with respect to other women; which would keep the mind in an uneasy agitation, and greatly divert him from applying to cares of the greatest importance to the happiness of his family and of the public, and expose him thereby to many obvious inconveniences.

2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7. | 8. Since polygamy is thus pernicious to the interest of the husband, wife and children, and if it commonly prevailed, to that of

so many single persons, virtue requires that one man should have but one wife at a time. Q. E. D.

Burnet's Life of Rochest. p. 112, 113. | *Reflect. on Polyg.* p. 13—19.
Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 16—19. | *L'Esprit des Loix*, vol. i. l. xvi. c. ii—vii.
Salmon's State of Turkey, p. 411—416.

COROLLARY.

It is yet more evidently unlawful for him who has married one wife, with a promise of confinement to her, afterwards to take a second. Vid. Prop. 55.

SCHOLIUM I.

Some have argued in favour of the proposition, that it would prevent the over-stocking the world with inhabitants, which would be the consequence of polygamy. But we have waved that argument,

1. Because it seems that the contrary is true, *i. e.* that the number of mankind is lessened rather than increased by polygamy, which is a direct consequence from *grad.* 1. for it is plain, that ten women for instance would be like to have more children by ten men, than by one, especially in some length of years; considering how much the body might be weakened, by that luxury with which seraglios are generally attended: and accordingly it is found in fact, that there is the greatest increase of men, where polygamy is not used, as the author of the reflections on that subject has proved, in an accurate and convincing manner. But

2. If it were fact, that polygamy would increase the number of mankind, it would be an argument *for* it, rather than *against* it: for it is certain, the earth with proper cultivation would be capable of maintaining a much greater number of inhabitants, than at present subsist upon it; and so many general calamities have from age to age interposed to thin their numbers, that it is hardly to be imagined, they will ever grow insupportably great. In the mean time, that polygamy lessens the number, is an additional argument that it is contrary to the happiness of the species, and therefore to virtue.

Reflect. on Polyg. Diff. vi, vii.

PART 2.

One woman should have but one husband at a time.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Several of the arguments urged in the preceding demonstration will (*mut. mutandis*) prevail here; especially those taken from the proportion of the sexes, mutual jealousy, and the want of peculiar endearments arising from one most intimate friend.

U 2

2. The

2. The offspring would be thereby rendered uncertain, and healthful propagation prevented, by which the main purposes of marriage would be evidently defeated. *Prop.* 57.

1 & 2. 3. *Valet propositio.*

Puffend. ib. l. vi. c. i. § 15.

SCHOLIUM.

This has appeared so intolerable a thing, that it has hardly been practised by any nation on earth, unless some very barbarous people are to be excepted. On the contrary, it has almost universally been made a main branch of the marriage covenant, that with regard to matrimonial converse, a wife should be the property of one husband alone, and those women have been accounted infamous, who have violated this engagement.

L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvi. c. v. | *Temple's Hist. of Engl. p. 14—16.*

PROPOSITION LX.

To inquire to whom virtue prohibits marriage.

LECT.
LXXIII.
}

SOLUTION.

1. In general, it is not advisable that marriage should be contracted by those, who, by reason of their unripe age, or some natural or accidental defect in their understanding, are destitute of reason, and so incapable of making a proper choice, or behaving themselves aright in the conjugal state.

Puffend. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 26.

2. It is prohibited to those who are evidently incapable of propagation, unless they marry with others in the like condition with themselves: otherwise by their incapacity, the great end of marriage would be frustrated, and a foundation laid for a perpetual jealousy, and many other irregular passions.

Puffend. ib. § 25.

Ricaut's Ott. Court, p. 293.

| *Lettres Persannes, N^o. 41.*

3. To those who labour under any distemper of body, or distraction of mind which would probably be conveyed to their offspring.

4. To those who are already married, and whose consorts are yet living, virtue forbids marriage, upon the principles of the preceding proposition, while the former marriage continues undissolved: and whereas among us, one man and one woman have been mutually appropriated to each other, it is yet more evidently and universally unlawful for either to marry a third person, without the consent of the other, as it is a breach of the marriage covenant: whether it may

may be lawful when such consent is gained, even supposing the preceding proposition to hold good, *i. e.* whether marriage may be dissolved by mutual consent, will be inquired in the next proposition.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 11.

5. It has generally been said, that marriage is unlawful to those who are nearly allied by blood or affinity. The chief reasons assigned against such marriages are,

1. That in some cases, the duties of other relations would be plainly confounded by them, as in case of a mother's marrying her son.

2. Friendship by this means would be less widely diffused; and covetous parents would hinder their wealth from being communicated, perhaps on these principles even forcing the elder brethren to marry their sisters, however contrary to their inclination; which must be the source of great calamity to them, as well as detriment to others.

3. By prohibiting these marriages, provision is made against some temptations to unchastity, arising from the more frequent converse of near relations.

4. There seems to be something generally in the constitution of our natures abhorring such marriages, if the relations are near, which has rendered them infamous among most civilized nations: though it must be owned the *Egyptians* and *Persians* were an exception to this rule; however among the *European* nations, it prevails in its full force.

Puff. ib. § 28, 32, 34.

| L'Esprit des Loix, vol. ii. l. xxvi. c. xiv.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Notwithstanding what has been said, it must be owned very difficult to fix the degrees of affinity, or consanguinity, within which marriage is unlawful, and if mankind ever have been or should be in such circumstances, that a brother could have no wife but his own sister, most of the arguments urged above would cease, and the rest must give way to such a necessity.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The argument urged *gr. 5.* concludes much more strongly against marrying with those nearly related by *blood*, than by affinity.

Puff. ib. § 35.

PROPOSITION LXI.

To inquire in what cases marriage may be rightly dissolved.

SOLU-

SOLUTION.

1. It is no doubt dissolved by the adultery of either party, which is an apparent breach of the most fundamental article of the covenant. *Def.* 48. and *Prop.* 55.

2. For the same reason, it is dissolved upon the obstinate desertion of one of the parties, since thereby the covenant is also broken.

Life of Galeacius Caracciolus.

3. It is questioned whether marriage may be dissolved, on account of the unkind behaviour of one of the married persons. In one view, it may appear reasonable that it should, since consulting their mutual happiness and comfort is a branch of the marriage covenant: yet when we consider what damage might arise to the innocent offspring, how frequently complaints of this kind occur among married people, how generally in this case both parties are to blame, and on these accounts how uncertain marriage would be rendered, if the dissolution of it in this case should be allowed, it seems on the whole more for the happiness of mankind, that some who are in these unhappy circumstances should bear their calamity, than that they should be eased of it on terms so hazardous to the security and happiness of many more. To which we may also add, that the consideration of marriage as an indissoluble bond may engage both husband and wife, out of regard to their own peace, to be careful to govern their passions, so as not to make it mutually intolerable; in which exercise of wisdom and virtue, each party may find a very great account.

4. Marriage may not be dissolved, as many other covenants may, by the consent of the parties; if it might, marriages might frequently be contracted almost in jest, or merely in some views of present indulgence: and when one party was weary of the bond, very indirect measures might be used to procure the consent of the other to dissolve it; and thus a state of things would probably be introduced into the world, little different from that which marriage was intended to prevent.

5. Neither ought marriage to be dissolved, merely on account of barrenness, unless one of the parties evidently appears to have been under some natural incapacity before the contract; otherwise it would be difficult to fix the time when such a dissolution should take place, and great room would be left for fraudulent separations.

6. Neither are marriages to be dissolved, on account of any concealed deformity of body, or flaw in estate; though it be allowed very criminal and foolish, for any to impose upon another in a matter of so great importance.

Milton's Prose Works, p. 5—12.

Puff. l. vi. c. i. § 20—22. 24.

Lettres Persannes, vol. ii. N°. 102.

Locke on Government, part ii. § 78—81.

Reeves's Apol. vol. i. p. 187, 188.

More's Utopia, p. 141—144.

C O R O L -

COROLLARY.

Since the marriage bond is of so strict a nature, it ought never to be formed without the most mature consideration; nor should any be forced into it by the authority of superiors, contrary to their own inclinations.

DEFINITION XLIX.

CONCUBINAGE is a sort of marriage, in which the woman by agreement of both parties is to be considered as a servant in the family, and express provision is made, that her children shall not have such a right of possession and inheritance, as the children of the primary wife. LECT. LXXIV.

SCHOLIUM.

It appears by *Prop. 59. part 1.* that the taking a concubine during the life of another wife is generally at least to be avoided: and it seems, that he who never marries any woman but as a concubine, neither pays due respect to the female sex, nor sufficiently consults his own happiness, in a free and ingenuous friendship: yet perhaps, in case of a second marriage, where the children by a former wife are living, concubinage is not altogether to be condemned, if the constitution of the country permit it.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 36. l. iv. c. xi. § 9. | Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 15.

PROPOSITION LXII.

Virtue requires that parents should take peculiar care of their own children.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The state of infancy is so feeble, that if tender care were not taken of young children, they would die quickly after their birth.

2. In childhood, on account of the weakness of reason, they are incapable of providing for themselves.

3. It is evidently of importance to themselves and the public, not only that their lives be taken care of, but that their minds be formed to virtuous and pious sentiments, of which they are at first void, not to say that many at least seem strongly inclined to the contrary.

1, 2, 3. *Prop. 51.* 4. Virtue requires that some provision should be made for the education of children.

5. Those who have produced them ought not in reason to throw them as a burden upon others, when they are capable of taking care of them themselves.

The care of children properly belongs to their parents. PART III.

6. That *sopyn*, or natural affection, which parents feel towards the children, will render this task more easy and delightful to them, than it would be to others.

6. 7. It is probable *cæt. par.* that children will be better taken care of by their parents than others.

4, 5, 7. 8. Virtue requires that parents should take peculiar care of their own children. *Q. E. D.*

Rel. of Nat. p. 159, 160.

Delany on Rel. Duties, Sermon. iv.—vii.

| *Fordyce's Mor. Phil. § 3. c. iii.*

COROLLARY I.

Virtue generally requires that those who have children should make them their principal heirs.

Grot. ib. l. ii. c. vii. § 5. N^o. ii.

| *L'Esprit des Loix, vol. ii. l. xxvi. c. vi.*

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue requires that remoter ancestors should be careful of grand-children, or other descendants; especially if the immediate parents be either taken away by death, or any other way rendered incapable of affording them assistance.

Grot. ib. § 6.

SCHOLIUM I.

It does not appear necessary, that an equal distribution of goods be made among all the children: some proper regard should be had to the merit of each: yet great care should be taken, that the parent does not by an imprudent distinction sow such seeds of discord, as may counterbalance the advantage accruing to the most deserving child from a larger share.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It seems reasonable, that the eldest son should generally have a larger share of his father's possessions than the rest; that so the honour of the family may be supported, and that he may be a refuge to younger children, if they should fall into poverty; especially since (*cæt. par.*) it may reasonably be expected, that he will be more capable of managing what he has for the common good, and the distinction made in his favour will generally be less provoking to the rest, than if it were made in favour of any other child.

Puff. de Jure, l. iv. c. xi. § 8.

| *Fleetw. Rel. Dut. p. 111—113.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, an elder son, or any other may be disinherited, or deprived of a part of what he would otherwise have had, upon account of his vicious disposition,

position, if there be reason to believe that he will abuse it to the detriment of others: this the reason of things requires, and the laws of most nations admit of it, though *Plato* only allows it with the consent of near relations. As for the argument brought against it from *Deut. xxi. 15, &c.* as a law of God to the *Jews*; it may be answered, that the *Jews* had not that power of alienating their estates in general, which all allow to others not under such a peculiar appointment, and therefore no valid argument can be drawn from hence: and it is plain, God often interposed to transfer the inheritance; as in a most memorable instance *Jacob* did, and that, (as all who believe scripture must suppose) by divine direction, *Gen. xlix. 3. 1 Chron. v. 1, 2.* not to mention that power, which the law of God gave to *Jewish* parents to put a wicked child to death, which might render a particular licence to disinherit him needless. *Deut. xxi. 18, &c.*

Puffend. ib. § 11.

Fleetwood, ib. p. 113—127.

| *Burnet's Life of Sir M. Hale, p. 7, 8.*

A X I O M XVII.

There is an evident fitness, that when one rational being has received a favour and kindness from another, he should have some sense of gratitude, and return good rather than evil.

LECT.
LXXV.

Puffend. de Off. li. c. viii. § 7, 8.

C O R O L L A R Y.

Virtue requires gratitude. Vid. *Def. 37.*

P R O P O S I T I O N LXIII.

To inquire into the duty of children towards their parents.

S O L U T I O N and D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. Forasmuch as children have received important favours from their parents, gratitude, and therefore virtue requires that they should love them. *Ax. 17. and Cor.*

2. Considering the superiority of age, and the probable superiority of wisdom, which there is on the side of parents, and also how much the satisfaction and comfort of a parent depends on the respect shewn him by his children, it is fit that children should reverence their parents.

2. | 3. It is fit that while the parents are living, and the use of their understanding continued, their children should not ordinarily undertake any matter of great importance without advising with them, or without very cogent reasons pursue it contrary to their consent.

4. As young people need some guidance and government in their minority, and as there is (*cæt. par.*) some peculiar reason to trust the prudence, care, and affection of a parent, preferably to any other person, it is reasonable that children, especially while in their minority, should *obey* their parents; without which, neither the order of families nor the happiness of the rising generation could be secured: nevertheless, still supposing that the commands of the parents are not inconsistent with the will of God:

1, 2. 5. Virtue requires, that if parents come to want, children should take care to furnish them with the necessities of life, and so far as their ability will permit, with the conveniencies of it.

<i>Puff. de Jure</i> , l. vi. c. ii. § 4. 7. 11.		<i>Delany ib.</i> N ^o . viii, ix.
<i>Fleetwood on Rel. Duties</i> , p. 4—22. 51,		<i>Puff. de Off.</i> l. ii. c. iii. § 12.
52.		<i>Rel. of Nat.</i> p. 161, 162.

COROLLARY 1.

The like regards are in some degree due to remoter ancestors, if yet living; though if they come to want, they fall most properly under the care of their more immediate surviving descendants.

COROLLARY 2.

If any generous and compassionate friend act the part of a parent, in taking care of an helpless child, he may justly expect from him the returns of filial duty.

COROLLARY 3.

Where the parent has delegated his authority to some other person, reverence and some degree of obedience are on that account to be paid to him, beyond what might otherwise be his due.

COROLLARY 4.

Different degrees of obedience will be due to parents according to the different age and circumstances of the child, and in some degree according to the capacity and character of the parent.

Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. iii. § 5—8.

COROLLARY 5.

It is the duty of parents, or of those who sustain their character and place, to behave to the children under their care in such a manner, as may most effectually conciliate their reverence and love, and make the yoke of obedience as light as possible; and for this reason all unnecessary severities are to be forborne.

Fleetwood of Relat. Dut. p. 73—81.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Many have chosen to build the right of parents to the obedience of the child, wholly or chiefly on their having been the instruments of bringing it into existence, and have inferred from hence a sovereign right in the parent to dispose of the life, liberty, and fortune of the child; but it appears from the preceding propositions, that parental authority within moderate bounds may be fixed on a basis less liable to exception.

<i>Grot. l. ii. c. v. § 7.</i>		<i>Puff. ib. § 1—6.</i>
<i>Filmer of Patr. Government, c. i. § 4—8.</i>		<i>Barbeyrac's Notes on ib. § 10. p. 606.</i>
<i>Locke of Government, l. i. § 52—59.</i>		607.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It appears from the reasoning of the proposition, that *both* the parents have a right to the duties there mentioned: nevertheless, (*cæt. par.*) the authority of the *father* is chiefly to be regarded; though *Hobbes* is of a contrary opinion, and maintains, that a sovereign and unlimited power over the children resides in the *mother*, and that the authority of others over them is derived from her.

<i>Hobbes de Cive, c. ix.</i>		<i>Puff. De Offic. l. ii. c. iii. § 3.</i>
<i>Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 2, 3.</i>		<i>Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 1. Not.</i>

SCHOLIUM 3.

Though it appears from *Demonstration gr. 3.* that it is an irregular thing for children generally speaking to contract marriages without the advice or consent of their parents, nevertheless it might be attended with still worse consequences, if marriages so contracted were to be deemed invalid.

<i>Puff. ibid. § 14.</i>		<i>Grot. ibid. § 10.</i>
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SCHOLIUM 4.

The indigence of human infants seems to have been wisely designed by providence, on purpose to lay a foundation for those mutual offices of parental and filial duty, on which much of the happiness of life evidently depends.

Cambray on Gov. p. 26, 27.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It follows from hence, that when the health of the mother and the convenience of the family will admit of it, it is fit that mothers nurse their own children, or take care that they be nourished at home.

<i>Tillotson's Serm. vol. i. p. 523—525.</i>		<i>Speet. vol. iii. N^o. 246.</i>
<i>Delany of Rel. Dut. Serm. iv. p. 79—88.</i>		

DEFINITION L.

LECT. A COMMUNITY is a company of men, which is so associated, that the whole
 LXXVI. body, either by themselves or their representatives, should judge concerning any
 disputed rights or properties of each member of it.

Locke of Gov. l. ii. § 87.

DEFINITION LI.

Those men are said to be in a STATE OF NATURE, who are not by any mutual engagements, implicit or express, entered into communities.

PROPOSITION LXIV.

It is for the happiness of mankind, that men in a state of nature should form themselves into societies.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The happiness of mankind requires, that controversies which arise among them should be determined.

2. The prejudices of self-love would lead men to lay down different rules for themselves and others; it is proper therefore that there should be some universal rule.

3. When these rules are admitted, prejudice would bias particular persons in the application of them: therefore it is fit that particular cases should be determined by some other person, rather than by either of the parties, whose interest is in question.

4. Such determinations would often be in vain, if there were not some power to enforce the execution of them.

5. Where men are formed into communities, rules may be laid down, judges appointed, and determinations enforced, by the joint power of the whole body. Therefore

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Prop. 51.* 6. The happiness of mankind, and therefore virtue requires, that men should form themselves into communities.

Locke of Gov. l. ii. § 124—126.

Camb. of Gov. p. 36—38

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. i. § 8—11.

Thomson's Seas. Autumn, ver. 43—144.

SCHOLIUM.

It is queried, who is to be considered as a member of a community. There can be no doubt as to those who have given their express consent to it: as for those who live under the protection of any community, it is to be taken for granted that

that while they so continue, they consent to bear the burthen, as some equivalent for sharing the happiness of it: but for ought that yet appears, such may withdraw themselves from it, when they shall judge it requisite.

Locke of Gov. l. ii. § 119—122. | *Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 24. N^o. ii.*

DEFINITION LII.

A LAW is a rule of action, prescribed by some superior, in such a manner, as at the same time to declare a purpose of favouring or punishing those under his power, as they shall act agreeably or disagreeably to it.

Puff. de Jure, l. i. c. vi. § 1—4. | *Grot. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 9.*
Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 25, 26.

COROLLARY.

If it shall appear to us hereafter, that God has given us intimations, not only of his own delight in virtue and aversion to vice, but also that he will reward the one and punish the other, then it may properly be said, that the law of God requires virtue.

DEFINITION LIII.

They are said to have the SUPREME CIVIL GOVERNMENT in any state or community, who have the supreme power of *making laws* for that community, and *executing* them in their own persons, or by such officers as they shall appoint.

DEFINITION LIV.

When the supreme civil government is entirely in the hands of *one person*, it is called A MONARCHY: if in a *select number*, AN OLIGARCHY; which some have divided into an ARISTOCRACY, which is the government of the *nobles*, and AN OCHLOCRACY, which is the government of a few of the *meanest*, appointed and supported in a tumultuous manner; whereas A DEMOCRACY is the government of the *whole body* of the *people*: but a constitution of government compounded of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, like the *British* constitution, is called A MIXED MONARCHY.

SCHOLIUM.

The composition in different governments is so various, that some have thought this distribution not sufficiently accurate, urging that neither *Poland* nor *Holland* fall under any of these.

Temple's Ess. vol. i. p. 47, 48. | *p. 61—67.*
Voltaire's Hist. of Charles XII. l. ii. | *Temple on Netb. c. ii.*

DEFI-

DEFINITION LV.

Laws made by the supreme civil power of any community, to be observed by all their subjects, are called CIVIL LAWS, and so differ from MUNICIPAL, made for particular towns and corporations.

SCHOLIUM.

The word *civil law* among us is generally used to signify the laws of the *Roman empire*, which on account of their equity have been generally received in other nations: whereas those, which have been established by *act of parliament*, are commonly called *statute*, though they be in our sense *civil laws*.

Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. i. § 1.

PROPOSITION LXV.

To inquire into the probable original of civil government, or of communities.

LECT.
LXXVII.

SOLUTION.

1. Considering the natural dependence of children upon their parents, it is certain that government would at first be *parental*: and it is exceeding probable, that if, according to many of the most credible traditions, the human race descended from one pair, so long as the first man lived, and continued in the exercise of reason, he had a considerable influence over the councils and actions of his descendants, and was regarded by them as their common head.

2. From the nature of things, it is not probable that the power he had over his family descended entirely to the eldest son: it is certain, that the reason for being governed by an *elder brother*, is by no means the same as for being governed by a *father*; though we may naturally suppose, that (*cet. par.*) the age and experience of the elder brother, together with the larger share of the inheritance which he probably had, would have given him some superiority; yet not so great, as an elder brother would now generally have; partly, as the world being thinly peopled, each might have as much land as he pleased, and partly, as in proportion to the length of mens lives in those early ages, (if we credit tradition as before,) the difference between the ages of the several elder brethren of a family would be very inconsiderable.

Sidney on Gov. c. i. § 9.

2. 3. Each family would probably on the death of the common parent become a kind of little sovereignty, whose governor would naturally be the father of it during his life; and such sovereignties as these would be greatly multiplied in the third, fourth, or following generations.

4. It

4. It is exceeding probable, that among these lesser communities disputes would arise, for the determination of which they might judge it proper, on the principles mentioned *Prop. 64.* to form themselves into larger societies, including several of those domestic communities; and perhaps the form of these might be various, according to the various tempers, characters, and circumstances of the persons concerned.

5. As disputes arose between one and another of those larger societies, which no doubt they often did, it was necessary, that on their forcibly opposing each other, the command of their respective armies should center in one person; and if he were not only remarkable for his valour, but also wisdom, humanity, eloquence, piety, and good success in affairs, any of these, but especially the conjunction of them all, would greatly tend to increase his authority in the community, and might engage them to acquiesce in his stated government.

Sidney on Gov. c. i. § 16.

6. It is not to be supposed, that persons, families, or larger communities, before free and independent, would submit themselves to the government of any one person whatever; without some equivalent, which could probably be no other, than that of protecting them in their liberties and properties; so that there was no doubt some original *contract* between the prince and the people, in all those kingdoms where the prince gained his power by a peaceable election.

7. Some ambitious persons, partly by stratagem and partly by force, might possess themselves of power over others; yet even those conquests could not be settled without some agreement between the victor and the vanquished; for till such an agreement was made, there was evidently a state of hostility; and not a community.

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. iii. § 1, 5—9.

Temple's Misc. vol. i. p. 55—82.

Camb. of Gov. c. vii. p. 49—54.

Locke of Gov. part ii. c. viii. § 95—112.

Rollin's Anc. Hist. vol. i. Introd.

Lyttlet. Pers. Let. p. 33, &c.

COROLLARY 1.

From hence it will follow, that though there might be various kinds of governments prevailing, and in monarchies various degrees of liberty in the people and power in the prince, yet there must always have been some original *contract* between them, as the foundation of all government, except that of a father or his descendants.

Sidney on Gov. c. i. § 20.

COROLLARY 2.

From hence we may see, how far sovereignty may be said to have its original *from God.* We have reason to believe that it is the will of God, that we should do our utmost to promote the happiness of mankind: now *some* government appears

appears necessary for this purpose; (Vid. *Prop.* 64.) and when governments are formed, attempts to destroy them might in many instances be pernicious to ourselves and to the public: we have reason therefore to believe, that God wills not only that government in general should be, but that the present form of government should continue in any place, so long as the happiness of the whole may be promoted thereby; but there appears as yet no reason to believe, that God wills it should continue immutable, however it is administered, or that a prince can justly claim a commission from God in attempting the ruin of the community, which it is his business to protect. God's being the author of government in the sense explained above, will be a great aggravation of the guilt of such a tyrannical sovereign; and any pretence to divine authority in such outrages will only be adding impiety to treachery and cruelty; but this will be examined hereafter.

Camb. of Gov. c. vi.

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. iii. § 2—4.

Rollin's Man. vol. i. p. 423, 424.

Sidney on Gov. c. i. § 6.

Delany on Rel. Dut. Sermon xiv, p. 276—285.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT.
LXXVIII.

The account of the original of civil government here given is illustrated, and somewhat confirmed, by the constitution of several of the most considerable nations which we find in ancient history; particularly by the power of the *Ephori* and *General Assembly* amongst the *Spartans* (a), the *Amphictyones* of *Greece* (b), the *Suffetes*, *Senate*, and *Popular Assembly* of *Carthage* (c), the *Senate*, *Comitia*, and *Tri-bunes* of *Rome* (d), the *Saxon Wittenagemot* (e), which was the original of the *British* parliament, and the *Spanish Cortes* (f); not to mention the constitution of many other and more modern governments.

Sidney on Govern. c. ii. § 16. p. 130, &c.

(a) *Stanyan's Gr. Hist.* vol. i. l. iii. c. iv. p. 80—82.

Univ. Hist. vol. ii. p. 574.

(b) *Potter's Archæol.* l. i. c. xvi. vol. i. p. 83—85.

Stanyan, ib. p. 119—120.

(c) *Rollin's Anc. Hist.* l. ii. § 3. vol. i.

(d) *Moyle's Works*, vol. i. p. 8, 9, 103—108.

Vertot's Rom Rev. vol. i. p. 7—9.

Kennet's Rom. Ant. part ii. l. iii. c. ix, & xvi.

(e) *Rapin's Hist. of England*, vol. i. p. 152—156.

Squire of the Anglo-Sax. Gov.

(f) *Geddes's Misc.* vol. i. p. 317, &c.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some probable conjectures, why arbitrary monarchy prevailed more in the northern parts of *Asia*, and in *Africa*, than in *Europe*, may be seen in

Temple's Misc. vol. i. p. 50—53.

L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. xvii. p. 3—77—385. *Engl.*

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

The objection against this scheme, from our not having a right over our own lives, and much less over the lives of others, in a state of nature, goes upon a very false principle; for every man, previous to contract, has a right of using all his natural power for the public good, and when that seems to require it, even of taking away the life of another, or forbearing to defend his own; and all that any man promises in this respect, is submission to a sentence of death in certain cases; for no law ever condemns a man to execute himself.

Burn. iv. Disc. p. 10, 11.

Locke of Gov. part ii. c. xi. § 135.

Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. iii. § 1.

Hoadly on Gov. p. 168—188.

PROPOSITION LXVI.

To propose and confute that other hypothesis of the original of government, which is commonly called the *patriarchal scheme*.

SOLUTION.

1. The foundation of it is, that the *first man* was absolute sovereign of all his posterity, so as to dispose of their possessions and their lives, without being accountable to any but God.

2. That on his death, his eldest son *Cain* having been disinherited by God, the supreme power devolved upon *Seth*, the next eldest son, and passed from him by a lineal succession to *Noah*.

3. That he, according to the divine direction, divided the earth after the deluge among *seventy* of his descendants, heads of so many nations, who were each of them made independent and absolute sovereigns; in whose successors (when they can be discovered) the right of government still continues.

4. That it is to be presumed, that in every country the *reigning prince* is that successor, and consequently, that such unlimited obedience is to be paid to him, unless it appears that some other person has an hereditary claim better founded than his.

Hoadly on Gov. p. 3, 4. | Filmer's Patriarch. Scheme, c. i. § 4—9. p. 12—22.

CONFUTATION.

Admitting the credibility, and for argument's sake the inspiration of the *Mosaic* history, the following objections seem abundantly sufficient to overthrow this hypothesis.

1. It can never be proved, that *Adam* had such an unlimited power over his whole race: it is certain, the relation of a *father* does by no means imply it, (*Prop. 63. Schol. 1.*) and no text in the writings of *Moses* is alleged directly to prove it, unless *Gen. i. 26—30.* and *iii. 16.* the first of which was a grant to the human

man race of the whole animal and vegetable creation for its use; and the second related only to *Eve*, and at most amounts to no more, than that, as woman had abused her husband's tenderness, she should sometimes find herself galled by the yoke of his authority; but this does not imply an absolute power: at least there is not a shadow of argument for any thing more than *Adam's* dominion over his own wife, and by no means over their descendants.

Hoadly of Gov. p. 5—35. præf. p. 5 | *Locke of Gov. part i. c. iv—vi. præf. p.*
—13. | 23—31.

2. Allowing *Adam* to have been possessed of such a power, it will by no means Prove that it was to descend from him, and centre in one of his children. It is certain that the right of a *father* and of an *elder brother* are in this respect very different, (*Prop. 63, 65. gr. 2.*) and as for the argument of a supposed divine appointment, drawn from *Gen. iv. 7.* though it may prove some *pre-eminence* in an elder brother, especially during the time that his younger lived with him, it will never prove an *absolute power* during life, over him and all his remotest descendants.

Hoadly, ib. p. 35—38.
Locke, ib. c. viii.

| *Sidney, ib. c. ii. § 4.*

3. The distribution of mankind into seventy nations, with an absolute sovereign to each, supposes a contradiction to the right of primogeniture, as before asserted by *Filmer*, without any apparent reason; and is itself a most chimerical and arbitrary assertion. *Gen. x. 32.* is a most feeble foundation for such a grand superstructure; and only signifies, that the chief nations among whom the earth was divided sprung from the persons there mentioned. The division, which *Filmer* supposes, would make the parents subject to their children; besides, that some of those there mentioned were not born when the distribution is supposed to be made.

Hoadly, ib. p. 49—54.

| *Sidney, ib. c. i. § 7, 8.*

4. Had God meant to establish the right of primogeniture in this manner, it is not probable he would so often have chosen *younger* sons to special favours, dignity and authority, as we are sure he did, if the truth of the old testament be granted.

Sidney, ib. c. i. § 13.

| *Hoadly, ib. p. 55—59.*

5. The admission of such an hypothesis, grounded on so slender an evidence, would be attended with great damage to mankind; as it might destroy the settlement of many very considerable nations, as appears from the genealogy of their royal families. At best, this is an *useless* scheme; since no one person upon earth can be known to be the true heir: and since the number of sovereigns in the world is so vastly greater than *seventy*, it would, upon *Filmer's* hypothesis,

sis, be *cet. par.* a great probability against any one, that he was not one of those seventy, in whom the right lay.

Locke, ib. c. xi.

| *Sidney, ib. c. i. § 14, 17, 18.*

6. The scheme is plainly inconsistent with itself: for if fatherhood give an absolute power over the children, then it rests in all parents; and consequently, had *Seth* commanded his children to have resisted *Adam*, they would on this scheme have been obliged to do it, though by another part of it they were obliged to an unlimited obedience to *Adam*.

Locke, ib. § 68—72.

Hoadly, ib. p. 13—15.

| *De Foe's Jus Divin. l. ii. p. 2—6.*

SCHOLIUM.

Some have argued for what they call *indefeasible hereditary right* in monarchs, from the right of elder children to succeed to the land of their parents. But it is certain that the elder son has not in equity a right to succeed to the whole paternal inheritance, so that the rest of the children should have no share of it; though it may generally be fit he should have a larger share than the rest; (*Prop. 62. Schol. 2.*) yet he may be disinherited, whenever a regard for the common good requires it: besides, that a succession to places of trust, power, and dignity, is a thing of a very different nature from a succession to an estate.

Camb. of Gov. c. ix.

PROPOSITION LXVII.

Every man is born in a *state of freedom*, i. e. he is (so far as appears by the light of nature) no further obliged to support or submit to the form of government, in the country where he is born, than he shall judge, upon a view of present circumstances, that a subjection to such government will be for the good of the whole.

LECT.
LXXIX.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. If a person were, by any argument which the light of nature suggests, universally bound to be subject to and support any government, further than it appears to him for the public good in present circumstances, such obligation must be built, either on some natural right in the governors to unlimited obedience, or on such a power conferred upon them by some previous contract.

2. The natural right in favour of primogeniture has been considered and confuted above, *Prop. 66.*

3. A previous contract of parents, binding themselves and their offspring to unlimited subjection, is a thing which can hardly be supposed: but if we were sure that such a contract had been ever so expressly made, as they had no right

to dispose of the lives and properties of their children according to their own will, the children could not be bound by such a contract.

1, 2, 3. 4. *Valet propositio.*

COROLLARY 1.

Hence it will evidently appear, that virtue will allow to resist the supreme governor, if any circumstances shall arise, in which such resistance shall appear to be most for the public good. Vid. *Prop.* 65. *Cor.* 1. and *Prop.* 56. *Schol.* 3.

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. viii. § 5.

Sidney on Gov. c. iii. § 41.

Locke of Gov. part ii. § 202—222.

COROLLARY 2.

Much more may it be allowed in a *mixed* monarchy, that the other branches of the legislative power should resist the monarch, when he goes about to subvert their constitution, in direct violation of that contract on which he is admitted to the crown.

Caermich. Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. ix. § 4.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Some, waving all pleas from a supposed donation of power from God to kings, assert resistance to be universally unlawful, because it can even promote the public good, but must on the whole be detrimental to mankind. But it may be answered.

1. That cases may occur, in which the affections of the people may be so alienated from the government, that a revolution may be accomplished with very little blood-shed and confusion.

2. That by this means, the civil and religious liberties of a mighty nation may be, and often have been secured, when even on the brink of ruin.

3. That such an event may contain matter of very wholesome instruction to succeeding princes, in that country and else where, and by preventing future oppressions, may greatly promote the good of mankind.

And whereas it is urged, that the encouragement which the doctrine of resistance might give to insurrections and popular tumults would be an equivalent for all this, it is to be remembered,

1. That it may be concluded, a virtuous man will, as he certainly ought to do, attentively weigh the reasons and consequences of things, before he engages in so important an undertaking.

2. That the apparent danger attending it will deter men of prudence from embarking themselves in it, till there be a great prospect of succeeding; which probably there cannot be, till the people have been alienated from their governors, by long, frequent, and notorious oppressions.

3. That

3. That though it is true, this doctrine may be abused, and may in some cases be attended with ill consequences; yet, considering the temptations of royalty, the doctrine of *passive obedience* and *non-resistance* is likely to be much more abused, as it has certainly in fact been; so that upon the whole, the hazard seems to be abundantly balanced.

Camb. of Gov. c. x. p. 74—76. 84. | *Sachev. Trial, p. 88—114.*
Locke of Gov. part ii. c. xix. § 223—230. | *Sidn. on Gov. c. iii. § 40. p. 434—436.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Considering the many difficulties to which princes are exposed, how liable they are often to be imposed upon, when they design best, and how impossible it is for the bulk of the people to enter into all the reasons of their councils and actions, we do most readily grant, that men ought to put the most candid interpretation upon the actions of their governors which they can in reason bear; and that they should never have recourse to violent methods, but in cases of very great extremity, and where the probability of promoting the public security and happiness by it is very apparent.

Camb. of Gov. c. x. p. 78—83. | *Evans's Christ. Tem. vol. ii. p. 308, 309.*

PROPOSITION LXVIII.

To inquire what form of government is to be preferred, as generally most subservient to the happiness of mankind.

SOLUTION.

A mixed monarchy, generally to descend by inheritance, seems preferable to the rest.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. An *arbitrary monarchy* would undoubtedly be most desirable, if the monarch were perfectly wise and good, seeing he would then have much greater opportunities of doing good to his subjects, than under a limitation of power he could possibly have; and the unavoidable imperfection of general laws would be greatly remedied by his integrity and wisdom. But considering the degeneracy and imperfection of mankind, it seems unsafe to trust so much power in one man; and it is generally in fact seen, that where this kind of government is admitted, tyranny, cruelty, and oppression prevail with it.

2. An *aristocracy*, and much more a *democracy*, leaves too much room for the cabals of statesmen, makes the dispatch of business slower, and there are secrets of state of which it is impossible that the people should be proper judges, and which it is by no means convenient to lay before them; and when discords arise

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arise between one part of the people and another, it is much more difficult to compose them, when there is no monarch.

1, 2.|3. The chief advantages of all these constitutions are secured, and the chief disadvantages are avoided, by a *mixed monarchy*; especially in one that consists, like ours, of three states, one of which is to be chosen by the people, and to have the power of granting revenues to be raised on the subjects, while the prince has the power of making peace and war: such a constitution is therefore to be preferred.

4. That a kingdom should be *elective*, has indeed many advantages; especially, as it prevents the succession of an improper person, and moderates the temptation which the sovereign is under to enhance the prerogative of the crown, as also that which the nobles are under to oppress the people, if the people have any share in the election.

5. Yet it proves the occasion of so many factions, and where the kingdom is considerable, of so many destructive civil wars, that the danger seems to be more than equal to the advantage.

4, 5.|6. The proper balance between both seems to be, that the right of *succession* should *generally* prevail; but that in case of any evident incapacity or male-administration, the next heir should be set aside by the other branches of the legislature.

3, 6.|7. *Valet propositio.*

Camb. of Gov. c. xv, xvi.

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. v. § 22.

Moyle's Works, vol. i. p. 57—61.

Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. viii.

Speet. vol. iv. N^o. 287.

Hobbes's Leviath. c. xix.

Sidney on Gov. c. ii. § 16, 24, 27, 30.

L'Esprit des Loix, l. xi. c. vi. l. xix. c. 27.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Notwithstanding these general reasons, so much regard is to be had to the temper and usages of particular nations, that it might often be attended with dangerous consequences, to attempt a change, from a less to a more perfect form of government.

Temple's Eff. vol. i. p. 16, 17.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Instances of the oppression and misery, which have attended arbitrary governments, are to be seen every where, especially in

Addis. Freeholder, N^o. x.

Kroufsinski's Rev. of Pers. vol. i. pass.

Knox's Ceylon, l. iii. c. iii, iv.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The *Commons* of Great-Britain have grown up to their present share in the government, by gradual advances. In the earlier reigns, particularly that of Ed-

ward I. (A. D. 1280.) the laws were enacted by the king and lords, the commons being only mentioned as *suppliants*. But what laid the foundation of their growing so considerable, was the grant, which according to *Cambray*, Henry VII. but indeed *Stephen*, Henry II. and *John* had long before his time made, to empower the lords to alienate their lands, which thus passing into the hands of the commons, who before were only their tenants, they became more considerable than before, as the proprietors of land in a state will be.

Rapin's Hist. of Eng. p. 155. Note.

Camb. of Gov. p. 138—140, 147—

149.

Bacon's Henry VII. p. 12.

Lyttlet. Pers. Lett. N^o. 59—69.

Sidn. on Gov. c. iii. § 10. p. 297 & § 28.

PROPOSITION LXIX.

Virtue requires, that obedience should be paid to civil rulers, in those things in which the authority of God is not apprehended to contradict their commands.

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DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 64. 1. Virtue requires that there should be communities.

2. Affairs cannot be administered in communities, unless some civil rulers are appointed to manage them.

3. This appointment would be vain, unless obedience were to be generally paid to them, as above.

2, 3. 4. The refusal of such obedience to civil power tends to the ruin of communities.

1. 4. 5. Virtue requires they should be generally obeyed as above. *Q. E. D.*

Puff. de Jure, l. vii. c. viii. § 1.

COROLLARY I.

Reverence is to be paid to rulers; and in dubious cases, virtue will require us to put the mildest construction upon their actions, which they will reasonably bear. *Vid. Prop. 67. Schol. 2.*

Puff. ib. § 3.

COROLLARY 2.

Virtue will require us rather to acquiesce in their determinations, even where we imagine ourselves injured; than to disturb the public by taking our revenge into our own hands; unless it may be the probable means of freeing a country from an intolerable tyranny.

Killing no Murther, pass. Ap. Harleian Miscell.

COROL-

COROLLARY 3.

To chuse to determine points by single combat, rather than to refer them to the judgment of the magistrate, is to be condemned; as being a derogation from his authority, or opposition to his determination, as well as a rash exposing our own lives or that of others; and a probable means of introducing a wrong sense of honour, which may be detrimental to the lives and souls of many, who might otherwise be useful to the common-wealth.

Hale's Gold. Rem. p. 107—115. 8vo.

p. 90—96. 4to.

Speet. vol. ii. N^o. 97.

Montesq. Spirit of Laws, vol. ii. l. xxviii.

c. xvii, xx, xxiv, xxv.

Freethinker, vol. i. N^o. xv.

Delany's Serm. on Duelling, vol. ii.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Marriages are to be made only as the civil law of any country directs, supposing there is nothing in the ceremony so directed, which shall appear unlawful to the parties concerned: and though private contracts are undoubtedly binding in the sight of God, yet they ought to be discouraged, and the offspring of such unauthorized marriages may justly be laid under some incapacities, in order to prevent the prevalency of them, which would be much more to the damage of society. And the same kind of observations and reasons may be applied to *divorces* and to *wills* in some degree, where the civil law determines the circumstances with which they shall be attended.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 36, sub. fin.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Princes are undoubtedly bound by their covenant with their people; for the reasoning *Prop. 55. Dem.* has a peculiar weight when applied to them. Some have questioned, whether a succeeding prince be bound by any concessions made by his predecessors: but there can be no room for such a debate, when a prince swears or even promises to govern according to law, and the concessions made by preceding princes have been, as they generally are, passed into civil laws. To say, that such concessions were sometimes forcibly extorted, and therefore are not obligatory, would be to destroy all the faith of treaties, and is bringing the thing back to the exploded scheme of passive obedience.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiv. § 10, 11.

PROPOSITION LXX.

Briefly to inquire into the mutual duties of masters and servants.

SOLU-

SOLUTION.

1. Servants owe to their masters diligence in their business, fidelity in any other trusts reposed in them, and such a reverence in their behaviour, as may both promote and express their obedience.

2. Masters owe to their *hired* servants, a regular payment of their wages; to all, a proper care of their support during the time of service, and a kind and affable treatment: they are to see that they be neither unemployed, nor overwhelmed with business, beyond what their strength and time will admit, and that their minds be duly cultivated, according to the circumstances of life in which they are placed.

Spect. vol. ii. N^o. 107, & 137. | *Delany on Rel. Dut. Serm. x, xi.*

DEMONSTRATION.

The obligation to these duties on both sides, is evident from the nature of the relation, and those mutual covenants which generally attend it, in which these things are either expressly or tacitly stipulated.

Fleetwood of Rel. Dut. p. 279—281. | *Puff. de Off. l. ii. c. iv. § 1, 2.*

SCHOLIUM I.

It is disputed, whether it be unlawful to buy men as slaves, and forcibly compel them to do service for life or a term of years. Some have thought the strength of body, and stupidity of mind, to be found among some parts of the human species, especially the *Negroes*, intimate, that they were designed to be the drudges of the rest. But to admit such an argument might be attended with dangerous usurpations and contentions; for who does not think he has genius enough to command others? Nevertheless, if any case occurs, in which a man be justly condemned to be a slave by the laws of his country, it seems very allowable to buy him and use him as such: and if purchasing men for slaves out of the hands of their enemies, by whom they are taken prisoners, may be a means of preserving their lives, which in *Guinea* is often the case, it seems very allowable to purchase them; unless it prove the means of encouraging unreasonable and destructive wars, and the mischief occasioned thereby be greater than the good arising from the preservation of the lives of those already taken, and the fruit of their labours; which may possibly make the matter a greater difficulty than some imagine. Yet virtue will require, even in this case, that the slaves be treated with as much humanity as may be consistent with the safety of their master, and with a prudent care of his affairs.

Snelgrave's Guinea p. 160, 161.

Puffendorf de Off. ib. § 3.

| *Spirit of Laws, l. xv. c. ii. vol. i. p. 336.*

| —357.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is questioned, whether a father may ever sell his child. Some have argued, but without reason, that fatherhood gives a right universally. It seems he only has it, when the constitution of a country appoints him the civil judge of his children; or when his circumstances are such, that the sale of his child in his minority is absolutely necessary for the supporting the lives of either or both of them. *Prop. 51. Cor. 3.*

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 5.

| *Puffendorf de Jure, l. vi. c. ii. § 9.*

LEMMA TO PROPOSITION LXXI.

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As the word *punishment* occurs in the proposition, and is not defined, it may be proper here to give a definition of it, as a *Lemma*, not to alter the number of the succeeding definitions; and it may be taken thus—PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted, in consequence of an offence committed against the person by whom it is inflicted or appointed, whether under a public or private character.

PROPOSITION LXXI.

Virtue may permit, or even require the civil magistrate, not only to execute other heavy punishments upon offenders, but in some cases to take away their lives.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Virtue requires that the civil magistrate endeavour to preserve the public peace and tranquillity, which is the design of his office.

2. In order to this, it is necessary that effectual methods be taken to deter men from such crimes, as are ruinous to society, *v. g.* murder, treason, theft, &c.

3. The corruption of men is so great, that it evidently appears in fact, that they rush on to the commission of those crimes, even though they are made capital by the laws of their country.

3.4. There is great reason to believe, that if such crimes were not severely punished, and even sometimes with death, they would be much more frequently committed, and the community in time destroyed by them.

1, 2, 4.5. *Valet propositio.*

Puffendorf de Jure, l. viii. c. iii. § 6, 7.

COROLLARY.

A regard to the public good may in some cases require, that an innocent person should be given up to calamity and even to death: *v. g.* if a man infected with the plague, were, in a frenzy, to run up and down to the evident hazard of spreading

ing the contagion; and many add, when an innocent person is demanded by an enemy, against whom the public cannot defend itself: it seems more justifiable to confiscate the estates of traitors, though thereby innocent children are impoverished: both that a regard to their family may prevent their conspiring against the government, and that the children of noble families may be less able to revenge the death of a father.

Puffendorf ib. § 33. c. ii. § 5.

| *Grot. de Jure*, l. ii. c. xxv. § 3.

S C H O L I U M I.

Considering how precious life is, and how much the fear of violent death would embitter the enjoyment of it, virtue requires that capital punishments should be sparingly used. For murder, none can doubt the reasonableness of them, but perhaps some methods might be found out in case of theft, that would strike the offender with so much terror, as to render capital punishments but seldom necessary; and the severity of *Draco*, in introducing them on the smallest occasions, was greatly to be condemned.

More's Utopia, p. 145, 146.

| *Stanyan's Gr. Hist.* p. 145, 146.

S C H O L I U M 2.

Public executions ought to be managed with very great solemnity; and it would be prudent to make a difference between the kinds of death inflicted for different crimes; since perhaps some may be found, who would dread the pain and shame of some executions, even more than death itself.

Mandeville on Executions, c. iv. l. v.

S C H O L I U M 3.

It is questioned, whether a community have a right over its *exiles*: but that must be determined by the degree of severity attending the sentence; for if the exile possesses the revenues of an estate, in that country from whence he is driven, it is evident that community has a right and power over him, more than it would otherwise have had.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 25.

| *Bott against Warb.* p. 73—78.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 16, 17. and Notes.

S C H O L I U M 4.

It is questioned, whether private persons have a right of killing those who invade them by violence. *Civilians* generally state it thus: where communities are formed, it is to be considered whether it be the intent of the law, barely to permit, or also to require such executions: in the former case, v. g. if a man find another in adultery with his wife, or if a rape be attempted, or an assault made

by a robber, the law, though it permits to kill the aggressor, and thereby frees the slayer from punishment, yet cannot justify the action before God. Yet where the law *requires* such resistance, as in the case of soldiers invading a country, then it becomes the duty of the subject to endeavour the destruction of such invaders. But it seems, that in the former case it is a person's *duty* too, when, upon the best views he can form of the consequences, it appears probable, that the immediate slaughter of the aggressor will turn to the public good; otherwise, it is a vicious indulgence of the passion of revenge; and those who believe a future state ought to be peculiarly solicitous, that they do not plunge even an enemy into irrecoverable misery, by cutting him off unnecessarily in the act of his crime. *Prop. 51. Cor.*

Grot. ibid. l. ii. c. xx. § 17.

| *Puffendorf de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 11, 14.*

DEFINITION LVI.

LECT. LXXXIII. Those rules, which by a tacit consent are agreed upon among all communities, at least among those who are reckoned the polite and humanized part of mankind, are called the LAWS OF NATIONS.

Grot. ibid. Proleg. § 17.

PROPOSITION LXXII.

The laws of nations are to be regarded.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Communities have certain affairs, which must of necessity be transacted between them.

1.|2. Disputes may arise upon these, which cannot be determined by the peculiar civil laws of either of the contending parties.

2.|3. Recourse must in that case be had to the laws of nations, to prevent disputes which might otherwise be very mischievous.

3.|4. Mutual regard must be paid to these laws. Q. E. D.

DEFINITION LVII.

WAR is a state, wherein men endeavour by open violence to hurt and destroy the persons or possessions of each other.

Grot. de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 2.

| *Puffendorf de Jure, l. i. c. i. § 8.*

COROLLARY.

War is a great evil, and virtue will require us to avoid engaging in it, unless circumstances should arise, in which it should appear necessary for the greater good of mankind. Vid. *Prop. 51.*

PROPOSITION LXXIII.

Virtue may in some cases permit, and even require that men should engage in war.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The injustice of some is so great, that men will not be able to secure their possessions and their lives in many cases, unless they oppose force to force.

2. Persons violently opposing their inoffensive neighbours, without just cause, are so far from being valuable members, that they are the pests of society.

2. | 3. By attempting to destroy such invaders, we may not only secure ourselves, but also many others who might afterwards be swallowed up by them, especially if their power of hurting were strengthened by our submission or destruction.

1, 3 | 4. Cases may occur, in which opposing force to force may tend to the public good, *i. e.* in which virtue may allow and require us to engage in war. (Vid. *Def.* 57. *Prop.* 51.) Q. E. D.

Grot. ibid. l. i. c. ii. § 1—3.

Puffendorf ibid. l. viii. c. vi. § 7.

| *Carmichael in Puff. de Off. l. i. c. v. § 18.*
p. 123, 124.

SCHOLIUM.

The argument urged in this demonstration only proves a *defensive* war to be lawful: it is questioned whether it is ever lawful to engage in an *offensive* war.

Ans. It is certainly inhuman, and therefore vicious, to begin to hurt unprovoked; and considering the many calamities brought on mankind by war, virtue will require us to abhor the thought of increasing our dominions and possessions by the ruin of innocent persons: nevertheless, self-defence will require us to take up arms, before we are actually invaded, as it may prevent the intended invasion, and the mutual slaughter which would be consequent upon it, and will indeed be necessary in order to sustain the first shock, which would otherwise be fatal to the party unprepared: nay, a regard to our own safety may require us to invade and subdue the country of the aggressor, and to push on our conquest, till he is disabled from doing us further mischief.

As to the question, whether it is lawful to take up arms, in defence of the injured subjects of another state, to preserve their civil and religious liberties, it must be determined by the prospect of good arising from such a war: if there be an apparent probability, that tyrannical power may be reduced, and the happiness of other states as well as that invaded may thereby be promoted, it seems lawful on the common principles of humanity.

Puffendorf, ib. § 3.

Burnet on the Art. p. 361.

| *Grot. ibid. l. ii. c. xx. § 41—43.*

DEFI-

DEFINITION LVIII.

PUBLIC WAR is that which is undertaken and managed by the authority of the community; PRIVATE is that which is undertaken and managed without it.

Grot. ibid. l. i. c. iii. § 1.

COROLLARY.

Private war may sometimes be necessary, where the assault is too sudden to allow an act of the community to authorize resistance. (*Vid. Prop. 71 Schol. 4.*) But generally where the prospect of danger is more remote, it is very unwarrantable for persons to form themselves into military bodies, without commission from the civil magistrate; even though it be on pretence of warding off the enemy. Yet it must be acknowledged, there may be cases of public danger so extreme, that the force of the civil law may seem for that time to be suspended; and it is the business of every good man, conscientiously to judge for himself, when these cases occur; and the business of every wise and good state, to indemnify by a law such acts as shall appear to have been so necessitated, though not being foreseen they could not have been provided for by laws *a priori*.

Grot. ibid. § 2.

SCHOLIUM I.

Subjects may not, even when commanded by their prince, engage in any war which they are *fully persuaded* is unjust, but if it appears a *dubious* point to them, the same obligation does not hold; for otherwise, common soldiers could hardly ever engage at all, since they seldom have or can have a full view of all the circumstances of the affair. Nevertheless officers in the higher ranks are under greater obligations to inquire critically into it, both as they have much better opportunity of information than their soldiers, and as the part they are to act in carrying on the war is of much greater importance.

Grot. ibid. l. ii. c. xxvi. § 3—5. | *Burnet on the Art. p. 362.*
Puffendorf, ibid. § 4. |

SCHOLIUM 2.

He who offered the injury may defend himself, when the party injured has refused an equitable satisfaction proposed; in that case, the party injured becomes the aggressor: much more may subjects defend themselves, even when their prince has been to blame, if the enemy endeavour to avenge the quarrel, not on the person of the prince, but on his innocent subjects.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. i. § 18. c. xxvi. § 6. | *Puffendorf de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 19.*
Telamaque, l. xxi. p. 451—453. French.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

The violence of war is to be attempted, as much as may be consistent with securing the good ends proposed by it. An unnecessary waste of the enemies goods, (Vid. *Deut.* xx. 19, 20.) and much more of their blood, is to be avoided, and especially rapes, which injure the person by, as well as those upon whom, they are committed; nor are women and children to be slaughtered, unless women be found active in war, and then they are to be treated as other soldiers. But it is to be observed, that we here, and in all this part of the work, speak only of war as undertaken on the principles of the common rights of mankind, not pretending to dispute the right which God has to doom any of his creatures to death, in such circumstances as he shall see fit, and to make some of them executioners on others.

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Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. iv. § 19. c. xiii. § 4.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is questioned how far *stratagems* in war are lawful.

Ans. It may be lawful to deceive the enemy by dubious actions, which may probably be interpreted wrong; and the rather, as there is a kind of universal agreement to suspect each other, where no treaties are commenced, so that faith among men is not so much injured by these as by other deceits. Yet there is a degree of honour to be observed even towards an enemy, and a direct lie, especially a false oath, should by no means be allowed.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 17, 20. c. | Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. vi. § 6.
xix. § 1. *Telemaque, l. xx. p. 426—432.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

The laws of nations are to be observed in war; and these forbid violating the persons of *Ambassadors*, (seeing this would make wars perpetual, as none would venture to mediate a peace) hiring soldiers to assassinate their general, or subjects, their prince, and poisoning the enemy by weapons, water, or any other method.

Grot. ibid. l. iii. c. iv. § 15—18. l. ii. | Puff. ibid. § 18.
c. xviii. § 2, 3, 7. *More's Utopia, p. 158—164.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is much queried, whether temples dedicated to God may be spoiled of their treasures by the conqueror.

Ans. Those treasures being in some degree still the property of the state, and therefore used in times of great extremity for its defence, the conqueror may justly seize them; yet care should be taken to avoid any circumstances of
rude-

rudeness and irreverence, lest by that means religion should be brought into contempt.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. xii. § 6. | *Works of the Learned, for March 1738.*
Prideaux's Connect. vol. ii. p. 25, 26. | *Art. 16.*

PROPOSITION LXXIV.

To inquire how far government may justly be founded in conquest.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. The victor in a just war may see it necessary (in order to repair the expences and losses sustained, in order to punish those who have been injurious to the public peace, and that he may prevent future assaults from the vanquished) to make himself king of a conquered country, and to model the laws of it in such a manner as he shall on the whole judge fit, and he may be justified in doing it. Nevertheless, if the persons so conquered enter themselves into no engagements to him, it may reasonably be expected that they should take the first opportunity to throw off his yoke, and they are not obliged to submit to it so much as that of their natural sovereign: yet virtue will require them to be cautious, that they do not make their own condition and that of the public worse, by a precipitate resistance.

2. If a prince, by an unjust war, or any other unrighteous method, have possessed himself of the government, and uses it well, though he gained it ill, virtue will require, that he be obeyed; at least till the person to whom it belongs be able and willing to assert his right, with some probable prospect of success: for it is certainly better, that an usurper should govern, than that there should be no government at all.

3. It seems reasonable, that if the rightful prince, or at least his immediate successor be not able to assert his claim, but the government continue for a considerable time in the hands or family of an usurper, long possession should make up the defect of an original title; lest the encouragement of antiquated claims should throw nations into confusion, and by a parity of reason private families too.

Puff. de Jure, l. viii. c. vi. § 24. l. vii. | *Camb. of Gov. c. viii.*
c. vii. § 3, 4. c. viii. § 9, 10. | *L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. l. x. c. iii—ix.*
Locke of Gov. part ii. c. xvi, xvii. |

SCHOLIUM.

The rights of hostages and captives are to be settled by the law of nations: but it is plain, that neither hostages, when upon public faith, nor slaves, when they have by compact obliged themselves to their masters, may be allowed to desert, unless extreme injury be offered.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. xiv. § 7. l. iii. c. xix. § 54.

P R O-

PROPOSITION LXXV.

To inquire into the principal branches of human or personal virtue.

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SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Since the happiness of a rational creature must chiefly depend upon the state of his own mind, virtue requires that great care be taken of it, particularly to furnish it with such knowledge as may be delightful and useful.

2. As we may by an heedless conduct be betrayed into numberless evils, virtue requires that we should attentively consider our circumstances in life, and often reflect on our conduct.

3. Since we are compounded of body as well as mind, virtue will require a proper care of the body, that on the one hand, it may not want any thing necessary for its subsistence, health, and vigour; and on the other, that it may not be indulged in such excesses, as however pleasant at first might at length enfeeble and destroy it.

4. As it is impossible to be happy, while our minds are the sport of irregular appetites and passions, virtue will require a due guard upon these; that the agreeable things of life may not be objects of excessive desire, hope, or joy; and that the evils of it may not overwhelm us with fear, with grief, or resentment, nor its uncertainty with excessive solicitude.

5. As many disorders of body and mind may take their rise from idleness, virtue will on the preceding principles require that we keep ourselves in a series of useful employments, and labour to improve every portion of our time well, proper allowance being made for such recreation as animal nature requires.

6. That we may not be led into undertakings disproportioned to our strength, that we may not expect too high regard from others, nor be too keenly impressed with the sense of slights and injuries, as well as for many other important reasons, virtue will require us to moderate our opinion of ourselves, in proportion to the degree and value of our real advantages, whether of mind, of body, or estate.

<p><i>Scott's Christian Life</i>, vol. i. c. iii. § 1. <i>Carmich. Suppl. to Puff. de Off. l. i. c.</i> v. § 2.</p>	<p><i>Wright's Great Concern</i>, p. 113—125. <i>Fordyce's Mor. Phil. l. ii. § 2.</i> <i>Grove's Ethic</i>, vol. ii. part ii. c. ii.—v.</p>
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SCHOLIUM I.

It may be observed, that the first and second of these steps comprehend *prudence* and *consideration*, the third *temperance*, *chastity* and *mortification*, the fourth *fortitude*, *contentment*, *meekness* and *moderation*, the fifth *diligence*, the last *humility*; and thus the distribution in effect coincides with those of *Scott*, *Wright*, &c.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Thoughts tending to vice are no further criminal, than as they are approved and indulged by the will. *Dcf.* 38.

Ostervald, of Unclean. § 1. c. vii. p. 72—74.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Though a constant care should be taken (on the principles laid down *gr.* 3.) to maintain such moderation, in the articles of food, dress, sleep, &c. as may prevent the mind from being enslaved to the body; and though it be prudence in us to inure ourselves to such hardships, as may be expected in a worthy and honourable passage through life; it is by no means necessary to deny ourselves in every thing which gives pleasure to the senses: for God has placed us in such circumstances, that some pleasures are unavoidable, (the benevolence of his nature no doubt engaging him to delight in the happiness of his creatures;) it is therefore ingratitude to him, as well as injustice to ourselves, to throw back his gifts upon his hands, as if they were snares rather than favours. To which we may add, that in the circumstances in which mankind now is, were all the elegances and ornaments of life to be renounced, many families must be undone, who are now maintained by an honest labour in furnishing them out, and maintained more chearfully, and indeed more safely, than they could merely by alms.

Philemon to Hydaspes, part ii. præf. p. 26—64, 91, ad fin.

PROPOSITION LXXVI.

To inquire into some of the principal means of promoting virtue in the soul.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Virtue may be promoted by attentive hearing and reading discourses on divine subjects, and seriously meditating upon them; all which may serve to assist us in forming right notions of God, and in judging of our duty, and may awaken us to the practice of it.

2. External acts of adoration and praise may promote as well as express inward veneration.

Atterb. Post. Serm. vol. ii. N^o. vii. p. 191—203.

3. Earnest and frequent prayers to God may greatly tend to promote virtue: for though they can neither inform nor move him, yet they may bring us to a proper temper for receiving his merices. And if any object, that God has established such an order of things, as he will not alter in compliance with the intreaties of his creatures; it may be replied, that this order was no doubt established in connection with, and in correspondence to the view, which the divine Being always had

of the prayers and temper of his rational creatures : and husbandry, and all the most necessary labours of life, might as reasonably be argued against as prayer, on the force of this objection.

<i>Burn. Life of Roch. p. 52, 53, 60—64.</i>		<i>Relig. of Nat. p. 103, 104.</i>
<i>Stebbing on Div. Rev. p. 36—42.</i>		<i>Leechman's Serm. on Prayer, præf. p. 14.</i>
<i>Benson of Prayer, p. 13—21.</i>		<i>—25. Glasg. Ed.</i>

4. It is proper that men should meet in religious assemblies, to join in divine worship ; as thereby a public honour is done to God, and the hearts of men may be fixed and quickened by beholding the devotion of each other.

Colliber on Nat. and Rev. Rel. p. 25.

4.5. It is proper that some person should be appointed, whose chief business it should be to preside in these assemblies ; since by this means, religious offices will be performed in a manner most tending to common edification.

4.6. Lest the civil business of some should interfere with the religious appointment of others, it is proper that some time should be set apart by common consent for religious purposes : besides, that the rest of beasts and servants may require some such appointments ; which therefore have made a part of the religious constitution of almost all nations.

<i>Watts's Holin. of Times and places, p. 3—5.</i>		<i>Foster's Serm. on the Morality of the Sabbath.</i>
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7. It may be proper that fasting should sometimes be joined with other acts of divine worship, to promote more intense devotion, to express our humiliation for sin, and to promote that command of the mind over the body, which is suited to the constitution of a rational being.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxxv. § 3, 4. | *Amory's Dial. on Devot.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Those things are only to be asked of God in prayer, which are of some considerable importance, by which our truest happiness may probably be promoted, and which there appears some hope of obtaining : and where it is dubious, as with respect to many temporal enjoyments it is, whether obtaining our petitions will be on the whole for our advantage, we are to ask these things only conditionally, with a becoming submission to the superior wisdom of God.

LECT.
LXXXVI.

Juvenal, Sat. x.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is questioned, whether we may pray for what we are sure God will give or do.
Ans. There can be no doubt of this, if our asking it be the *condition* of its being bestowed or done : nor can we, without a revelation be absolutely sure of any future event, how probable soever : and it seems, that if a promise were ab-

solutely given, we might justly plead it with God in prayer, thereby to promote our conformity to the Divine will, our expectation of the blessing, and fitness to receive it: but such prayers ought to be managed, so as not to intimate any doubt of the Divine veracity, but on the contrary to express a firm and joyful reliance upon it.

S C H O L I U M 3.

It is allowed, that *forms* of prayer may help the ignorant and weak, and may prevent public devotion from falling into that contempt, of which there might otherwise be danger, when such persons are to officiate; as also from being made the vehicle of conveying the errors and irregular passions, which particular persons so officiating might otherwise mingle with them: they may also be useful in secret and family-worship; and even to persons of the best capacity, in seasons when they are out of frame for the duty. Yet it is very unreasonable, that persons in public or private should be confined to forms; since they cannot suit all circumstances, and a frequent repetition of the same words tends to deaden those affections, which ought to accompany prayer.

The chief objections against *extemporary* or *free* prayer are,

1. That the mind cannot, without great disturbance and dissipation of thought, give that attention and examination to it, which is necessary to a rational assent and concurrence.
2. That the auditory may be disquieted with the fear, lest the person officiating should fall into some impropriety or absurdity of expression, inconsistent with the reverence due to the Divine Being, and the improvement of his fellow-worshippers.

To the *former* we reply, by appealing to experience as an evidence of the quickness of the mind in its operations, to which the quickness of words bears but little proportion. A probable guess may be made at the tendency of a sentence from its beginning, especially when due care is taken that sentences be not drawn out to an immoderate length, and when any book supposed sacred, furnishes out much of the language.—As to the *latter*, experience also shews, that persons of no extraordinary genius are capable of praying without gross absurdity or impropriety of expression; so that where the abilities of the person are known, the probability of his running into them is so small, as not at all to affect the mind; and there is a possibility, that a *reader* may mistake.

<i>Bennet's Abridg. of Lond. Cases</i> , p. 72	<i>Jackson on Lord's Prayer</i> , pref. p. 7.
—78.	<i>Limb. Theol. l. v. c. xxv. § 28.</i>
<i>Rel. of Nat.</i> p. 122—124.	<i>Halifax's Char. of a Trimmer</i> , p. 45, 46.
<i>Pierce's Vind. of Diff. l. iii. c. iv. p. 398,</i>	<i>Baxter's Works</i> , vol. i. p. 671.
399, 404—406.	<i>Watts's Misc.</i> p. 202—213.

S C H O L I U M 4.

Where liturgies are established by public authority, great care ought to be taken that there be no phrases in them likely to lead men into hurtful mistakes; seeing

seeing the veneration quickly contracted for such offices, would render it exceeding difficult to eradicate an error so imbibed.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is our duty to pray for *others*; since hereby our benevolence for them is expressed and increased, and it is the only way by which we can express it to far the greatest part of our species.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is the duty of the community to take care that there be able teachers, of a virtuous character, that so virtue may be promoted in it. Nothing therefore should be done to deter fit persons from undertaking the work, by subscriptions, oaths, &c. which would be most likely in some cases to exclude the most valuable men. It is also fit, that the community by whom they are employed should allow them such subsistence, that they may pursue their studies without avocation, and may be fitted for performing their office, in a manner most honourable to the Divine Being, and most edifying to those among whom they officiate.

Rees of Maintenance.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Great care ought to be taken that religion be not over-burthened with ceremonies; for the mind of man is of so limited a nature, that by an over-exact attendance to these, greater things will probably be neglected; and the diversity of tastes, education, &c. will probably lead men into differences with respect to them, which, if they be too much regarded, will be very detrimental to that benevolence which they ought to maintain for each other.

Tind. Christi. as old, &c. p. 123, 124. | Geddes's Tracts, vol. iv. p. 205—225.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Though prayer and praise have been mentioned above, as the *means* of virtue, yet they are not *only* to be considered in that view; they are certainly a part of the duty we owe to God, as well as proper means of disposing us to the other branches of virtue: and it would appear unnatural, under a deep sense of our dependence upon, and our obligations to the Divine Being, never to express it in any kind of address to him, tho' we believe him continually present with us.

PROPOSITION LXXVII.

Virtue requires, that the civil magistrate should not so interpose in matters of religion, or rites of worship, as to inflict any penalties on his subjects upon account of them, so long as nothing is done prejudicial to the peace of the community.

LECT.
LXXXVII.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 49. gr. 23. 2. Virtue, and consequently, religion, which is that branch of it that more immediately relates to God, consists not merely in the external performance of an action, but in a correspondent temper and disposition of soul.

2. Compulsion only influences the external actions, and can by no means convince the understanding.

1, 2. 3. Such severities cannot make men religious, but are rather likely to make them hypocrites.

3. 4. Persecution for conscience-sake must be prejudicial to the public, by corrupting the characters of men.

5. The persons persecuted must probably be brought into a very unhappy condition by it: for if they renounce their profession, they subject themselves to great remorse, while they secretly believe it to be true; and if they maintain it, penalties are incurred, by which ruin may be brought on themselves and their families.

6. The minds of men are naturally prejudiced in favour of a religion, for which men suffer hardships, though they do nothing injurious to the public peace.

7. Persecutions may promote the cause they are intended to destroy, and by increasing the number of its votaries may occasion insurrections, which may be extremely detrimental to the public tranquillity.

Tertul. ad Scap. c. v. ad fin. Apol. c. i.

4, 5, 7, 8. The magistrate by interposing in these cases, would prejudice the public rather than serve it, and therefore virtue requires him to forbear such interpositions.

Moyle's Post. Works, vol. i. p. 24—26.

Warburt. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 304, 305.

Owen's Syn. Pneum. p. 137—139.

Tind. Rights Christian Church, part i. c. i. § 20.

Montes. Spirit of Laws, l. xxv. c. xiii. vol.

ii. p. 183—186.

Doddridge's Sermon on Persec.

Old Whig, vol. i. N^o. v, vi. viii, ix, x.

Foster's Serm. vol. i. N^o. vi.

SCHOLIUM.

The history of religion in most countries, and the many calamities which have arisen from persecution, greatly tend to illustrate and confirm the last steps of this demonstration; and perhaps there is no part of history more instructive, though none be more melancholy.

Occas. Pap. vol. i. N^o. iv. p. 18—22.

Temp. Netherl. p. 166—169, 175.

Geddes's Account of the Inquisition, ap.

Traets, vol. i.

Geddes's Hist. of the Expulsion of the Moriscoes, ibid. vol. i.

New Advent. of Telemachus.

Candler's Hist. of Persecut. pass.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. There are a variety of religions in the world, which are so inconsistent, that it is impossible they should all be true.

2. If it be the duty of the magistrate to establish and defend *any* religion by penalties, he must establish and defend that which he takes to be true.

3. There is reason to believe that the generality of men take their own religion to be true.

1, 2, 3. 4. Many magistrates in the world, and perhaps the greatest part of them, would be obliged, (if the contrary to the proposition were true,) to persecute truth, and establish falsehood. *Q. E. D.*

Old Whig, vol. i. N^o xxxiii.

SCHOLIUM 1.

To the whole reasoning in *Dem. 1.* it is objected, that some errors in opinion and in worship are so displeasing to God, that the toleration of them would quickly bring down his vengeance upon the public, which it is the magistrate's business to endeavour to preserve.

Ans. It seems that opinions and practices so provoking to God must be highly contrary to reason, and therefore that the prevalency of them might be prevented by a rational debate, without having recourse to violence: and if in some few instances they should prevail, there may be danger, lest God should be more provoked by attempting to root them out, by methods so detrimental to human society, and to the cause of truth, (*Dem. 2.*) which this objection itself supposes to be the cause of God. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that if God should give any nation convincing proofs, that he would visit it with some extraordinary calamity and judgment, if any particular religion were violated among them, this would indeed alter the case, and justify such a magistrate in fencing it with such penal laws, as in other cases would be unjustifiable: but if a magistrate rashly concludes this to be the case of the people under his government, he is answerable to God for all those injuries which he may do them and religion upon this false supposition: and as for *christianity*, it does not treat with *nations as such*; nor does the new testament contain declarations of vengeance against the nations rejecting it, however virtuous they may be, but only treats with *particular persons*, as those who shall be finally happy or miserable, as it is received or rejected.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To *Dem. 1. gr. 5.* it is objected, that it may be kindness to the person suffering, to endeavour by such severity to reclaim him from such notions and practices, which, (supposing what is generally granted in this debate, the immortality of the soul,) may expose him to the danger of eternal ruin.

Ans.

Ans. It appears by *gr. 3.* of that *Demonstration*, that persecution is not the way to prevent it, but rather to bring on further guilt, by adding hypocrisy to error and if it be said, that by this means at least others are preserved; it is answered, that the evidence of truth itself may be sufficient, without violence, to preserve men from such gross and dangerous errors as the objection supposes. If it be further pleaded, that the corruption of their natures will lead them to error, if human terrors be not employed to restrain them from it; it may be answered, persecution tends to beget a suspicion in their minds of the cause to be supported by it: the magistrate cannot by any means prevent and cure all the secret abominations of the heart, but many of them must be referred to the judgment of God: and upon this principle, it might be allowable to persecute any notion whatsoever, which the fury and uncharitableness of the magistrate might call a damnable error.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To *gr. 2. Dem. 1.* it is objected, that severity may bring men to examine, and examination may introduce a rational conviction.

Ans. Arguments so offered are not likely to work upon the mind, and the magistrate seems to have done his part if he has taken care the argument should be fairly, clearly, and strongly proposed; nor is it worth while to risk so much evil, for the sake of people that will not be persuaded to inquire; especially since the generality of such people usually go into the prevailing religion, which is that of the magistrate, and rest there.

SCHOLIUM 4.

To the argument of *Dem. 2.* it is generally replied, that none are obliged to use violence in defence of their religion, but those whose religion is true. But then the question returns, who is that person? Every man will say it is he; and the controversy will be eternal, and all the mischief arising from it perpetual, unless some one person or body of men can give the world convincing proof, that they are in the right; and then there will be no further room for persecution, even on the principles of our adversaries.

Bayle's Philos. Comment.

| *Conyb. Sermon on Exped. of Rev. p. 17—21.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

Many insist upon the right of punishing those who *teach* false religions; though they confess that men are not to be obliged to profess the true. But seeing a man may think himself obliged in conscience, to endeavour the propagation of a religion, as well as himself to believe and practise it, most of the reasonings in both *Demonstrations* will take place here. Nethertheless, we readily allow, that the magistrate, or any religious community, may deprive a teacher of any salary or emolument, given him at first as a teacher of truth,
if

if he appear in the judgment of that person or society to become a teacher of error: but this by no means comes within the case condemned in the proposition.

Scotch Confess. Pref. p. 52—58. | *Old Whig, N^o. iv. p. 37, 38.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

The doctrines of atheism, human sacrifices, and community of women or goods, are so evidently detrimental to society, that many who have in general condemned penal laws in religion, have allowed them with regard to these, as well as to those who deny the essential difference between virtue and vice.

We readily allow, that if by any *overt act* in consequence of these doctrines, any subjects of the society be injured, the aggressor ought to be severely punished, and his pretences to conscience to be admitted as no excuse, in these cases or any others. But these notions are so notoriously absurd, that there is little danger, that upon a free examination they should prevail, especially in a civilized country; and the danger there would be of admitting persecution, on any pretence whatsoever, seems an equivalent for the damage the public would sustain, by permitting them to be publicly defended, while they reached no farther than speculation.

Alliance between Church and State, p. 118—121. | *Old Whig, vol. i. N^o. xiii, xiv, xvi, xviii. xxxvi.*

SCHOLIUM 7.

If a body of men, as the *Papists* among us, hold principles, which will not allow them to give the government security for their peaceable behaviour, and yet bring them under strong suspicion of being engaged in designs subversive of it, the government may in that case weaken them by heavier taxations than are laid upon other subjects; especially if the probable suspicion of their disaffection puts the public to any additional charge: and it seems only so far as this principle will justify it, that our laws against the *Papists* can be vindicated, on the foot of natural religion, not now to inquire into any supposed revelation.

Serm. against Popery, vol. i. N^o. iv. p. 36—38. | *Doddridge's Serm. on Perf. p. 6—19, 20—28. Old Whig, vol. i. N^o. xi.*
Locke on Toleration Let. 1. pass.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Some have represented all encouragement given to one religious profession in preference to another, as a degree of persecution: but this seems to be carrying the matter into a contrary extreme. Both a regard to the honour of God and the good of society, (which surely the magistrate is not the only person under no obligation to,) must engage him to desire and labour that his people may be instructed in what he takes to be truth; for which purpose it will be necessary that

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some provision be made for those that so instruct them, preferably to other instructors: that he may maintain such out of his private purse, none can doubt; and if he have a discretionary power with respect to any branch of the public revenue, it seems he may apply it to this purpose, even though most of his people were of a different religious persuasion from himself: and for any, who teach different doctrines, or will not submit to the ritual he thinks fit to establish, to claim the same emoluments from him, seems an invasion of that right of private judgment, which the magistrate and others joined with him must be allowed to have, as to the manner in which either his revenue or theirs shall be disposed of. But then it must be allowed, that it will be matter of duty and prudence in the magistrate, and those that join with him, to make his establishment as large as he can; that no worthy and good men, who might as established teachers be useful to the public, may unnecessarily be hampered and excluded; and for this he will be answerable to God.—If the majority of the people by their representatives join with the magistrate in such establishments, it will be the duty of the minority, though they cannot in conscience conform themselves, yet to be thankful that they are left in the possession of their own liberty, as by the reasoning above they certainly ought to be. If it be asked, whether such dissenters may regularly be forced by the magistrate and majority, to assist in maintaining established teachers whom they do not approve; it is answered, that this will stand upon the same footing with their contributing towards the expence of a war, which they think not necessary or prudent. If no such coercive power were admitted, it is probable, that covetousness would drive many into dissenting parties, in order to save their tithes or other possessions. So that none can reasonably blame a government for requiring such general contributions: and in this case, it seems fit it should be yielded to, as the determination of those, to whose guardianship these dissenters have committed themselves and their possessions. But if the majority disapprove of the conduct of their governor in this respect, it must stand upon the same footing with the right of resistance in any other case, in which the people apprehend themselves to be betrayed by their governor.

Dunlop's Pref. to Scotch Confess. | *Abernetky's Tracts*, p. 170—176.

PROPOSITION LXXVIII.

Virtue prohibits any man to put a period to his own life.

LECT.
LXXXVIII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Self-murder plainly implies a want of reverence for God, and resignation to his will, who is the Lord of life and death, and has assigned to every man his post in life to be maintained, till he shall dismiss him from it.
2. It is generally injurious to the public, in defrauding it of a member who might some way or other be useful to it, and introducing an example which might be very pernicious.

3. It

3. It brings great distress and often great infamy on surviving relatives and friends.

4. It argues a dishonourable weakness of mind, in not being able to endure the calamities of life, which many others, whose passions are well governed, support with serenity and cheerfulness.

5. If there be a future state, (which we shall afterwards prove,) it may, in consequence of the preceding arguments, bring irreparable damage on the person himself, who dies in an action highly displeasing to God, and cuts off the possibility of further preparation.

1, 5, 6. Self-murder is contrary to the duty we owe to God, to ourselves, and our fellow-creatures, by the preceding propositions, and therefore contrary to virtue. Q. E. D.

Watts against Self-Murder, p. 4—8.

39—41. 47—52.

Clarke of Nat. and Rev. Rel. p. 207

—211.

Puffendorf de Jure, l. ii. c. iv. § 19.

Cic. Somn. Scip. ap. Off. p. 229. *Græw.*

Ed. ibid. Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. xxx.

COROLLARY 1.

All lawful means are to be used to preserve our lives; for not to preserve is to destroy.

COROLLARY 2.

If bringing any temporary disorder upon ourselves may be the probable means of preserving life, virtue will not only permit but require us to do it, though it may be attended with some hazard; provided that hazard be less than would arise from omitting it: and if *inoculation* for the small-pox be lawful, it is on these principles.

Some of Inocul. pass.

SCHOLIUM I.

To *Dem. gr. 1.* it is objected, 1. That life was given as a *benefit*; and therefore may be returned, when it ceases to be so.

Ans. It was not given as a benefit merely to the person that enjoys it, but as a *trust* to be improved for the good of others: God intending, in the creation of each creature, not merely the happiness of that individual himself, but of the whole system of which he makes a part: this plainly follows from *Prop. 45.*

2. That we are such inconsiderable creatures, that there is no reason to believe, that God will be displeased with what affects the order of nature so little as our death would do.—But this argument would conclude for killing ourselves or each other at pleasure, and indeed at once overthrow the basis of all morality and virtue.

3. That we may conclude God gives us leave to retire, when our continuance in life will answer no good purpose.—But to this it is answered, we can never say that this is the case; since we may be sometimes unexpectedly recovered from great calamities; or even when we lie under them, may be very serviceable to others, by affording them examples of patience and resignation. God alone is capable of judging certainly when our usefulness is quite over; and therefore his orders are to be waited.

4. As for *Gildon's* observation, that we do not come into life by our own consent, as a soldier does into an army; the answer is obvious, that God as our creator has a much greater right to our humble obedience, than a general can have to that of a soldier, how willingly soever he may have enlisted himself into his service.

Blount's Orac. of Reas. p. 7—13. | *Passeran's Phil. Enq. pass.*
Lettres Persannes, vol. ii. N^o. 64. | *Fitzosborne's Lett. N^o. xxii.*

S C H O L I U M 2.

To *gr. 2.* it is objected, that some people cannot in any respect be serviceable to the public, or that if they could, they have a right to retire from the community when they see fit.

Ans. This can only be allowed, when there may be a prospect of at least equal happiness to mankind by the remove; otherwise the general laws of benevolence oblige them to a continuance; and how this can be the case in self-murder, will be hard to shew.

Watts, ibid. p. 12—14.

S C H O L I U M 3.

To prevent a tormenting death, (whether natural or violent,) certainly approaching, or the violation of chastity, seems the most plausible excuse for suicide. Yet as to the first of these, it is to be considered, (besides what was hinted *Schol. 1.*) that to die in torment for the sake of truth, is a glorious example of virtue, which may be exceeding useful: and humbly to yield to a severe sentence of death for any crime committed, may deter others from it much more effectually than self-violence could do, and may be on the whole an action the most pious and the most beneficial a man can in these circumstances perform. As to the latter, such violence would not destroy the character and usefulness of the person suffering by it; or if it did, it were to be borne with submission as a trial coming from the hands of providence.

Watts, ibid. p. 65—69.

S C H O L I U M 4.

Nevertheless it seems, that if the magistrate condemns a man to death, and gives him his choice, whether he will die by his own hand, or by a more severe

severe execution from the hands of another, he may in that case execute himself.

Athenian Oracle.

PROPOSITION LXXIX.

God is true in all his declarations, and faithful in all his engagements to his creatures, if he enters into any engagements with them.

LECT.
LXXXIX.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 54, 55. 1. Virtue requires *us* to be true to our declarations, and faithful to our promises.

2. Our obligation to truth and fidelity in our converse with our fellow-creatures does not arise from our own weakness and dependence, but from the general laws of benevolence: and if a being, beyond all possibility of receiving any personal advantage from falshood and treachery, were to be guilty of it, he would be so much the more inexcusable, and therefore so much the more odious.

1, 2. *Prop. 44. Cor. 3.* 3. *Valet propositio.*

Abernethy's Serm. vol. ii. N°. v. p. 229—
231.

Tillotson, vol. ii. p. 654.

Wilkins's Nat. Rel. p. 140—142.

SCHOLIUM 1.

If there be any force in what is said *Prop. 54. Schol. 1.* to prove that there is a kind of *instinct* in favour of truth rooted in our nature, that may afford some presumption, that God the author of our nature is a lover of truth, as the *benevolent* instinct implanted in our nature, may be an argument of his benevolence.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many have questioned, whether God, by the veracity and fidelity of his nature, be obliged to fulfil his *threatenings*. It is urged, that promises give another a right of a claim to what has been promised; but for a person not to accomplish his threatenings, is to be *better* than his word; and consequently it would be no reflection on the Divine Being to suppose it thus with regard to him.

But it seems, this question is to be determined, by the manner in which the threatening is delivered. If any action be forbidden by God on such a penalty, and no further declaration be added, he does not seem to be bound by it; but if he has in any case added a declaration, that he will in fact make his threatenings as well as his promises the rule of his final proceedings, it seems inconsistent with his *veracity*, though not his *fidelity*, to act contrary to them; especially if we consider, that as there is no change in the views and purposes of God, if he fail to act according to such minatory declarations, he must have intended to act

act contrary to them even at the time he made them; which seems a mean and dishonourable artifice, infinitely beneath the majesty of God.

Tillot's vol. i. Serm. xxxv. p. 353, 354.
Ed. 1704. p. 413, 414.

Watts's Serm. vol. ii. p. 146, 147.

Emlyn's Tracts, vol. i. p. 243—246.

DEFINITION LIX.

That governor is said to administer his government with justice, who in proportion to his legal power distributes good to the virtuous and evil to the vicious, or in other words, treats his subjects on the whole according to their characters.

Abernetby, vol. ii. N^o. v. p. 180—186.

SCHOLIUM I.

Justice sometimes signifies, “giving to every one that which is his own, or “that which he has in reason a right to,” *i. e.* which virtue requires he should have; or in other words, treating him as virtue requires he should be treated: now in this sense of it, it is *universal rectitude*. (*Def. 38.*) Sometimes it stands distinguished from *charity*; and then he is said to be a *just* man, who gives to every one that to which he has by law a claim, and he is *good* or *charitable*, who abounds in good offices, to which human laws do not oblige him.

Foster's Serm. vol. i. N^o. ii. p. 27—35.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Justice as it respects *men*, is often divided into *commutative* and *distributive* justice: the former consists in an equal exchange of benefits, the latter in an equal distribution of rewards and punishments.

Bury-street Lect. vol. i. p. 82, 83.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It will not follow from the definition given above, that every governor is unjust, who does not carry the execution of the law to its utmost rigour upon offenders; all governments allowing a power of pardoning, in cases in which the governor shall judge it most agreeable to the public good to do it; and as the public good is the supreme law, justice is no further a virtue than as it consists with it: but as injustice is always a term of reproach, it is not to be applied to those instances of favour, which, though contrary to the *letter* of the law, are consistent with and subservient to its general design.

PROPOSITION LXXX.

God is with respect to his dispensations, on the whole just to all his rational and free creatures.

D E M O N.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. All rational and free creatures are the proper subjects of moral government, *i. e.* are capable of being governed by a law, enforced by the sanction of rewards and punishments.

1. | 2. It is in itself highly congruous, that they should be treated with favour or severity, as virtue or vice do on the whole prevail in their tempers and conduct.

2. | 3. It would be justly accounted an infamous thing, for any created governor to act contrary to the rule of justice, in his treatment of any such creatures committed to his government.

4. The most excellent creatures might in some imaginable instances lie under some temptations of this kind, to which an omnipotent God cannot possibly be exposed.

3, 4. | 5. It would be most dishonourable to conceive of the Divine Being, as acting contrary to those rules, and dispensing final good and evil without regard to the moral character of his creatures.

Gr. 15. Prop. 44. Cor. 3. | 6. Valet propositio.

Abernethy's Serm. vol. ii. N^o. v. præf. p. 186—208.

COROLLARY.

GOD is just in all his dispensations to mankind. *Prop. 16.*

Tillotson, vol. ii. p. 647.

Wilkins's Nat. of Rel. p. 139, 140.

Butler's Anal. part. i. c. iii. vii.

SCHOLIUM.

The only considerable objection against this, arises from the unequal distribution of good and evil, observable in the present administration of providence: but it may be sufficiently answered by considering,

1. That we are often mistaken in the judgment we form concerning the characters and conditions of men.

2. That the interest of particular persons may sometimes clash with that of society, in such a manner as that public justice will require, that for the present the former be sacrificed to the latter.

3. That if a future state be admitted, it will solve those phænomena, which otherwise would appear the most unaccountable; and perhaps those inequalities may be permitted, to convince us of it: but of this more hereafter.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 248—
265.

Religion of Nat. p. 110—114.

Abernethy's Serm. N^o. v. p. 209—216.

DEFI-

DEFINITION LX.

LECT.
XC.

He is said to REPENT of a vicious action that he has committed, who is so convinced of the folly of it, as heartily to wish that he had not committed it, and stedfastly resolve that he will no more repeat it.

Tillotson's Serm. vol. iii. p. 63—69.

COROLLARY.

Wherever there is true repentance for an injury offered to another person, the penitent will be ready to make restitution, so far as it is in his power to do it.

Tillotson. vol. iii. Serm. cxvi. p. 85—90. | Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xvii. § 13—17.
Puffendorf de Jure, l. iii. c. i. § 5—11. | Granada's Mem. p. 119—121.

SCHOLIUM.

If it be hereafter proved, that every man who has committed a vicious action is obliged to repent of it, then he who by an unjust war has deprived any of their rights is obliged to make restitution: and if any possessions came into the hands of a conqueror in a just war, which did not of right belong to the persons from whom he took them; such a conqueror seems obliged to restore them, when the claim of the former owner is made and proved; proper allowance being made for the trouble and expence of recovering them.

Grot. de Jure, l. iii. c. x. § 4—6. c. xvi. § 1—3. | Conti's Will, ap. Life, p. 7—14.

DEFINITION LXI.

Those rules of action, which a man *may discover* by the use of his reason to be agreeable to the nature of things, and on which his happiness will appear to him to depend, may be called THE LAW OF NATURE: and when these are considered as intimations of the divine will and purpose, they may be called the NATURAL LAWS OF GOD. Vid *Def. 52.*

Caermichael on Puff. Suppl. c. i. § 10, 19, 20.

DEFINITION LXII.

That part of the law of nature, which a man by the exercise of his reason *has actually discovered*, is to him at that time THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

COROLLARY.

The light of nature and the law of nature may to the same, and yet more evidently to different persons, be different: yet they can in no instance be contradictory to each other.

S C H O -

SCHOLIUM.

If by the *law of nature*, be meant in general the obligation arising from the nature of things, it can in all its extent be known only to him, to whom the nature of things is universally known, *i. e.* to God: and with respect to him, it can only improperly and figuratively be called a *law*, since there is no superior whose will is thereby signified to him. Vid. Def. 52.

Conyb. against Tind. p. 11, 13—17. | Leland against Tind. vol. i. c. ii.

PROPOSITION LXXXI.

The natural law of God requires the practice of universal virtue.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 44. Cor. 1. | 1. Since God is a being of perfect rectitude, it must be his will, that creatures capable of virtue should practise it in all its branches.

Prop. 80. | 2. As he is the just governor of the world, he will on the whole dispense good or evil, as virtue has been cultivated, or as it has been violated.

Gr. 1, 2. Def. 61. | 3. Valet propositio.

Cic. de Rep. ap. Lactant. quod vide ap. | 557. 4to Ed. vol. iii. p. 351, 352. 8vo
Middlet. Life of Cic. vol. ii. p. 556, | Ed.

COROLLARY 1.

A due reverence to the Divine Being, as well as a regard to our own happiness, will require us attentively to study the law of nature; especially seeing there are so many cases, in which it is exceeding difficult to determine what it requires.

Sykes's Connect. c. i, ii.

COROLLARY 2.

The natural law of God must require, that those who have been guilty of vice, should repent of it. Vid. Def. 60.

COROLLARY 3.

This natural and universal law of God, is of infinitely greater efficacy to restrain vice and promote virtue, than any human laws can be; since, whereas in human laws, *punishments* are generally the only sanctions, (the magistrate being neither capable of judging of the degree of virtue in any action, (Compare *Prop. 49. Cor. 2.*) nor having a fund out of which he can universally reward men in proportion to it) the divine law has the sanction of *rewards* likewise, and extends itself to, what the civilians call, *duties of imperfect obligation, i. e.* those which cannot fall under the cognizance of human governors.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 12—21. | Fitzosborne's Lett. N^o. xlv.

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COROL-

COROLLARY 4.

It is highly for the interest of states, that the great principles of natural religion should be believed, *viz.* the being and providence of God, and the certainty of an exact retribution either here or hereafter; since it is on these principles alone, that the efficacy of such supposed laws must depend.

Warb. ibid. p. 21—24.

| *Watts of Civil Power in Rel. p. 27—29.*

COROLLARY 5.

For any to pour contempt upon this natural law of God, under pretence of extolling any supposed divine revelation, or intimation of God's will in an extraordinary manner, will appear very absurd; since our obligation to receive any such supposed extraordinary discoveries made by God, must depend upon our knowledge of his moral perfections; and no discovery can be supposed so particular, as not to need the use of reasoning upon the principles of the law of nature in explaining and applying it to particular cases.

Hodges's Elibu, Pref. p. 23—25.

| *Dove's Creed, p. 9, 10, 13.*

SCHOLIUM 1.

That it will not at all follow from the usefulness of religion to communities, that therefore it is merely an engine of state-policy, is in a most sagacious and conclusive manner shewn in

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. iii. § 6. p. 443—471.

SCHOLIUM 2.

From the second *Corollary*, arises a most difficult and important question, *viz.* whether the justice of God will permit him to forgive the penitent; at least, whether we can have such assurance of it, as cheerfully to depend upon pardon, how great soever our offences may have been. Some have asserted the contrary in the strongest terms; and urge, that there is an infinite degree of evil in sin, from which it is impossible that any creature should recover himself; and that the infinite goodness of God must make every the least violation of the laws of eternal order and rectitude an incurable evil. But others have universally asserted, that we may on the principles of the light of nature be certain, that God will and must upon repentance fully and freely pardon every sin. But on the whole, we must answer in a medium between those two opinions.

1. There seems some probable reason to believe, that at least *some* sins may be forgiven by God; considering the known goodness of the Divine Being, and especially from observing the provision he has made in the world of nature for the necessities and calamities of mankind, even of many which are brought upon

upon men by their own folly: and indeed had God determined to punish every sin without mercy, we can hardly believe that such a benevolent being would have placed mankind in circumstances of such strong temptation from within and without, that not a person on earth who is arrived at years of understanding should be free from it. Nevertheless,

2. We cannot *certainly* and *universally* conclude, that sin shall be pardoned on repentance: for the end of punishment is not merely, as some have rashly asserted, the amendment of the offender, (though even then some punishment might be inflicted after repentance, to make him more cautious, and to preserve him from future guilt;) but principally the maintaining the honour of the divine government, and the admonition of others: now it is impossible for us certainly to say, how far the right of his government and the interest of the whole rational creation may require severity even against penitents themselves, especially in cases of notorious provocation. So that on the whole, it seems that unassisted reason could give us at best but a wavering and uncertain hope that *all* sin was pardonable, though it might shew it to be highly probable, that *some* sins were so, or that the penalty inflicted for them might not be the utter destruction of the penitent.

Tind. Christianity as old, &c. c. iv.

Conyb. against Tind. p. 114—131. or

Leland against Tind. vol. i. c. vi.

Balguy on Redemption.

Fost. Disc. on Nat. Rel. vol. i. c. viii.

Hallet on Script. 326—343.

Taylor against Deism, c. i. p. 1, &c.

Watts's Strength and Weakness, &c. p. 72.

—87.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. v. § 2—4.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, though it remains dubious how far God will pardon sin upon our repentance, yet repentance will appear reasonable; since to be sure, if any pardon is to be expected, it must be received in that way: for it would be utterly unbecoming the dignity of the Divine Being, and his character as the universal judge, always to spare and always to bless an obstinate and incorrigible rebel: and if any punishment is after all to be expected, it must surely be much better to meet it in a posture of humble submission, than with a vain and obstinate resistance and opposition to a being infinitely superior to us, and who can continue us in a capacity of feeling punishment as long as he pleases; for some mitigation of which punishment we might at least hope, in consequence of such humble submission as is recommended above.

Collib. of Nat. and Rev. Rel. part i. § 8. p. 27—35.

The END of the THIRD PART.

P A R T IV.

*Of the IMMORTALITY and IMMATERIALITY of the SOUL:
its ORIGINAL: the general obligations to Virtue, and State
of it in the World.*

D E F I N I T I O N LXIII.

THE DEATH of the MAN is the universal cessation both of perception and of animal motion, and particularly respiration, and the circulation of the blood in the human body.

S C H O L I U M.

Though perception and animal motion are not necessarily connected; yet, so far as our observation reaches, the latter being never found without the former, it seemed not improper to join them as we have done in the definition.

D E F I N I T I O N LXIV.

The DEATH of the MIND is the utter destruction of its thinking powers.

P R O P O S I T I O N LXXXII.

The soul does not die with the body; but survives in a state of greater happiness or misery than before, as it has behaved in a virtuous or vicious manner.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N I.

Prop. 80. 1. As God is just, he will take care, that on the whole his creatures shall be more or less happy or miserable, according to the degree in which virtue or vice prevails in their characters.

2. No such distinction is here made, correspondent to their characters; but virtuous men are often exposed to the greatest distress, whilst the worst of men live and die in a series of prosperity.

Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. iii. § 32—35.

1, 2. 3. There must be a future state of retribution. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 251—257. | Balguy's Six Sermons, p. 81—86.
Religion of Nat. p. 199—203.

S C H O.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that the secret pleasure attending virtue is its own reward, and renders the good man happier in his most calamitous state, than the wicked man is in his greatest prosperity.

Ans. 1. That the support and comfort of a good man in his troubles, greatly depends on the expectation of a future state; and that this expectation being his greatest encouragement to persevere in virtue under its greatest disadvantages, we can hardly suppose that a wise, just, and good God would so order it, that the great foundation and support of virtue should be a false and vain expectation.

2. There are some sufferings of flesh and blood, to which good men even for conscience-sake have often been brought, so extreme, that without some extraordinary support from God, it is morally impossible the pleasure of rational thought should be enjoyed under them: and this case would be a sufficient answer to the objection, unless such supports were granted; which if they were, as they arise from views of a future state, the faithfulness of God, as well as those attributes mentioned before, would seem to be injured, by supposing there were no such state.

3. Good men, in calmer seasons of life, often find the inward satisfaction arising from the consciousness of their own virtue interrupted, whilst they labour under disquieting doubts and fears as to the state and prevalency of it; and it is unreasonable to suppose that God would leave their minds under such distresses, if the present pleasure of virtue were its only reward. On the other hand, bad men often outgrow the remorse of conscience; so that those who are the most experienced in wickedness, and so deserve the heaviest punishments, do so far as we can judge suffer much less than others not equally criminal, and owe their tranquillity to their wickedness.

4. That all this passes in private, and is little taken notice of; whereas one would naturally expect that the justice of God should have its public triumphs, especially over those who, being in exalted stations of life, and therefore under the greatest obligation to virtue, have acted a very guilty part, without appearing to be in any measure proportionably miserable; and in favour of those who have suffered very hard things for virtue, without any visible retribution, and have perhaps even died in its defence.

Religion of Nat. p. 203—205.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 257—261.

Balguay's Six Serm. p. 88—91.

Baxt. Reas. of Christianity, part i. c. xiv.

§ 1. ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 46—48.

Foster's Disc. on Nat. Rel. vol. i. c. ix.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Others urge, that this goes on a false supposition, that there are some good men; whereas the best, being but imperfectly virtuous, can claim no future rewards.

Ans.

Ans. 1. It must be acknowledged, that the best of men cannot in strict justice claim any reward from God as a debt, seeing they owe all to him; especially are they destitute of such a claim, when they have in any instance failed of the duty they owe him, as the best here do: nevertheless,

2. The vast difference there is in the characters of men will require that there should be some greater difference in the manner of treating them, than there is in the present state, where there is no proportion between their suffering and present demerit.

3. That considering the extraordinary progress some make in virtue, and consequently how fit they are for the most sublime and rational happiness, and how unavoidable some degree of imperfection is, considering the constitution of our nature and the temptations of life, there seems some probable though not certain reason to hope, that God will hereafter reward those who are in the main his faithful servants, with some greater degrees of felicity than they have here enjoyed.

Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 226—229. | *Grove against Hallet*, c. vii, p. 340, &c.
& p. 236—240.

S C H O L I U M 3.

Nevertheless it must be confessed, that reason does not certainly assure us, that all good men do *immediately* pass into a state of happiness: least of all could we conclude it in favour of those penitents, who have been reclaimed but a little before their death, after a long course of vice, for which they have met with no remarkable calamity. It might seem more probable with regard to such, that they should either suffer an utter extinction of being, or pass through some state of purgation, whereby at least some further honour might also be done to the divine violated law.

Virg. Æn. l. vi. ver. 719—748.
Plato's Phæd. § 44, 45.

| *Cyrus's Trav.* vol. ii. p. 110, 8vo.
| *Æschin. Dial.* iii. § 19—21.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N 2.

LECT.
XCII.

1. The human mind is framed with perpetual capacities for improvement; whereas brutes soon attain to the utmost perfection of which their natures are capable.

1.2. It seems not consistent with the divine *wisdom*, to form so excellent a being for so short a duration, and such low employments, as are to be found in this mortal life.

1.3. The human mind is formed with a capacity for far greater happiness, than it can enjoy in the present state.

4. Men are necessarily exposed to a great variety of evils, from which even innocent infants are not exempted: and perhaps it may be acknowledged, that were immortality to be absolutely despaired of, the state of brutes would appear less calamitous and pitiable than that of men; at least that it would be so, were the whole human species to disbelieve a future state.

5. There

5. There is a strong desire of immortality possessing our natures, and it is strongest in the most virtuous minds.

3, 4, 5. 6. The circumstances of men in the present world are such, as we can hardly reconcile with the divine *goodness*, unless we suppose some other and better state of existence; especially considering, that in others and those much inferior things, there is a correspondence between natural desire and the possibility at least of enjoyment.

Gr. 2, 6. Prop. 42, 45. 7. The wisdom and goodness of God join in requiring that there should be a future state, and therefore it is reasonable to expect it.
Q. E. D.

Speet. vol. ii. N°. cxi.

Religion of Nat. p. 208—211.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 269.

Howe's Vanity of Man, &c. pass. præf.

ap. Op. vol. i. p. 640—650.

Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 256—258, 272—289.

Fost. Sermon. vol. i. N°. xv. p. 406—408.

Balguy's Six Sermon. p. 66—69.

SCHOLIUM.

Near-akin to this argument, is that which Mr. *Balguy* draws from the sense of *friendship* rooted in the human heart, which engages virtuous friends to wish to continue for ever in the enjoyment of each other, and renders the thoughts of a final separation so shocking, that it is not to be imagined the great and benevolent author of nature should have implanted such a passion, had he not intended to leave room for the eternal gratification of it. And it may further be observed, that whatever weight there is in this argument is increased by considering, that the notion of the mortality of the soul will be an additional grief to a virtuous mind, when he considers, that upon this supposition, he must not only be deprived himself of the enjoyment of his friends, but they likewise must entirely perish, and lose all the delight which growing science and virtue have given, and which they seemed fitted for receiving, in yet farther and more exalted degrees. To which we may add, on like principles, that the love of God growing in the virtuous mind, will make the thought of the extinction of being more painful in proportion to that advance; as all enjoyment of God must of course cease. And the importance of this thought both illustrates *Balguy's* remark, and is strongly illustrated by it.

Balguy's Six Sermon. p. 71—75.

DEMONSTRATION 3.

1. The lives of men, according to the ordinary course of nature, are continually in the power of themselves and others.

2. If the soul were mortal, a desperate villain might immediately deprive the most virtuous man of his being, and with it, of all the further rewards which his virtue might have expected and received.

1. | 3. Such a person might also upon that supposition put a period to all further punishment intended for his crimes and due to them, by laying violent hands upon himself.

2, 3. | 4. The justice of God might in a great measure be frustrated, if the soul were mortal.

Prop. 31, and 80. | 5. Seeing God in an omnipotent and just being, we have reason to conclude that his justice cannot be frustrated.

4, 5. | 6. The soul is immortal. *Q. E. D.*

Watts's Reliq. Juv. N^o. lxxv. p. 334—336.

SCHOLIUM 1.

To this it may be objected, that God will in an extraordinary manner interpose, to prevent such deaths as would interfere with the distribution of justice.

Ans. 1. So far as we can judge, many such deaths do in fact happen.

2. It would be unreasonable to expect a course of things to be established, in which without perpetual extraordinary interpositions the greatest irregularities must happen: this would reflect as much upon the wisdom, as the other on the justice of the Divine Being.

Watts, ibid. p. 336, 337.

SCHOLIUM 2.

What is most solid and important in the argument for a future state, from the impossibility of governing the world without the belief of it, seems to coincide with this argument, or *Demonstration* 1.

Baxt. Reas. of Christ. part i. c. xiv. § | Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 334—337.

5, 6. *ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 49—51. |*

DEMONSTRATION 4.

1. There is in man a certain affection of mind, or principle of action, which is commonly called *conscience*, whereby we are capable of considering ourselves as under a divine law, and accountable to God for our conduct.

1 | 2. From hence arises self-approbation, or self-condemnation in men, as they apprehend their actions have been agreeable or disagreeable to the divine law.

3. The force of this often appears so great, that the worst of men cannot, at least without great difficulty, divest themselves of it; and that even when they are in such circumstances, as to have least to fear from their fellow-creatures, and especially in their dying moments.

2, 3. | 4. It is exceeding probable, that this principle is intended by God to intimate a future state of retribution, since it is chiefly to that it seems to refer.

1, 4. 5. Both the wisdom and truth of God seem to require, that there should be a future state in some respect answerable to this apprehension. Q. E. D.

Tillotf. Sermon. vol. iii. p. 124, 125.

Barrow, vol. ii. p. 334, 335.

Hallet on Script. p. 259—263

Fost. Sermon. vol. ii. N^o. iii. p. 55—68.

Balg. Six Sermon. p. 75—79.

DEMONSTRATION 5.

1. It appears that most nations, not excepting the most barbarous, have generally believed the doctrine in the proposition: and it is observable that most of their *funeral rites*, so far as we are informed concerning them, seem to imply some apprehension of it: as that very ancient kind of idolatry, the worship of the dead, (as well as all pretences to the art of *necromancy*, which were plainly founded on this persuasion,) contains a further and most evident proof of it. To which we may also add, that the *lesser initiation* of the ancients seem to have been a sort of machinery, in which, especially in the *Eleusinian mysteries*, the seats both of the blessed and damned were represented.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. ii. § 4.

1. 2. The doctrine was probably inferred from some arguments level to every capacity, or it would not have been so universally believed. Compare *Prop. 27. Dem. 2.*

2. 3. It is reasonable to believe it. Q. E. D.

Tillotf. vol. iii. p. 116—118.

Stev. against Pop. Sermon. vii. p. 192—194.

Sherlock's Disc. vol. i. N^o. vi.

Customs of Ind. and Jews comp. Art. vii.

p. 39—42.

Balg. Six Sermon. p. 70, 71.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is objected, that a great many ancient philosophers disbelieved the immortality of the soul, and some of the ancients tell us, it was first taught by the Egyptians. LECT. XCIII.

Ans. The common people seem to have had a firmer persuasion of it than the philosophers, many of whom do indeed speak dubiously about it; and as for others of them, the accounts they give of it are very low and absurd, and several of the arguments which they bring for the support of it are weak and inconclusive: and it may by the way be observed, that in *Plato's Phædon*, the argument in the *first* demonstration, though so proper to the circumstances of *Socrates* at that time, is strangely omitted, nor do any that I remember mention it before *Seneca*.

Dr. Warburton has lately stated this matter very particularly; and undertaken to prove, that though the philosophers did indeed believe the doctrine of the soul's immortality, they did not believe that of the future state of rewards and punishments;

D d

which

which he proves to be inconsistent with the essential principles, not only of the *Epicureans*, but also of the *Pythagoreans*, *Peripatetics*, *Platonists* and *Stoics*, particularly with the doctrine of the $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon$, or the refusion of souls into their common eternal principle, and also with that doctrine, which taught the deity to be incapable of that resentment without which they supposed he could not punish. So that all those passages, in which these philosophers inculcate future retribution, are, according to this ingenious author, to be looked upon, merely as popular accommodations to doctrines commonly received; or at most, as what the philosophers thought fit to *teach*, though they did not themselves believe them, in a view to their being useful to society: and he imagines that the distinction between the *exoteric* and *esoteric* doctrines is of great importance here. —On the contrary, Dr. *Sykes* and Mr. *Bott* suppose these philosophers really to have believed a future retribution, and that the difference between the external and internal doctrine, was only in the manner of illustrating the kinds of those rewards and punishments which they asserted in both; and the doctrine of the $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\upsilon$ is so explained by *Bott* as to be consistent with that of retribution.

<i>Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. iii. § 1—4.</i>	<i>N. Taylor of Deism, p. 80—110. & p. 119—144.</i>
<i>Bott against Warb. § 2</i>	
<i>Sykes against Warb.</i>	<i>Grot. de Verit. c. i. § 22. c. ii. § 9.</i>
<i>Critical Enquiry, pass.</i>	<i>Whitby's Certainty of Christian Faith, c. x. § 11. with Annot. p. 312—315.</i>
<i>Tillot's vol. iii. p. 132—134.</i>	<i>Cudworth's Intell. Syst. c. i. § 45.</i>
<i>Plato's Phæd. pass.</i>	

S C H O L I U M 2.

Others account for the phænomenon by saying, that men might *wish*, and therefore *think* themselves immortal.

Ans. Most who held and taught a future state of distinct, personal existence, seemed to think it a state of *retribution*, which it is to be feared it was not their interest to desire; and the fears of it are sometimes spoken of as a burden: and if notwithstanding these fears, they wished the soul immortal, it is so much the greater confirmation of *Dem. 2. gr. 5.*

S C H O L I U M 3.

The principal objections against this doctrine are reckoned up by *Lucretius*: but most of them are so evidently weak as not to deserve a particular examination. The most plausible are those that arise from the sensible decay of the faculties of the mind with those of the body, and the supposed impossibility of action and perception without bodily organs: but to these it is replied,

1. That the soul does sometimes continue in full vigour, even when the body is under the greatest disorder, and death immediately approaching.

2. That it may be a law of nature, that while the spirit is united to the body, it should be so affected with the good or bad state of the bodily health as we often see it

it is, and that the memory should be impaired with age and sickness will not appear at all strange, considering how much it depends on the brain. Vid. *Prop.* 8 *Dem.*

3. That perhaps this may be a state of imprisonment to the soul, as many of the philosophers thought; and that when it is set at liberty from the body, it may obtain new and noble ways of perception and action, to us at present unknown.

4. That if a body were necessary, we might more reasonably believe God would give it a new body in the state immediately succeeding this, than suffer its faculties to perish, for the reasons assigned above.

Lucret. l. iii. ver. 418—740.

Polignac's Anti-Lucretius.

Rel. of Nat. p. 194—199.

Cic. Tusc. Disp. l. i. § 20.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 79—81.

Plat. Phæd. § 9, 10.

Rocheft. Life, p. 65—68. & p. 20, 21, 150.

Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. § 5. præf. p. 395—400.

More's ~~Immort.~~ l. iii. c. xiv. xv.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Others attempt to prove the immortality of the soul, from the impossibility of governing the world without such hopes and fears on the one hand, (Vid. *Dem.* 3. *Schol.* 2.) or of God's governing it by a lye on the other, as they say it is plain he in fact does, if there be not a future state. They also argue from God's being the author of those hopes which arise in the mind of a good man; and from the probability there is, that there are other worlds inhabited by spiritual beings, to whom therefore the soul may go, and among whom it may dwell, after the dissolution of the body. It is likewise said, that since we see other beings ripening gradually to perfection, and animal life improved from low beginnings to noble heights; it is on the principles of analogy probable, that the human soul shall pass by death into some more elevated state of being, or at least may be a candidate for it.—But as where these arguments are distinct from the former, the premises in some of them are liable to much dispute, and perhaps cannot be all sufficiently made out; and as in others, granting the premises, the conclusion may be disputed, we reckon it enough barely to have suggested these considerations, without entering into the more particular examination of them.

Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 55, 658.

Butler's Anal. part i. c. i.

Young's Night-thoughts, N^o. vi. p. 158, 159. Ed. 12mo.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It may further be questioned, whether allowing a future state, it can be proved eternal and immutable.

Ans. The soul seems originally designed for an eternal duration on the principles urged *Dem.* 2. but that the state on which it shall enter at death shall be eternal, the light of nature does not discover: there is no reason at all to expect eternal rewards, for so short and imperfect a virtue as can here be attained, and

as for eternal punishments, though some of the heathens did assert them, and many have undertaken to infer them from natural principles; (all moral evil being a breach of order, and every instance and act of it having a natural tendency to harden the soul, universal and perpetual misery must follow, unless God interpose in an extraordinary manner, either to restore the health of the soul, or to end its being,) yet it seems that our natural apprehensions of the divine goodness would rather encourage us to hope, that he would leave some room for amendment, and recovery of happiness in a future state, or by annihilation would put an end to mens misery, when they appeared humbled by their punishment. But if it should prove that in a future state of chastisement, the sinner should harden himself against God, and go on still in his crimes, perpetual succeeding sins would justify perpetual succeeding punishments: for it is certain, every new crime committed after severe punishment is on that account so much the more aggravated. The same may be said concerning a series of eternal happiness, in case of continued virtue, and that very consistently with the preceding observation. Vid. *Prop.* 81. *Schol.* 2. *Prop.* 82. *Dem.* 1. *Schol.* 3.

Lucret. l. i. ver. 108—112

| *Taylor of Deism*, p. 149—167.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It may be granted that the resurrection of the body, whatever change it may be supposed to undergo after death, may be possible to the divine power, and may be subservient both to render rewards and punishments the more complete, and the triumphs of divine justice more conspicuous, than they would otherwise be; but it by no means appears certain by the light of nature.

Lime str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 376—384.

Gale's Court of the Gent. part i. l. iii.

c. vii. p. 81, 82. part ii. l. ii. c. viii. p. 189.

| *Phocylides*, ver. 98—101.

| *Pearson on the Creed*, p. 365—367.

| *Baxt. on the Soul*, vol. i. p. 278—306.

SCHOLIUM 7.

The atheist cannot be infallibly certain that there shall be no future state, even though he should believe the existence of the soul to depend on that of the body, or thought to be no more than a power resulting from matter so disposed; since that omnipotent chance, which according to his principles formed the whole world, may possibly throw together into one body the particles of which he now consists, with such alteration, as to make him capable even of eternal misery, from which no virtue can secure him.

Gurdon at Boyle's Lect. p. 151—163. | *Fiddes of Mor.* Pref. p. 12—16.

DEFINITION LXV.

LECT. The MIND may be said to be CORPOREAL, if thought arise from and be inseparably connected with a certain system of matter; so that if such system so arranged

ranged exist, thought must exist with it, though no distinct being should be produced; or if that system were to be dissolved, or the arrangement of its particles to be altered, thought must immediately and necessarily cease with it, unless God were instantaneously to produce some new being which did not before exist.

PROPOSITION LXXXIII.

To enquire into the most considerable arguments brought to prove the immateriality of the soul.

DEMONSTRATION I.

Prop. 23. Cor. 1. Prop. 26, & 41. 1. God is an immaterial and almighty spirit.

1. 2. There is no absurdity in supposing the existence of an immaterial spirit produced by him.

3. If the soul be material, its faculty of thinking must either necessarily arise from the nature and arrangement of its particles, or it must be superadded by God to a system of matter.

Prop. 24. 4. It is in the nature of things entirely inconceivable and incredible, that thought should necessarily arise from matter, however figured or moved.

5. To say that a power of thinking is superadded by the divine will, is unintelligible, or in effect granting the proposition; for there cannot be a power of thinking where there is not a thinking being, and the superaddition of this to matter is nothing more than the union of an immaterial being to a body, which none who assert the immateriality of the soul, (granting what is here supposed, the real existence of matter) pretend to deny. *Def. 65.*

3, 4, 5. 6. There are insuperable difficulties attending the supposition that the soul is corporeal.

2, 6. 7. It is reasonable to believe it incorporeal. *Q. E. D.*

Ditton on the Ref. p. 430—460.

Cheyne's Princ. of Nat. Rel. c. ii. § 13.

p. 36—40.

Tillot's. vol. iii. p. 127—129, 130.

Rel. of Nat. p. 186—189.

Abernethy, vol. i. Sermon. iv.

Bext. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 156—160,

186—192.

SCHOLIUM.

To this it is objected, that it limits the divine omnipotence, to say that God cannot make matter think.—It is generally replied, that it is no more so than to say, that God cannot make a square circle. God may unite a soul to a system of matter; but then the matter to which it is united can only be said to think, as our body is said to feel; *i. e.* by the divine appointment, though without any necessary connection, it may become an organ of sensation and motion to that spirit: and it will be difficult to form any scheme, by which thought may be supposed to result from matter any how modified and agitated by an omnipotent being,

ing, on which it might not be asserted to arise from it without the action of such a being, and consequently by which all religion might not be overthrown.

Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii. § 6. with Not. | *Howe, vol. i. p. 52, 53.*

Rel. of Nat. p. 189—193.

| *Baxt. on the Soul, vol. i. p. 192—195.*

D E M O N S T R A T I O N 2.

1. Matter is divisible, and consists of parts actually distinct.

1. | 2. Whatever system of matter can be supposed to be conscious, it is capable of being divided into several lesser parts; and they will be as really distinct, when laid or cemented together, as when separate, and removed to a distance from each other.

2. | 3. If any system of matter be conscious, it must either have a distinct consciousness in each lesser particle, or one consciousness resulting from the union of its several parts.

4. There cannot be in each system a number of distinct consciousnesses; for that would suppose a vast and unknown multiplicity of souls in every soul. *Q. E. A.*

5. An assemblage of various unthinking parts can never be supposed to make one thinking mass; so that thought should arise from the whole, and yet not exist in any given part.

3, 4, 5. | 6. The soul is not material. *Q. E. D.*

Clarke against Dodwell, p. 1—3.

| *Baxter ibid. p. 227—239.*

S C H O L I U M.

To the fifth step it is objected, that one indivisible power may reside in a system consisting of divisible parts, as sweetness in a rose: but it is replied, that sweetness is only a *secondary* power, (*Def. 18.*) and not properly speaking in the rose at all; and as for those *primary* powers or qualities, they do proportionable reside in every particle.

Clarke, ibid. p. 8—15.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N 3.

Prop. 82. | 1. The soul is immortal.

2. What is immaterial has no internal tendency to corruption and dissolution; and is incapable of being hurt by a variety of accidents, which may destroy any material system known to us.

3. It is unreasonable to believe that God would make a being, which he intended for an immortal duration, with a tendency to corruption, or obnoxious to dissolving accidents.

1, 2, 3. | 4. It is unreasonable to suppose that God has made the soul material; even supposing it possible that matter might think. *Q. E. D.*

Baxter ibid. p. 239—247.

S C H O-

SCHOLIUM 1.

To this it may be replied, that neither is matter obnoxious to dissolution; nor does any immaterial substance tend to continue in existence, any otherwise than as God shall act in and upon it; (*Prop. 32.*) so that the whole demonstration is founded on a mistake: and it is said, that allowing the soul to be material does no more disprove its immortality, than owning the body shall be so, after that resurrection which christians expect, will be a sufficient objection against its perpetual duration. LECT. XCV.

Locke's Third Letter to Still. p. 420—429 | Bant. Works, vol. ii. p. 176—179.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Nevertheless we allow, that if the immateriality of the soul were proved, it would something strengthen our natural argument for its immortality; as it would certainly shew us, that the destruction of the body does not imply the extinction of the mind; and would be a probable intimation that God intended it for a longer duration; as we have reason to believe, that though marble and free-stone be equally dependent upon him, he intended the former should continue in its form longer than the latter.

Grove against Hallet, c. iii.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have argued much to the purpose of *Dem. 2.* that an indivisible power cannot subsist in a divisible subject: but the power of thinking is an indivisible power; therefore the soul in which it exists is indivisible, and therefore immaterial.—But the foundation of this argument is liable to much dispute; and some attempt to retort it thus: “The idea of two feet is a divisible idea; but it exists in the mind; therefore the mind is divisible.” But though we conceive of two feet as divisible, it is not proper to say, that the *idea* of two feet may be divided into two ideas, each of which shall be half the former, as the *archetype* of it may.

Hallet on Script. vol. i. p. 216—219.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Much of the same kind is that argument taken from the limited nature of bodies, which are incapable of being extended beyond certain degrees, whereas the mind is continually opening itself to receive more and more knowledge, and never complains that an idea is too long, too broad, or too wide: but this goes on the supposition, that ideas are material things, otherwise they could not crowd or stretch a material mind.

Serm. de Superville, vol. iii. p. 10, 11.

SCHOL-

S C H O L I U M 5.

Some plead that the spirits and particles of the brain are in a continued flux, and therefore cannot be the seat of consciousness which is a fixed thing.—It is answered, that consciousness may inhere in some stable, solid and unchanged piece of matter, such as the *stamina vitæ* are by many philosophers supposed to be.

Hallet *ibid.* p. 215, 216

S C H O L I U M 6.

Against the proposition it is objected, that if thought infer immateriality, and immateriality immortality, then, as brutes may reasonably be supposed to have perception, (*Prop.* 2.) which is a species of thought, they must be immortal.—It is answered, that we know not what may become of them. God can no doubt put a period to their existence at their death, since immateriality cannot necessarily infer immortality. Vid *Schol.* 1. As for *Ramsay's* notion, that brutes are degraded intelligences, which were once *Seraphim*, and are now doing penance in so base a state; it depends on so many uncertain principles, and is in itself at first appearance so improbable, that we shall not now stay to examine or confute it.

Ramsay's Princ. part i. vol. i. p. 374

—378.

Tillot's vol. iii. p. 127—129.

Clarke against Dodwell, p. 26—28

Burnet on the Art. p. 34.

Edwards's Exercitations, part i. p. 125—129.

S C H O L I U M 7.

That the faculties of the mind are sometimes impaired by the decay of the body, will no more prove the soul material than mortal. *Prop.* 82. *Dem.* 5. *Schol.* 3.

Burn. on the Art. p. 35.

S C H O L I U M 8.

From comparing the arguments on both sides it appears, that allowing it not to be *demonstrable* that the soul is immaterial, it is at least *possible* it may be so, and even highly *probable* that it is. Vid. *Dem.* 1. *gr.* 2.

Blount's Orac. of Reas. p. 185.

| *Locke's Ess. l. iv. c. iii.*

S C H O L I U M 9.

Should the soul be immaterial, it is nevertheless possible that it may be always united to some *vehicle*: our not seeing it go off at death can be no argument against it; since many things known to be corporeal are to us invisible, particularly the air, which is so extremely forcible, and the magnetic and electrical effluvia.

More's Imm. of the Soul, l. iii. c. i. § 2, 3.

Rel. of Nat. p. 197. Not.

| *Watts's Ess. N^o. vii. p. 173, 174.*

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S C H O L I U M IO.

As to the opinion which the heathen philosophers entertained on this subject, there is room for debate; but it seems the greater part concluded, that the soul consisted of, or was inseparably united to some system of matter; excepting those who held it to be an ἀποσπασμα from the divine substance, and held that substance to be incorporeal.

Locke's Third Lett. to Still. p. 431—

Plato's Phæd. § 20.

441.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 403, 404.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 263—267.

Campbell's Necess. of Rev. p. 132—143.

N. Taylor of Deism, p. 131, 132.

P R O P O S I T I O N LXXXIV.

To enquire whether, supposing the soul to be immaterial, there is reason to LECT. believe that it is extended, *i. e.* limited to some certain quantity of space, so that XCVI. it may be said to fill it. }

S O L U T I O N.

There is no reason to believe, that if the soul be immaterial, it is extended.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. If the soul be extended, seeing all acknowledge that extension must be limited, it must be of some shape or figure.

1.2. If the soul be extended, we may conceive of it as losing a part of its shape; and if it be supposed commensurate either to the whole or to any part of the body, a bullet, sword, or any thing else, which rends or cuts off a part of the body with which the soul is co-extended, may, for ought appears, also carry off a part of the soul with it; unless we were to suppose it, when in such danger, to shrink up into smaller dimensions.

2.3. This discription of the soul on the one hand, or condensation on the other, would imply some degree of solidity, *i. e.* corporeity, *Def. 4.* contrary to the hypothesis,

4. If the soul be extended, it may touch the body, or be touched by it: but it is utterly inconceivable, that there should be any contact between an immaterial being and matter.

5. Whatever absurdity could be supposed to follow from granting the *soul*, if immaterial, to be unextended, would follow from supposing *God* to be so: yet on the other hand, insuperable difficulties would arise from supposing *him* extended. *Prop. 41. Schol. 2.*

3, 4, 5.6. There is no reason to believe, that if the soul be immaterial it is extended. *Q. E. D.*

Watts's Eff. N^o. vi. § 2. p. 146—152.

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S C H O L I U M

To this it is objected, that nothing acts but *where it is*: therefore if the soul were not extended, it could not act at all.

Ans. All matter acts upon other matter at a distance by gravitation: and it is inconceivable how the soul should move the nerves inserted in the brain, any better by being near, than by being farther off, unless we suppose it material: and we before observed, that, in whatever sense it is supposed to be seated there, it is impossible to explain the manner of its perception and action. (*Prop. 1. Schol. 2. Prop. 8. Schol. 3.*) God could no doubt give a soul a power of moving a stone or even a mountain, at several yards distance from the body to which it is united, *i. e.* he might appoint, that ordinarily the motion of such a distant body should follow on the volition of that mind; (*Vid. Prop. 32.*) which he could not, if the hypothesis in the objection were just; seeing, if such a proximity were necessary, this could not possibly be effected, without such dilatation and contraction, as seems inconsistent with immateriality. It is moreover plain, that it is not this proximity, which gives the mind a consciousness of bodily motion; since the mind is least conscious of some things, which on that hypothesis must be nearest to it; being entirely unacquainted, otherwise than by foreign observation and analogy, with the structure of the brain, and the cause of its disorders, and not being able to determine by inspection or consciousness, where the common sensorium is. *Vid Prop. 4. Schol. 1.*

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 45.

| *Watts ibid. p. 152—161.*

S C H O L I U M 2.

It is further objected, that what is not extended is *no where*; and what is no where has no existence. But though this has been generally allowed as a maxim, it is not self-evident; and indeed is no other than taking the whole question for granted.

Watts ibid. p. 161—164.

S C H O L I U M 3.

Nevertheless, when God has united a spirit to any body, so that it shall be to that spirit an organ of sensation and action; the soul may in a less proper sense be said to *be there*, where the body is; and spirits in general may be said to *be*, where bodies are, on which they are capable of acting. *Vid. Def. 15, 32.*

Watts ibid. p. 165—167.

S C H O L I U M 4.

The objection, that if the soul were not extended, it could have no idea of an extended substance, is taking the matter for granted; and has been considered
in

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in the only view in which it is worthy of consideration, *i. e.* as an objection against its immateriality. *Prop. 83. Schol. 3, 4.*

Cudw. Int. Syst. p. 824—826.

PROPOSITION LXXXV.

To propose and examine the principal hypotheses, relating to the original of the human mind.

LECT.
XCVII.

SOLUTION.

The three chief hypotheses are those of *pre-existence*, of *existence ex traduce*, and of *immediate creation*.

HYPOTHESIS I

Some suppose the human mind existed at first, without this gross body in which it now dwells; but whether without any body at all, is not universally agreed. Some of the ancient philosophers, particularly *Plato*, supposed it *eternal*, or as the *Latins* emphatically express it, *sempiternal*, as being a necessary emanation from the divine mind: but most of those who have embraced this doctrine of *pre-existence*, supposed it to have been created at some far distant period of time; and they all agreed, that in some unknown moment between generation and birth, perhaps, say some, the middle space, it was sent to inhabit this body.—The principal argument to support this hypothesis, is taken from the justice of God, with which it is supposed to be inconsistent, that a pure and innocent spirit should be so incommodiously lodged: they say that this embodied state seems to be an imprisonment, to which it is condemned for crimes committed in some better state of existence.

To this it is answered,

1. That the divine justice may admit, that an innocent creature in the first stage of its existence should be exposed to some inconveniencies, if they be counterballanced by the advantages of its state, and especially by an opportunity of securing a more perfect happiness hereafter, which the patrons of this hypothesis allow to be our case.

2. If, as the generality of christians believe, the first parents of our race were in a happier state of existence, and were also under such a constitution, as made them the representatives of their whole posterity; and they in that state offended their Maker; it is possible that the whole family might fall under some marks of his displeasure, which they would not otherwise have been subjected to: and this may perhaps be the easiest way of accounting for those phænomena on which the hypothesis is built.

3. That divine justice seems to require, that if a creature were punished for its own personal offence committed in a former state, it should have some con-

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sciousness of its guilt: our present calamities therefore, not being attended with such consciousness, cannot be a punishment for sins so committed.

S C H O L I U M.

It is a great objection against this hypothesis, that it is merely *gratis dictum*; forasmuch as no man can remember any such pre-existent state as is pretended, or the adventures that befell him in it.

Brainerd's Journal, p. 221—223.

Plato answers, that we have not entirely forgot them, but that all our knowledge is entirely *remembrance*; and that without it no knowledge could be obtained. But that is evidently inconclusive, because at this rate the argument might be carried on *ad infinitum*, and an eternal, immutable, and self-existent being could know nothing.—It is much more reasonably replied, that it is the law of our present state of being, that we should remember only by the assistance of the brain, in which it is impossible that any traces of our former adventures should be drawn.

Plato's Phæd. § 16—18.

Burnet's Theory, vol. ii. l. iv. Pref.

p. 3—5.

Phænix, vol. i. N^o. i. p. 16—30

Ramsay's Princ. Prop. xlvii. vol. i. p.

147—156.

Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 243—245.

Travels of Cyrus, vol. ii. p. 145—152.

8vo. Ed. p. 248—252. 12mo.

More's Immort. of the Soul, l. ii. c. xii. xiii.

Cudw. Int. Syst. l. i. c. i. § 31, 32.

Watts's Ruin and Recov. quæst. ii. p. 94

—105. Ed. 2.

H Y P O T H E S I S 2.

The hypothesis of the soul's existence *ex traduce*, is this. From the observations made chiefly by *Leuwenhoek* of the animalcula existing in *semine maris*, some have supposed, that the first elements of the soul as well as the body were contained there; which gradually grow up to sense with the ripening foetus, and to reason in the advance of life. Of the patrons of this hypothesis, some suppose that these animalcula are produced from the food of the immediate parent, others, that the elements of them are to be found in the body of an infant, and that all those from which all mankind have arisen, besides an immensely greater multitude that have perished, were contained in the body of the first man, each generation being inclosed in the former, as the coats of an onion within each other, or, as perhaps it might be better illustrated, the kernel of a nut.—The chief arguments to prove this, are,

1. The existence of these animalcula.

2. The absurdity of supposing a kind of *equivocal* generation in the body of the parent. *Prop.* 21. *Schol.* 1.

3. The

3. The resemblance between parents and children, which seems to imply such a derivation or traduction of the *body*, which on principles of analogy may prove that of the *soul*.

SCHOLIUM.

To this it is replied,

1. That there is some reason to doubt whether there really be such animalcula as *Leuwenhoek* talks of: few but himself have ever been able to discover them with his glasses, and it is very possible the motion might arise from some spirituous particles of the fluid, as it was only observed while the fluid was in a degree of gentle warmth, but soon ceased, *i. e.* as it seems, those particles evaporated in the heat.

2. That if it be allowed that animalcula are really seen, it may be questioned whether they are originally in the seed, or in the water; since they must be diluted with water, before they can be discerned.

3. That if they be in the seed, it may still be questioned whether they be the stamina of the human body; not only, as it is doubtful whether they can pass the two teguments of the *ova*, but also considering how unlike the animal growing in an impregnated egg, as observed and delineated by *Malpighi*, is to that observed in the seed of the cock.

4. That allowing such animalcula in the seed of every adult male, and also allowing them to be the stamina from whence the next generation proceeds, it is groundless to assert that they contain the stamina of all future generations. It is allowed indeed, that the exquisite smallness of those removed at the greatest distance from the present is no objection against the possibility of their existence, since omnipotence could no doubt in the compass of a grain of sand make a system similar to our solar system: but there is no necessity of supposing this to be the fact here, since we are sure the same omnipotence can, and perhaps does, by some settled law of nature to us unknown, produce animal bodies from particles of matter before existing under another form. And it is the more probable, as it seems hardly consistent with our views of divine wisdom, to form such multitudes of animal bodies for certain destruction, and to answer no imaginable purpose; for it is evident, that not one of many millions of them is ever born into the world: and if it be true with regard to *men*, it is so likewise with respect to *fishes* and *insects*, where this objection is vastly greater.

5. If such bodies were allowed, it would be unreasonable to suppose them all endued with souls; such low degrees of life, as in proportion we must have had at the distance of many generations, being hardly conceivable: nor can we imagine, that God would, for so many thousand years, continue human minds in so mean and contemptible a state of existence.

6. This hypothesis is most suitable to the *materiality* of the soul; the traduction of one *spirit* from another being inconceivable, and but poorly illustrated by the simile usually brought, of lighting one taper by another.

7. The

7. The destruction of a multitude of souls to every one that grows up or has life, is a still stronger objection against this doctrine than the destruction of bodies, *gr.* 4. and that these subsist in a future state none maintain.

Baker on the Microscope, c. xvi. p. 152
—167.

Leuwenhoek Epist. vol. i. p. 1—12,
149, &c.

Nieuwent. Rel. Phil. vol. i. *Contempt.*
xvi. § 9, 11. p. 341—344, 345—
348.

Rel. of Nat. p. 88—91.

Watts's Phil. Ess. N°. ix. § 2. *with Append.*

p. 201—208, & p. 307—311.

Denne's 2d Serm. of Veget. Pref.

Drake's Anat. vol. i. c. xxiv.

Baxter on the Soul, vol. i. p. 198—202.

Chamb. Dict. on the Word Generation.

HYPOTHESIS 3.

The hypothesis of *immediate creation* is, that at a certain time, generally supposed between conception and the birth, perhaps 20 weeks after the former, but some say in the birth itself, the soul is created; and from the first moment of its existence united to the body.—The weakness of the former hypothesis, seems the principal strength of this. It is indeed objected, that this supposes God to be always creating new souls: but it is not easy to see the force of that objection. We are sure he always acts; (*Prop.* 32.) and acts with infinite ease; (*Prop.* 31.) nor is continual new creation any reflection upon him. What if we should acknowledge, that his works may be ever growing, both in number, extent, and perfection? It is difficult to see how it would blemish either his wisdom or power.

Gale's Court of the Gentiles part ii. p. 344—346.

SCHOLIUM.

On the whole, it seems that this last hypothesis is rather the most probable: but it does not become us to be confident in so dark and dubious a matter.

Le Clerc's Pneum. part i. c. viii.

PROPOSITION LXXXVI.

LECT. It is highly probable, that there are some created spirits, which were in the XCVIII. first constitution of their nature superior to human souls.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. When we consider the vast variety there is in the inanimate, the vegetable, and the animal creation, and how one class and order of beings rises above another, almost by imperceptible degrees, it seems highly probable, that we, who are in part allied to the beasts that perish, and who are placed in so imperfect a state

state of being, are not the highest order of spirits, and the most glorious creatures of our almighty Creator; but rather, that the scale of created beings rises abundantly higher.

Baxter's Mathe, vol. i. Conf. v. p. 248—257, 275—290.

2. Astronomers generally grant, and strongly prove, that some of the planets are abundantly larger than the earth: we can hardly think they were made merely to afford us that little light and benefit we derive from them; it is much more probable they are habitable worlds; especially considering what discoveries have been made of the satellites of *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, and those varieties in the face of our moon, that seem like seas, land, and mountains. And it is highly probable, that some of these inhabitants may be spirits superior to us: not to mention the possibility there is, that the interstellar spaces may be inhabited: nor to insist on *Wells's* conjecture, that there may be more planets than we commonly reckon revolving about our sun.

Swinden of Hell, p. 287.

3. Most nations have believed the existence of *Demons*, i. e. created spirits superior to human souls: and the accounts that have been given of their intercourse with men might probably have some foundation in fact; though no doubt the greater part of them are fabulous.

1, 2, & 3. 4. *Valet propositio.*

Speer, vol. vii. N^o. 519.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. xxiii. § 13. l. iv. c.

iii. § 24, 26: l. iv. c. xvi. § 12.

Wilkins World in the Moon, Prop. vii

—ix. xiii.

Mathe, vol. ii. p. 55.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 55, 56.

Hier. in Pyth. Carm. ver. 3, 4. *Vid. Dacier's Not.* *ibid.*

Euseb. Prep. Evang. l. xv. c. 43.

S E H O L I U M I.

If it be objected, that perhaps those beings, now superior to us, were at first on a level with us, though perhaps something different; we answer, that the reasoning of the *first* step lies strongly against this. And as for what is objected against the *third* step, (though it must be acknowledged, according to Dr. *Sykes's* assertion, that many of those, whom the heathens called both good and bad *Demons*, were supposed to be *human souls*,) yet it is very evident they had a notion of some *Demons*, who were originally in a state superior to humanity, and never had dwelt in human bodies: compare *Hierocles* and *Eusebius* quoted above.

Inq. into Demoniacs, p. 1—4.

Twells's Anf. p. 5, 6.

Farther Inq. p. 2—20.

Answer to it, p. 8—24.

Pegge of Demon. p. 1—35.

Just. Mart. Opera, p. 28. Col. Ed.

Pope's Iliad, l. xix. ver. 93. *Not.*

Stil. Orig. l. iii. c. iii. §. 15. p. 514—516.

Euseb. Prep. l. viii. c. xix. p. 387. l. xiii.

c. xi. p. 663.

Gale's Court Gent. l. ii. c. viii. § 11, 12.

p. 186—188, & 337.

S C H O-

S C H O L I U M 2.

However it may be granted, that the perfection and happiness of those spirits is growing and increasing, as (if we suppose them not subject to forgetfulness, which the extraordinary memory of some men makes probable) it is certain their stock of knowledge must always be; with the increase of which much pleasure is connected.

Locke's Ess. l. ii. c. x. § 9.

S C H O L I U M 3.

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that whatever their perfection be, or can be at any imaginable most distant space of time, with any imaginable degree of continued improvement, they will still continue inferior to the divine Being in knowledge and in power, and will still be equally dependent on him for their existence and every degree of their happiness; in which respect the noblest and meanest of his creatures are on a level, and so are to him as nothing. And this, by the way, is a strong argument for the infinity of the divine Being.

S C H O L I U M 4.

Let it be observed, that the proposition is to be taken only in a general sense; for we have not any assurance by the light of nature, that no human soul shall ever arrive in its improvement to an equality with the most excellent of those superior spirits: on the other hand, that there are some spirits now superior to what those of men are in this embodied state, is in effect no other than a corollary from *Prop. 82.*

P R O P O S I T I O N LXXXVII.

LECT. More fully to prove that it is the interest of every man to cultivate virtue thro' XCIX. the whole course of his life, and in every particular action. Vid. *Prop. 44. Cor. 2.*

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Ax. 15. Cor. Schol. 1 | 1. There is a secret and immediate pleasure attending virtuous actions, especially those of a benevolent kind, or those in which there is any remarkable degree of gratitude and piety towards God; which pleasure is of a very sublime and delightful kind, vastly preferable to any sensual gratification; as those who have tried both experimentally know: and pious philosophers will acknowledge that the immediate pleasures of virtue are superior to those of science.

2. In reflecting upon all virtuous actions, and particularly those which are attended with the greatest difficulty, there is a high satisfaction of mind.

3. Human

3. Human nature and life is so constituted, that, generally speaking, health, reputation, and interest in the world, and in a moderate degree the possessions of it, may be most effectually secured by a virtuous course; at least it is seldom or never injurious to any of these.

4. A good man has or may have a source of happiness distinct from all these, in the present views of the favour of God, a confidence in his care, and the prospect of a future state of happiness after death, by which he may be delightfully supported under those calamities which are common to all; so that the painful sense of them may sometimes be swallowed up in vastly superior pleasure.

5. On the contrary to all this, a wicked man often finds a great deal of uneasiness in his vicious affections and actions, especially in his reflections upon them; he often brings upon himself diseases, infamy, poverty, and various kinds of distress in life, greatly aggravated by the apprehensions of the divine displeasure, and the fears of future evil to arise from it, in this life and the next.

1, 5. 6. If we consider only the present life, it appears that virtue does ordinarily on the whole tend to promote its happiness.

Prop. 82. 7. Though it be granted that in some extraordinary cases, it may be otherwise than has been represented in the former steps, (*Vid. Prop. 82. Schol. 1.*) yet the future state will abundantly overbalance all the advantages, which there may in any imaginable circumstances be on the side of vice; even where the most gloomy fears have clouded the virtuous mind on the one hand, or on the other the vainest hopes have been entertained by the bad man, his conscience ever so much deadened and perverted, or where his course of prosperity in life has been ever so great.

6, 7. 8. It is on the whole the interest of every man to cultivate virtue in every action. *Q. E. D.*

Wishart's Ref. Serm. p. 15—29.

Hutch. on the Pass. c. v.

Wilk. Nat. Rel. l. ii. c. i—viii.

Gast. Nat. Rel. p. 129—136, & p. 178—181.

Puff. de Jure, l. ii. c. iii. § 14. 15.

Shaftesb. Inq. after Virtue, part ii. pass.

Self-Love and Virtue reconciled by Relig.

Pope's Ess. Ep. iv. præf. ver. 309—360.

Balguy's Serm. vol. i. N^o. iii.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

It must be the interest of every one to prosecute and cultivate the proper means of virtue.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

It must be the interest of every person heartily to repent of every instance in which he has acted contrary to virtue. *Vid. Prop. 81. Cor. 4.*

S C H O L I U M.

Some have argued the necessary connection between virtue and happiness from this consideration, that the divine Being who is perfectly virtuous is perfectly happy;

happy; so that in proportion to the degree in which any inferior being resembles him in virtue, he must also resemble him in happiness. But so far as this argument is distinct from that stated in the preceding demonstration, it is inconclusive: for if it would prove any thing, it must be, that every virtuous man is in every moment of his existence happier than any vicious man is, or can be, which seems evidently contrary to fact.

Clergyman's Lett. to Dr. Clarke, pass.

PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

LECT.

It is on the whole for the benefit of societies to cultivate virtue.

C.

—

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 87. 1. It tends to promote the happiness of every individual member, and therefore by consequence of the whole.

Prop. 51. Schol. 2. Virtue teaches each to consult the good of all, and to be willing to resign any private interest of his own to the interest of the society, when it comes in competition with it; so constituting each man in his sphere the guardian of the public happiness.

Prop. 80, 81. 3. Virtue must ordinarily tend to bring down the favour and blessing of God upon societies, to which they must owe their surest foundation and best prosperity: and his interposition may the more reasonably be expected, since societies, as such, have no existence in a future state.

1, 2, 3. 4. *Valet propositio.*

<i>Clarke's Serm. vol. vi. N^o. xiv. p. 207</i>		<i>Butler's Anal. part i. c. iii. p. 85—96.</i>
—210. 12mo. Ed.		Ed. 2. 8vo.

SCHOLIUM.

To this *Mandeville* has objected, that private vices are often public benefits, and that an universal reformation would necessarily produce the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, who subsist upon the public luxury and debauchery: but it may be replied,

1. That though some good may arise to particular persons from the vices of others, it does not from thence follow, that greater might not arise to the whole from common virtues.

2. That virtue would allow the free use of many things, not absolutely necessary to the support of life, yet tending to make it more agreeable, as wine, tea, &c.

3. That public temperance and reformation would prevent the ruin of multitudes of persons and families, which is often aggravated by former splendor, and the consciousness of those extravagancies by which they have been re-

duced, as well as by the additional infamy attending poverty when occasioned by such means.

4. That during the time that the prosperity of families continues, we shall judge very wrong, if we estimate their happiness by their external circumstances, without allowing for the inward temper of their minds, the happiness of which virtue would always promote, and thereby be a noble equivalent for rendering them something less opulent and magnificent.

5. That the community would be better defended from foreign and domestic enemies by poorer citizens, who were temperate, generous, and courageous, than by the effeminate, debauched, and mercenary; besides all that extraordinary protection, which an universally virtuous people might justly promise itself from divine Providence.

6. If the history of the most celebrated ancient or modern states and kingdoms be examined, it will be found they have risen by virtue, and fallen by vice, agreeably to our argument in the proposition above, and contrary to those principles which we here oppose. See, (besides *Persian Letters* referred to Prop. 51. gr. 4.)

Fable of the Bees, pass.

Warb. Div. Leg. l. i. § 6, vol. i. p. 76—84.

| *Innes of Virtue*, p. 99, &c.

| *Browne's Ess. on the Charact.* N^o. ii. § 5, p. 146—158.

PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

To take a survey of the state of virtue in the world.

SOLUTION.

1. A great part of the world is over-run with pagan idolatry and superstition; many of their rites are impious, obscene, or cruel; and as new countries are discovered, new scenes of wickedness are discovered with them: and it is by the way observable, that several of those writers who speak most favourably of the morals of new discovered countries, have in other respects most of the air of a romance.

2. Though it is to be acknowledged, that the religious institutions of *Christians*, *Mahometans*, and *Jews* contain many excellent lessons of morality in all its branches; yet it evidently appears, that under all these professions, the greatest part of mankind are strangers to real virtue.

3. Those who cultivate it with the greatest care are in many respects defective, and far from that perfection which they themselves desire.

DEMONSTRATION.

The proof of all this is too evident from all the opportunities we have of knowing the moral characters of our fellow-creatures, by reading, travelling, or observation at home.

Watts's Ruin and Recov. quest. i. § 5. p. 32—41.

F f 2

SCHO-

S C H O L I U M

That the state of things in former ages, even amongst the most polite, learned, and celebrated nations of antiquity, was generally much the same, appears from all the strain of ancient authors; and further from the known lewdness and cruelty of many of their religious rites, the custom of exposing children, and the public spectacles, besides many other things illustrated in

Jenk. of Christ. vol. i. p. 353—364. | *England's Morals of the Ancients, c. ult.*
St. Real, vol. i.

C O R O L L A R Y 1.

There is great reason for adoring the divine patience, that the earth is still preserved, and made the seat of so much pleasure, considering the exact and circumstantial manner in which God knows all crimes, and the almighty power with which he is always armed to punish them.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

Those who are themselves truly virtuous have great reason to exert themselves to the utmost, to stem the torrent of vice, and to support the interests of virtue, which humanly speaking are so weak.

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

There seems a great deal of reason to suspect, that mankind is degenerated from some better state, in which it may be supposed the race first came out of the hands of so holy and good a being as the blessed God is: and accordingly, we may observe among some ancient as well as modern nations remarkable traditions on that head, which will be more fully considered hereafter.

Howe, vol. i. p. 150, 151.

| *Cyrus's Trav. part ii. Ap. p. 93—99.*

C O R O L L A R Y 4.

Some further discoveries from the divine Being seem very desirable, to lead us into the paths of more perfect virtue and happiness: but the fuller discussion of this will be the business of the next part of this work.

The END of the FOURTH PART.

PART

P A R T V.

Of the Reason to expect and desire a REVELATION: and the internal and external EVIDENCE with which we may suppose it should be attended.

D E F I N I T I O N LXVI.

THEOLOGY or DIVINITY is that branch of *Pneumatology*, which relates in general to the *knowledge of God*, but especially to those *extraordinary discoveries* which he is supposed to have made of himself to mankind; and considers the probability, the certainty, and the contents of them. LECT.
CI.

S C H O L I U M

Forasmuch as *miracles* are generally urged in proof of such extraordinary discoveries, it seems proper here to enquire into the nature, use, and importance of them.

D E F I N I T I O N LXVII.

When such effects are produced, as (*cæteris paribus*) are usually produced, God is said to operate *according to the common course of nature*: but when such effects are produced, as are (*cæt. par.*) *contrary to, or different from that common course*, they are said to be MIRACULOUS.

Conebeare on Mir. p. 6—12.

Fleetwood on Mir. p. 2—5.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 374—376.

Clarke and Leibnitz, p. 89. § 17. p. 113.

§ 43—46. p. 149. § 43—46.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

Nothing can be known to be miraculous, till the course of nature has been observed.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

If two opposite effects (*cæt. par.*) were to be alternately produced, neither of them would be properly miraculous; but the alternate succession of both would make up the course of nature: v. g. if the sun were to arise one morning in the east, and the next in the west.

C O R O L L A R Y

COROLLARY 3.

When the course of nature can be but imperfectly known, in particular instances we may be incapable of pronouncing in many respects concerning certain remarkable events, whether they be or be not miraculous.

COROLLARY 4.

A miracle contains no greater exercise of divine power, than an operation according to the course of nature.

COROLLARY 5.

Miracles are possible in general, (*Cor.* 4.) and possible in any given instance, when the wisdom of God does not require that the course of nature should be preserved; which it is impossible for us to know that it always does.

It has indeed been asserted, that it is most honourable to God to suppose that he at first lays down the best possible laws, from which therefore it would be a defect of wisdom to deviate. But it may be answered, that at least for any thing we know, the best possible scheme may be that, in which there shall be some deviation from the stated rules, provided always that those stated laws be generally so far observed, as that men may know what it is their duty to do, and what consequences are generally to be expected from their actions, which is apparently the case.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 376, 377.
Coneb. Sermon on Mir. p. 12—17.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. ii.

PROPOSITION XC.

To consider some other definitions which celebrated writers have given of miracles.

SOLUTION.

1. Mr. *Locke* defines a miracle to be “a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, is *in his opinion* contrary to the course of nature, and taken by him to be divine.”

But on this account of the matter, every juggling trick, which I cannot understand, will, while my ignorance continues, be a miracle to me. In answer to this, *Locke* urges, that if this definition be not taken, we can never know what a miracle is; because no man is acquainted with the whole course of nature. But though we acknowledge that great part of it is unknown, yet so much may be known, as that some instances may plainly appear to be above it: *v. g.* recovering the sight of the blind, or the life of the dead by a word speaking, or multiplying bread, so that one loaf should serve a thousand men, and more be left at

at last than there was at first.—Besides this, the extraordinary works apprehended to be done by evil agents, would not be miracles on this definition.

Locke's Post. Pieces, p. 217—220.

| *Chandler of Mir.* p. 9—11.

2. Many others define a miracle to be “an extraordinary operation, above the power of all created beings, and performable by God alone.”

But this definition either goes on the false supposition, of such a proper agency in the creature, as is inconsistent with *Prop.* 32. or else supposes, contrary to fact, that we know the utmost limits of the power of created agents, allowing that to be called *their power*, which is usually communicated to them.

Limb. Theol. l. i. c. ii. § 17.

| *Clarke at Boyle's Lett.* p. 372—374.

Chandler on Mir. p. 11—13.

3. Dr. *Chandler* says, “a miracle is an action done, or an operation visibly performed by any being, which is really and truly above the reach, natural power, and capacity of that being who does it of himself, and without the assistance of some superior agent to perform.”

This definition seems liable to the following objections.

1. It supposes created beings capable of doing something of themselves, and without the assistance of any superior agent, contrary to *Prop.* 32.

2. It makes it impossible for God to perform a miracle, without the interposition of some creature.

3. It supposes it would be no miracle for God to send an angel to relieve a starving man, to open the prison-doors, or even to roll back the sun in his course, supposing I know the angel so employed to be ordinarily capable of producing such an effect; whereas in truth here would be a miracle, in suffering an angel in such a manner to act out of his usual sphere, though not beyond his common strength.

Chandler of Mir. p. 13—19.

Dr. *Hutcheson's* definition, “that it is a work far exceeding human power, yet performed by the command or upon the volition of a man,” nearly coincides with this of Dr. *Chandler's*, and is equally liable to the 2d and 3d objection.

Hutches. Metaph. Synops. p. 89.

4. Dr. *Clarke's* definition of what he calls a *theological* miracle, includes several particulars in it, which may more properly be examined hereafter.

Clarke at Boyle's Lett. p. 382, 383.

According to Dr. *Sykes*, “a miracle is a designed effect, sensible, unusual in itself, beyond the art and power of man to do:” and he expressly declares against defining it, an event contrary to the course of nature. But to this it may be objected,

1. That

1 That if he does not by the word *unusual*, mean as much as *beyond the course of nature*, its being unusual is of no importance at all to prove any thing miraculous; as in the instance of the first *parhelion*.

2. If by *sensible* be meant something made known in consequence of a sensation excited by external objects, distinguished from the inward perception of impressions upon our minds, it is no way essential to constituting a miracle.

3. That the expression of *designed* is either superfluous or improper; since considering it as the work of God, every thing is designed; and if it might happen without *human* design, it might still be miraculous; as if health should unexpectedly be restored, while another person was praying for it.

Sykes of Mirac. p. 16—23.

6. Dr. *Chapman* defines it, “an unusual and sensible event, most evidently either in the nature or manner of it, above the power of all natural material causes, and the art of man to produce.”—To this it may be objected,

1. Against the words *sensible* and *unusual*, as in the last step, *N^o. i. ii.*

2. That an event may really be a true miracle, though it is not *most evidently so*.

3. That it seems to intimate a distinction between *natural* and *supernatural* material causes; not to urge that a *material cause* can only be a passive power, nor to insist upon it, that it may be questioned, whether *dreams* be not miracles upon this supposition: so that here as well as in other instances, what is super-added to our definition appears to be an incumbrance rather than an advantage.

Chapman Euf. vol. i. p. 72—76.

DEFINITION LXVII.

LECT.
CII.

A DIVINE REVELATION is a discovery of some proposition to the mind, which came in not by the usual exercise of its faculties, but by some miraculous divine interposition and attestation, either mediate or immediate.

SCHOLIUM.

We shall endeavour in the following propositions to prove, that a revelation is possible, (*Prop. 91.*) that it is desirable, (*Prop. 92.*) and that there is some reason to hope that God will grant it, (*Prop. 93.*) and then shall more particularly examine with what kind of internal and external evidence, we may reasonably suppose that it should be attended.

PROPOSITION XCI.

A divine revelation is a possible thing.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. God may, for any thing we can certainly tell, think proper to make some discovery to his creatures of what they did not before know, or what by the use of their faculties they could not find out.

Prop. 31. 2. Since God is almighty, we may assure ourselves, that he who has given us a power of communicating our ideas to each other, cannot be at a loss for some proper method to make it apparent to his creatures, that it is he who speaks to them.

3. The pretences that have from time to time been made to divine revelation, and the ready reception they have many of them met with, plainly shew, that the greater part of mankind have thought it not impossible.

1, 2, & 3 | 4. A divine revelation is at least a possible thing. Q. E. D.

Tillotson. vol. iii. p. 441, 442.

SCHOLIUM.

It would be most absurd to object, that God's goodness will oblige him to give his creatures by their natural faculties the knowledge of all that it is *necessary* for them to know, and that his wisdom will prevent his miraculous interposition to discover *unnecessary* things; for both these propositions universally taken are false. For since it is as easy for God to communicate knowledge to us by revelation, as by the use of our natural faculties, we cannot say universally, that he must make man in such circumstances as that no revelation should be necessary; much less, that he can never suffer him to fall into such circumstances. On the contrary, on the first formation of mankind, (when that experience, which now instructs us in so many things of the greatest importance, could not possibly be our guide) it seems that some revelation was necessary with relation to his food; for surely, unless human nature were then vastly different from what it is now, appetite would have been but a very uncertain and dangerous rule: and it is certain, that the giving necessary intimations by revelation rather than by reason, would in some views be an additional favour; as it would so much the more sensibly illustrate God's care of his creatures and inspection over them; which, though it might be solidly reasoned out on principles laid down above, might become more obvious in this case, at least to weaker minds. Nor is it on the other hand true, that God bestows on his creatures nothing that is unnecessary; if by *unnecessary* be meant, what in the present connection it must mean, only something without which they might have enjoyed some considerable degree of happiness, sufficient to overbalance the evils to which they are exposed: nothing is more evident than the contrary, *i. e.* that God has consulted our convenience and delight in numberless instances.

Delany's Rev. examined, vol. i. p. 2, 3. | Leland against Tind. c. i, ii, iii.

P R O P O S I T I O N X C I I .

LECT. The circumstances of mankind are such, as to render a divine revelation highly
 CIII. expedient and desirable.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

1. In the generality of mankind, we too plainly see such indolence with regard to the things of religion, such strong passions, such early prejudices, and inveterate habits of vice, as render them very unfit for an impartial inquiry after divine truth.

2. The greater part of mankind, even those whose morals are least vitiated, are so entangled in secular cares, that they have little leisure for long and laborious inquiry.

3. It appears by the preceding parts of this work, that it is a very laborious and difficult task, to trace out the great principles of natural religion in their due connection and evidence.

1, 2, 3. 4. It is not to be expected that many will undertake it for themselves, or that if they do, they will succeed in it.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 273—278.

5. There are some points, which the most diligent and impartial inquirer will find it hardly possible to clear up to himself, especially those relating to the pardon of sin, and the complete happiness of a future state. *Prop. 82. Schol. 3. Prop. 83. Schol. 5.*

6. Of those things which such an inquirer may be able to clear up to *himself*, there will be many, which it will be difficult to communicate to *others*; considering how abstruse many of his arguments will be on the one hand, and on the other, that indolence, prejudice, and secular cares, will in their degree hinder the generality from inquiring into truth proposed by others, as well as from discovering it for themselves. *Vid. gr. 1, 2.*

7. Could the great doctrines of religion and rules of morality be settled, and proposed, and taught ever so plainly, and inculcated ever so frequently, it would nevertheless be exceeding difficult to *enforce* the *practice* of them. The credit of the person proposing them would do little, considering the pride of the generality of mankind, and the difference which might probably happen among those who should undertake to instruct others: and we have before (*Prop. 77.*) proved it not to be the business of the civil magistrate to establish religion by force; and it is certain, if he should attempt it, he could not by his secular power produce any single action truly virtuous, considering how much depends upon the temper and intention, with which an action is performed. *Prop. 49. gr. 1, 2.*

4, 5, 6, 7. | 8. A revelation seems in *theory* highly expedient, and in a manner necessary to bring men to the knowledge of natural religion, and the practice of virtue.

Conbeare's Sermon on Rev. p. 4—28.

Prop. 89. | 9. If we consult *fact*, we shall find the ancient and the modern world over-run with error, superstition and vice.

10. Though there have been in the heathen world some excellent teachers of morality, yet the number of those, who have in good earnest set themselves about it, has been but small; and some of those few have been entirely ignorant of some things necessary to be known, and very dubious about others, concerning which they had some glimmering of knowledge: where they appear to have been certain themselves, they have often been unable to advance a clear and distinct proof; and even where proofs have been most clear and distinct, they have wanted authority to enforce their instructions and precepts; so that they have availed but little to reform those parts of the world where they dwelt; of which the remarkable wickedness of *Greece*, in the age of *Socrates* and *Plato*, is a very melancholy instance, as that of *Rome*, in the days of their best moral philosophers, also was.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 281—302.

Dac. Plato, vol. i. Intr. p. 7—9.

Jenkins of Christ. vol. i. p. 364—376,

Fiddes of Mor. Virt. c. xix.

384—389.

Chandler of Mir. p. 65—77.

8, 9, 10. | 11. Experience joins with theory, to prove a revelation so necessary to bring mankind to the knowledge and practice of virtue, that little is to be expected without it.

12. A revelation may make the knowledge of what the light of nature might discover to every man, more plain, easy, certain, and affecting; not to say, that there may possibly be some things beyond the discovery of our unassisted reason, which might prove cogent motives to virtue.

Prop. 87, 88. | 13. The knowledge and practice of virtue is necessary to the happiness of private persons and societies.

11, 12, 13. | 14. A divine revelation is in the present circumstances of mankind, highly expedient, and therefore greatly desirable. Q. E. D.

Foster against Tind. p. 12—24.

Watts's Strength and Weakness of

Campbell Necess. of Rev. pass. præf. c. v, vi.

Human Reason.

SCHOLIUM I.

The proposition may be illustrated (and especially *gr. 10*) by observing, that the most celebrated *Lawgivers* of antiquity have thought it necessary to profess some intercourse with heaven, in order to enforce their laws, though many of them were armed with secular power; as appears, not only in the instance of *Moses*, but also of *Zoroaster*, *Pythagoras*, *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, *Seleucus*, *Numa*, *Hermes*

Trismegistus, Orpheus, Suphis the Egyptian, Minos, Zamolxis the Getan, Woden the Saxon, Melesagoras the Eleusinian, Zathraustes the Arimaspiian, Mango-Copal the Peruvian, and Phoe the Indian: to which we may also add Amasis, Mnevis, Radamanthus, Triptolemus, Zaleuchus, Lycaon, and Romulus.

Shuckford, vol. i. p. 319—323.

Temple's Miscel. vol. ii. Ess. iii. p. 87—

89, ibid. p. 58—74.

Lucas Inq. vol. i. p. 108, 109.

Customs of Ind. and Jews compared, p. 56, 57.

Collier and Bayle in Nom.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 101—109.

It may not be improper to observe by the way, that whereas the rise of superstition is generally ascribed to the *priests*, it appears in fact, that *princes* and *legislators*, under pretence of inspiration, as well as by other methods, were the chief agents in introducing it into the world; as with great accuracy and learning shewn at large by

Chand. against Morg. part ii. § 15. vol. i. p. 556—585.

SCHOLIUM 2.

LECT. CIV. To the reasoning in the demonstration above, it is objected, by the author of *Christianity as old as the creation*, that natural religion is so *plain*, as to need no explication, and so *perfect*, as to admit of no addition.

Tindal of Christianity, c. ii, § vi.

SCHOLIUM 3.

To the *first* of these assertions it is answered, that the differences there have been between many learned philosophers, about many branches of natural religion, do evidently prove it not to be so *plain* as is here supposed: and indeed this hypothesis would entirely supersede all *human* as well as divine teachings: And as to what is said of the *perfection* of it, we reply, that if *natural religion* only mean that which in the most extensive sense may be called the *law of nature*, *i. e.* the obligation on a rational agent arising from the whole nature of things, (*Def. 62. Schol.*) though the assertion be true, it is nothing to the present purpose; but if we mean by it merely the *light of nature*, (*Def. 62.*) then the assertion is evidently false, being contrary to fact: but if it be a sort of medium between both these, *i. e.* that rule of life, to the knowledge of which men might attain, if they would in general use their faculties well; then it seems, that it is neither so perfect nor so plain, as to supersede the usefulness of a revelation, though it should on the other hand be granted not so imperfect and obscure, as to render it universally of absolute *necessity*.—On the whole, *Tindal* is very little consistent with himself, when, shifting between these different ideas, he sometimes insists on such a *perfection* of it, as is inconsistent with any tolerable degree of *plainness*; and sometimes on such a *plainness*, as must suppose it very *imperfect*.

Coneb. against Tind. p. 134—138. or | Leland against Tind. p. 4—10. vol. i.

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S C H O L I U M 4.

It is objected further, that it seems injurious to the divine goodness, to suppose that God has suffered mankind to fall into such deplorable circumstances as the proposition represents. We answer,

1. That the proposition does not assert mankind to be left under an absolute impossibility of obtaining virtue and happiness.

2. That to leave men in great danger of error and vice, and that in such a degree, as will in *fact*, though *not necessarily* prove fatal to many, is certainly consistent with the divine perfections, because we plainly see it to be done; and is a difficulty by no means peculiar to those that believe revelation, but common to all that believe the goodness of the Deity. And what *Tindal* says of the great evil of *superstition*, which he supposes worse than atheism, joined to the charge of superstition which he brings against the whole *christian* world, serves yet more to illustrate and confirm this reply.

3. To suppose the light of nature ever so perfect, will not infer the circumstances of mankind less deplorable: for the degree of wickedness and consequently misery prevailing in the world, being in other respects the same, will be aggravated in proportion to the degree in which their light and advantage are supposed perfect.

Tind. Christian. as old, &c. p. 173, 174. | *Fost. against Tind.* p. 64—70, 73—77.

S C H O L I U M 5.

It is objected nearly to the same purpose as before, that if a revelation were thus expedient, it must have been *universal*; there being no imaginable reason, why God should give it to some rather than others. Reserving this to be more fully considered elsewhere, we here answer,

1. Since, on our principles, God was not obliged in strict justice to give it to any, he could not be obliged to give it to *all*.

2. That though we cannot tell why one nation should have it rather than another, there is no reason to be surprised at such a distinction, considering in how different, and to us unaccountable a manner, all must acknowledge the means of virtue and happiness to be dispensed among the children of men.

3. That it is a very supposable case, that if ever God gave a revelation at all, suited to the general use of mankind, it was with such circumstances, that its not having an universal spread was owing to the folly and wickedness of men: nay it is a very possible case, that God may already have given an universal revelation; *i. e.* a revelation made to the human family when very small, the tradition of which has been lost through their own folly, though their happiness might have been greatly promoted by keeping up the memory of it.

Blount's Oracles of Reas. p. 210, | *Foster against Tind.* c. ii. p. 78—86.

211, 196, 197.

| *Butler's Anal.* part ii. c. vi.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 315—518. | *Sykes on Mir.* p. 217—219.

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SCHOLIUM 6.

Those who assert a revelation to be so absolutely necessary, that every man, how well soever he uses his reason, must inevitably perish without it, generally ground that assertion, not on principles of natural religion, but on those passages of *scripture*, which relate to the necessity of *faith in Christ*, which cannot here be properly examined.

Jenkins Reas. of Christianity, vol. i. p. 2—14.

LECT.
CV.

PROPOSITION XCIII.

There is some reason to hope that God will grant a revelation.

LEMMA.

It is to be observed, that we are far from saying, that a man could have any *certainty* in this point; but a *probable hope* might be produced by the following considerations.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 92. 1. The circumstances of mankind greatly need it.

1. 2. The general goodness of the divine Being may lead us to *expect* it: and it seems probable, that God would not have suffered mankind to have fallen into so great apostasy, unless he had intended them such an assistance.

3. The provision which God has made in the natural world for removing *bodily disorders*, give us some additional reason to hope, that he will not be altogether regardless of the much more dangerous diseases of the *mind*.

Prop. 92. Schol. 1. 4. The pretences to a divine revelation, which have been often made, and one and another of them so readily received, even sometimes upon very slender evidence, plainly shew that men have thought a revelation probable: and perhaps we may add, there would not have been so many counterfeits, if there had been no true coin.

5. Some of the ancient philosophers, and especially *Socrates* and *Plato*, tho' they did not believe the pretences to revelation made by their *priests*, yet hoped that such a favour would be given to mankind, and express their comfortable expectation of it.

2, 3, 4, & 5. 6. *Valet propositio.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 304—310.

SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be objected, that since mankind brought themselves into these deplorable circumstances by their own fault, there is the less reason to expect any extraordinary assistance.

Ans.

Ans. We allow no particular person can have any assurance that God will favour him in this manner; but since it is certain that God confers many unmerited favours upon his creatures, and that in the natural world many remedies are provided for evils, which men bring upon themselves by their own folly, this objection will not overthrow the preceding argument.

DEFINITION LXIX.

That MIRACLE is said to be UNCONTRouLED, the apparent design of which is not evidently *contradicted*, either by the *absurdity* of the thing it is intended to prove, or by some at least *equal miracle* opposed to it.

Chandler on Mir. c. iii.

| *Sykes, ibid. p. 130—134.*

SCHOLIUM.

A man may be said to perform miracles *in proof of a doctrine*, when he asserts the doctrine, and then works the miracle as an immediate confirmation of it; or when he does publickly and frequently assert himself to be a teacher sent from God, and appeals to a train of miracles to shew that he is so: for in that case such miracles, (if they be allowed any proof at all) do prove particular facts or doctrines asserted by him, even though no miracle be distinctly applied to such particulars.

Fleetwood of Mir. p. 120, 121, 220—228.

PROPOSITION XCIV.

When a man performs evident and uncontrouled miracles as a proof of any doctrine, virtue requires those who have sufficient evidence of the reality of such miracles, to admit the doctrine as true.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 91. 1. God may see fit to reveal some things to his creatures, not discoverable by their natural light.

1. 2. God's wisdom will require him to reserve to himself some certain *criteria*, by which his own testimony may be known and distinguished by us.

Prop. 32. and Def. 67. 3. A miracle cannot be performed without an extraordinary divine interposition, either mediate or immediate.

3. 4. If God would confirm the truth of a proposition to one man, by the testimony of another to whom it was immediately revealed, we can think of no method, by which he could do it in so effectual a manner, as by giving him a power to work a *miracle* in confirmation of it.

Def. 69. 5. When a miracle is *uncontrouled*, we can imagine no circumstance by which it can be distinguished from a miracle wrought to confirm a truth.

4, 5. | 6. If God were to suffer an uncontroled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falshood, it seems he could have no criterion by which his testimony could be distinguished.

2, 6 | 7. It is inconsistent with the *wisdom* of God, to suffer an uncontroled miracle to be wrought in confirmation of a falshood.

6. | 8. It would also be inconsistent with his *goodness*; seeing it would leave his creatures in a perpetual and melancholy uncertainty, as to the truth of any pretended revelation from him; an uncertainty that would be most painful to the most virtuous and religious part of mankind.

7, 8. | 9. Seeing God is both wise and good, we may depend upon it, that a proposition attested by uncontroled miracles is attested by him.

Prop. 79, 9. | 10. Seeing God is true, virtue will require us to admit of a proposition so confirmed. *Q. E. D.*

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 214—216. | *Chand. on Mir.* c. ii.
Locke's Post. Works, p. 219—222.

S C H O L I U M I.

We have not mentioned that additional confirmation, which may arise to the proposition, from the regard which men in all ages and nations seem to have paid to miracles, as the surest proof of a divine revelation; that fact having been disputed, especially of late by the learned and ingenious Mr. *Weston*, though some considerable stress is laid upon it by bishop *Atterbury*, in the place quoted below; and Mr. *Comber* has laboured to shew that miracles were greatly regarded by the Gentiles. It is observable, that few of the *legislators* mentioned above, (*Prop.* 92. *Schol.* 1.) though they pretended to revelations, (which by them must have been supposed miracles, *see Def.* 68.) ventured to prove the truth of them by professing a power to work miracles. Nevertheless, tho' the pretended miracles of the heathens were seldom proposed as in proof of any doctrine, (as will be further noted) yet there was a sort of accidental credit derived to heathen establishments by such pretensions to them, which occasioned the multiplication of those pretences in opposition to christianity; and is a proof after all, that miracles were not disregarded by the pagans in general; as, considering the constitution of human nature, it would be strange if they were, at least by those who were themselves eye-witnesses of them, and that in instances where the facts could not be disputed.

Atterbury's Post. Sermon. vol. i. p. 207—210.

S C H O L I U M 2.

LECT. CVI. To this it is objected, that if we believe the *Bible*, we shall find that it is not only supposed there, that miracles *may be* wrought in proof of a falshood, but it is expressly asserted to *have been fact* in one case, and foretold as what *shall* cer-

tainly be in others. *Deut.* xiii. 1—5. *Matt.* xxiv. 24. 2 *Theff.* ii. 9, 10. *Exod.* vii and viii. To these texts it has been answered by some, that they especially the first, may be only *hypothetic*: by others, that all the wonders here spoken of are *tricks*, and not real miracles; which may be true of 2 *Theff.* ii. 9. But the justest answer seems to be, that none of these are supposed to be *uncontrouled* miracles, but to be sufficiently confuted, either by the apparent absurdity of the thing they attempted to prove, or by other more and greater miracles wrought on the contrary side; and it is to be remembered in this view, that *Matt.* xxiv. 24. refers to the *apostolic* age: so that all the miracles of those false Christs were directly opposed, by the sum of all those wrought in the very same time in proof of christianity.

Tillotson's Serm. vol. iii. p. 499, 500.
Limb. Theol. l. iii. c. xvii. § 2.
Fleetwood of Mir. p. 173—209.

Chapman's Euseb. vol. i. p. 119—127
Sykes of Mir. p. 175—179.

S C H O L I U M.

Bishop *Fleetwood's* singular solution of the miracles of the *Egyptian Magi*, may be seen at large in

Fleetwood ibid. p. 52—61.

S C H O L I U M. 4.

Others assert, that by stating the case as in the proposition above, we fall into a round of proving the doctrine by the miracles, and the miracles by the doctrine. But the contrary is plain; for though we readily allow, that nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature can be proved by a miracle, yet we maintain, that many doctrines, of which the light of nature could give us no information at all, and in which even when proposed we can see no innate mark of truth, may be proved by miracles; it being sufficient in this case to render the proof valid, that no apparent absurdity attend the doctrine to be established by them, where there are no contrary miracles to be compared with them: nor could miracles according to us in any imaginable case be proved by the doctrine, be it ever so apparently true.

Fleetwood on Mir. p. 169—173.
Hoadly's Tracts, p. 26—28.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 383—385.

S C H O L I U M 5.

It is further pleaded, that any *one* miracle is as good a proof of divine interposition as *a thousand*; and that *all* miracles are as to their evidence *equal*, since no work can to the divine power be greater or less than another.—We answer, though all things be equally easy to God, yet there are some of his works, which appear to us more grand and magnificent than others, and more indubitably

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miraculous: and the story of the *Egyptian Magi* before referred to plainly shews there may be circumstances, by which one miracle may appear evidently to triumph over another; in which case, it seems that all the evidence arising from the opposite miracle is in a manner even transferred to the victorious side.

Fleetwood ibid. p. 30—37, 81—83, 211
—213.

Hoadly's Tracts, p. 5—16.

Locke on Mir. p. 223—231.

S C H O L I U M 6.

It must be granted, that the evidence of miracles seems so strong, as to render it highly probable, that God will not suffer it to be applied in proof of a falshood, without appearing by a miracle to turn the balance on the side of truth: for should he suffer them often to be profaned, to confirm what is evidently contrary to the principles of natural religion or common sense, they would gradually grow into such suspicion and contempt, as we can hardly suppose his wisdom would permit; and the more illustrious any miraculous fact in question appears, the stronger will this argument be.

Chapman's Euseb. vol. i. p. 89—93, 96—116.

S C H O L I U M 7.

It is further objected, that this method of stating the doctrine of miracles renders them of no use. But not to repeat what was said in answer to the objection in the 4th *Schol.* which is nearly equivalent to this; it is most evident they may, on this hypothesis, serve to awaken attention: to illustrate the goodness of the deity, when they are of a benevolent kind, and in all instances his power, and thereby impress the consciences of men with sentiments of religious reverence and awe: to command respect to the person speaking; who might otherwise, especially if in circumstances of external meanness, appear pragmatistical and usurping: to increase the evidence of some things which may be less certainly known by natural light: and to discover many others, which though not contrary to reason, are not discoverable by it, nor capable of receiving immediate evidence from it.

Foster against Tind. p. 50—63.

| *Atterb. Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 210—216.*

S C H O L I U M 8.

It appears from the survey we have now been taking, that the question, whether evil spirits, if such there be, may work miracles, is not of so great importance as some have represented: since it is certain that on the principles of the proposition, God will not suffer them to work uncontrouled miracles; and if any such should be wrought in proof of a falshood, charging it upon an evil spirit would by no means remove the difficulty, since such a spirit could act no otherwise than by a divine energy communicated to him, *Prop. 32.* Nevertheless, if a miracle were

were ever wrought, which was controuled by the absurdity and wickedness of the doctrine to be proved by it, or by a series of opposite and greater miracles; in that case, it seems more congruous to the christian scheme, (if there appear to be reason for admitting it) to ascribe such miracles to the power of evil spirits than to speak of them as the work of God. Vid. 2 *Thess.* ii. 9. *Acts* xiii. 10. *Job* ii. 7. compare *Rev.* xiii. 2, 14. Vid. *Prop.* 32. *Schol.* 3.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 318—322.

DEFINITION LXX.

That is called the INTERNAL EVIDENCE of any revelation, which is drawn from *L E C T.* the consideration of those declarations and doctrines, which are contained in it: *CVII.* and that is called its EXTERNAL EVIDENCE, which arises from some other circumstances referring to it, v. g. predictions concerning it, miracles wrought by those who teach it, its success in the world, &c.

PROPOSITION XCV*.

To enquire what kind of internal evidence, we may probably expect to find in a divine revelation.

L E M M A.

Let it be observed, that the divine revelation of which we here speak, is supposed to be one intended for the benefit of mankind *in general*, and introduced as that in which the whole scheme of revelation *terminates*: for otherwise it must be acknowledged, that there may be particular revelations on different occasions,

* This and the forty-seventh proposition seem liable to some objection. It must be owned that we are very little qualified to judge *à priori* what kind of evidence, and especially what *external* evidence should attend a divine revelation: and to select all the particulars of that evidence with which the *christian* religion was attended, and to propose this as the *standard*, by which revelation in *general* is to be tried, looks too much like an attempt to prepossess the mind in favour of christianity, before it is fairly examined. The author seems to have been aware of this objection himself; and has accordingly in the *Lemma* to the 97th proposition, endeavoured to soften the manner of expression; as if the intention of the proposition was only to shew the *reasonableness* of such kind of evidence, if it should hereafter appear to have in fact attended any supposed revelation, without asserting that all the particulars of this evidence would have occurred to us as probable, when only reasoning upon it in theory: for it is evident that to see the reasonableness of any scheme when it is proposed to us, is a very different thing from making the discovery ourselves.— But though this way of stating the question must be allowed less exceptionable than the other, yet it seems on the whole, that this inquiry would be made with much greater advantage, if it were reserved till the evidence which has in fact attended christianity were fully stated. We should then better be able to judge of any objections that are made to particular parts of the evidence, and should be prepared to make a more precise and determinate answer: whereas when the subject is only *in theory*, our reasoning upon it will of necessity be more indeterminate, and therefore less satisfactory; an instance of which we have in the objections that are urged in some of the following pages, against *positive institutions* and a *traditional* revelation.

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which may be very credible, though not attended with all those internal evidences; nor could it be expected, that every discovery which God makes of himself to any particular person, or nation, should answer all these characters.

SOLUTION.

1. We may be sure it can contain nothing apparently contrary to the light of nature, because that is the law of God, *Def. 61.* and he is too wise and too faithful to contradict himself.

2. It may be expected, that it should further confirm some important truths known by the light of nature, and clear up the difficulties which hang on some articles in which our happiness is much concerned: particularly, that it should give us firmer assurance of the pardon of sin in a way consistent with the divine justice, and that it should discover more of a future state of happiness, perhaps also of the entrance of sin and calamity in the world.

3. It may very probably contain a discovery of some doctrines as well as facts, which though not inconsistent with our natural light, are not discoverable by it.

4. As it is very probable that much of it will relate to the divine Being and his operations, it is to be expected, that though some additional light may be given us as to many things concerning him, yet these discoveries may be connected with further hints relating to what is yet unknown; so that there may be many things in it beyond our adequate comprehension, or in other words, some things *mysterious*. *Vid. Prop. 18. Cor. 3.*

5. Nevertheless, we may conclude the most important things will be plainly revealed, so that every honest inquirer may come to a full satisfaction about them.

6. The end of all must be to subserve virtue, and so to promote the happiness of mankind: and those additional discoveries beyond what the light of nature could have found out, supposed *gr. 3.* will no doubt center in this, and not tend merely to amaze our minds and excite our curiosity.

7. Considering how greatly and how universally *pride* prevails in the minds of men, how detrimental it is to almost all the branches of virtue, and how much it taints and debases many actions which would otherwise be the most excellent, as likewise how ill it becomes any creature, and especially a mortal and a sinful creature; it is exceeding probable, that the whole series of a divine revelation will evidently tend to exalt God and to humble man.

Tillotson, vol. iii. p. 442, 443.

Dod. x. Serm. N^o. viii. p. 209—211.

Duchal's Serm. p. 111—118.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. iii.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is objected, that on these principles a revelation must be needless; since a man must understand the principles of natural religion before he can judge of a revelation, and if he can judge of these he does not need a revelation.

To what is said *Prop. 94. Schol. 7.* we may here add the following remarks.

1. We allow that the being and truth of God must be known, before we can judge of the internal evidence of a revelation as above.
2. That nevertheless a revelation may improve what is known, correct mistakes, and excite men by proper motives to the practice of virtue, which they generally need more than merely to be instructed in its nature.
3. That a revelation may be a means of leading a person into the knowledge and belief of those doctrines, which must be believed before that revelation can be admitted: *v. g.* miracles may convince an atheist of the being of a God.
4. That the report of a revelation, and some probable external evidence of its truth striking the mind, may lead into more attentive reflection on the principles of natural religion: and thereby further promote the knowledge of them, and make way for a rational admission of the revelation itself, with a regard to its internal evidence as now better understood.
5. That the evidence with which a revelation is attended may further convince even a wise and good man of those things which he before believed, and on the belief of which he admitted the revelation as probably true: *v. g.* remarkable appearances of God may further prove his particular providence, and the accomplishment of prophecies and threatenings may introduce a further and more lively conviction of his truth. To which we may add,
6. That the whole objection is founded upon an evident mistake; since it lies against all methods of instruction whatsoever, and might be applied even to mathematical treatises; as it might be said, they cannot improve reason, since we must by reason judge whether the arguments are conclusive.

Tindal of Christianity, p. 369.

Foster against Tindal. p. 41—51.

Leland against Tindal, vol. ii. 95—100.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. i.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be questioned whether a revelation is to be admitted, which commands an action forbidden by the general rules of morality, *v. g.* to kill an innocent child, or put a whole nation of men to the sword.

Ans. 1. That cannot be a divine revelation, which requires any thing which all things considered is in present circumstances evil.

2. It is difficult for us to say, that such actions as those here mentioned are in all cases and circumstances unlawful, or even that human sacrifices are universally so: because it is possible they may be for the public good; and God, whose views are infinitely more extensive than ours, might see them to be so in circumstances when we could not possibly discern it.

3. Upon the whole therefore, we must judge by comparing the evidence on both sides: and if in any given instance, we have a stronger evidence that God requires a thing, than we have on the other hand that in present circumstances it is an evil, we are then to believe it good, and to obey the revelation requiring it; depending upon it that God will one way or another
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interpose, to prevent such an issue of the affair, as it would be contrary to his perfections to permit.

Chubb's Prev. Quest. pass.

| *Butler's Anal. p. 267, 268. 8vo Ed.*

SCHOLIUM. 3.

Considering how liable the human mind is to mistake, great care should be taken that we do not admit any principle as certain, which may really be doubtful, with respect to natural religion; lest, trying revelation by this complex notion as a standard, we should reject any thing that is really authentic, and sufficiently proved to be so by external evidence. This therefore is to be diligently attended to upon the principles laid down above, and one part of the internal evidence weighed against another; as well as the sum of both with the external, in order to form a right judgment.

DEFINITION LXXI.

LECT. Those are called POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS OR PRECEPTS, which are not founded upon any reasons known to those to whom they are given, or discoverable by them, but which are observed merely because some superior has commanded them.

COROLLARY

It is plain, that *positive* precepts may be distinguished from *arbitrary* precepts, i. e. those which are founded upon the mere will of the commander, and for which he himself can see no reason.

Conebeare against Tind. p. 155—157.
Main Arg. p. 45, 46.

| *Hallet on Script. vol. iii. p. 187—191.*

PROPOSITION XCVI.

There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. There are various relations of things unknown to us, and beyond the discovery of our natural faculties.

1. 2. It is possible those unknown relations may render some things fit to be done by us, which we cannot see ourselves under any obligation to.

Prop. 33. 3. These are most clearly known to the divine mind.

1, 2, 3. 4. God may have sufficient reasons to us unknown for appointing some particular actions, which we could not otherwise see ourselves obliged to.

5. There may be in other instances a general reason for appointing some test of our obedience, when there is no peculiar reason for preferring one to another.

6. Hu.

6. Humility, and consequently virtue, may be in some circumstances more effectually promoted, when we are required to obey commands founded on reasons unknown to us, than if those commands carried their own apparent reason along with them; and it may be with this view that God sees fit to conceal from us the foundation of the commands in question.

7. Civil governors may make laws founded on reasons unknown to their subjects, and proper to be concealed from them.

8. God, as our creator and constant benefactor, has a right to command us incomparably superior to that of any civil governor.

9. Circumstances of worship will appear more solemn, when considered as matters of divine institution, than merely as matters of human invention; and a greater solemnity may thereby be added to the worship itself: by which means they may have a remoter tendency greatly to promote those several virtues, which such acts of religious worship are intended to subserve.

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9. 10. There may be positive institutions in a religion of which God is the author. Q. E. D.

Conebeare, p. 158—170

| Foster against Tindal, p. 281—284,

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that forasmuch as God is unchangeable, (*Prop. 30. Cor.*) his will and our duty to him must always be the same.

Ans. Our general duty will always be the same, but the particular expressions of it must vary as our circumstances vary; nor is there any change in the divine will implied in such a variety; or in his giving new commands to us, when those new circumstances arise, more than there is in his producing new creatures.

Tindal, *ibid.* p. 20.

| Foster, *ibid.* p. 288, 289.

Conebeare, *ibid.* p. 170—174.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is also objected, that it is inconsistent with the divine wisdom to command indifferent things as necessary.—It is answered, they are not commanded as necessary, *i. e.* as morally and universally so, though in the present circumstance they may be expedient; and if they could never in any instance be expedient, they would not be indifferent, but universally and morally evil, contrary to the hypothesis.

Tindal, *ibid.* p. 131, 132.

| Conebeare, *ibid.* p. 174—177.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is said to be inconsistent with the goodness of God to fetter our liberty, and thereby impair our happiness, by requiring things under certain penalties, which we might else have been excused from; and that this will turn a revelation into a curse instead of a blessing.

To

To this it is replied,

1. It is not granted that every positive institution as such does necessarily impair our happiness, whether by restraining our liberty, or by multiplying our care in observing them; for the pleasure a pious mind will have in resigning to God's will some of its enjoyments, and in finding itself continually employed in his service, may upon the whole make the observance of such positive precepts more delightful than a freedom from them.

2. The tendency these things may have in their consequences to promote virtue, may on the whole be vastly more than an equivalent for present pleasure forborne and labour and difficulty incurred.

3. If on the whole these positive precepts did diminish our happiness, a revelation of which they are a part might contain such advantages of another kind, as on the whole to make it a great blessing; nor can it by any means be proved, that every thing which God *requires* of us must *immediately* promote our happiness, any more than that all he appoints in the course of his *providence* must have this effect.

Tindal, ibid. p. 123, & 131.

Conebeare, ibid. p. 177—182.

| *Limb. Collat. ap. Spect. vol. iii. N^o. 213.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is objected, that it is self-contradictory to suppose God should *forbid* that by a revelation, which he has *allowed* by a natural law.

Ans. 1. No natural law allows it in *such circumstances*, as those in which it is by a revealed law forbidden, *i. e.* when God has expressly determined a case, in itself indifferent.

2. On the same principles, all those civil laws are to be condemned, by which things are forbidden, which are not directly contrary to the law of nature.

Main Arg. p. 52.

| *Foster against Tindal, p. 285—288.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is also objected, that positive precepts overcharge the mind, and so lead to the neglect of moral virtue; and that if people come to believe these things good for any thing, they will soon suppose them good for every thing, *i. e.* place the whole of their religion in them, considering how prone men are to superstition. *Prop. 76. Schol. 7.*

Ans. 1. There is no arguing against the use of a thing from the possibility of its being abused; for then all the entertainments and supports of human life must be condemned.

2. It is reasonable to believe, that if God gives a revelation in which positive precepts are contained, he will take proper care to distinguish them from the great precepts of moral virtue.

3. A

3. A few positive precepts, given in a revelation declaring the rule of faith and practice, may more effectually prevent the increasing and idolizing such observances, than if none at all had been appointed.

Tindal of Christianity, p. 123, 124. | *Main Arg.* p. 48—51.
Conebeare against Tindal, p. 182—193. | *Foster against Tindal*, 289—303.

C O R O L L A R Y.

It appears from this survey of the subject, that the insertion of some positive institutions, in a proper manner moderated, and declared subordinate to the precepts of moral virtue, is so far from being an objection against such a revelation, that it is rather to be considered as an additional part of its internal evidence: especially considering, that as a divinely instituted religion will probably require some association of its professors, there must in the nature of things be some form of entering into that association, and of maintaining a profession of continued adherence to it; which will have evident advantages, if supposed of divine appointment.

Butler's Anal. p. 215—217. *Off. Ed.* | *Leland against Tind.* vol. i. p. 51—92.
Letter to Wallace, p. 8—11. | *Lett. of Posit. Inst. prefixed to Leland*,
Answer, p. 27—33. | vol. ii.

P R O P O S I T I O N XCVII*.

To enquire into the external evidence which may probably attend a revelation.

LECT.
CIX.

L E M M A.

It is to be observed, that we do by no means limit the divine Being to all the circumstances here mentioned; but only remark, that if a revelation offered should seem to be attended with such circumstances, in conjunction with the abovementioned internal evidences, each of these circumstances would concur to recommend it to our candid and diligent examination.

S O L U T I O N and D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

We might reasonably suppose, that at least *most* of the persons chiefly employed in the first publishing the revelation would be persons of piety and virtue; otherwise, we could neither imagine that God would favour them with such extraordinary discoveries of himself, nor could we depend upon their veracity in reporting them to us: yet we cannot say, that it is necessary that *all* the persons so employed, if there be a considerable number of them, should be good men, and much less that every one of them should be freed from every degree

* See the note on Prop. 95.

of sin, perhaps, if any one person is to bear a much greater part in the revelation than the rest, he may be so distinguished.

Tindal, ibid. p. 8, & 243.

| *Leland, ibid. vol. ii. part ii. c. ii. p. 36—*

Foster against Tindal p. 113, 114.

| 38, 49—53.

2. It is possible that some *superior spirit* (Vid. *Prop. 86.*) may be employed as a messenger from heaven to bring this revelation; and if he should not only make a transient appearance on earth, but take up his abode here for a considerable time in a human form, giving an example of the most perfect virtue, we must acknowledge the circumstance extremely well chosen and worthy the divine wisdom, though we cannot pretend it to be of absolute necessity.

3. We may reasonably depend upon it, that the *chief* messenger, if such there be, or others commissioned by him, will, at the first publishing of such a revelation, be endued with a power of working evident, uncontrouled, and probably most of them beneficial *miracles*; they being not only a very solid proof of a divine mission, (*Prop. 94.*) but upon many accounts the most plain, popular, and convincing, and best suited to the bulk of mankind, for whose benefit no doubt a revelation would be calculated.

Atterbury's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 217—222.

4. It is probable that the chief persons employed in opening such a revelation may appear in plain and low circumstances of human life, rather than with princely grandeur; since in this view their testimony might be less suspected of being a political contrivance, and their example would be more instructive to the generality of mankind. Nor is it on the whole incredible, that such persons, notwithstanding their own virtue, should be despised and persecuted, and perhaps put to death, for their attempts to reform the world: if this were the case, they would give a most edifying example of suffering virtue, and an evidence of the integrity of their character and testimony to all ages, beyond what we could conceive in other circumstances. And though for this reason God might probably leave some of them to die by their enemies hands, yet it is not unlikely, but in some remarkable instances he might interpose for the delivery of his servants in their extremity, either rescuing some of them by miracle, in order to their further usefulness, or perhaps raising them from the dead.

Plato de Rep. l. ii. ap. Dod. x. Serm. p. 206. Ed. 1.

| *Foster against Tindal, p. 317, 318.*

| *Flem. Christol. vol. ii. p. 51—53, 76—85.*

5. It is not improbable, that a revelation should be *gradually* introduced, and the expectation of mankind awakened by *predictions* and previous miracles, before the greatest scene of all be disclosed: this is analogous to the usual method of divine operation in the works of nature; and would lay a foundation for a very convincing additional evidence of the truth of the revelation; if it should appear, that a variety of different persons, of different ages and perhaps different coun-

coun-

countries, had been led by the providence of God and his influence on their minds to carry on their proper distinct parts of one harmonious design, the connection of which was unknown to each of them.

Barrington's Ess. on Div. Pref. p. 22—28. | Butler's Anal. part ii. c. vii.

6. It is probable God may bear further witness to such a revelation, by giving it at first remarkable success, notwithstanding strong opposition, and though it may be destitute of human support; and by making it visibly effectual for reforming the characters of its professors. Such facts might be capable of most convincing proof to future ages; on which account they seem peculiarly proper.

7. Forasmuch as miracles would lose much of their force, if they were frequently to be repeated for a long succession of ages, it is not reasonable to conclude, such a revelation would always be attended with the same degree of sensible evidence, with which it was at first introduced into the world: it is more natural to imagine, that God would take care that the first publishers of it should deliver in *writing* the history, purposes, and contents of the revelation, and that their books should be transmitted to posterity with such kind of evidence as other ancient records have.

8. It is probable, that if this method of transmitting a revelation be taken, providence may so order it, that the evidence of the main facts on which it is built shall at least in part be drawn from the testimony and confession of those by whom it was opposed; at least we must confess that this would be a strong additional medium of proof.

Doddridge's x. Sermon. N^o. viii. p. 215—218. Ed. 2.

SCHOLIUM I.

The principal objections against the preceding solution are those which affect the *seventh step* of it: we shall therefore in the following *Scholia*, give a view of the chief arguments brought against the supposition of such a *traditional* revelation, (as *Tindal*, though with some partial ambiguity, has affected to call it) and propose the most obvious answers to them.

LECT.
CX.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is objected, that forasmuch as the credibility of any testimony is impaired by passing through a number of hands, all the evidence which any traditional revelation can be supposed to have, must in time be utterly worn out.

Ans. 1. Where the testimony of any traditional witness gives *indubitable persuasion*, the credibility of the thing testified suffers *no diminution* by passing thro' his hands; and the credit universally given to many facts in ancient history, proves the decrease is exceeding small even in a long succession of ages, when the intermediate witnesses are faithful, careful and knowing.

I i 2

2. That

2. That a tradition preserved by *writing*, is evidently less liable to corruption than that which is merely *oral*; since when the facts are once recorded, there is no room left for a failure in memory, to which alone the mistakes of honest men will be owing in transmitting a testimony.

3. That the agreement of various witnesses, and many of them in separate interests, concerning such a revelation, may be more than an equivalent for the little defects mentioned above.

4. That the success of a revelation, or the accomplishment of some prophecies contained in it, and the illustration of many other branches of internal evidence, relating to the characters of historians, mutual connection, and correspondence of facts, &c. on the principles of the *fifth* step, may give it such an increase of evidence, as shall abundantly over-balance all that it can be supposed to lose, by being transmitted thro' many hundred years.

Tindal, ibid. p. 185.

Foster against Tindal, p. 92—96.

Leland, ibid. vol. ii. p. 113—119.

Warb. Div. Leg. p. 1—3. vol. i.

Comber against Weston. Append,

Jennings Log. Prop. xvii, xviii.

Ditton on Resur. part ii. Prop. xv, xvi.

SCHOLIUM. 3.

It is also objected, that there are so many forgeries of books pretended to be ancient, that it is a difficult matter to distinguish the genuine from the spurious; and that since the bulk of the common people have neither leisure or ability to manage an enquiry of this nature, if they receive a traditional revelation, it must be by an implicit faith in the testimony of those who are the teachers of that religion; so that in reality they believe not *God* but the *Priest*.

Ans. 1. It is universally allowed that learned men may have sufficient evidence as to the genuineness of ancient books, and therefore of those which contain the substance of a supposed revelation: and as it is highly probable in the nature of things, that books of this kind would early pass into many hands, and be examined with the utmost rigour, and preserved with the greatest care, the evidence of their being genuine might (*cat. par.*) be much greater than could be obtained as to any other books of equal antiquity.

2. Though the common people cannot of themselves enter minutely into the proofs, yet they may have some opportunity of gaining rational satisfaction, by consulting persons of learning and seeming integrity, not merely among the priests but the *laity*; and by reading books that give a view of the arguments, in which they may reasonably take it for granted, that especially in a learned and inquisitive age, no man will cite vouchers notoriously false.

3. They may compare writers on both sides, if the revelation be opposed; and perhaps may see, from the manner in which the opposition is made, what may greatly confirm them in the truth opposed.

4. A person that cannot read himself may get some valuable treatises read over to him, perhaps again and again by different persons, whose partiality he has

has no reason to suspect, and concerning whom he might be confidently sure they read what was before them.

Tindal, ibid. p. 232—234. 4^{to}.

Foster, ibid. p. 171—174, 178—182.

Main Arg. p. 67—72.

Dodd. First Lett. to the Author of Christ. not founded, &c. p. 52—56.

S C H O L I U M 4.

It is objected that the common people cannot be sufficient judges of the faithfulness of a *translation*, which yet is necessary in order to their understanding a traditional revelation, depending on books and designed for the use of various nations. We reply,

1. That though we acknowledge they cannot be so entirely satisfied as those who understand the original language; (which should recommend the study of the original to those who can conveniently engage in it;) yet the unlearned may very cheerfully depend upon the testimony of persons of acknowledged ability and known integrity, who have diligently compared the version with the original, and declare it as a fact on their own knowledge, that it is in the main agreeable to it.

2. Such a testimony acquires a very strong additional degree of evidence, when persons of different parties and sentiments in religion agree in allowing the same version; and when the originals are in the hands of those who are its greatest enemies.

Main Arg. p. 73.

[Dodd. x. Sermon. N^o. viii. p. 228—231.]

S C H O L I U M 5.

It is further objected, that there will be difficulties in the most literal and faithful translation of any ancient book, and in the original itself, arising from the different genius of languages; and especially if it be an oriental book, from the strong figures with which it will abound.

Ans. 1. Figurative language is not always obscure.

2. It is reasonable to suppose, that if God sees fit to communicate a revelation by books, he will take care that the most important things shall be expressed in such a manner, as to be very intelligible in a literal translation.

3. The objection here urged would equally affect all ancient books.

Foster against Tindal, p. 186—191.

Main Arg. p. 74, 75.

[Leland against Tind. vol. ii. p. 232—246.]

S C H O L I U M 6.

To get clear of all these objections against a traditional revelation, some have asserted, that we may reasonably suppose, that if God communicates a revelation from

from age to age, every particular person will have the truth of a revelation so proposed immediately discovered to him by some divine agency on his mind; though perhaps this may be an argument only for his own use.

It cannot be denied, that such an immediate impulse on the mind of each individual is possible to divine power: but this manner of stating the case supposes the revelation to be a *personal* thing; so that those who have never experienced any thing of this kind, would probably look upon it as an enthusiastical pretence. Yet we may perhaps reasonably admit, that where men lie under great disadvantages for receiving the ordinary proofs, God may by some secret influence so dispose their minds, as that the *internal* evidence of a revelation, and its visible effects, shall produce a very strong degree of assent, though they are forced to take up with very slender *external* proofs: to which we may add, that God can if he pleases order such a correspondence between certain events in his providence, and certain impressions on the mind made in consequence of the supposed truth of a revelation, as shall greatly confirm the faith of the enquirer, and be almost equivalent to miracles wrought for his conviction; though he may not be able to make these things out fully to another. And if on the whole the belief of any revelation produces a virtuous temper, the great end of it is answered; even though the person so influenced and reformed by it may not be able to give a rational account of the grounds of this assent, or may build it upon some weak arguments.

Letter to Wallace, sub fin.

Christianity not founded on Arg. pass.

Doddridge Ans. N^o. i. præf. p. 11—32.

SCHOLIUM 7.

On a survey of the whole argument, we must confess that a traditional revelation will be attended with some difficulties and some defects; and that those who have it, will not enjoy altogether the same advantages with those to whom the revelation was originally given: nevertheless it seems reasonable to conclude,

1. That strong degrees of internal evidence, and an experience of the reforming power of any religion upon the minds of its professors, and especially on our own, will make up the deficiency of some degree of external evidence, which might otherwise be very desirable: more especially, when on the one hand it concurs with some remarkable *personal experience*, (as above *Schol.* 6.) and on the other, there are no strong circumstances of suspicion attending what external evidence there is, *v. g.* the vices of the author of that revelation, its being first introduced by sanguinary methods, its acknowledging the want of miracles, or pretending to such as are palpably ridiculous, &c.

2. That if God gives a traditional revelation, he will give such evidence of one kind or another, as shall be sufficient to convince every honest and candid enquirer.

3. That it by no means becomes us to prescribe to God, what further degrees of evidence, beyond what is barely sufficient for this purpose, shall be given to any revelation.

4. That a mixture of obscurity either in the proof or contents of a revelation may perhaps have its use; particularly to humble men's minds, and to serve as a *touch-stone*, by which their true character may be distinguished.

Grot. de Verit. l. ii. c. xix.

Dodd. Third Lett. ibid. p. 57—59.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. vi. p. 226—

235. 4to. 333—344. 8vo.

SCHOLIUM 8.

In this argument, it may be very proper to review that excellent abstract of the controversy between *Tindal* and his antagonists, which is given in

Main Arg. p. 77—86.

The END of the FIFTH PART.

PART

P A R T VI.

*In which the GENUINENESS and CREDIBILITY of the
Old and New Testament is asserted and vindicated.*

P R O P O S I T I O N XCVIII*.

CHRISTIANITY is not a modern religion, but was maintained and professed by great multitudes quickly after the time in which CHRIST, its supposed founder, is said to have appeared, *i. e.* in the days of *Tiberius Cæsar*.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

LECT. I. There is a series of books written by *Christian* authors, who are said to
CXI. have lived, some in the *first*, some in the *second* century, besides a multitude in
those that follow; concerning the genuineness of which we have as much satisfaction as concerning that of any other ancient writers, whether *Jewish* or *Pagan*; particularly *Clemens Romanus*, *Ignatius*, and *Polycarp*, in less than an hundred years after the time mentioned; *Justin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Tatian*, *Athenagoras*, and *Theophilus Antiochenus*, in less than 200 years; for accounts of whom see any historical dictionary: not to mention a great many others, whose books are now lost, but whose writings are mentioned by *Eusebius* and other ancients, by whom also some considerable fragments of them are preserved; of whom see *Præp.* 101.

2. Some of the most ancient *Jewish* books, said to have been written above these 1700 years, expressly mention the *Christians*, and bitterly inveigh against them.

3. It plainly appears that *Celsus*, *Porphyry*, *Hierocles*, *Julian*, and many other *heathen* writers, assaulted christianity with great bitterness; and several fragments of their writings are preserved in those of the christian apologists, by whom they were answered, and whose pieces are allowed genuine, though many of the *heathen* originals are unhappily lost. Their antagonists were *Origen*, *Methodius*, *Eusebius*, *Gregory Nazianzen*, and *Cyril*.

4. *Tacitus* assures us, that in *Nero's* days there was a multitude of christians, not only in *Judea*, where he tells us that religion begun, but in *Rome*; against

* See a good view of the argument contained in this and the following proposition in Dr. Leland's reflections on Lord Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study of History, p. 105—122.

whom

whom *Nero* raised a persecution, attended with such circumstances of ignominy and cruelty, as moved the compassion of their enemies; intimating also that this was not the first attempt to crush that sect.

Taciti Annal. l. xv. c. 44.

5. *Suetonius* also expressly mentions the punishment inflicted upon the christians by *Nero*.

Sueton. Nero, c. xvi.

| *Pitisc. Annot. in Loc.*

6. *Pliny Junior* informs *Trajan* at large of his proceedings against the christians in *Achaia*, and after having borne a very honourable testimony of the morality and virtue of their character, says, "that multitudes of both sexes of persons of every rank were infected with this superstition, which was got into villages as well as cities; so that, till he began to put the laws in execution against them, the temples of the heathen deities were almost deserted, and few could be found to buy victims for them."

Plin. Epist. l. x. Ep. 97.

To which we may add the answer of the emperor to him, forbidding the christians to be sought out, but commanding them to be punished if they presented themselves: (*ibid. Ep. 98.*) and also the epistle of *Tiberianus* governor of *Palæstina Prima* to *Trajan* on the same subject, and nearly parallel to this of *Pliny*, which is preserved by *John Malela* in the second book of his chronicles, and published by Archbishop *Usher* in his *Appendix Tiberiana*, to the genuineness of which nothing can be reasonably objected; so that it is strange, that so many who collect testimonies of this kind, should have entirely omitted it.

Near akin to this also is the letter of *Serrenius Granianus*, proconsul of *Asia*, to *Adrian*, with the rescript of *Adrian* himself in favour of the christians, mentioned by *Justin Martyr*, and also by *Meleto* as quoted by *Eusebius*.

Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. p. 449, 450.

| *Just. Mart. Op. p. 99, 100.*

Euseb. Hist. l. iv. c. viii, ix, & xxvi.

7. *Lucian* expressly mentions the christians, as performing some extraordinary works, as resolutely bearing extreme sufferings, as expressing a great contempt of heathen deities, and as remarkable for their mutual charity, as well as for the prophets and the missionaries of their churches; and though the author of the *Philopatri* be not certainly known, it is undoubtedly a very ancient piece, in which christians and their affairs are expressly mentioned in a great variety of circumstances.

Moyle's Works, p. 261—263.

—*Post. Works, vol. i. p. 285, &c.*

Huet. Dem. Evang. p. 41, 42. Prop.

iii. § 20. ad. fin.

| *Lucian de Morte Peregr. ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 565—567.*

—*Pseudomant. ib. vol. ii. p. 419—423.*

| *Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. p. 450, 451.*

K k

8. Mar.

8. *Marcus Antoninus* expressly mentions the christians as examples of an obstinate contempt of death; and in his *Constitutions to the community of Asia*, (quoted from *Melito*, who wrote in this emperor's time, by *Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. iv. c. 13.*) speaks of the christians as having for a considerable time been persecuted even to death. See also *Justin Martyr's* apology to *M. Anton. ap. Op. p. 101, 102.*—To which we may add, that *Epietetus* is generally supposed to have referred to them, when he speaks of the fortitude with which the *Galileans* endured the severest torments: and *Galen*, the celebrated physician, in the second century, uses the obstinacy of the christians in defending their tenets, as a proverbial expression.

Marcus Antoninus, l. xi. c. iii.
Clerici Hist. Eccles. p. 545.

| *Arr. Epiet. l. iv. c. vii. p. 400.*

9. *Justin Martyr*, in his dialogue with *Trypho*, mentioning the practice of the *Jews*, to curse the Christians in their synagogues, charges it upon them as a known fact, "that after the death of *Christ*, and while *Jerusalem* was yet standing, they sent out chosen men from them into all the world, to inform them that the new sect of the christians was an atheistical sect; expressly to contradict the doctrine of *Christ's* resurrection and ascension, and to warn them in the most solemn manner against receiving it."

Just. Mart. Trypho, p. 169—171, & 368. Ed. Thirlb.

| *Lardner's Cred. vol. i. l. i. c. viii. § 2.*

10. The same *Justin Martyr*, not much above 100 years after the death of *Christ*, declares it as a notorious fact, "that there was no nation of men, whether *Greek* or *Barbarian*, not excepting even those wild stragglers the *Amax-obii*, and *Nomades*, who had no fixed habitation, who had not learned to invoke the one Father and Former of all things, in the name of *Jesus* who was crucified:" and though one may allow something hyperbolical in the expression, it must undoubtedly contain a most important testimony of the fact asserted in the proposition, parallel to which is a celebrated passage in *Tertullian* referred to below.

Just. Mart. Trypho, p. 338. Thirlb. Ed.
Tertul. Apol. c. xxxvii. ap. Op. p. 30.

| — *Ap. Reeves's Apol. vol. i. p. 323*
— 326.

SCHOLIUM I.

It is observable, that most of these writers, at the same time that they mention the christians as a body of men then in being, do also mention the persecutions they endured; an important fact, which is also further confirmed by the apologies of *Justin Martyr*, *Tertullian*, *Minutius Felix*, *Athenagoras* and *Origen*; which are undoubtedly to be reckoned among the most valuable remains of antiquity.

Dodd. x. Serm. N^o. viii. p. 226—230. | *Chand. of Persecut. p. 17—30.*

SCHO.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It seems exceeding probable, that when *Seneca*, (*apud August. Civ. Dei*, vi. 11.) *Tacitus*, *Dio*, *Numatian*, and other pagan writers, speak of the vast increase of the *Jewish sect* about their age, and of the severe punishments inflicted upon them for their religion, they do at least include, if not principally refer to the *Christians*, whom they looked upon as a branch of the *Jews*; because the founders and first teachers of christianity were by birth of that nation.

Huet. Dem. Pr. 3. § 21. p. 42.

PROPOSITION XCIX.

There was such a person as *JESUS of Nazareth*, the founder of the *christian* LECT. religion; and he was crucified at *Jerusalem*, about seventeen hundred years ago, CXII. *i. e.* during the reign of *Tiberius Cæsar*.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 98. 1. There were a multitude of men, who called themselves by the name of *Christ*, and professed the religion which he was said to have founded, a little after the time in which we assert that he lived.

2. We can never imagine they would have done this, especially at so great a hazard of their possessions and their lives, (*Schol.* 1.) if they had not been well assured that he was a real person, and not merely a fictitious name.

3. *Tacitus* expressly says, "that he was the author of the christian name, and that he was put to death by *Pontius Pilate*, the *Roman* procurator for *Tiberius Cæsar*."

Tacit. Ann. l. xv. c. 44.

And *Pliny*, in the passage quoted before, (*Prop.* 98. gr. 6.) asserts, "that the christians sung a hymn to *Christ* as to a God."

4. The primitive christians appeal to the *acts of Pilate*, as giving an account of the innocence and death of *Christ*: and though we readily allow those now extant to be spurious, yet we can never think such writers would have made such appeals, especially to the very person in whose keeping these monuments were, (if they were at all) had they not been satisfied of their existence and contents.

Just. Mart. Apol. p. 76. c. 84. e.

Tertull. Apol. c. xxi.

Ditton on the Res. p. 416—420. Ed.

1712, p. 467—470.

Vandale de Orac. p. 608—624.

Fabric. Cod. vol. ii. p. 289—301. vol.

iii. p. 455—465.

Addison of Christianity, c. i. § 7.

5. It is very probable, that *Suetonius* refers to *Christ*, when he says, "tha
" *Claudius Cæsar* expelled all the *Jews* from *Rome*, on account of the tumults
" which they raised, *impulsore Chresto*," i. e. probably, on account of *Christ*,
whom it is certain they often called *Chrestus*. Compare *Acts* xviii. 2.

Sueton. Claud. c. xxv. N°. xii.

Pitisc. Not. in Loc. vol. i. p. 689.

Vandale de Orac. p. 604—607.

Lardner's Creed, vol. i. l. i. c. ii. § 3.

Wits. Meletem. de Vit. Paul, § 7. N°. ii, iii.

Usher's Annals, Jul. Per. 4767.

6. *Spartianus*, otherwise called *Lampridius*, assures us, that the emperor *Alexander Severus* entertained such high thoughts of *Christ*, that he would have admitted him among the number of his deities, and built a temple to him, had not his pagan subjects vigorously opposed it.

Spart. de Vit. Sev. c. xxix, & xliii.

7. *Porphyry* also, though an inveterate enemy to christianity, not only allowed there was such a person as *Christ*, but honoured him as a most wise and pious man, translated into heaven, as being approved by the Gods; and accordingly quotes some oracles, referring both to his sufferings and virtues, with their subsequent rewards.

Euseb. Dem. Evang. l. iii. p. 134.

8. *Celsus* likewise mentions numberless circumstances in the history of *Christ*; (indeed so many, that an abstract of the christian history might almost be taken from the very fragments of his book preserved by *Origen*;) and never pretends to dispute his real existence, or the truth of the facts.

9. *Hierocles* also, under the fictitious name of *Philaethes*, in a book which *Eusebius* has expressly quoted and largely answered, speaks of *Jesus* as extolled by the christians as a God, for giving sight to the blind, and doing some other wonders of that kind; and also speaks of *Peter* and *Paul* as crying him up in so extraordinary a manner; though he foolishly endeavours to shew that *Apollonius* was equal and even superior to him, of which we shall afterwards treat.

Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 512. cont. Hier. sub init.

10. It is a most notorious fact, that (so far as we can learn) the enemies of christianity never disputed the existence of such a person as *Christ*, nor his dying as his followers assert; but on the contrary, upbraided them with it as their greatest reproach; the *Jews* calling him in derision תלוי, i. e. the crucified person, and his followers עבדי תלוי; and many of the heathens, particularly *Lucian*, deriding him as a crucified impostor; and *Julian* himself, who was one of the most learned as well the most inveterate enemies against christianity, though he had himself been educated among the christians, and therefore probably knew this religion thoroughly, never goes about to dispute this fact; but owns,
not

not only the being, but, as we shall afterwards observe, the miracles of Christ.

Buxt. Lexic. Tal. in תלוי.

Lucian de Morte Peregr. ubi supra.

Ditton on the Res. part iii. § 3, 8.

Chapm. against Morg. vol. i. p. 364, 365.

Lightf. Hor. Heb. on Matt. xii. 24.

2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. | 11. *Valet propositio.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

We do not here argue from that celebrated passage, in which *Josephus* bears such a remarkable testimony to Christ.

Jos. Ant. l. xviii. c. iv. § 33.

It is most certain that it is to be found in all the manuscript copies of *Josephus*, and that it was very early quoted by the christian fathers, particularly *Eusebius* and *Jerom.* The two chief objections are,

1. That neither *Justin Martyr*, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, nor even *Photius*, in his extracts from *Josephus*, have cited it: but this negative argument against fact is not much to be regarded; especially considering, that *Justin* argues only out of *Scripture*, and never mentions *Josephus*; that *Tertullian* in his controversial writings deals chiefly with *Gentiles*; that *Cyprian* does not professedly write in defence of christianity; and that *Photius's* extracts from *Josephus* are very imperfect. It is with more weight objected,

2. That the encomium upon the character and miracles of Christ is so great, that *Josephus* must have been a *christian*, or he could not have written as he did. To this *Lambesius* answers, that his words are to be understood ironically, and really contain a severe sarcasm: and Mr. *Whiston*, that *Josephus* was a *Nazarene*, *Ebionite*, or *Jewish christian*, afterwards bishop of *Jerusalem*: but Mr. *Martin* maintains, that *Josephus*, being a pensioner of the *Roman* court, and seeing *Domitian* something alarmed with the prophecy of the *Jewish Messiah*, for his own security and that of his people, chose rather to represent the matter, as if that messiah had already appeared, but through the mistake of their priests been rejected. But none of these things seem upon the whole a sufficient account of it; so that if he really wrote it, he must have been inwardly convinced of the truth of christianity; and wanting courage openly to profess it, left this testimony, perhaps in the last copies of his *Antiquities*, in some measure to quiet his conscience, for not having more generously and faithfully pursued its dictates.

As for the other passage in *Josephus*, relating to the death of *James* the brother of Christ, *Ant. l. xx. c. viii.* it is of much less importance in the present question. But what *Origen* quotes as from him, concerning the death of that righteous man being the cause of the destruction of the *Jews*, it is no where to be

Why there are no more testimonies from ancient writers. PART VI.
be found in *Josephus*, and seems to have been a slip of *Origen's* memory. Vid. *Hudson's Notes in Loc. p. 896.*

<i>Itigii. Prol. ad Jos. Ed. Col. præf. p. 25, &c.</i>	<i>Whist. Jos. Diff. i, & vi.</i>
<i>Ditton on the Ref. part iii. § 4—7.</i>	<i>Chapman against Morg. vol. i. p. 386—389.</i>
<i>Huet. Dem. Evang. Prop. iii. § 11—18. p. 31—39.</i>	<i>Orig. cont. Cels. l. i. p. 35.</i>
<i>Martin's Diff. pass.</i>	<i>Eusebius's Ecclesiastical Hist. l. ii. c. 23.</i>

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be asked, why facts of so great importance are not more frequently mentioned by ancient historians, whether *Jews* or heathens? To this it is answered,

1. That many books written in that age are lost, in which it is very possible some mention of these facts might be made.
2. That of the few remaining historians, who wrote about that age, most of them were by their subject otherwise engaged.
3. That several of those facts, relating to Christ and his miracles, coming from the *Jews*, would be slighted by the *Gentile* writers as fabulous, especially considering on the one hand, how common prodigious and magical stories were, and on the other, how superstitious and credulous the *Jews* were thought to be.
4. That the first appearance of the christian scheme would shock them, as seeming so improbable, and so contrary to their received maxims, that it is no wonder if many of them cared but little to inquire into evidences and facts relating to it.
5. Many of those who did inquire no doubt became christians; and therefore their testimony is not here reckoned.
6. The facts mentioned above as recorded by some, are such as on the whole it was most reasonable to expect that they, continuing enemies, should know, observe and mention.

<i>Addison on Christianity, c. i. § 2—6.</i>	<i>Jackf. Cred. vol. i. c. xi, xii. ap. Op. vol. i. p. 38—44.</i>
<i>c. ii. § 1, 2.</i>	

PROPOSITION C.

LECT. The first publishers of christianity wrote books containing an account of the **CXIII.** life and doctrine of their master: several of which bore the names of those books, which now make the *New Testament*.

DEMONSTRATION.

- I. The great importance, of which the primitive christians at least apprehended the facts and doctrines of their religion to be, (as appears by the extremities

tremities they endured for their profession of it. Vid. Prop. 98. Schol. 1.) would engage them to take the most effectual care they could to transmit the memory of it to future ages.

2. The age in which they lived was one of the most learned ages of antiquity; nor was there any, in which books were more common in the countries where they flourished.

1, 2. 3. It is exceeding probable in the nature of things, that there were some such ancient books as the proposition asserts.

4. Writers of great antiquity do expressly mention *four* books, written by the disciples of Christ, which they call *evangelists*: and some of them do particularly name *Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John* as the four.

Jones on the Can. part iv. Introd.

5. *Eusebius*, the most accurate historian among the ancient christian writers, mentions it as a fact well known, and asserted particularly by *Origen*, a still older writer, that the *four gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John*, the *epistles of St. Paul, one of Peter and one of John*, were *universally* received by the church; and he calls them *εὐαγγέλια ἀναγινώσκοντα* and *ὡμολογούμενα*, as not being able to find they had ever been disputed; and though the *Acts* are not expressly mentioned in this catalogue by *Origen*, *Eusebius* himself, in the passage referred to in the next step, declares that he hath no scruple concerning it; and it is certain, from many passages in *Origen's* works still extant, that he paid the same regard to the *Acts* as to any other book of this New Testament: nay in the close of the passage referred below, he also mentions them incidentally as written by *Luke*.

Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. p. 507—509. | Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. iii. c. xxiv. l. vi. c. xxv.

6. Though the other seven books of the New Testament, *i. e.* the epistle to the *Hebrews*, the epistle to *James*, the 2d of *Peter*, the 2d and 3d of *John*, *Jude*, and the *Revelations* were *disputed*, (and therefore called by *Eusebius* *ἀντιλεγόμενοι*) yet he tells us they were at length introduced into the *canon*, *i. e.* into the number of those books, which christians regarded as the rule of their faith and manners, and which they distinguish from other books, written by persons, whom they thought less eminently under the divine direction, whatever their sanctity might be.

Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. iii. c. xxv.

Jenkins of Christian. vol. ii. p. 116—118.

Jones on the Can. vol. i. p. 23—27.

7. We shall endeavour to shew at large in the following proposition, that at least all the most important of those books, were either expressly quoted by name or plainly alluded to by a series of primitive writers, several of them much more ancient than *Eusebius*; and indeed, that there is hardly any writer of christian antiquity, who has not either some express reference or allusion to some of them.

3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 8. *Valet propositio.*

S C H O L

SCHOLIUM.

Whereas Mr. Toland in his *Amyntor*, and several other writers, have taken great pains to shew, that there were many ancient books; some of which are pretended to be still extant, but are evidently spurious, which yet are quoted by several writers of the primitive church with great regard; from whence no doubt he would lead his reader to infer, that little regard is to be had to their opinion on this head; we shall not enter into the particulars here, but leave the reader to judge, by those passages referred to by Toland, compared with those enumerated below, as to the different manner in which they mention confessedly fictitious writers, and those of the New Testament: but the fullest and best account of this matter that I know of, is to be found in

Lardn. Cred. of Gosp. Hist. part ii. vol. i, & ii. pass. | Jones Hist. of the Can. vol. i, & ii. pass.

PROPOSITION CI.

LECT. CXIV. To take a more particular survey of what the most considerable ancient ecclesiastical writers have delivered concerning the several books of the New Testament: at the same time giving a catalogue of those of the *three first centuries*, in the order in which they wrote.

SOLUTION.

1. Barnabas, contemporary with the *Apostles*, who is mentioned *Acts* iv. 36, 37. *Acts* xi. 22—24. xiii. 1—4. 1 *Cor.* xi. 6. is said to have written a general epistle in *Greek*; a *Latin* translation of which is by many maintained to be extant; though I think the arguments against its authority are so strong, as to leave little weight to any thing argued from thence; any farther than that so far as we can judge by the manner of the writing, it is indeed very ancient.

Jones on the Can. part iii. c. 37—42. | Wake's Prelim. Disc. p. 69—72.
Lardn. Cred. part ii. vol. i. p. 23—30.

In this epistle several words of Christ are quoted, which are recorded by the evangelists; v. g. *Matt.* xx. 16. ix. 13. xxii. 43. *Luke* vi. 30. and many of those scriptures quoted from the Old Testament in the New are likewise cited here. Many of the phrases arguments used by Paul in his epistle to the *Hebrews* and elsewhere, are also inserted; v. g. 2 *Tim.* iv. 1. i. 10. but not in the form of quotations, so that hardly any ancient work gives less assistance in this inquiry.

Lardner *ibid.* p. 31—48. *præf.* p. 45, &c.

2. *Clemens Romanus*, mentioned *Phil.* iv. 3. who is said to have been one of the first bishops of Rome, wrote an epistle to the *Corinthians*, probably about the year 96.

Lardner, ibid. p. 51—61.

He quotes by name no book of the New Testament, excepting the *first* epistle to the *Corinthians*; which by the way is one of the most important in the whole volume for proving the truth of christianity, as will afterwards appear; and it is worth our notice, that it is here quoted by those who were the best judges of its being genuine, and quoted as of an authority acknowledged even by all the different parties among them: it is therefore not improbable, that the *original* might then be in their hands.

Lardner, ibid. p. 64.

He evidently refers to some of Christ's words, which are also recorded by *Matthew*, *Mark*, and *Luke*: but we cannot lay much stress upon those passages, to establish the authority of these books, because *Clement* living so near the apostle's time might have learned them by *oral* tradition, and the *evangelists* are not named. Yet on the other hand it may be remarked, that he does not introduce those things as new, but refers to them as well known to the *Corinthians*; which he could hardly have been so sure they were, unless they had some books among them, (commonly also received among other christians) in which those passages were inserted: nor will *Acts* xx. 35. invalidate this observation, since it does not appear that *Clement* had lived among the *Corinthians*, as *Paul* had done with the elders of *Ephesus*, and probably taught them those traditions with his own mouth.

Lardner, ibid. p. 65—68.

The following passages are transcribed with very little variation, *Rom.* i. 29. xii. 5. *1 Cor.* x. 24. xiii. 4. *Eccl.* *Eph.* iv. 4. *Phil.* i. 10. *Col.* i. 10. *1 Thess.* v. 18. *1 Tim.* v. 4. *Tit.* iii. 1. *Heb.* i. 3—5, 7—13. iv. 12. xi. 37. xii. 6. *1 Pet.* iv. 8. He seems also evidently to allude to the following passages, *Rom.* xiv. 1. *1 Cor.* xii. 12. xv. 20. *2 Cor.* iii. 18. viii. 5. xi. 24. *1 Tim.* iii. 13. *Heb.* vi. 18. *James* iii. 13. *2 Pet.* ii. 5. iii. 4.

Lardner, ibid. c. ii. præf. p. 102—105.

3. *Hermas* (mentioned *Rom.* xvi. 14.) is said to have been the author of several books under his name: one is called his *Pastor*, in three parts, the first of *visions*, the second of *commands*, the third of *similitudes*: we have only a *Latin* translation of it, and a few fragments of the original. It is probably an ancient book, but strong objections are brought against its being genuine.

Wake's Preliminary Discourse, c. viii. p. 79—87.

There are no express quotations of any book either of the Old or New Testament by name to be found in him; but there are many allusions to the latter, of which the most considerable are the following passages, *Matt.* v. 28. x. 32. xiii. 5, 7, 31. xviii. 3. xxviii. 18. *Luke* xvi. 18. *John* xiv. 6. *Acts* v. 41. *1 Cor.* iii. 16, 17. *Eph.* iv. 4, 30. *Heb.* xii. 17. *James* i. 5. iv. 7, 12. *1 Pet.* i. 6. v. 7. *1 John* ii. 27. *Jude*, ver. 21. There are also many visions resembling those of the *Revelations*, but no mention is made of that book.

Lardner, c. iv. *præf.* p. 144—146.

4. *Ignatius* bishop of *Antioch*, who was martyred about the year 116, wrote several epistles, mentioned by *Eusebius*, *Irenæus*, *Jerom*, and many others: they are still said to be extant: but there are two different copies of them. Mr. *Whiston* has contended earnestly that the *larger* are genuine; but from comparing both, it appears much more probable, that the *larger* are a paraphrase upon the *smaller*, than the *smaller* (as some suppose) an abridgment of the *larger*.

Whiston's Prim. Christian. vol. i.

Nor is it at probable, that the epistles to *Tarsus*, *Antioch*, and *Hiero* are genuine; since they are not mentioned by *Eusebius*, who was so likely to have discovered them, and would no doubt have been glad to quote them. We shall therefore only take notice of those quotations and allusions, which are to be found in the *smaller* epistles, and which are as follow. He plainly quotes or alludes to *Matt.* iii. 15. x. 16. xii. 33. xv. 13. xviii. 19. xix. 12. *John* iii. 8. viii. 29. x. 9. *Acts* x. 41. *Rom.* xv. 7. *1 Cor.* ii. 9. v. 7. vi. 9. xv. 8. *Eph.* v. 2, 25. *Phil.* ii. 3. *1 Thess.* v. 17. *2 Tim.* ii. 4. *Philem.* ver. 20. *1 Pet.* v. 5.

Lardner, c. v. *præf.* p. 188—190.

To which we may add, that he speaks of the *Gospel*, in such a connection with the *Law* and the *Prophets*, as seem to imply that he meant *a book*.

Lardner, *ibid.* p. 110—184.

| *Seed's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 294—299.

5. *Polycarp*, bishop of *Smyrna*, thought by some to be the *angel* of the church there mentioned in the *Revelations*, was martyred about the year 169. *Eusebius* mentions a letter written by him to the *Philippians*, which probably was that excellent epistle bearing his name, which is now extant in a *Latin* translation, and most of it in the *Greek* original. In this epistle he quotes by name *1 Cor.* vi. 2. as the words of *Paul*, and also *Eph.* iv. 26. as *a saying of scripture*, and also mentions *Paul's* epistle to the *Philippians* with the highest respect, as written by a wisdom which nothing could equal: he likewise most evidently transcribes the following passages, *Matt.* v. 3, &c. vii. 1, 2. v. 44. xxvi. 41. *Acts* ii. 24. *Rom.* xii. 9. xiv. 10. *1 Cor.* vi. 9. *2 Cor.* iv. 5. vi. 7. viii. 21. *Gal.* iv. 26. vi. 7. *Eph.* ii. 8, 9. *Phil.* ii. 10, 16. *1 Thess.* v. 17, 22. *2 Thess.* iii. 15. *1 Tim.* ii. 1, 2. vi. 7. *2 Tim.*

2 Tim. ii. 11. iv. 10. 1 Pet. i. 8, 21. ii. 11, 12, 17, 22, 24. iii. 9. iv. 7. v. 5. 1 John iv. 3. Considering how short this letter is, the transcribing so great a number of passages in it from the New Testament, is an evident proof of the regard he paid to that book.

Lardner, *ibid.* c. vi. *præf.* p. 202, 203, & 222, 223.

6. That epistle from the church of *Smyrna*, giving an account of the martyrdom of *Polycarp*, evidently refers to 1 Cor. ii. 2. and gives the title of *gospel* to the history of Christ written by the *Evangelists*.

Lardner, c. vii.

It may be observed, that the writings which have been enumerated under these six first steps, are those which are commonly called the works of the *Apostolic Fathers*, being published under that title by *Cotelerius*, in a very celebrated edition of them, and translated into *English* by archbishop *Wake*, whose account of them all it may be convenient to peruse.

7. *Papias*, who is said to have been the companion of *John*, and who died about the year 115, wrote five books, now lost, called an explication of the oracles of our Lord; in which *Eusebius* says he often quoted our four *Evangelists*, and mentions some remarkable particulars both relating to the gospel of *Matthew* and *Mark*: *Eusebius* also says, he brings testimonies out of the first of *John* and the first of *Peter*. LECT. CXV.

Lardner, *ibid.* c. ix.

8. *Justin Martyr* wrote his two apologies, and his dialogue with *Trypho* the Jew. He died at the least about 163. The epistle to *Diognetus*, and questions to the orthodox, though they do not seem to belong to *Justin Martyr*, (among whose works they are published) are however undoubtedly writings of great antiquity.

There are in his genuine works the following quotations and allusions, *Matt.* i. 20, 21. v. 28—32. xi. 27. xxv. 41. *Mark* viii. 31. *Luke* i. 31, 35, 38. x. 19. *John* i. 20. iii. 3. xiv. 24. He quotes also the *memoirs of the apostles*, which he adds are called *gospels*, as containing the institution of the eucharist, and *Luke* xx. 44. *Matt.* xxvi. 39. He introduces *Trypho* the Jew, speaking of the precepts delivered in the *gospel*, as what he had read; and expressly declares that the *written commentaries*, or *memoirs of the apostles*, as well as of the *prophets*, were read publicly in all christian assemblies for divine worship, which is a circumstance of vast importance.

Just. Mart. Apol. § 87.

| *Reeve's Apol.* vol. i. p. 124.

He either quotes or refers to *Acts* vii. 22. xiii. 27. 1 Cor. v. 7. xi. 18, 19. xii. 8—10. *Gal.* iv. 12. *Eph.* ii. 20. *Col.* i. 15. 2 *Thess.* ii. 3, 4. *Heb.* v. 9, 10. 2 *Pet.* iii. 8. *Rev.* xx. 4, &c. *Luke* xx. 35, 36.

Lardner, c. x. *præf.* p. 286—288.

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9. The

9. The epistle to *Diognetus*, which Mr. *Whiston* wildly thinks to have been written by the evangelist *Timothy*, is certainly ancient, though it was not written by *Justin*; and there are evident quotations or allusions to the following passages, *Matt.* vi. 25, &c. *John* i. i. xvii. 14. *Rom.* v. 19. *1 Cor.* iv. 12, viii. 1. *2 Cor.* x. 3. iv. 8, &c. *Phil.* iii. 20. *1 Pet.* ii. 24. iii. 18. *1 John* iv. 19; and he also speaks of the gospels and traditions of the apostles, in such a connection with the law and the prophets, as seems plainly to intimate, that he referred to books of that name.

Lardner, p. 296, 297.

10. *Dionysius of Corinth* was a man of excellent character, who flourished about the year 170. He wrote seven epistles, which are now lost; but in a fragment of one of them, preserved by *Eusebius*, he mentions the conversion of *Dionysius the Areopagite* by *Paul*, agreeably to the account given in the *Acts* of the apostles; but it does not appear, that he speaks of that book.

Lardner, ibid. c. xii. p. 300.

11. *Tatian*, who flourished about the year 172, wrote an elegant oration against the *Greeks*, which is still extant; and *Eusebius* (*Eccles. Hist.* l. iv. c. 29) tells us, he wrote the harmony of the four gospels. In his oration, he quotes *Luke* vi. 25. *John* i. 3, 4. *1 Cor.* xv. 22. besides some other passages, which *Clement* and *Irenæus* say he quoted from the epistles to the *Corinthians* and *Galatians*, in a work now lost; and *Jerom* says he allowed *Paul's* epistle to *Titus*.

Lardner, ibid. c. xiii.

12. *Hegefippus*, a converted Jew, wrote the history of the christian church about the year 170, of which only some fragments are remaining: in which the following scriptures seem to be referred to, *Matt.* xxvi. 64. *Luke* xxiii. 34. *Matt.* xiii. 16.

Lardner, ibid. c. xiv.

13. *Melito*, bishop of *Sardis*, in the year 170, wrote an apology to *Marcus Antoninus*, and many other books, particularly a commentary on the *Revelation*: and as he expressly speaks of the *Old Testament* he seems by that phrase to imply that there was in his time a collection of books called the *New*.

Lardner, ibid. c. xv.

14. There is an epistle of the churches of *Vienne* and *Lyons*, preserved in *Eus. Eccles. Hist.* vol. iv. and written about the year 177; in which there are very express quotations from *Luke* i. 6. *John* xvi. 2. *Acts* vii. 60. *Rom.* viii. 18. *Eph.* vi. 5. *Phil.* ii. 6. *1 Tim.* iii. 15. *1 Pet.* v. 6. *1 John* iii. 16. *Rev.* xiv. 4.

Lardner, c. xvi.

15. *Irenæus*, bishop of *Lyons*, wrote, about the year 178, besides many other books, five of *Herefy*, which are yet preserved in the *Latin* translation, and some fragments in the original *Greek*. In one of these fragments preserved by *Eusebius*, as well as in the translation, there is express mention of the four *gospels*, under the names of their respective authors, and they are likewise mentioned together. In two other passages of his works, he professedly vindicates the genuineness of each, and sets himself to give an account of the occasion on which they were written. He often expressly quotes the book of the *Acts*, and in many places the epistles of *Paul* by name, and mentions all which our New Testament ascribes to him, excepting that to *Philemon*. He has many passages in sense parallel to several in the *Hebrews*, but he does not expressly quote that epistle, and *Photius* says he did not allow it to be St. *Paul's*. He has also passages in sense parallel to several of *James*, but no express quotations: the first epistle of *Peter* is quoted by him, and the first of *John*, and also the second, though by a mistake he calls it *the same with the former*. *Jude* is not quoted, though it would have been peculiarly proper to the occasion of his writing, but the book of the *Revelations* he very frequently and largely quotes.

Lardner, ibid. c. xvii. præf. p. 381, 382. & Ind. ad Iren.

16. *Athenagoras*, who before his conversion was a philosopher, between 166 and 178, wrote an *apology* for christianity, and quickly after a discourse on *the resurrection*, in which he expressly quotes, or evidently alludes to the following passages, *Matt. v. 28, 44, 45. Luke xvi. 18. John x. 30, 31. Acts xvii. 25. Rom. i. 24, 27. 1 Cor. xv. 32, 54. 2 Cor. v. 10. Gal. iv. 9. 1 Tim. v. 1, 2. vi. 16.* He seems also to refer to *James iii. 13. v. 7. 2 Pet. i. 21. Rev. xx. 13.*

Lardner, ibid. c. xviii.

17. *Miltiades* is supposed to have writ about the year 170 an elegant apology, LECT. which is now lost. He is celebrated by *Eusebius*, (*Eccles. Hist. v. 17.*) for his CXVI. acquaintance with scripture; but no fragments remain.

Lardner, ibid. c. xix.

18. *Theophilus*, bishop of *Antioch*, wrote three books to *Autolycus* yet extant, published about the year 181. His book against *Hermogenes*, in which *Eusebius* says he quoted the *Revelations*, is lost, as also that against *Marcion*, and the *harmony of the Evangelists*, mentioned by *Jerom, Ep. 151.* but the *commentary* upon them, which goes under his name, is spurious. In those of his genuine works which remain, he quotes *Matt. v. 28, 32, 44, 46. vi. 3. Luke xviii. 27. John i. 1, 3. Rom. ii. 6, &c. xiii. 7, 8. 1 Cor. vi. 9—11. 2 Cor. xi. 19. Eph. ii. 2. iii. 10. Phil. i. 10. iii. 20. iv. 8. Col. i. 17. 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2. Tit. iii. 5. Heb. xii. 9. 1 Pet. i. 18. ii. 13.* Some of these passages he mentions as spoken by a *divine word*, and he seems to allude to *2 Pet. i. 20. Rev. xii. 19.*

Lardner, ibid. c. xx. præf. p. 447—449.

To

To this work is added, particularly in the *Cologn* edition, a little tract of *Hermias*, called *Irrisio gentium*, which is written with great elegance and spirit; which begins with an express quotation of 1 Cor. iii. 19. as the words of the blessed apostle Paul in his epistle to the Corinthians.

Lardner, *ibid.* c. xxv. p. 553, 554.

19. *Pantænus*, once a philosopher of the *Stoic* sect, was president of the catechetical school of *Alexandria*, about the year 130, as *Eusebius* (*Hist.* v. 9, 10.) assures us: he wrote commentaries on scripture, which are now entirely lost; so that he is capable of doing no service in the present question, any further than as *Jerom* testifies, he brought back the gospel of *Matthew* written in *Hebrew* from *India*, whither he was sent by *Demetrius* his bishop, to preach the gospel.

Lardner, *ibid.* c. xxi.

20. *Clemens Alexandrinus* succeeded *Pantænus*, and wrote about the end of the second and beginning of the third century. His remaining works are his *Pedagogue* and *Stromata*, his *admonition to the Gentiles*, and a homily of the *salvation of the rich*. He is mentioned with great honour by the most valuable ancient writers that succeeded him: *Eusebius* tells us, that he speaks of *Mark's* gospel, as written from the account of things he had received from *Peter*, and in effect at least authorised by that apostle. (*Eccles. Hist.* ii. 15) He also speaks of the epistle to the *Hebrews*, as written in *Hebrew* by *Paul*, but translated by *Luke*. *Ibid.* vi. 14.

Lardner, c. xxii. p. 468—473.

He expressly mentions the four gospels of our evangelists, the *Acts*, the epistles to the *Romans*, *Galatians*, *Ephesians*, *Philippians*, *Colossians*, first and second to the *Thessalonians* and *Corinthians*, first and second to *Timothy*, *Titus*, *Hebrews*, the first of *Peter*, and the first of *John* by the name of his larger epistle, and *Jude* and the *Revelations*: but does not expressly mention *James* or the second of *Peter*. We refer not to particular passages, there being great numbers of them from the several books abovementioned. It is true that he also quotes several apocryphal pieces, such as the gospel according to the *Hebrews* and the *Egyptians*, the *preaching of Peter*, the *shepherd of Hermas*; but not with titles of equal regard, nor in such a manner as seem to lay any stress upon them.

Lardner, p. 494—515, and *Index to Clem. Alex.*

21. *Polycrates*, bishop of *Ephesus*, about the close of this century, in an epistle of his, of which *Jerom* has preserved some fragments, refers to *Matt.* xix. 12. *John* xxi. 20. *Acts* v. 29. and speaks of the scripture as the rule of faith.

Lardner, c. xxiii.

22. *Tertullian*, presbyter of *Carthage*, was contemporary with *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and survived him: his works are known and numerous. In them he expressly quotes all the books of the New Testament, but *James*, the second of *Peter*, and third of *John*: *Hebrews* he supposed to have been written by *Barnabas*. It is remarkable there are more quotations from the New Testament in him, than from all the writings of *Tully* in all the ancient books in the world: the same may be said of those of *Irenæus* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

Lardner, ibid. c. 27.

23. Dr. *Lardner* has also mentioned a great many other christian writers, of whose works only fragments are preserved, which serve to illustrate the present question, of which we shall not give so particular account. The chief of them are *Serapion*, who speaks with great reverence of our gospels, rejecting that of *Peter*; (*ibid. c. xxvi.*) *Quadratus*, *Aristides*, *Claudius Apollinaris*, and *Symmachus*. (*Ibid. c. xxviii. pass.*) Besides these, he also mentions several supposititious writings, forged in the second century, such as the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, the *Sybilline verses*, the Testament of the 12 patriarchs, the *Recognitions*, *Homily* and *Epitome* of *Clement*: but they bring little light to the present question; which is not to be wondered at, considering that most of them pretend to be written before the books of the New Testament. But it is observed, that in the three last of these there are several references to facts recorded in the evangelists, and that phrases used especially in *Paul's* writings are introduced in these pieces.

24. The third century produced many famous christian writers, *v. g.* *Minutius Felix*, *Origen*, *Cyprian* and *Arnobius*; most of whose works abound with a vast many quotations from all the uncontroverted books of the New Testament, especially *Novatian* on the trinity: and it would be almost an endless task to enumerate them all: much less is it necessary to enter into the particulars of those quotations, brought from *Lactantius*, *Athanasius*, *Eusebius*, *Optatus*, *Basil*, *Ephraim Syrus*, *Gregory Nyssen*, and *Nazianzen*, *Ambrose*, *Cyril of Jerusalem*, *Chrysostom*, *Hilary*, *Jerom*, *Augustin*, and other authors of less note, who flourished in the fourth century, of whom see

Spanb. Eccles. Hist. Sac. iii. § 10. Sac. iv. § 12. | Lardner part ii. vol. iii. pass.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

From hence we may easily collect and compare the evidence, which there is of each particular book of the New Testament, to prove it genuine.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

From hence we may see great reason to believe what is asserted *Prop. 100*, at least concerning the books which are called *ὁμολογούμενοι*. Vid. *ibid. gr. 7.*

C O R O L -

COROLLARY 3.

From hence it appears, that the evidence of those books which are called ἀποκαταστατικοί is comparatively very small, so far as it depends upon the fathers of the two first centuries, especially with regard to *James*, the second of *Peter*, and *Jude*.

COROLLARY 4.

Mr. *Dodwell* was grossly mistaken in asserting, that the books of the New Testament lay concealed till the year 130, and that there was nothing settled concerning the canon till the fourth century.

Dodwell's Diff. on Iren. p. 65—73. | *Jenk. of Christian.* vol. ii. c. ix. p. 118—128.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXVII. It may not be improper here to add, that *Amelius*, the *Platonic* philosopher, in the third century, mentions the writings of *John*; and *Dionysius Longinus*, A. D. 250, those of *Paul*, with considerable applause.

Huet. Dem. Ev. Prop. i. § 6. p. 21. b. | *Smith's Life of Long*, p. 23, 24.
Eusebius Præp. Evan. l. xi. c. xix.

And it is yet of greater importance to observe, that *Celsus*, who seems to have lived in the second century, and perhaps not later than the middle of it (*Orig. against Celsus*, l. i. p. 3, & 8) not only brings a great many citations from the New Testament, but founds the main stress of his argument against christianity upon the supposed absurdity of that book; which is an illustrious testimony, not only to its antiquity, but to its high esteem among christians in that early age.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be added here, that some have thought *Luke* x. 7. is expressly quoted by *Paul*, 1 *Tim.* v. 18. and it is observable, that if it be so, then it is put upon a foot of equal authority with *Deut.* xxv. 4. quoted in the same passage.

Seed's Serm. vol. ii. p. 292.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some may perhaps wonder, that (considering how much christianity prevailed, and in how great esteem the writers of the New Testament are supposed to have been in those early ages) there should have been no more quotations from them within the first 150 years. It may be answered,

1. That as most of the first christians were persons of a low station in life, (1 *Cor.* i. 25—28. *James* ii. 5.) the number of early christian writers was small, and of those who did write many of their works are lost, as evidently appears from
Euse-

Eusebius, *Photius*, and many more, who have given us some of their names and some account of them, and in part from several steps in the preceding proposition.

2. That several of the remaining pieces are but short.

3. That the subject of many of these was such, as to give little opportunity of quoting the writings of the New Testament; very few of them relating to any controversy of christians with each other, and in their controversies with the heathens, it is observed they are employed more in demonstrating the falshood of paganism, than the truth of christianity, as that was the point most necessary to be laboured, considering the *sociability* of the heathen superstitions.

4. Several of the writers, whom we have mentioned, were so early, that it is exceeding probable, they had not an opportunity of seeing some of the epistles, which could not circulate in the world so soon as papers now do by the assistance of printing.

5. Those books not being then divided into chapters and verses as now, quotations from them were not altogether so easy: not to say, that considering to what extraordinary divine assistances many of the primitive christians pretended, they might not seem to have so much need of a written rule; so that on the whole, it is wonderful, that we can trace so great evidence in such circumstances.

Warburton Div. Leg. vol. i. l. ii. § 6. p. 266—284. Ed. 2. p. 278—295.

PROPOSITION CII.

To inquire more particularly into the evidence there is, that the ancient christians had books among them, which went by the name of those which *Eusebius* calls *αὐθιγεγομενοι*. Vid. *Prop.* 100. gr. 6.

SOLUTION.

With regard to the epistle to the *Hebrews*, many parallel thoughts and phrases are to be found in *Clemens Romanus*, *Justin Martyr*, and *Irenæus*. *Clemens Alexandrinus* quotes it as the words of the divine apostle, and elsewhere of *Paul*. *Origen* frequently speaks of it as *Paul's*; and *Eusebius* mentions it as received with great pleasure by the *Hebrews*, who were the most capable of judging whether it were genuine or not.

<i>Lardner, Cred. part ii. vol. i. p. 87—</i>	<i>Whitby Comment. on Heb. Pref.</i>
<i>95, 368—373. vol. ii. p. 470—</i>	<i>New Transl. of New Test. p. 838—840.</i>
<i>472, 501, 502, vol. iii. p. 234—</i>	<i>Twell's Exam. part ii. c. ii. § 1.</i>
<i>238, 248—261.</i>	

As for *James*, passages at least parallel to it are to be found in *Clemens Romanus* and *Ignatius*; and it is acknowledged by *Origen*, *Eusebius*, and *Jerom*, though the last tell us it was long doubted in the *Latin* church.

<i>Whitby Comment. on Jam. Pref.</i>	<i>New Translation, p. 873—875.</i>
<i>Lardner, ib. in nom. Clem. Ignat. &c.</i>	<i>Twells, ibid. § 2.</i>

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3. The

3. The second of *Peter* seems to be quoted by *Justin Martyr*, and is ascribed to *Peter* by *Origen* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

Whitby on 2 Pet. Pref.

Twells, ibid. § 2.

New Translation, p. 903, 904.

4. The second epistle of *John* is quoted by *Irenæus*, and by the council of *Carthage* in the year 256. *Clemens Alexandrinus* speaks by way of distinction of the larger epistle. *Origen* likewise mentions the second and third epistle, in something dubiously; and *Epiphanius* has some reference to them, speaking of the plural number of *John's* epistles.

Whitby in Loc.

5. *Jude* is expressly quoted by *Origen*, *Tertullian* and *Cyprian*, but by no other writers.

Whitby on Jude, ver. 1.

Twells, ibid. § 4.

New Transl. p. 943.

6. *Justin Martyr*, *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* allow the *Revelations* to have been an ancient book, and ascribe it to *John the apostle*: we may believe the testimonies of *Eusebius* and *Jerom*, who had in their hands the writings of many of the ancients which are now lost, *Papias*, *Melito*, *Philus of Antioch* and *Apollonius*, all in the second century, received and used it: and it appears to have been allowed by *Origen*, *Cyprian*, *Victorius*, *Melito* and *Pamphilus*, besides *Hippolytus*, earlier than any of them in the third: it is certain some rejected it, as the work of an unknown and heretical writer.

New Translation, p. 1091—1022.

Twells's Ex. vol. iii. pass. præf. p.

Mills's Proleg. New Test. p. 24—28.

i. § 2. c. ii. p. 11—15.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

It evidently appears, from comparing this demonstration with that of *101*. that the evidence of the genuineness of the six former of these books is equal to that of the rest, nor are they all equal to each other in this respect.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

Nevertheless it seems more reasonable to admit, than to reject them, when we consider,

1. That several of these epistles, not being written as most of *Paul's* either to particular churches, or even particular persons, whose names and addresses are recorded in them, it could not be so easy to find out the originals.

2. That some of them are so short, and the contents of them so general, that there was (*cat. par.*) less reason to expect quotations from them.

3. As they were more inquired into, they came to be generally received; and at last all opposition against them ceased. To which we may add,

4. That the accomplishment of many remarkable prophecies in the *Revelations*, especially those relating to the *Roman* and *Papal* empire, in proportion to the degree in which it appears, must, to those that see it, be one of the strongest demonstrations that can be imagined, not only that the book itself was genuine, but that it was written by some extraordinary assistance and illumination from God: and when this is granted, and the external evidence considered, and compared with that of the rest of these seven pieces, it will further prove, that a book, not more frequently quoted by the earliest writers than this, may yet be both genuine and divine.

Blackwell, at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. iii. p. 9—12. | Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 106—116.

S C H O L I U M I.

Whatever be thought of the preceding arguments, it is to be remembered, that the agreement between these books and others of the New Testament is so great, that we need not be very solicitous about them: nor if the others should hereafter be proved to be of divine authority, need we be apprehensive of any dangerous consequences attending our referring to them in public discourses. This is especially observable with regard to those whose external evidence is the weakest; in which number the second and third of *John* and *Jude* are to be reckoned.

Foster against Tindal, p. 143—147. | Sherlock on Propb. Diff. i. p. 199, &c.

S C H O L I U M 2.

With relation to the books mentioned by *Toland* in his *Amyntor*, (compare *Prop. 100. Schol.*) such as the *Acts of Paul*; the *Revelation of Peter*; the *Gospel of Peter*, *Andrew*, and *Matthias*; the *Acts of Peter and John*, &c. it is evident, that *Eusebius*, in the place before quoted, (*Eccles. Hist. l. iii. § 25, p. 119.*) mentions these as $\nu\theta\theta\alpha\iota$ which (though *Dr. Twells* maintains the contrary) is plainly different from the $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\gamma\epsilon\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota$, as well as the $\omicron\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota$: and it will appear, as was hinted above, that even when they are quoted, which they seldom are, by ancient writers; it is in such a language, as plainly to shew, that the regard to them was far inferior to that which they had for the *sacred* books. And it is further remarkable, that tho' *Celsus* has one where or another given us a kind of abridgment of the history of the *evangelists*, (see *Prop. 101. Schol. 1.*) yet he has hardly ever if at all mentioned a single fact recorded in any of those pieces, though many of them would have afforded matter for much more plausible objections, than those which he endeavours to ground upon the facts recorded by the *evangelists*: (compare *Evang. Infant. ap. Fabric. Cod. vol. ii. p. 163—165, 182—185.*) which makes it probable he was not acquainted with those pieces;

for his candour was not so great, as to have waved any opportunity of aspersing christianity; and it is highly probable several of these forgeries were later than his time. We may also add, that *Tertullian* tells us (*de Baptif. c. xvii.*) that *John* the apostle discovered the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* to have been forged by a *presbyter*, and degraded the author on that account; which if true, is a very remarkable circumstance.

Seed's Sermon, vol. ii. p. 209—311.

PROPOSITION CIII.

LECT. CXVIII. The New Testament as we now have it in the original is *genuine*; i. e. it is in the main such as it came out of the hands of those, by whom the several pieces contained in it are said to have been written.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 100. 1. The primitive christians had books among them, said to have been written by those authors whose names are prefixed to those of our New Testament.

2. The primitive christians had as good opportunities of satisfying themselves as to the genuineness of them, as other ancients had with regard to the genuineness of their books; especially considering that several of those epistles were written to numerous societies of men, or to persons of a very public and sacred character; and those of *Paul's*, if not written by his own hand were signed by him, to prevent as far as could be the very possibility of imposture. (1 *Cor.* xvi. 21. 2 *Theff.* iii. 17. *Comp. Rom.* xvi. 22. *Gal.* vi. 11.)

3. The great concern which christians had in these books, and the high value which they set upon them, (as appears in part already, and will hereafter more fully appear,) would no doubt engage them to be very careful and accurate in this inquiry.

Lardner, ib. vol. i. p. 384, 385, vol. iii. p. 282—289. vol. viii. p. 197—203.

4. We find there were many books going under the name of the *apostles*, which were rejected by the primitive christians; and that a vast difference was made between those of the New Testament, and other books allowed to have been written by persons of great eminence in the church. Vid. *Prop. 100. Schol.* and *Prop. 102. Schol. 2.*

Lardner, ib. vol. viii. p. 105—124. | Blackw. at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. iii. p. 12, 13.

5. We do not find that either the *Jews* or the *Heathens*, with whom the christian apologists were engaged, disputed the genuineness of these records: nay *Julian* the apostate, who was so well acquainted with them, and afterwards proved

proved so inveterate an enemy to christianity, does in some of his writings allow them to be genuine; as we before observed that *Celsus* doth earlier, especially the evangelists. See *Prop. 101. Schol. 1.*

1, 2, 3, & 4, & 5. | 6. There is great reason to believe that the books of the same title with those of our New Testament, which were in the hands of the primitive christians, *i. e.* those of the two first centuries, were genuine.

7. Considering the zeal which the primitive christians expressed for the New Testament, and the sufferings which they were ready to undergo rather than they would deliver it up, as the *Traditores* under the *Dioclesian* persecution did, we can hardly imagine, that if it had been in their power, they would willingly have corrupted it in any important instances; which would indeed have been introducing another religion, different from that for which they suffered such dreadful extremities.

Suicer Thesaur. vol. i. p. 800 | *Lardner, ibid. vol. vii. l. i. c. 66. p. 212—217.*

8. If they had been ever so desirous of corrupting the New Testament, neither they nor any in succeeding ages could have effected such a design; considering how long the originals were preserved, how soon they were transcribed, and translated into various languages, how publickly they were read in their religious assemblies, so that wherever there was a christian church, there must have been a copy, by which any that attended might examine and correct their own; (*Vid. Prop. 101. gr. 8.*) considering also how wide they were dispersed in a very few years after they were written; and what a variety of sects arose very early among christians, who were all a guard upon each other, to prevent any material alteration in the books which they professed to make the rule of their faith, and from which each pretended to defend his own opinions.

King of the Prim. Church, part ii. c. i.

Boyle's Lect. p. 491—493.

§ 2.

Lardn. ibid. vol. iii. p. 289—293, 300,

Tertullian de Præscript. c. 36.

304.

—*Advers. Marcion, ap. Biscoe at*

9. There are numerous quotations from the New Testament in christian writers of all the latter ages, and even from the beginning of the third century; insomuch that if the books were to be lost, by far the greater part of them might be recovered from such quotations, and from the homilies and commentaries written upon several parts of it: and all these do in the main agree with our present copies, in sense at least, if not in words. *Comp. Prop. 101. gr. 22.*

7, 8, 9. | 10. The New Testament, as we now have it in the original, is in the main agreeable to what it was in the first ages of christianity.

6, 10. | 11. The New Testament, as we have it in the original is genuine. *Q. E. D.*

Limborch Coll. p. 46.

Ditton on the Ref. part iii. § 10—17.

—*Script. iii. Judæi. Quæst. iv. N^o.*

Bennet on Script. p. 302—306.

viii. p. 144—148.

Foster against Tindal, p. 95—105, 161.

Baxt. Works, vol. ii. p. 119. b. 120. a.

Wetstein New Test. Pref. p. 77—81.

C O R O L.

COROLLARY I.

From hence it appears, that the evidence we have of the genuineness of the writings of the New Testament, is abundantly greater than for that of any other book of equal antiquity; as may be seen by comparing the preceding argument with what could be said in proof of those writings, which go under the names of *Virgil, Tully, Cæsar, Suetonius, &c.*

Blackwell at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. iii. p. 6—8.

COROLLARY 2.

From comparing the several steps of the preceding demonstration, particularly *gr. 3, 7, 8.* it will appear, that where the possibility of corrupting the books of the New Testament, (if it had been desired) was the greatest, *i. e.* in the time immediately following their being written, we have the strongest evidence of an aversion to do it; considering the known zeal and piety of the first professors and confessors of christianity, and that as the character of christians grew worse, the impossibility of changing these books increased. And it may not be unworthy of further remark, that with respect to those epistles, which being written to particular persons might have been most easily altered, we have peculiar evidence that they were not; partly from the distinguishing piety of those persons, *i. e. Timothy and Titus*; and partly from the tenour of those epistles as they now appear, which is the very contrary to what dishonest, ambitious, and interested men, who alone would have been likely to have attempted a corruption, would have desired it should have been.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXIX. If it be objected to *gr. 7, 8.* that the fathers accused the *Heretics* of corrupting the scripture, and that it is possible that all the copies or versions now extant might be thus corrupted by them; to this we answer,

1. The corruption of this scripture, to which they refer, was either by false interpretations, or at most by the alteration of a few particular passages.

2. The agreement between the doctrines of the fathers in some of those points, and the scriptures as now extant, shews that we have not corrupt copies of those passages.

3. We may conclude from the reasons urged above, that if the *Heretics* made any such attempts, they must have been unsuccessful; and the protest of the fathers against them shews it.

4. The copies now extant came from such different parts, and many of the translations, especially the *Syriac, Ethiopic, and Vulgate*, were so ancient, that the hypothesis proposed in the objection is utterly incredible. To which we add that the fathers, who have several of them quoted the same passages of scripture, lived in very distant countries, or at near the same time; *v. g. Justin Martyr* and

and many others in *Asia*, *Irenæus* in *France*, *Clemens* at *Alexandria*, *Cyprian* at *Carthage*, some of his correspondents at *Rome*, &c. at all which places christian churches were founded, long before the time in which these authors respectively lived; yet these authors never in the least intimate any disapprobation of those anciently received copies, which greatly confirms the evidence drawn from this view of them. And whoever considers the alarm taken at the attempt of Pope *Celestine* I. about the year 425, to impose a forged canon, as established by the council of *Nice*, upon the *African* bishops, whereas it was only a canon of the council of *Sardica*, will be yet more sensible of the force of this argument.

* *Bower's Hist. of the Popes*, vol. i. p. 370, &c. | *Wetstein Prol. in New Testament*. § 2. *Foster, against Tindal*. p. 149—165.

Nearly akin to this, is that objection taken from the passages in *Victor's Chronicon*, in which it is said, " that when *Messala* was consul, at the command of " the emperor *Anastasius*, the holy gospels, as written by *Idiotis Evangelistis*, were " corrected and amended : " which seems only to refer to the correcting a few copies at *Constantinople*, which were falsified by *Macedonius*, and were now restored to what the plain *Evangelists* wrote. It is certain no thought could be wilder, than an universal corruption of all the copies of the New Testament at such an age, (*A. D.* 500.) and among so many diversities of opinions, as well as in the vast tract of land where *Anastasius* had not the least power.

Collins on Freethinking p. 89. 90.

Bentley's Remarks. § 33, p. 77—84.

SCHOLIUM. 3.

Many have objected the *various readings*, which Dr. *Mills* reckons to be more than 30000 : but it may be replied,

1. That considering the bulk of the book, the vast number of copies which have been compared, the ignorance of many transcribers, and the nicety with which the least variations have been observed ; and especially considering how many *versions* and *quotations* Dr. *Mills* brings into the account, we are rather to wonder there are no more ; since in the few copies of *Terence* which have been compared, almost as many various readings have been found.

2. There are but very few of these various numerous readings, which at all affect the sense, at least in any important article; as appears by examining not only those of *Mills*, but those of *Wetstein*, which are by far the most significant of them.

3. That when copies come to be compared, there is often so great a number on one side against those of the other, that it is easy to settle the true reading, and to see what it was that led the transcriber into a mistake; and this is generally the case, where the variation from the received reading is the greatest.

*Canones Critici ap. Wetstein
Collins, ibid. p. 87—90.*

Bentley's Remarks, p. 60—68, 74—84.
Ditton on the Ref. part iii. § 18, 19.

S C H O-

S C H O L I U M 4.

It is objected, that it is improbable the whole New Testament should have been written in *Greek*: we answer,

1. That many great critics alledge, chiefly on the authority of *Papias*, as quoted by *Eusebius* (*Eccles. Hist. l. iii. cap. ult.*) that the gospel of *Matthew* and the epistle to the *Hebrews* were originally written in *Hebrew*: but if that should be allowed dubious, we may further add,

2. That great numbers of the christian converts were *Græcians* born, and others *Hellenists*, who used the *Greek* translation of the Old Testament.

3. That the *Greek* language had spread so much beyond any other in those days, that on the whole it was most convenient for books that were intended for universal use; which also in part appears from the writings of several of the ancients, who though they lived in *Asia* and *Egypt*, used this language as *Josephus* also did, though he wrote at *Rome*, and seems to have designed his books principally for the use of the *Romans*.

Berewood's Inq. c. i, & vi.

Limb. Coll. p. 144, 145. 183, 184.

Jones against Whiston, c. xvii, &c.

Hallet on Heb. Pref.

S C H O L I U M 5.

Mr. *Whiston* has endeavoured to prove the evidence of the genuineness of the *Apostolic Constitutions* to be equal to that of the New Testament. We own there are many curious and valuable articles, among many weak and ridiculous things, in that very miscellaneous collection. Nevertheless, when *Whiston's* arguments for them come to be compared with those in the proposition, it will immediately appear, that they fall vastly short of them. And indeed the *Constitutions* contain many very evident marks of forgery; especially as they expressly determine the two grand controversies, relating to the time of *Easter*, and the re-admission of those who had fallen away after *baptism*: yet their authority is never pleaded for the decision of these controversies, even when those persons were engaged in them, in whose hands he supposes the originals of these *Constitutions* to have been lodged: not now to insist upon, the great improbability of keeping those things secret at first, which were intended to be a rule to christians in all succeeding ages; which very ill agrees with the plain and simple genius of christianity, or that courage in defence of the truth for which its earliest professors were above all mankind so eminent. There are likewise so many things in these *Constitutions*, different from and even contrary to the genius and design of the writers of the New Testament, that no wise man would believe, without the most convincing and irresistible proof, that both could come from the same hand.

Whiston's. Prim. Christianity, vol. ii, iii.

Saurin's Serm. vol. ii. p. 185—187.

Coci Censura Patr. p. 3—7.

Grabe's Answer, to Whiston's passages.

Barratieri Opera.

Lardner's Cred. part ii. vol. viii. c. ult.

P R O-

PROPOSITION CIV.

The Jewish religion has been of considerable antiquity ; and according to the LECT. common chronology, was founded by *Moses* near 1600 years before *Christ's* time. CXX.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. That there was such a people as the *Jews* about the time of the christian æra, and that they were a little while after subdued by the *Romans* under *Vespasian* and *Titus*, is so apparent from the history of *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, as well as many other ancient writers and monuments, that it has never been called in question, and therefore needs no more particular proof.

2. *Philo* and *Josephus*, the two most considerable writers who lived in that age, as well as a great many others of the same religion before and since, do expressly assert it as a notorious fact, that *Moses* was the author of their religion and polity, and that he lived about the time mentioned in the proposition.

3. There is reason to believe, that as the *Hebrew* language is of acknowledged antiquity, and does indeed bear many of the peculiar marks of an original, they had among them some written and credible account of the beginning of their constitution and nation ; especially considering how much their laws differ from those of any other people on the face of the earth.

4. Several of the *Pagan* writers, of whom we shall give a more particular account in the scholium, do mention *Moses* as undoubtedly the *Law-giver* of the *Jews*.

5. We cannot find that there was any contest between the *Jews* and the neighbouring nations, concerning the antiquity of *Moses*, and the origin of the *Jewish* religion, though several of them pretended their religious institutions to be much older ; as appears especially by those two excellent books which *Josephus* has written against *Appion*, expressly on this subject.

1, 5. 6. There is reason to believe that the *Jewish* religion has been of considerable antiquity, and was founded by *Moses* about the time mentioned above.

Q. E. D.

Grot. de Verit. l. i. § 16. p. 63—66. | Jenkins of Christianity, vol. i. p. 95—100.

SCHOLIUM I.

It may not be improper here to illustrate *gr. 4.* by giving an account of several ancient authors among the *Pagans*, by whose testimony it is confirmed.

1. *Manetho*, *Cheremon*, *Apollonius*, and *Lyfimachus*, besides some other ancient *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, whose histories are now lost, are expressly quoted by *Josephus*, as extant in his days, and passages are collected from them, in which they agree, that *Moses* was the leader of the *Jews* when they departed from *Egypt*, and the founder of their laws ; though some of these writers intermix with their

N n

story

story many ridiculous and infamous circumstances, which the *Jews* have always denied, but from the quotation of which we may assure ourselves, that the authors quoting the passages in question took them honestly and exactly as they found them.

Josephus against Ap. l. i. § 26. p. 1352. | *Ibid.* § 32. p. 1357, 1358. *ibid.* § 34. p. 1354. *Ed. Hudf.* p. 1055. *Cologn.* | 1359, 1360.

And *Eusebius* brings passages to the like purpose from *Eupolemus* and *Artapanus*; but as for those long quotations, he afterwards brings from the tragedies of *Ezekiel* and *Demetrius* upon the same subject; as the authors seem to have been *Jews*, if not *Christians*, they are placed with less propriety among the testimonies now under examination.

Eusebius Præp. Evang. l. ix. cap. 26—29.

2. *Strabo*, (*Geog.* l. xvi.) gives an account of the law of *Moses* as forbidding images, and limiting divine worship to one invisible or rather universal Being; and in consequence of this bears an honourable testimony to the *Jews*, as a pious and righteous nation.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 417, 418. | *Leland against Morg.* p. 212, 213.

Celsus also refers to this passage of *Strabo*, and frequently mentions *Moses* and other persons recorded in the *Jewish* history, in such a manner as plainly to shew he was familiarly acquainted with it.

3. *Justin* from *Trogus Pompeius* tells us, that *Moses*, whom by mistake he calls the son of *Joseph*, being driven from *Egypt*, and leading other exiles, encamped at mount *Sinai*, and there consecrated the seventh day as a sacred solemnity, or as he ignorantly expresses it a perpetual fast.

Justin Hist. l. xxxvi. c. ii.

4. *Pliny* the elder speaks of *Moses*, as eminent among the magicians, probably referring to his power of working miracles.

Pliny's Natural History, l. xxx. c. i.

5. *Tacitus* mentions *Moses* as one of the exiles from *Egypt*, who persuaded the rest of them to commit themselves to him as a celestial guide, and takes further notice of their being conducted by him through the wilderness, relieved in their thirst, and receiving a set of laws from him, of which he gives a large though a very faulty account.

Tacit. Hist. l. v. c. iii—5

| *Gordon's Tac.* vol. iv. p. 476—482.

6. *Juvenal* mentions *Moses* as the author of a volume, which was preserved with great care among the *Jews*, by which the worship of images and

and eating swines flesh were forbidden, circumcision and the observation of the sabbath strictly enjoined.

Juv. Sat. xiv. ver. 96—106.

N. B. Before him, *Horace* has mentioned *Judæus Apella*, or a circumcised Jew, as a sort of proverb of credulity, probably in reference to their believing so many miraculous events recorded in their sacred books: (*Hor. Sat. l. i. § 5. sub fin. comp. Sat. ix. ver. 69, 70.*) yet as he does not expressly mention *Moses*, (however some have thought he referred to him *Od. ii. ver. 19.* which we lay no stress upon, *Vid. Delph. Not. ibid.*) we chuse not to add him to the catalogue of these writers.

7. *Longinus* cites *Moses* as the law-giver of the Jews, and a person of no inconsiderable character, and adds, that he has given a noble specimen of the true sublime, in his account of the creation of the world.

Long. de Sub. § 9. p. 50. Pearce's Ed. 1732.

8. *Numenius*, as quoted by *Eusebius* and *Origen*, mentions *Musæus*, probably *Moses*, as a leader of the Jews, who by his prayers brought dreadful calamities on Egypt; which *Jannes* and *Jambres*, those celebrated magicians, were not able to resist: and *Eusebius* reports it as his saying, that “*Plato* was only *Moses* speaking Greek.”

Eusebius Præp. Evang. ix. 8. xi. 10. | Origen against Celsus, l. iv. p. 198, 199.

9. *Chalcidius* speaks of *Moses* as a person of eminent wisdom, more than human eloquence, and as one who pretended to divine revelation: but it is much to be doubted whether he were a Pagan, or, as both *Eusebius* and *Fabrizius* maintain, a Christian Platonist. *Vid. Budæi Phil. Hist. c. iv. § 22. not. p. 160, 161.*

10. *Hermippus*, an ancient writer of the life of *Pythagoras*, says that the philosophers did in many of their rules imitate the laws of the Jews; but I find not that he expressly mentions *Moses* as the author of them.

Josephus against Appion, l. i. § 22. p. 1345. Hudf.

11. The *Orphic* verses, which though spurious are generally reckoned of great antiquity, inculcate the worship of one God as recommended by that law, “which was given by him who was drawn out of the water, and received two tables of stone from the hand of God.”

Eusebius Præp. Evang. l. xiii. c. xii. p. 666.

12. *Diodorus Siculus*, in his catalogue of those law-givers who pretended to have received the plan of their laws from some deity, mentions *Moses* as ascribing his to that God whom he calls *Jach*, which is probably a corruption of *Jehovah*.

Diodorus Siculus, l. i. sub init.

| Gale's Court of Gentiles.

And in an extract out of his fortieth book, which is preserved by *Photius*, he gives a large though in some respects erroneous account of the *Jews*; in which he speaks of *Moses* as a man of illustrious prudence and courage, who settled the *Jews* in their land, and instituted their religion and laws, forbidding them images as he pretends on *panteistic* principles, divided them into twelve tribes, established the priesthood among them with a judicial power, and adds several other particulars, which though mingled with mistakes are of great importance.

Diod. Siculus ap. Phot. Bib. N^o. 244. p. 2051, 2052.

13. *Dion Cassius*, l. xxxiii. speaks of the *Jews* as worshipping a Being of unutterable majesty and an invisible nature; but I find not that he mentions *Moses* as giving them those ideas of him.

14. *Varro* mentions the *Romans* as having agreed with the *Jewish* nation, in that first worship of theirs without images, of which he declares his approbation.

Var. ap. Aug. de Civ. Dei, iv. 31.

15. *Philemon*, in the days of *Alexander* the Great, has some verses which seem to be a kind of translation from part of the decalogue; so that there can be no reasonable doubt of his being acquainted with it, though he says nothing of *Moses*. See the verses in

Ridley of the Spirit, Sermon vii. p. 266.

And if *Phocylides* were indeed as is generally thought a heathen poet, before Christ's time, he may justly be joined to *Philemon*, as he has plainly translated many of the *Mosaic* laws, though he does not expressly mention their author.

16. *Justin Martyr* expressly says, that most of the historians, poets, law-givers and philosophers of the *Greeks* mention *Moses* as the leader and prince of the *Jewish* nation; and particularly enumerates *Polemon*, *Appion* of *Possidon*, *Ptolemy Mendesi*, *Hellanicus*, *Philochorus*, *Castor*, *Thallus*, and *Alexander Polyhistor*, besides those taken notice of above; and adds, what it is very important to observe, that they took their account of *Moses* not from the *Jews*, but the *Egyptian* priests, from whence it is well known they collected most of their learning.

Just. Cohort. ad Gent. p. 9—11.

Huet. Dem. Pr. iv. c. ii. p. 49, &c.

Calm. Diet. vol. ii. p. 236—238.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may not be improper here to add, that *Josephus* has insinuated, that the *Shepherd kings*, whom *Manetho* mentions as making so great a figure in *Egypt*, and at length expelled, were *Israelites*; and Dr. *Morgan* has grafted a great many false and absurd things relating to the *Jewish* history upon that supposition: but a late

late ingenious writer has entirely overthrown the foundation of that notion, as well as justly exposed *Morgan's* wild superstructure; and has advanced some reasons worthy of consideration, to prove that the shepherd kings were *Arabians*, and descendants of *Ishmael*.

Morg. Mor. Phil. vol. iii. p. 73. | *pass. præf. Rem. xxv. p. 53—64.*
Theoph. Cant. Vind. of anc. Heb. Hist. | *Josephus contra Appion, l. i. § 14—26.*

PROPOSITION CV.

The ancient *Jews* before the time of Christ had books among them, bear. LECT. ing the title of those which make up what we protestants call the books of the CXXI. *Old Testament*, and a catalogue of which may be seen at the beginning of any of our Bibles.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The books of the Old Testament are still extant in the *Hebrew* and *Chaldee* languages, with such marks of purity as prove them to be very ancient.

2. There was a *Greek* translation of them, in the days of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, which was laid up in the *Alexandrian* library collected by him.

Prid. Con. vol. ii. p. 27—47. præf. p. | *Josephus's Antiquities, l. xii. c. ii.*
 27—35, 44—47. | *Eus. Eccles. Hist. l. v. c. viii. Vales. Not.*

3. It is generally thought by learned men, that *Onkelos* published his *Targum*, i. e. the *Chaldee* paraphrase on the law, and *Jonathan* his on the prophets, either before or very near the time of Christ, which plainly shews the original *Hebrew* to have been older.

Calmet Dict. in Onk. and Jonath. | *Prid. Con. vol. ii. p. 531—538, 542—545.*

4. *Josephus* gives us an obscure kind of catalogue of the sacred books among the *Jews*, in which he expressly mentions the five books of *Moses*, 13 of the *Prophets*, 4 of *Hymns* and *Moral precepts*. Now if we with many critics allow, that *Ruth* was added to *Judges*, and *Lamentations* to *Jeremy*, then this number will agree with those which make up our Old Testament.

Jos. against Appion, l. i. p. 1036. Col. | *Prideaux's Con. vol. i. p. 331, 332.*
Ed. p. 1333. Hudf.

5. Both *Jews* and *Christians* from the time of Christ, have generally agreed to receive those books which make up our Old Testament as genuine. As to the attempt that has been made to introduce others called the *Apocrypha*, which will hereafter be examined, it does not affect the present question, any

any further than as the *Jews* rejecting these books may be considered as an argument of their care in examining those they admitted.

6. The quotations made from the Old Testament in the *New*, which we have already proved to be genuine, do evidently infer the existence of those books from whence they were taken; and also shew by the way, that the *Jews* did not only receive them as authentic but *divine*, as *Josephus* also in the preceding reference assures us that they did in the strongest terms: and it is observable, that all the books of the Old Testament are cited in the *New*, except *Judges*, *Ruth*, *Ecclesiastes*, *Canticles*, *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, and perhaps *Chronicles*; insomuch that on the whole, the express quotations from or references to the Old Testament in the whole volume of the *New*, are computed at about 600. Vid. *Index to Mattaire's Ed. of the New Testament*.

7. *Melito*, *Gregory Nanzianzen*, *Origen*, *Athanasius*, *Hilary*, *Epiphanius*, *Jerom*, and several late writers, have given us catalogues of the books of the Old Testament; in which none of ours are omitted, except *Ruth*, which is left out in some, because perhaps included in *Judges*.

8. The *Samaritans*, who separated from the *Jews*, many hundred years before the birth of Christ, have in their language a *Pentateuch*, in the main exactly agreeing with the *Hebrew*.

Prideaux's Con. vol. i. p. 416—418. | *Calmet's Dict.* vol. ii. p. 599, 600.

Dupin on the Can. vol. i. c. i. § 2—5. |

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. *Valet propositio*.

Leusd. Diff. Phil. p. 54—62. | *Jenkins of Christian.* vol. ii. p. 84—94.

C O R O L L A R Y.

Sir *William Temple's* insinuation, that there are no *Hebrew* records now extant older than the *Augustan* age, is most wild and arbitrary; and so contrary to strong and direct evidence, and indeed common sense, that one would believe he intended to except the Old Testament, though he expresses himself in so unguarded a manner.

Temp. Misc. vol. ii. p. 36. Ed. 2.

S C H O L I U M.

Nothing is said above of that *Jewish* chronicle, called *Seder Olam Rabbah* i. e. the *larger chronicle*, on which some have laid so great a stress, as the authority of it is disputed: but the regard which some very learned men have paid to it, makes one wish that the evidence of its authenticity, and the importance of its contents, may be set in a clearer and easier light than that in which it has hitherto appeared; for if it be indeed true, that its author was master to the compilers of the *Mishna*, it must be worthy an attentive inquiry.

Prideaux's Con. vol. ii. Pref. p. 20.

PROPOSITION CVI.

The books of the Old Testament, which the ancient *Jews* had among them in Christ's time, were in the main genuine *.

DEMONSTRATION I.

From *external* evidence.

Prop. 104. 1. Considering what evidence there is, that there was such a person as *Moses*, and that he was law-giver of the *Jews*; there is reason to believe that he would write his institutions, since there was such proper and important occasion for doing it.

Prop. 104. Schol. 1. N^o. 6, 7, 9, 11. 2. Several of the authors enumerated above speak of *Moses* as a *writer*, as well as a law-giver.

3. In the nature of things it is very probable, that in a polity so founded as that of *Moses* appears to have been, occasions of writing histories and laws should have occurred; and that religious teachers, rising in different ages, should by their writings, as those of other religions have done, endeavour to enforce an institution, which they at least supposed to be divine.

4. The persons to whom the books of *Moses* and the succeeding writers were first proposed, were capable of judging whether they were genuine or no; and there is no reason to believe, they would have received them with such extraordinary regard, as it is well known the *Jews* paid to them, if they had not been well satisfied on that head: and considering how highly those books were regarded by all the pious *Jews*, and how much even their civil affairs depended upon them, we cannot suppose that an entire change of them could have been attempted, without being discovered and rejected with the utmost indignation.

1—5. *Prop. 105.* 6. There is reason to believe the books of the Old Testament, which the ancient *Jews* had among them, were genuine. Q. E. D.

DEMONSTRATION 2.

Taken from *internal* arguments.

1. Many of the facts recorded in the Old Testament are of so extraordinary a nature, that if the books giving an account of them had been forged, the very circumstance of their being before unknown, would have been a sufficient argument against receiving any books that contained an account of them.

2. Many of the institutions contained in their laws were so burthensome, and some of them humanly speaking so hazardous, or rather so certainly ruinous to any nation not secured by an extraordinary providence correspondent to them, (especially those relating to the *sabbatical year*, the resort of all the males to *Je-*

* As a general reference on this subject, see *Leland's Answer to Bolingbroke's Letter on the study of History*, p. 44—70.

The books of the Old Testament in Christ's time proved genuine. PART VI.
rusalem, and the prohibition of cavalry) that forged books containing such precepts would probably have been rejected with the greatest abhorrence.

Bennet on Scripture, p. 72—74.
Sherlock on Proph. Diff. iv.

| *Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 462, 463.

3. The great variety observable in the *style* of these books, makes it improbable they should have been the work of *one*, and the *unity of design*, that they should have been the invention of *many*: for if these supposed inventors lived in different ages, they could not have consulted with each other; and if they lived in the same age, the largeness of their plan would only have subjected them to new difficulties, without being likely to answer any valuable end: and he who could be weak enough to embarrass a scheme with so many unnecessary articles, must probably have wanted a genius capable of managing them all so well.

N. B. The same remark may also be applied to the *New Testament*, though the external arguments for the genuineness of it are so strong, that it did not seem necessary to insist upon this hint.

Millar's Prop. vol. i. p. 98.

4. The provision that was made for reading the law publicly every seventh year, at the feast of *tabernacles*, (when it is probable the copies kept in private hands might be compared with that laid up before the Lord) *Deut.* xxxi. 9—13, 24—26, and the injunction on the king to transcribe it with his own hand, *Deut.* xvii. 18—20, would be a probable means of preventing corruption; and adds an evidence to the genuineness of these writings, much greater than can be found with regard to others of the most ancient authors.

The charge also given to private persons to make themselves familiarly acquainted with the contents of the law, and to teach it their children, deserves to be mentioned under this head, as an institution of the greatest importance for keeping it uncorrupted: *Deut.* vi. 6—9. *and sim.*) and which indeed according to the remark of *Josephus* in the preceding reference, had an extraordinary efficacy to this purpose.

1, & 2, & 3, & 4. | 5. *Valet propositio.*

Nich. Conf. vol. iv. p. 17—22.

| *Jenk. of Christian.* vol. i. p. 169—187

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXXII. To this it is objected, that the degeneracy of the *Jews* according to their own history, and their disregard to the institutions of *Moses*, together with the scarcity of books in those early ages, and the various oppressions which they suffered under their enemies, might occasion the loss of authentic copies, and give some designing priests an opportunity of substituting others in their room: espe-

especially might this happen, when the *book of the law* was said to be found in the reign of *Josiah*, 2 *Kings* xxii. 8, &c. or during the time of the *Babylonish* captivity. But to this it is answered,

1. This at best is no more than a conjecture, without any positive proof of such a forgery.

2. It is uncertain whether, if such a fraud had been attempted, it could have succeeded at either of the times mentioned, though they are indeed the most probable which can be assigned. For, not to insist upon the possibility there is, that the writing found in *Josiah's* reign was only the last chapter of *Deuteronomy*, that awakening passage of scripture; were we to suppose it have been the *whole Pentateuch*, perhaps *Josiah* might before have had some copy of the law, though not equally perfect with the original which had been found in the temple; and he might be more powerfully struck with hearing it read in the circumstances there described, though he had not been before an entire stranger to the contents of it, which it is certain he was not, considering the reformation he had before made, 2 *Chron.* xxxiv. 3, &c. There were probably some copies of the law remaining in other hands, as there certainly were during the time of the captivity: See *Dan.* ix. 11—13. to which may be added *Ezra* iii. 2—5. vi. 18—21. 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 22. *Ezra* i. 1. *Neh.* viii. 1—8. So that it appears to be an idle tale, which so many of the christian fathers borrowed from the *Jews*, that *Ezra*, by divine inspiration restored the sacred books, after they had been entirely lost.

Eusebius Eccles. Hist. v. 8. *Vales. Not.* | *Prideaux's Con.* vol. i. p. 329.

3. There is not the least probability, that such laws as those which are now to be found in the Old Testament, were forged at any time, especially on such an occasion; since nothing could have been more imprudent, upon the principles of human policy, than such precepts as those mentioned *Prop.* 106, *Dem.* 2. gr. 2. which would have been peculiarly liable to exception, when *Israel* was so surrounded with enemies, and straitened in their possessions, as they were both in the days of *Josiah* and *Ezra*. Nor can we imagine, that to these *Ezra* would have added that precept, on which they were obliged to put away their strange wives, which was so tender a point, and might have produced such fatal divisions; considering how many had married such, and how considerable some of them were both by birth and alliance, and how many foreign families would be made their enemies by such divorces: some of them were priests and *Levites*, who must have been privy to the forgery, if there had been any. So that upon the whole, there is so little reason to suspect *Ezra* as the inventor of these precepts, that it is an instance of the impartial regard he had for the original, that he would retain them at so great a hazard; *Ezra* ix, x. *Neh.* xiii. 23—29. a remark also applicable in some degree to *Josiah*.

Burnet on the Art. p. 83, 84.

Evans's Christian Temp. vol. ii. p. 375—377. | *Millar's Prop.* vol. i. p. 88—94.

Allix's Reflect. vol. i. p. 32, 33.

S C H O L I U M 2.

It is further objected, that it is impossible that *Moses* should have been the author of the *Pentateuch*, or *Samuel* or *Nebemiah* of those books which go under their name; since many circumstances are recorded in them, which did not happen till many years after their death; Vid. *Gen.* xii. 6. xxii. 14. xxxvi. 31. *Exod.* xvi. 35. (compared with *Josh.* v. 12.) *Numb.* xii. 3. *Deut.* ii. 12. iii. 11, 13. xxxiv. 5, &c. 1 *Sam.* xxv. to the end of the 2d of *Samuel*, *Neb.* xii. 10, 11. where the catalogue of high priests is carried down to the time of *Alexander the Great*.

To that part of this objection which may affect the *Pentateuch*, some have replied, that *Samuel* might have been the author of those books, which are called the books of *Moses*, because they treat of him, as those of *Samuel* are named after that prophet, because his history made so considerable a part of them. Among others, Sir *Isaac Newton* and Lord *Barrington* suppose *Genesis*, and the other historical books before *Moses's* time, to have been written by *Samuel*, and for this purpose quote *Acts* iii. 21, 24. But this is so directly contrary to many other scriptures, that it is strange that any should patronize the opinion; especially when comparing 1 *Sam.* ii. 10. and 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 3—5. which may afford so easy and beautiful and illustration of the above-mentioned text in *Acts*, on which *Barrington* lays his chief stress. (See *Grey* on the last words of *David*.) The scriptures to which this hypothesis is most directly contrary, are 2 *Chron.* xxiii. 18. *Dan.* ix. 11, 13. *Mal.* iv. 4. *Mark* vii. 10. xii. 19. *Luke* xvi. 29, 31. xx. 28, 37. xxiv. 27, 44. *John* i. 45. v. 46, 47.

Barrington's Essays on Div. Dispensations. App. N^o. iv.

Therefore waving this, it seems more reasonable to say, (as the most ancient *Jewish* writers since the time of the Old Testament assure us,) that *Ezra* published a new edition of the books of *Moses*, in which he added those passages as notes, which perhaps afterwards crept into the text, by the mistake of the transcribers: though indeed with regard to many of the passages alledged, it is evident there is no absurdity at all in supposing them to have been written by *Moses* himself. Perhaps *Simon the Just* might also make some additions to those books which were written after *Ezra's* time.

Prid. Con. vol. i. p. 342—345, 573—575. | Kidder on the Pent. vol. i. Diff.

S C H O L I U M 3.

As for Father *Simon's* hypothesis, that the *Pentateuch* was formed from some loose writings of the annals of *Moses*, and that many of the leaves were transposed; the reasons on which it depends are so inconsiderable, that it seems not necessary to give a more particular view of it.

Sim. Crit. Hist. O'd Test. p. 36, &c.

Dupin of the Can. vol. i. c. iii. § 1. p.

68—75.

Nich. Conf. vol. iv. p. 8—16. vol. ii. p.

5—10, 8vo.

S C H O-

SCHOLIUM 4.

Under the 2d step of the 2d *Demonstration*, we might have mentioned the omission of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, on which Dr. Warburton has insisted so largely in his learned work, called the *Divine Legation of Moses*: but as that argument is intended to prove not only the genuineness, but also indeed the divine authority of those books, it may be proper to state it alone elsewhere. We shall only add here, that there is reason to suspect whether, allowing the argument to be valid, it be of so great importance as the ingenious author supposes; seeing it depends upon so many nice questions, *v. g.* how far it is certain that *Moses* has omitted it? how far such an omission is peculiar to him as a legislator? how far it proves his dependence upon an equal providence? what that equal providence was? whether personal or national? and how far the expectation of it or ground for that expectation was a thing peculiar to the *Jews*? On all these accounts the argument is much more complex, and seems less certain and less striking, than similar arguments, drawn from *Moses's* having laid it down as a fact certainly to be depended upon, that a treble crop should attend the sixth year of tillage from the sabbatical, *Lev. xxv. 21.* and that the family of *Aaron* in its male line should never be extinct, nor ever want an adult heir free from those blemishes that would have rendered him incapable of service; which nothing but a full consciousness of a divine legation, could have warranted so wise a man in making fundamental to his system.

PROPOSITION CVII.

The Old Testament as now extant in the *Hebrew*, is in the main what it originally was.

LECT.
CXXIII

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 106. 1. The Old Testament, as extant in the time of the *Jews* who were contemporary with *Christ*, was genuine.

2. Such as it was in the time of *Christ*, it came early into the hands of the christians, and has continued in their hands ever since; so that the *Jews* could not have been able to make any considerable alteration in it, had they been ever so desirous of it, while the christians were such a guard upon them, in a matter on which so much of the evidence of christianity has at least been supposed to depend; nor on the other hand, could the christians corrupt it without the discovery of the *Jews*, who would never have spared them, could they have proved such an attempt on records which they esteemed so sacred, by persons for whom they had such an implacable aversion.

3. There have been many ancient *versions*, which are yet extant in the *Polyglot Bible*, in which there is such an agreement in the main both with the original, and with each other, as we cannot suppose there could have been, had the original

been corrupted after the date of those versions, of which some are of considerable age.

N. B. The most considerable versions to which we refer above, besides the LXX. were the *Targums*, or *Chaldee Paraphrases*, which if later than Christ's time were yet very ancient; the *Greek* of *Theodotion*, *Aquila*, and *Symmachus*; the *Syriac*; the *Arabic*; *Ethiopic*, and *Persian*; besides the old *Italic*: of all which see *Jones* and *Walton* referred to below.

4. In later ages, the *Masorites* have expressed a great and even superstitious care, in keeping the copy of the Old Testament as incorrupt as possible, numbering even the lines, the words, and the letters in each book: and though this care may be said to come late, *i. e.* about the year 500, it is to be remembered, it extends to those ages in which christians were most ignorant of *Hebrew*, and the *Jews* had some learning; so that perhaps had they been disposed to corrupt their scriptures, they might have done it then with the greatest safety: in which view, there seems to be something very providential in this exact scrupulosity of theirs at such a period. See *Pref. to Van Hooght's Ed. of the Heb. Bib.*

1, 2, & 3, & 4. 5. The Old Testament as extant in the *Hebrew* is in the main uncorrupted.

Jones's Crit. Lect. c. iv. § 70—74. | Turret. vol. i. Loc. ii. quæst. x. § 5—13.
c. xiii, xiv, xxi, xvii, xviii. MS. | Walton's Prol. to Polyg. Bib.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this some object the difference which there is in many places between the LXX. and the *Hebrew*; some of which variations are of great moment, especially in chronology. To this we may reply,

1. That it is reasonable to believe the LXX. may have been altered in some places, or the *Hebrew* mistaken by the first translators, which may account for several differences.

2. If it be supposed that the *Hebrew points* were of later invention, a supposed difference in them will account for a vast number of variations in the LXX. and the similarity of several *Hebrew* letters will account for many more.

3. The LXX. itself attests the truth and exactness of vastly the greater part of the *Hebrew Bible*, even if it should be granted that this translation is preferable to the original; which yet is a concession by no means to be made: now the proposition does not assert, that there are no errors at all in the *Hebrew* copy; the contrary to which the difference between the *Keri* and *Kethib* does evidently shew.

Prideaux's Con. vol. i. p. 331.

Shuckford's Hist. vol. i. p. 48—72.

Winder's History of Knowledge, vol. i. c. xvi.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is further objected, that many passages quoted in the New Testament, and in the writings of the christian fathers, are very different from the correspondent passages

PROP. CVII.

Objections answered.

passages as they now stand in the *Hebrew*; and that some words are introduced as quotations, which are no where to be found.—Now if with some we suppose, that those early christian writers quoted from the LXX. the objection will then coincide with the former: but as, for reasons to be given elsewhere, we do not grant that, we answer,

1. Perhaps they quoted from their memory; which is the more probable, as sometimes the same passage is quoted by different authors in very different words, even where the sense agrees.

2. The *sense* of the passages supposed to be lost is still to be found in the Old Testament, though the *words* be not, especially *Matt. ii. ult. John vii. 38.* Yet if it were to be granted, that some of the verses originally belonging to the Old Testament are lost, it would not be at all inconsistent with the truth of our proposition, which only opposes general, material, and designed corruption.

Doddridge's Fam. Exp. in Loc. cit.

S C H O L I U M 3.

It is further objected, that many of the christian fathers complain, that the *Jews* had corrupted the Old Testament, in order to weaken the proofs of christianity from thence.

Ans. *Justin Martyr*, and some others who advance this charge, were only acquainted with some *Greek Versions*, which whether it were the LXX. or not, must be hereafter considered; and believing the divine authority of them, they charge all the variations which are to be found in the *Hebrew*, as the *Jews* quoted it, to be the corruptions of their own: and sometimes they may mean only *false interpretations*.

Collins's Grounds, part ii. c. i, ii, v.

Whiston's Essay, &c. Prop. xii.

Carpzov. Def. Ec. c. ix.

Jones's Crit. Leß. c. iv. § 75—83. MS.

Middleton's Inquiry, p. 41—43.

S C H O L I U M 4.

Nevertheless, we may, consistently with the truth of the proposition, allow, that some alterations have happened in transcribing, many of which were undoubtedly undesigned, because they could answer no imaginable end. Sometimes a very small mistake in a transcriber would greatly alter the sense, as *Psal. xxii. 17.* And it seems, on comparing all the arguments, we may safely conclude, that if there have been any designed alterations in the Old Testament, they must have been made between the time of Christ and the rise of the *Masorites* in the third century; and then the alterations would be of such a kind, as to be prejudicial rather than favourable to christianity: so that whatever arguments in proof of christianity can be brought from the Old Testament, the force of them will not be at all diminished, should we allow some designed variations.

But

But indeed it is not in the nature of things very probable, either that, leaving those important passages which yet remain, they would have corrupted the rest for so little reason, or that, believing (as we are sure they did) the divine original of the scriptures, they would upon any terms have corrupted them designedly, *i. e.* have destroyed what they thought divine, so far as in them lay, to substitute something human in its stead. Compare *Deut. iv. 2. xii. 32. Rev. xxii. 18, 19.*

Hallet on Scripture, vol. ii. p. 109, 110.

PROPOSITION CVIII.

LECT. The history of the New Testament is in the main credible: *i. e.* there is as
CXXIV. great regard to be paid to it, as is due to other histories of allowed character and reputation.

LEMMA TO DEMONSTRATION.

It is reasonable to believe, that the history recorded in the New Testament is in the main agreeable to those facts, which were asserted by the first preachers, and received by the first converts of christianity; for if there had been any remarkable inconsistency between them, those first converts could not have received the books of the New Testament as genuine, which yet we have already proved that they did.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 103. 1. The several books of the New Testament were written by those who were personally concerned in many of the facts they relate, and who had the best opportunities of being informed concerning the most important of those other facts which they have recorded. This especially appears with respect to *Matthew, Peter, John, Paul, and Luke*, at least so far as he wrote of several of *Paul's* journies, in which he himself attended him.

1. 2. The authors of the New Testament were capable of giving us a true account of the facts they have undertaken to record, and if what they have written were false, it must have been a designed forgery; for there is nothing which looks like lunacy in any of their writings: least of all can we imagine, that such a number of madmen could have agreed in so consistent a story.

3. There are the greatest marks of integrity in their writings, both in the simplicity of their style, and the faithful manner they relate circumstances, which might bring reflection on their own character and their master's.

Rollin Man. d'etud. vol. ii. p. 420—426.

4. There are also in their writings, the most genuine traces of a pious and benevolent temper, of a contempt of suffering and death itself, when they might be

be called to meet it in the cause of truth : upon the whole, it seems the design of their writings, to carry virtue in all its branches to the sublimest degree, even beyond what any of the heathen moralists did or attempted ; and so far as we can judge by their strain and manner, they appear like good men, bringing out of the treasure of their hearts good things.

3. 4. 5. Their character seems on the whole such, as may give us a probable expectation, that they would speak the truth to the best of their knowledge ; and there must have been at least some circumstances of strong temptation, to engage them knowingly to deviate from it, especially in points of so great importance, as those which by their writings they were labouring to carry : nor ought we by any means lightly to believe, that persons, whose characters at first view appear so fair and honourable, would engage in a design so much to the dishonour of God and injury of mens souls and bodies, as their's must have been, if their testimony were false ; since they laboured to turn men's devotion into a wrong channel, and to engage the most upright of mankind, and those who were their best friends, in a cause which was likely to ruin both themselves and their families.

6. Considering how incredible their story seemed at the first hearing, and how contrary it was both to the passions and secular interests of mankind, they had no temptation to attempt a fraud of this nature in expectation of any worldly advantage ; but might depend upon such persecutions and oppositions, as many of the first professors of christianity appear to have met with, and as they themselves in their writings tell us they both encountered and expected. See the texts under *Schol.* 4.

5. 6. 7. There is no reason to believe, they would in this instance attempt to impose upon us.

8. The persons to whom they addressed themselves, would be inclined to do their utmost to discover the fraud, if there were room to suspect any ; considering that the doctrines of the first teachers of christianity evidently tended to fix an odium upon the *Jewish* rulers, to destroy peculiar privileges and emoluments both of the *Jewish* and *Pagan* priests, to oppose all the superstitious regard paid to deified emperors, and the idolatries which mingled themselves in their most pompous games and spectacles ; that it poured contempt upon those things, for which the *Gentile* orators and philosophers were ready to value themselves most, and on the whole required such eminent degrees of humility and universal virtue, as were exceeding opposite to that pride and wickedness, which so generally prevailed both among *Jews* and *Gentiles*.

West on the Resurrection, p. 410—428. præf. p. 420—423.

9. A fraud like this, if it were a fraud, might very easily have been detected ; seeing they bore their first testimony in the very place and age, in which Christ is said to have been crucified, and to have risen from the dead : (as appears from what was observed of the early prevalency of christianity in *Judæa*. *Prop.* 101.) and

and as the persons, whose character and interest were chiefly affected by it, had the civil power in their own hands, no doubt the thing would be thoroughly canvassed, and if it had appeared false would have been immediately exposed. Besides, wherever they came, they attested facts of such a nature, as might easily have been discovered on the spot; not merely asserting, that they had seen Christ and some of his followers work miracles, but that they themselves had such a power; nay, that they communicated extraordinary gifts of the Spirit to their hearers, producing so sensible an effect as the speaking languages they had never learnt. *Paul* particularly appeals on this occasion both to the *Corinthian* and *Galatian* churches, and argues with them on these facts, even when his interest among them was beginning to decline: so that on the whole, multitudes must immediately and certainly have known, whether the great facts they asserted were true or not.

9. | 10. Had the story which the apostles told been a forgery, it would no doubt have been quickly discovered, and rejected with the utmost abhorrence.

Prop. 98, & 103. | 11. Nevertheless, it gained a very great degree of credit in *Judea, Greece, Italy*, and other places; and vast numbers of persons, in that very age in which these things are said to have been taught and done, were so fully persuaded of the truth of christianity, that, as it appears from the writings of the apostles to the primitive churches, as well as from other ancient monuments, they cheerfully ventured their estates and lives, upon a confidence of the truth of those facts, which the first preachers of the gospel taught.

2, 7, 10, 11. *Lem.* | 12. Since the writers of the New Testament were neither liable to be deceived themselves in the facts they relate, nor would have been inclined to attempt imposing on the world by such a forgery; and since their history met with that acceptance and success in the world, which without the support of truth it could never have found, there is abundant reason to believe it is true. *Q. E. D.*

Doddridge's x Serm. N^o. ix. per tot.

Gastrel's Christian Rev. p. 250—272.

Burnet's iv. Discourses, p. 27—35.

More's Theol. Works, p. 223—227.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 110—113.

Ditton on the Resurrection, part iii. § 21

—33. *p. 251—278.*

Burnet on the Art. p. 59—64.

Foster against Tindal, p. 135—137.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 304—312.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. CXXV. To the credibility of the gospel history, some have objected our Lord's not appearing in public after his resurrection, which might have been the most effectual method of convincing the *Jews*.—But it may be replied,

1. It is not certain the *Jews* would have been convinced even by this, considering the great obstinacy that people shewed in a variety of instances, in the Old Testament as well as in the New. Compare *John xii. 10, 11.*

2. God

2. God is not obliged to give the highest possible degrees of evidence to any revelation; and those evidences, which the New Testament affirms to have been given, were so considerable, both with respect to the number of witnesses, and the confirmation of their testimony by miracles, that there is no room to complain, merely because one may imagine how the evidence might have been carried yet higher: especially if we consider, how incapable the enemies of christianity seem to have been of producing evidence on the contrary side.

3. As the former obstinacy of the *Jewish* people, and their wicked treatment of Christ, abundantly justifies this conduct of God towards them; so if it were to be granted that they would generally have believed, upon Christ's public appearance among them, it is difficult to conceive, how the prophecies of their rejection for rejecting Christ could have been fulfilled; or that evidence for the truth of christianity preserved, which now arises from the existence of the *Jews*, as a distinct people, with the records of the Old Testament in their hands. On the whole therefore, the conduct of Providence in this affair is to be thankfully adored, rather than censured.

Woolston's 6th Discourse, p. 26—28.

Sykes of Christianity, p. 162—170.

Ditton on the Res. part iii. § 60—67.

Fleming's Christol. vol. iii. p. 494—498.

p. 338—352. § 69, 70. p. 361—368.

Blackw. at Boyle's Lect. Serm. iv. p. 25, 26.

Superville's Sermons, vol. iv. p. 9—12.

Burnet's 4 Discourses, p. 52—56.

Atterb. Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 182—190.

SCHOLIUM. 3.

It is further objected, that there were but very few of the *Jews* who believed in Christ; and considering that they were the best judges of his claim to be the Messiah, there is reason to suspect that the evidences of it were not sufficiently convincing.

Ans. 1. According to the account given in the New Testament, there were some considerable numbers of the *Jews* converted on the first publication of the gospel, and even some who were *priests*, and consequently lay under peculiar prejudices, Vid. *Acts* ii. 41. iv. 4. vi. 7. xxi. 20. and also those texts in the epistles, which evidently refer to the *Judaizing Christians*, and therefore prove that there were considerable numbers of *Jewish* converts.

2. That the *Jewish* nation in general lay under very strong prejudices, especially those arising from their expectation of temporal deliverance and grandeur from their Messiah, the peculiar dignity and privileges of their own nation, the perpetuity of the *Mosaic* law, and the sanctity of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees*, as well as the authority of their dictates in matters of religion, besides those arising from the wickedness and immorality of their own characters in that very corrupt age; so that it is not at all to be wondered at, that they had a very strong aversion to that teacher and religion, which seemed so expressly levelled against those prejudices. To which we may add, that the force of the argument arising from Christ's miracles would be much diminished, considering the notion they had

P p

of

of the power of magic, and the supposition they thought they had some reason to make, that a false prophet might possibly work them, of which there also remain many traces in the rabbinical writings.

3. We are not to conclude that all who refused to embrace christianity remained in their hearts unconvinced; for it is certain that the severity of persecution might engage many, who had not a deep principle of religion, to dissemble the inward conviction of their own mind; as it is expressly declared, many did, *John* xii. 42, 43, &c.

Woolston's 5th Discourse, p. 48.

Whitby's Certainty of Christian Faith,

c. ix. § 9. *ad fin.* p. 276—280.

Burnet's 4 Disc. p. 38—41, 56—58.

Whitby on Rom. ii, 1. *Note b.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is further objected, that the apostles had nothing to lose, and they might at least gain a subsistence, and the fame of being divine messengers by such a forgery.

Ans. 1. They had at least their lives to lose, which the poorest of mankind regard as well as others.

2. That if it could be supposed that persons of such low circumstances and education had the most eager desire of fame, they could not reasonably expect to raise their reputation by such an undertaking, but on the contrary to expose it to the greatest infamy: besides that the simplicity, with which they refer the honour of all they did to their great master, most evidently shews, how far they were from that vain-glorious temper, which the objection pretends to have been so strong in them, *Acts* iii, 12, 13. xiv. 15. 2 *Cor.* iii. 5. iv. 5. 1 *Cor.* iii. 5—7.

3. That if they had been actuated by mercenary views, they might much more easily have raised their fortune, by renouncing the cause they had undertaken, and discovering the forgery they had invented.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 111. b.

| *Limborch Collat.* p. 161—163.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is also objected, that the apostles met with but little persecution among the *Gentiles*: but we answer,

1. That though we acknowledge that the *Romans*, whose maxim it was to tolerate conquered nations in their own religion, were often a refuge to them at first, yet the heathen populace in the several cities of *Greece* and *Asia* to which they came, frequently rose up against them in a tumultuous manner, and exposed them to the extremest danger.

2. That considering how absolutely all pagan superstitions were condemned by christianity, the first preachers of it had great reason to believe, what was indeed fact, that in proportion to the degree in which their doctrines came to be known among the heathens, persecutions would be raised by the magistrates, and

and penal laws enacted against them. (Vid. *Prop.* 101. *Schol.* 3. and *Warburt.* quoted there.)

3. That the number and power of the *Jews* was very great in the apostles days, not only in *Judaea*, but also in other countries; so that upon the whole the persecutions of the primitive christian preachers and hearers were very grievous; as evidently appears from the whole tenour of the New Testament, especially the following passages, *Acts* v. 17, 18, 40. vii. 57—60. viii. 1. ix. 1, 2, 23, 24. xii. 1—4. xiii. 50. xiv. 5, 19. xvi. 22, *Ec.* xvii. 5, 6. xviii. 12, *Ec.* xix. 29. xx. 3. xxi. 27, 28. xxii. 22. xxiii. 14. xxvi. 10, 11. *Rom.* viii. 36. *1 Cor.* iv. 9—13. xv. 29—32. *2 Cor.* i. 8, 9. iv. 8—11. vi. 4, 5, 8, 9. xi. 23—27. *Gal.* vi. 17. *Phil.* i. 27—30. *Col.* i. 11, 24. *1 Theff.* i. 6. ii. 14—16. *2 Theff.* i. 4—7. *2 Tim.* i. 8. ii. 3, 9, 10. iii. 11, 12. *Heb.* x. 32—34. *James* ii. 6. v. 10, 11. *1 Pet.* ii. 19—21. iii. 14.—17. iv. 1, 12—16. *Rev.* ii. 10, 13. iii. 10.

Lardner Cred. l. i. c. viii. præf. p. 225—229, 259—264.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Some may perhaps think, that if such miracles as the christians pretend had really been wrought in proof of their religion, it would have been impossible that it should not have met with an earlier and more general regard in the world.—So far as the *Jews* are concerned in this objection, it has been considered above, and so far as it relates to the *Gentiles* only, it may be answered,

1. That it evidently appears in fact, that many of the pagans had at that time but a very low opinion of miracles, and paid but little regard to them. Mr. *Weston* has entered largely into several causes that might contribute to this; especially the many ridiculous pretences that were made to them by the professors of divination, and the pretences to oracles and magic; to all which the multitude and intercommunity of their gods would not a little contribute.

2. That where any regard was paid to them, (though if there had been a fair and candid examination, it must soon have appeared, that those which were pretended to as countenancing heathenism, were by no means in point of evidence comparable to those by which christianity was supported,) yet the strong prejudices that would lie against it as a *new* religion, and especially as a religion so opposite to men's secular interests and sinful passions, would prevent a careful and impartial inquiry; and so would dazzle their eyes, and make them prone to disregard the gospel, notwithstanding its miracles were allowed.

3. That the great discouragements under which christianity lay, while the empire was in the hands of the pagans, would no doubt engage many to smother the secret conviction of their minds in its favour; but when *Constantine* declared himself a christian, most of the opposition against christianity ceased; which might in many be owing to the dictates of conscience, as being persuaded of the truth of that religion, though in others it might be only a conformity to an establishment.

Weston's Inquiry into the Rejeet. of Christian Miracles, pass. præf. c. iii. p. 17—79.

SCHOLIUM 6.

As for those objections which Dr. *Tindal* has brought against the moral character of the apostles, in some instances, they are circumstantially confuted by Dr. *Foster*, Dr. *Leland*, and others who have written on the other side the question,

Tindal of Christianity, p. 220, 221.

Foster against Tindal, p. 111—132.

| *Leland, ibid. vol. ii. c. ii.*

SCHOLIUM 7.

The objections which Mr. *Woolston* has advanced against several miracles related in the New Testament, in his discourse on the miracles of Christ, have been sufficiently answered by almost all his antagonists; the most valuable of which are Mr. *Stevenson*, Dr. *Lardner*, Mr. *Peirce*, and the author of the *Trial of the witnesses*: an abstract of their most curious and important thoughts may be seen in our notes on the harmony of the evangelists, on those texts which he has excepted against.

PROPOSITION CIX.

LECT.
CXXVI.

Many material facts, which are recorded in the Old Testament, are also mentioned by very ancient heathen writers.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The heathens had a tradition among them concerning the original of the world, which bore some visible resemblance to the account which *Moses* has given of it; particularly the *Phœnicians*, *Indians*, *Egyptians*, *Greeks*, and *Romans*: and though they differ considerably from *Moses*, as to the time of the creation, we have formerly shewn their accounts to be in this respect extravagant and incredible. Vid. *Prop. 21. Dem. gr. 2.*

Cumberland's Sanchoniathon, p. 1—23.

Burnet's Archæol. l. i. c. i—vi. l. ii. c. i.

Ray's 3 Discourses, N^o. i. c. i.

| *Grot. de Verit. with Le Clerc's Notes*, l.

i. c. xvi. p. 26—40.

| *Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 11—17. fol.*

2. The division of time into weeks has long prevailed, not only among the inhabitants of *Greece* and *Italy*, as we learn from *Josephus*, *Philo Byblius*, *Clement Alexandrinus*, and *Lucian*, but also among the *Celtæ* and *Indians*, as *Philostratus*, *Dion Cassius*, and *Justin Martyr* assures us; and which we may further learn from the ancient names of the seven days.

Grotius, ibid. p. 41, 42.

Roll. Hist. Anc. tom. iv. p. 416. French.

| *Selden de Jure N. & Gent. l. iii. c. xvi*

—xxiii. præf. c. xvi, & xix.

3. Dio-

3. *Diodorus Siculus*, *Plato*, *Dicæarchus*, *Calanus* the Indian philosopher quoted by *Strabo*, and others quoted by *Maimonides*, and several other writers mention a state of innocence, and the fall of man; to which it is probable we are to refer what so many writers say of the golden age: nor is it an improbable conjecture, that the worship of serpents, which has prevailed among so many heathen nations, may have some reference to that form, in which *Moses* tells us the tempter appeared to the first human pair.

Grotius, *ibid.* p. 42, 43.

Burnet Arch. l. ii. c. ii, iii.

Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. i. p. 80, 81.

Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 246—248.

Stillington's Orig. Sac. p. 516—518.

Owen on Serp. Diff. iv, v. p. 216—232.

4. The long lives of men in the early ages of the world are mentioned by *Berosus*, *Manetho*, *Hieronymus*, and *Hellanicus*, as also by *Hesiod*, and many other writers quoted by *Josephus*, and afterwards by *Servius* in his notes on *Virgil*.

Grotius, *ibid.* p. 44.

Josephus's Antiquities, l. i. c. iii. § 9.

5. The account which *Pausanias*, *Philostratus*, *Pliny*, and several other writers give us of the remains of gigantic bodies which have been found in the earth, serve in some degree to confirm *Moses's* account of the antediluvian giants.

Grotius, *ibid.* p. 45.

Pliny's Nat. Hist. l. vii. c. xv.

Solinus, c. i. with *Salm. Not.* p. 9.

6. *Berosus*, the Chaldean historian, quoted by *Josephus*, and *Abydenus* by *Eusebius*, *Plutarch*, *Lucian*, *Mela*, *Nicholas Damascenus*, as well as many of the heathen poets, mention the deluge; and some traditions concerning it are to be found among the *Americans* and *Chinese*; not to mention what some modern travellers have fabulously related concerning some ruins of the ark said to remain on mount *Ararat*, and to have been seen there but a few centuries ago.

Grotius, *ibid.* p. 47—52.

Ray's 3 Discourses, N^o. ii. c. i.

Saurin's Diff. vol. i. p. 131—134.

Stillington's Orig. Sac. l. iii. c. iv. § 8.

Universal History, vol. i. p. 112. fol.

We may add under this head, (that we may not break the order of all that follow) that *Alexander Polyhistor* quotes *Artapanus* and *Eupolemus*, as mentioning the tower of *Babel*, and the former speaks of it as built by *Belus*. (*Eus. Præp. Evan.* l. ix. c. xviii.) *Abydenus* likewise (*ibid.* c. xiv.) and *Histiæus* (15.) mention the same building, with something of the circumstances attending the disappointment of that enterprize.

7. *Diodorus Siculus*, *Strabo*, *Tacitus*, *Pliny*, and *Solinus* agree in giving us an account of the destruction of *Sodom* and *Gomorrab*, and the neighbouring cities, in the main agreeable to that of *Moses*: the truth of which is in some measure confirmed by what modern travellers of the best credit have related concerning the

the phænomenon of the dead sea: and *Alexander Trallianus* mentions an heathen form of exorcism, "in the name of the God that turned *Lot's* wife into a pillar of salt."

Tacit. Hist. l. v. c. vii.

Whitby's Cert. of the Christian Faith,
p. 36—39.

Pliny's Nat. Hist. l. iv. c. xvi. l. xxxv.
c. xv.

Solinus, c. xxxvi. with Salm. Not.

Grotius, ibid. p. 58, 59.

Maundrel's Travels, p. 83—85.

Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 576, 577. fol.

8. *Herodotus, Diodorus, Strabo, Philo Byblius*, and some others mention *circumcision*, as a rite used by several of those nations into which, according to *Moses, Abraham* travelled, or which were descended from him, especially by *Hagar* and *Keturah*: and if the hypothesis of a late learned author be admitted, that the *Egyptians* derived it from the *Ismaelite shepherd-kings*, it will be equally applicable to the present purpose. Vid. *Prop. 104. Schol.* and the references there.

Grotius, ibid. p. 59, 60.

| *Saur. Diff. vol. i. p. 246, 247.*

9. *Berosus, Alexander Polyhistor*, (from *Eupolemus* and *Melo*, more ancient writers than himself,) *Damascenus, Artapanus*, and other ancient historians cited by *Josephus* and *Eusebius*, make express and honourable mention of *Abraham* and some of his family, as some of them do also expressly speak of his interviews with *Melchisedeck*. To which we may add the account given of him by *Trogus Pompeius* as abridged by *Justin*: nay *Josephus* tells us, that *Hecataeus* wrote a whole book of *Abraham's* life.

Josephus's Antiquities, l. i. c. vii. § 2.
Justin, l. xxxvi. c. ii.

| *Mill. Prop. of Christian. vol. i. p. 114, 115.*
Eusebius Præp. Evang. l. ix. c. 17—23.

10. Besides the express testimony concerning *Moses, Prop. 104.* which may properly be referred to this proposition, there are also many fabulous stories of *Thoth, Typhon, Hermes*, and others, in which many celebrated writers have endeavoured to prove that such traces of his history are to be found as shew he was the person represented under that variety of names.

Huet. Dem. Evang. Pr. iv. c. iii. p.
49—68.

Dacier on Hor. l. i. Od. x.

Mill. Prop. Christianity, vol. i. p. 167
—169.

| *Wits. Ægypt. l. iii. c. iv. per tot.*

Jackf. Cred. part ii. § 2. c. viii, ix. apud

Op. vol. i. l. i. c. 14, 15.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. l. iii. § 3. p. 354
—358.

11. *Eupolemus* and *Dias*, as quoted by *Eusebius* and *Grotius*, mention many remarkable circumstances of *David* and *Solomon*, agreeing with the Old Testament story; and *Herodotus* has a remarkable though much controverted passage, sup-

supposed to refer to the destruction of the *Affyrians* in the reign of *Hezekiah*, in which he mentions *Sennacherib* by name.

<i>Euf. Præp. Ev. l. ix. c. 30—34, & 39—41.</i>	<i>Millar, ibid. vol. i. p. 123—127.</i>
<i>Josephus's Antiquities, l. viii. c. ii.</i>	<i>Prideaux's Con. vol. i. p. 25.</i>
<i>—contr. App. l. i. p. 1340.</i>	<i>Herod. Hist. l. ii. c. 141.</i>

12. As for the mention of *Nebuchadnezzar*, and some of the succeeding kings of *Babylon*, as well as of *Cyrus* and his successors, it is so common in ancient writers, as not to need a more particular view of it.

1—12. | 13. *Valet propositio.*

S C H O L I U M 1.

It would be very easy to prove, that many passages of the Old Testament are mentioned by *Celsus*, and objections against christianity formed upon them; but he comes too late to be esteemed a witness to them; and all that can be inferred from those passages is, that he had read the Old Testament, probably in the *Greek* version of it, and that he knew *Christians* paid a religious regard to it, neither of which facts are at present in question.

S C H O L I U M 2.

It may not be improper here to mention the monument which *Procopius* mentions as found in *Africa*, testifying “that they had fled from the face of the “robber *Joshua* the son of *Nun* ;” though that coming through the hands of a *Christian* writer, and of one who lived so very long after christianity was introduced, it did not seem so convenient to insert it among the preceding testimonies.

P R O P O S I T I O N CX.

The history of the Old Testament is in the main worthy of credit.

LECT.
CXXVII.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

Prop. 106, 107. | 1. The books of the Old Testament received by the *Reformed*, (of which alone we speak,) are genuine.

1. | 2. Many of the writers of the Old Testament have given us an account of things, in which they were themselves personally concerned, v. g. *Moses*, *Joshua*, *Samuel*, *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, *Ezekiel*, *Daniel*, and several of the minor prophets; and consequently they were capable of giving us a true account of what they represented, as having fallen within their own observation and experience.

3. There

3. There are great marks of integrity in their writings, not only as they tell their very amazing story with great simplicity, and without apology, excuse, digression, &c. but as they every where write with the deepest sense of God upon their spirit, regarding him as the author of all events, whose moral as well as natural perfections they every where celebrate, and in whom they seem to have reposed the confidence of their souls, seeking his favour above all, and referring their actions to his glory: they do also most candidly acknowledge their own faults, and the faults of the greatest heroes of their history; and as for *Moses*, whose credibility is of the greatest importance to support all the rest, his leaving his family in the circumstances of common *Levites*, without entailing any peculiar honours or possessions upon them, is as strong a proof of his uprightness as could well be imagined.

Jackson's Cred. p. 20—38. 4to. apud Op. vol. i. l. i. c. iv. p. 15—28.

3. | 4. There is no reason to believe they would attempt to impose upon us, at least unless we can find that they were under some strong temptation to have attempted it.

5. Considering the time in which their writings were published, and also the public and remarkable nature of many of those events which are there recorded, and how many witnesses there must have been to the fallhood of them if they had been false, they could expect no advantage by attempting to impose upon the world by such forgeries, nor could they have reaped any thing but contempt from it.

Prop. 103. | 6. Nevertheless, we find that their writings were received as credible by those who were the most capable of judging in the case, and those institutions submitted to, (on the authority of these facts) which would otherwise have appeared very unreasonable and very grievous.

2, 4, 5, 6. | 7. There is reason to believe that the history of the Old Testament is true, so far as the authors wrote it upon their own personal knowledge.

8. As for the history of remoter ages, much might be known of it by tradition, considering the long lives of the first men; at least all that was necessary might be learnt by revelation, to which we well know that *Moses* pretended: and there is such an evident and close connection between what was written by *Moses* and other persons mentioned *gr. 2.* upon *their own knowledge*, and what they or others whose names are not certainly known have written in the Old Testament upon *tradition* or *revelation*, that he who believes the former to be credible, will easily admit the latter, especially considering that it is one leading fact of the history, that *Moses* himself was instructed in so extraordinary a manner by God.

Prop. 109. | 9. The agreement there is between many facts recorded in the Old Testament, and the testimony of many heathen historians of considerable note, is a further evidence in favour of its credibility.

7, 8, & 9 | 10. The history of the Old Testament is in the main credible. Q E. D.

Bennet on Scripture, p. 116, 117.

Mill. Prop. vol. i. p. 87, 88, 94—99.

Burnet on the Articles, p. 83.

Still. Orig. Sac. l. ii. c. ii. § 1, 2, 7—

9. c. iii. § 1, 2.

Williams at Boyle's Lect. p. 119—121.

Jenkins on Christianity, part ii. c. iii, vi,

xi. vol. i. p. 132, &c. 151, &c. 296,

&c.

Leland against Tindal, vol. ii. p. 38—42.

SCHOLIUM I.

The great ignorance of those *Latin* and *Greek* writers which now remain, as to facts which happened very long before their own time, and the peculiar contempt which several of them had for the *Jewish* nation, arising from the diversity of its customs and institutions, concur with some other considerations mentioned *Prop.* 99. *Schol.* 2. to answer any objection, which might be raised against the credibility of the Old Testament History, from the silence of such writers as to many important articles of it.

Jenkins's Reasonableness of Christianity, vol. i. p. 95, 96.

SCHOLIUM 2.

We do not particularly mention the supposed absurdities to be found in some parts of the history, because they do not affect the truth of the whole, and will much more properly be considered as objections against its *inspiration*.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless, as we have before proved that it is no absurd thing, that God should make a revelation of some things before unknown; (*Prop.* 93.) and as the main body of the *Jewish* story is taken up in giving an account of such revelations; the proposition must lay a reasonable foundation for our believing that series of *Prophecies*, which will be the subject of the two next propositions.

PROPOSITION CXI.

Many *Prophets* of the Old Testament foretold a variety of events, which it LECT. was impossible they should have foreseen, merely by the force of their natural CXXVIII. genius and sagacity*.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Immediately after the flood, *Noah* foretold the infamy and servitude of the descendants of *Cainan*, and the conversion of several Gentile nations descended from *Japhet*, i. e. the *Europeans*, to the worship of the true God, who stood in a peculiar relation to the *Jews*, as descended from *Shem*, *Gen.* ix. 25—27.

Cumberland's Orig. Gent. p. 247.

| *Whiston's Script. Proph.* p. 104—108.

* The reader may see the most important of these prophecies well illustrated, and their accomplishment very particularly pointed out, in *Dr. Newton's Dissertation on the Prophecies*.

Q 9

2. The

2. The servitude of the *Israelites* in *Egypt*, their deliverance from thence, and the extensive dominion they afterwards obtained, were exactly foretold to *Abraham*, *Gen.* xv. 13—21.

3. The character and fate of the *Ishmaelites* was in the most amazing manner foretold to *Hagar*, *Gen.* xvi. 12. which is accomplished even to this day, as the *Arabians* still remain an unconquered people, remarkable above any other for their fierceness and rapine.

Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. ii. Diff. iv. | *Jackson's Truth of Script.* p. 156—168.
p. 114—152. | *ap. Op.* vol. i. c. 25, 26. p. 115—123.

4. The contests between the *Edomites* and the *Israelites* with the success of them were foretold to *Rebekah*, before her children were born, and afterwards by *Isaac* to his children themselves with some further circumstances, *Gen.* xxv. 23. xxvii. 39, 40.

5. Many remarkable events, not only relating to himself and his family, but the whole *Egyptian* nation were in a wonderful manner predicted by *Joseph*, *Gen.* xxxix—xli.

6. Various surprizing circumstances relating to the settlement of the twelve tribes in *Canaan*, and the occurrences to befall some of them there, were foretold by *Jacob* upon his dying bed, *Gen.* xlviii, xlix.

Sherlock on Propb. p. 341—343. | *Vid. Patrick or Pyle in Loc.*

7. The obstinacy and ruin of *Pharaoh*, the deliverance of the *Israelites* from his kingdom, and their serving God at mount *Sinai* were discovered to *Moses*, *Exod.* iii. 11, 12. not to mention the prediction of each of the ten plagues, immediately preceding the execution of them.

8. Many remarkable circumstances relating to *Israel*, and the neighbouring nations, were foretold by *Balaam*, *Numb.* xxiv. 15—25.

Whiston's Propb. p. 214—221.

9. The various dispensations of God towards *Israel* in future ages, as well as the circumstances of their settlement in their own land, though decided by the contingency of lots, were foretold by *Moses*: and their national revolt from God, their destruction by the *Romans*, with the calamities afterwards attending them, and continuing upon them in part even to this day, have been, and are a most remarkable accomplishment of the express prediction of their illustrious prophet, *Deut.* xxxi. 16, &c. 28—30. xxxii, xxxiii, xxviii. *præf. ver.* 49.

Jackson, ibid. c. 6, 11, 13. p. 131, &c. | *Ap. Op.* vol. i. l. i. c. xxiii. p. 92. c. xxvii
174, &c. | —xxx. p. 123—156.

10. The calamity of *Eli's* family, and the transferring the priesthood to the descendants of *Eleazar*, were foretold by *Samuel* and other prophets, *1 Sam.* ii. 31—36. iii. 11—14.

11. The birth of *Solomon*, his extraordinary prosperity, and that of the *Israelites* under him, together with the settlement of the crown on his descendants, was foretold by *Nathan* to *David*, *1 Chron.* xxii. 8—10.

12. The

12. The revolt of the ten tribes from the house of *David*, was foretold by *Abijah* to *Jeroboam*, before there appeared any probability of it, *i. e.* in the midst of *Solomon's* prosperity, *1 Kings* xi. 29—8.

13. The destruction of *Bethel* and its idolatrous priests was foretold as to be accomplished by *Jeshiah*, who was named on this occasion 360 years before his birth; as well as the destruction of the family of *Jeroboam* for his continual idolatry, as also the captivity of *Israel* beyond the *Euphrates*, then a very distant and very improbable event, *1 Kings* xiii. 2, 3. xiv. 13—16.

14. The famine in *Israel*, their deliverance from the repeated invasions of the *Assyrians*, the death of *Ahab*, and ruin of his family by *Jehu*, with several other events in the reign of *Ahab*, were foretold by *Elijah* and other prophets, *1 Kings* xvii—xxii.

15. The relief of *Samaria*, when pressed by a siege, the exaltation of *Jehu* and *Hazael*, and the victory of *Israel* over the *Moabites*, besides several private and personal events were foretold by *Elishah*, *2 Kings* vii—xiii.

16. The deliverance of the *Jews* from the conspiracy of *Rezin* and *Pekah*, and afterwards the defeat of *Sennacherib*, and the captivity of the *Jews* in *Babylon*, were all foretold by *Isaiah*; as the last event was also by *Jeremiah*, *Hosea*, and many other prophets. LECT. CXXIX

17. The deliverance of the *Jews* from the *Babylonish* captivity as to be accomplished by *Cyrus*, (though an event quite unparalleled in its kind) was foretold by several of the prophets, and particularly by *Isaiah*, who named *Cyrus* many years before he was born, and the very date of that deliverance was fixed by *Jeremiah* to 70 years from the beginning of the captivity. *Isa.* xlv. 24—28. xlv. 1—4 *Jer.* xxv. 11, 12. xxix. 11. *Dan.* ix. 2 *Zech.* vii. 5.

18. The calamities which fell upon the *Tyrians*, the *Sidonians*, the *Egyptians*, the *Ethiopians*, the *Edomites*, the *Moabites*, the *Ammonites*, the *Syrians*, the *Arabians*, and many other nations were expressly foretold by *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, *Ezekiel*, *Amos*, and several other prophets; and above all, the destruction of *Babylon*, with such particular circumstances as are really astonishing, and such a prediction of its utter desolation, as humanly speaking seemed impossible, when the prophecies were delivered, and even long after their publication in the world, considering the greatness and magnificence of that city.

Sykes's Connect. c. viii. p. 139—150. | *Rollin's Anc. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 232—260. *Fr.*

It may be added under this head, that the easy conquest of *Egypt* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, so beautifully described, *Jer.* xliii. 12. and its final abasement, *Ezek.* xxx. 13. are events, considering the extraordinary grandeur of *Egypt* at that time, and the great confidence of its princes, extremely wonderful in their correspondence with that prediction.

Rollin, ibid. vol. i. p. 175—180.

The exact accomplishment of the abovementioned predictions is well illustrated by Dr. *Prideaux* in his *Connection*, and by Dr. *Wells* in his notes on the minor prophets, and many other writers.

19. The succession of the *Assyrian*, *Persian*, *Grecian*, and *Roman* monarchies, several particular circumstances in the history of the *Ptolemaidæ*, and *Seleucidæ*, the persecution of the *Jews* under *Antiochus Epiphanes*, and even the erection of the *Papal* kingdom, are foretold by *Daniel*: *Dan.* ii, v, vii, viii, xi, xii. and that part of them relating to the former article is well illustrated by the writers quoted under the last step, as those relating to the latter are by Sir *Isaac Newton*, in his book on the prophecies; (on which also see *Whiston's* Remarks) and in some measure by *Lowman* on the *Revelations*. See those passages in the several volumes of *Rollin's Ancient History*, which particularly relate to these prophecies, vol. vi. p. 270—280, & p. 289, 290. vol. viii. p. 417—424, 583—600. *Fr.*

20. Those prophecies which relate to the kingdom of the *Messiah*, and the various circumstances which would attend his appearance, are so considerable, that we shall make them the matter of a distinct proposition, and therefore wave the mention of them here.

Sykes's Connect. c. viii.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

If the genuineness and credibility of the books of the Old Testament be allowed, we have here a most certain proof of the divine foreknowledge of future contingencies; since there are some things foretold, which depended as much as any thing we can imagine upon the volition of free agents: and if it be said, as it is by Mr. *Colliber* and some others, that God had determined to render those events *necessary*, and upon that determination foretold them; it is to be considered, that some of the events mentioned above, especially *gr.* 2, 7, 9. are as criminal as any we can imagine, and in some of those instances are foretold by God as crimes, which he would severely punish on those who were the agents in them; which plainly shews that they were not necessarily determined, nor their accountableness in that instance suspended, as Mr. *Colliber* supposes. Where considerable bodies of men are concerned in the prediction, which is the case in some instances above, the difficulty on this hypothesis is still greatly increased; and indeed it is difficult to say how God could determine upon such supposed necessitating influences as fit, unless (contrary to this hypothesis) he foresaw those circumstances that would render them so.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

Such a series of prophecies as is here described is a very evident proof of the peculiar presence of God with the *Jewish* nation, which is further evinced by the many signal miracles wrought in confirmation of it.

C O R O L-

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

The accomplishment of many of these prophecies, and especially of those relating to the christian religion, and to events which happened after the time of Christ, does evidently prove the genuineness and credibility of the books in which they are contained: and it is to be considered as an argument for them independent on those urged before, *Prop.* 107, 108. for none can with the least shew of reason pretend they were forged since Christ's appearance; and it is most evident, that there is such a connection between one part of the Old Testament and another, and such a mutual dependence, that the whole history must in the main be credible, if those parts of it are allowed to be true, in which these prophecies are to be found, especially the books of *Isaiab* and of *Daniel*.

Vid. Sykes ubi supra.

S C H O L I U M.

The arguments brought against the genuineness of the book of *Daniel* are proposed and fully confuted in the following references.

Collins's Lit. Scheme, p. 149—159. | *Chandler's Vind. of Dan. pass.*
Bullock's Vind. p. 181—195.

P R O P O S I T I O N CXII.

To collect the chief of those Old Testament *Prophecies* which most evidently relate to the MESSIAH and his kingdom.

LECT.
CXXX.

S O L U T I O N.

1. It was foretold by many of the prophets, that the knowledge of the true God should be extended from *Jerusalem* over the whole earth; and that pagan idolatry should be entirely or in a great measure suppressed by it, *Psalms* xxii. 27. lxxxvi. 9. *Isa.* ii. 1—5, 17, 18. xi. 9. xlv. 22, 23. *Jer.* x. 11. *Zeph.* ii. 11. *Mal.* i. 11.

Bullock's Vind. p. 73—79.

2. Immediately after the *fall*, as recorded by *Moses*, intimation was given of some person to descend from the woman, so as to be called *her seed*, who should triumph over the enemy that vanquished them, though he should himself receive some damage comparatively small, *Gen.* iii. 15.

Chandler on Miracles, p. 275. | *Collins's Lit. Scheme, p. 231—239.*
Sherlock on Propb. p. 66—83. | *Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. i. p. 47—50.*

3. It

3. It was foretold to *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, that *all nations should be blessed in their seed*: which may naturally signify, that a person to descend from them should be a blessing to mankind. *Gen.* xii. 3. xxii. 18. xxvi. 4. xxxviii. 14.

4. *Jacob* on his dying bed speaks of some victorious person, unto whom the people should be gathered, whom he calls *Shiloh*, declaring that he should appear before *Judah* ceated to be a tribe. *Gen.* xlix. 10.

Sherlock on Prophecy, D. ff. iii. *pass.* | *Mede's Diatribe in Loc.*

5. *Moses* speaks of a prophet like unto himself, who should be raised up with such proof of divine authority, that all who rejected him should be rejected and destroyed by God; which could not refer to a succession of prophets, since it is expressly said none of them were like *Moses*. *Deut.* xviii. 18—20. xxxiv. 10.

Coll. Lit. Scheme, p. 239—262.

Sherlock on Prophecy, p. 187—193.

Jeffries's True Grounds, p. 128—133.

Bullock's Sermon in Loc. or his Vind. p. 220

Harris on the Mess. Sermon. vii. p. 199. | —246.

6. *David* foretels a person, who should be owned by God as *his son*, to whom universal dominion over the heathens should be given, and who should punish with utter destruction all that should refuse to submit to his government. *Psa.* ii. *pass.* He speaks also of an illustrious and victorious person, whom he calls *his Lord*, that should likewise be a priest for ever after the order of *Melchisedech*, *Psal.* cx. and this is probably the same glorious person, whom he else where calls *God*, and of whom he says much more than could be applied to *Solomon*, or any other temporal prince, both with regard to the excellency of his character, and the extent and perpetuity of his kingdom. *Psal.* xlv. *pass.* & lxxii. *pass. pass. ver.* 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17. To which add *Psal.* xxii. 26—31. which if it be allowed to refer to the same event, then the former part will also appear a prediction that this glorious person should suffer, with circumstances remarkably fulfilled in the death of Christ. See also 2 *Sam.* xxiii. 1—7. which relates to the glorious reign of the *Just One* over men, and expresses the final destruction of those that oppose his kingdom, as well as the blessings given by an everlasting covenant to those that should be his faithful subjects.

Grey on the last Words of David.

7. *Isaiah* speaks of an extraordinary child, who should be born of a virgin, of the house of *David*, whose name should be called *Emmanuel*, who should grow up from infancy to manhood, who should also bear many other illustrious titles, which speak him to be more than human; who should be most eminent for wisdom and piety, and finally, who should establish a most successful and permanent kingdom by very peaceful and gentle methods. *Isa.* vii. 14, &c. ix. 5—7. xi. 1—10. xlii. 1—7.

Collins on the Grounds, &c. p. 61—71.

Green's Lett. to Coll. N^o. iv. *pass.*

Candler on Miracles, p. 261—268.

Dod. Fam. Exp. vol. i. p. 39. Note e.

8. God

8. God foretold his purpose of laying a foundation stone in *Zion*, whereby all that trust in him should be saved, when others should find that their shelter was swept away by storms of the divine vengeance. *Isa.* xxviii. 16—18.

9. *Isaiab* likewise foretold an extraordinary appearance of God, which should be attended with the miraculous cure of the blind, the lame, the deaf, and the dumb, and introductory to a state of extraordinary holiness and everlasting joy. *Isa.* xxxv. 3—10.

10. The same prophet also foretold the coming of one, who should from the wilderness prepare the way for an extraordinary divine appearance, and bring tidings of a most gracious and compassionate shepherd. *Isa.* xl. 1—11.

11. *Isaiab* afterwards speaking of a person, to whom the characters, *gr.* 1, 7, 9. do so evidently agree, that we cannot doubt but it is the same mentioned before, adds, that he should be rejected and abhorred of the *Israelites*: and afterwards speaking of a person, to whom the same characters do belong, foretels his being rejected and wounded, mentions his silent submission under his sufferings, and at length his death and burial. *Isa.* xlix. 1—11. lii. *per tot.* liii. 1—9.

<p><i>Collins's Lit. Sch. c. v. § 12. p. 208</i> —220. <i>Bishop Chandler of Christian. p. 178—</i> 194. p. 147—161. <i>Ed. 2.</i></p>	<p><i>Harris's Remarks, pass.</i> <i>Burnet's Life of Rochester, p. 140—143.</i> <i>Bullock's Vind. p. 147—156.</i></p>
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12. Nevertheless, in the same period he prophesies of the exaltation and glory of this remarkable person, and the success of his cause in the world; which evidently implies his resurrection from the dead, *Isa.* liii. 10, 12. See the writers quoted above. In the following chapter he describes a most gracious and important covenant to be made with *Jews* and *Gentiles* by him, and such universal proposals of pardon and grace, as would by multitudes be accepted to their great advantage and complete happiness. *Isa.* liv, lv, *per tot.*

13. He does afterwards in a very pathetic manner describe the wickedness and ruin of the *Jewish* nation, foretels nevertheless its recovery and prosperous state, in the most exalted style, as effected by that *servant of God*, whom he had for that purpose anointed with his Spirit in an extraordinary manner. *Isa.* lix, lx, lxi, & lxx.

14. *Jeremiah* prophesies of a righteous and victorious prince, to be raised up out of the house of *David*, whose name should be called the *Lord our righteousness*; which most naturally implies, that by means of him his people should be made righteous by God through the provision of the divine mercy. *Jer.* xxiii. 5, 6. xxxiii. 14—16.

15. The same prophet evidently speaks of a *new covenant* to be made with *Israel*, which should contain extraordinary provision for divine instruction and the pardon of sin, beyond what had been made by the *Mosaic* religion. *Jer.* xxxi. 31—34. agreeable to the tenour of which it is else-where by this prophet foretold, that a plan of religion should be given to God's people, of which the regard then

then paid to the ark of God, the great center of their ceremonial worship, should make no part, when all the nations of the world should be incorporated with the Jews, and a lasting reformation should be introduced. *Jer.* iii. 16—18.

16. *Ezekiel* speaks of *one great Shepherd*, whom long after the death of *David* he calls by the name of that prince, who should be a means of conferring on his people such blessings as *Isaiah* and *Jeremiah* had before described. *Ezek.* xxxiv. 23—31. xxxvii. 23—26.

17. *Daniel* foretels a glorious *kingdom*, which God would erect on the ruins of the four grand monarchies, under the command of one whom he calls *the son of man*, whose empire though arising from small beginnings should be both universal and eternal. *Dan.* ii. 34, 35, 44, 45. vii. 13, 14.

Sykes of Christianity, c. ii. p. 12—28.

18. *Daniel* afterwards foretels that in seventy weeks, *i. e.* probably 490 years after the going out of the commandment to rebuild *Jerusalem*, which seems to refer to that given in the seventh year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, reconciliation should be made for iniquity, and an everlasting righteousness brought in by one, whom he calls *MESSIAH the prince*, who should be *cut off*, *i. e.* put to death, without any demerits of his own, after which the city of *Jerusalem* should be destroyed, and the sacrifices made to cease: yet not till he had confirmed his covenant with many of his people. *Dan.* ix. 24—27.

Frideaux's Con. vol. i. p. 262—306.

Bullock's Vind. l. ii. c. iv. § 6. p. 184,

&c. præf. p. 216—218.

Collins's Lit. Scheme, c. v. § 8. p. 173

—200.

More's Theological Works, p. 204.

Mann's Dissertation, p. 93—134.

Clarke at Boyle's Lectures, p. 427, 428.

Newton on Prophecy, part i. c. x.

19. *Joel* foretels an extraordinary effusion of the Spirit of God in the latter day, in which all that called on the name of the Lord should be saved, and extraordinary deliverance should be wrought out in mount *Zion* and *Jerusalem*. *Joel* ii. 28—32.

Chandler on Joel, *ibid.* & *Diff.*

20. *Micah* repeats part of *Isaiah's* prophecy of the glorious and peaceful kingdom that God would erect in the latter day, and afterwards expressly mentions *Bethlehem Ephrath*, as the place from whence the ruler should go forth, who should be the illustrious shepherd not only of the *Israelites*, but other most distant people. *Micah* iv. 1—5. v. 2—4.

21. *Haggai* prophesied, that during the time that the second temple was standing, which was not entirely demolished till the *Roman* captivity, (though in *Herod's* time gradually rebuilt) God would *shake all nations*, *i. e.* produce surprising revolutions in them; and *the desire of all nations* should come into his temple;

temple; on account of which the glory of it should be greater than that of the former house, though in external ornaments it were so much inferior. *Hag.* ii. 6, 9.

Pierce on Hebrews xii. 26. p. 190.

Bishop Chandler of Christian. p. 86—

102. p. 71—83. *Ed.* 2.

Literal Scheme, p. 120, &c.

Gill on the Prophets. p. 42.

L' Enfant Introduction to the New Testament. p. 14—16.

Bullock's Vindication, p. 177—180.

Berriman at Boyle's Lectures. vol. ii.

præf. p. 41—48.

22. *Zechariah* twice mentions a person whose name was *the branch*, i. e. probably who had been foretold by *Isaiah* and *Jeremiah* under that character, (*Vid.* *Isa.* xi. 1. *Jer.* xxiii. 5. xxxiii. 15.) on whom the eyes of God should be set with peculiar care, who should build the temple of God, and bear the glory and remove the iniquity of *Israel* in one day, and appear as a priest on his throne, (perhaps in allusion to *Psal.* cx. 4.) restoring under his administration peace and happiness. *Zech.* iii. 8—10. vi. 12, 13.

Lowth in Loc.

23. The same prophet foretells the appearance of a meek prince, who in token of the gentleness of his administration should at *Jerusalem* ride on an ass: he is described as the person who, taking off the *Jews* from their forbidden confidence, should speak peace to the heathen, and erect an universal empire, making a covenant by blood, whereby miserable sinners should be delivered from destruction. *Zech.* ix. 9—12.

Chandler of Christian. p. 102—107.

p. 84—88. *Ed.* 2.

Literal Scheme, p. 143—146.

Bullock's Vind. p. 176.

Sherlock's Fourth Dissert.

24. The same prophet afterwards predicted an extraordinary effusion of the Holy Spirit upon the *Jews*, which should bring them in a bitter manner to lament him whom they had pierced, and should be attended with ample provision made by divine grace for their pardon, *Zech.* xii. 10—14. xiii. 1.

Chandler, ibid. p. 107—115. p. 88—

94. *Ed.* 2.

Literal Scheme, p. 146,—148.

25. *Malachi* speaks of a messenger of the covenant, who should bring the *Jews* to a strict trial; of a sun of righteousness which should arise, and whose appearance should be introduced by a person, who in the language of prophecy is called *Elijah*, i. e. probably one in whom his spirit should eminently appear. *Mal.* iii. 1—4. iv. 2—6.

Chandler, ibid. p. 63—86. p. 52—70.

Ed. 2.

Literal Scheme, p. 113—129.

Bullock's Vind. p. 180—184.

Jeffries on Christianity, p. 351—358.

26. From comparing these prophecies one with another, it appears that they all center in one illustrious person; both as the language in which the deliverance is foretold by several of them is so much the same, and as there is no mention made of a succession of such deliverers, or a plurality, whose kingdom should be extensive and perpetual: to which we add, what we should more largely shew in the *scholium*, that there was a very universal expectation of a Messiah raised in consequence of these predictions.

1—26 | 27. The sum of the whole is this, the prophecies of the Old Testament foretel that there should be a glorious person, descended from *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, who should be born at *Bethlehem*, of a virgin, of the family of *David* then in its decline, before the *Jews* ceased to be a people, while the second temple was standing, and about 500 years after *Ezra's* time; who, though appearing in mean circumstances, should be introduced by a remarkable forerunner, whose business it should be to awaken the attention and expectation of the people: He, (*i. e.* this illustrious person so to be introduced) should himself be eminent both for the piety, wisdom, and benevolence of his character, and the miraculous works he should perform; yet that notwithstanding all this, he should be rejected, and put to death by the *Jews*, but should afterwards be raised from the dead, and exalted to a glorious throne, on which he should through all generations continue to rule, at the same time making intercession for sinners: that great calamities should for the present be brought on the *Jews* for rejecting him, whereas the kingdom of God should by his means be erected among the Gentiles, and diffuse itself even to the ends of the earth, wherever it came, destroying idolatry and establishing true religion and righteousness. In a word, that this great person should be regarded by all who believe in him as a divine teacher, an atoning sacrifice, and a royal governor, by means of whom God would make a covenant with his people very different from that made with *Israel* of old, in consequence of which they should be restored to and established in the divine favour, and fixed in a state of complete and perpetual happiness.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 390—473. | Euseb. Dem. Evang. l. vi—ix.
But. Anal. part ii. c. vii. p. 250—256.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

LECT. CXXXII. From hence it evidently appears, that there was in the divine mind a purpose of raising up a glorious prince, called the *Messiah*, to reign over mankind, and likewise of exciting a great expectation concerning him before he appeared in the world.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

From hence it will appear probable, considering the nature of prophecy in general, together with those express predictions mentioned above, that there might likewise be a reference to the Messiah in some of those passages, in which the prophets speak in *their own person*, and describe extraordinary distress or glory

glory in terms *literally* applicable to the Messiah, (comparing other prophecies) and only *figuratively* to themselves. And it might be the wisdom of providence so to order matters, that many eminent persons in the *Jewish* state should in some matters resemble the Messiah, and many deliverances granted to the *Jews* should represent the great deliverance expected from him. This may be the foundation of *types*, and for what may seem a *double sense* of some prophecies: which double sense is not to be understood, as if a prophecy *equally* and indifferently referred to many persons or events; or as if, *literally* referring to a *lower* person, it was only *figuratively* and allegorically to be interpreted of the Messiah; (for a passage only capable of being *accommodated* to him is not by any means a *prediction* of him :) but it is to be so explained, as that to appear the Messiah was *principally* intended, and the prophecy *literally* referred to him, though it might *in part* be applied to that other person that typified him; and might have been understood as referring to that inferior person *alone*, if further light had not been thrown upon it, by comparing other prophecies, or by the testimony of those whom on other accounts we have reason to regard as authentic interpreters. Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that though the tracing the Messiah in such prophecies as these may serve to illustrate the unity of design, which (as we before observed, *Prop.* 97. *gr.* 5.) is a considerable additional proof of the truth of a revelation, yet the main stress is to be laid upon such prophecies as those mentioned in the proposition, rather than on those in which the prophets personate him. Yet when some of these, (as *Psal.* xvi, xxii, xl, lxix. *Zech.* xi, 12, 13, &c.) are compared with parallel places in the Old Testament and correspondent facts recorded in the New, it is more reasonable to own that the sufferings and death, resurrection and exaltation of the Messiah were chiefly designed in them, than to consider the appeal made to them in the New Testament, as an objection against the truth of christianity: how far they are an objection against the *inspiration* of the New Testament, is a distinct point, and will afterwards be considered in *Prop.* 116. *Schol.* 7.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 205—207.

Jeffries Review, p. 97—109.

Chandler of Mir. part ii. c. vii. p. 255

—273.

Harris's Crit. Rem. 4to, p. 80—83.

Whiston on Propb. at Boyle's Lect. p.

13—29.

Mudge's Pref. to the Psalms.

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

That so many prophecies looking to the Messiah and centering in him, and which at least seem to be fulfilled in *Jesus of Nazareth*, and so naturally tend to promote the christian cause, should yet be extant in the Old Testament, is a plain argument that it is a book of an extraordinary character, and likewise that it has in the main been kept uncorrupted by the *Jews*, though through negligence or design some few passages should be altered; for had they allowed themselves any great liberty with it, they would probably have taken care to destroy or change such passages as have been quoted in the proposition.

COROLLARY 4.

It further appears, especially from the scriptures enumerated in the first step, when compared with several passages in those that follow, that the Messiah is not in scripture represented as a *temporal* deliverer of the *Jews* alone, by whom the Gentile nations were to be enslaved and destroy; but as an universal friend, teacher and benefactor, by whom they were to be brought to true religion and happiness.

Moral Philos. vol. i. 328, 329, 335. | Chapm. against Morg. vol. i. p. 485—493.

COROLLARY 5.

It further appears, as above, that in order to reconcile those prophecies with each other, some of the expressions be taken in a figurative sense; or that what is said of the conquests of the Messiah, or the destruction of the enemies of the *Jews*, must be understood of the punishments to be inflicted upon those who when the *Jews* become subject to him, should rise up against them.

Chapm. ibid. p. 500—515.

SCHOLIUM I.

For the illustration of what has been hinted at *Dem. gr. 26.* it may be observed, that there are several texts in the New Testament, from which it evidently appears, that there was among the *Jews* about Christ's time an actual expectation of the speedy appearance of the Messiah, though too many of them regarded him as a temporal deliverer. *Matt. ii. 2—6. Luke ii. 25, 26, 38. iii. 15. John i. 19—25. vi. 14, 15. x. 24. Luke xix. 11. Acts xxvi. 7.* Some have thought that some traces of such an expectation are also to be found in earlier ages, *1 Mac. iv. 46. xiv. 35, 41, 48. Ecclef. xxxvi. 6, 8, 12—17.* (compare *Luke i. 68—73.*) *xliv. 21, 22. Tobit xiv. 5—7. Baruch iv. 22.* As to the express references to the Messiah in the second book of *Esdra's ii. 42—47. vii. 28, 29.* we waive them, because it is certain that book was either entirely forged or interpolated long after the christian æra.—The many insurrections of the *Jews* about Christ's time, under impostors professing themselves the Messiah, do further shew there was such an expectation among them, which was also common to the *Samaritans*, who apprehended he would be a prophet as well as a king; compare *John iv. 25, 29, 42.*

There are also some remarkable passages, in *Josephus, Philo, Tacitus, Suetonius*, and *Celsus*, which shew that such an expectation prevailed in some degree even among *Heathen* nations: and many have supposed there is a reference in the fourth eclogue of *Virgil*; where there are indeed many things nearly parallel to those of the prophets, in which the glorious reign of the Messiah is described. Such expectations might possibly arise from the dispersion of *Greek* translations of the Old Testament.

As

As for those prophecies of Christ, which are pretended to have been found in the books of *Zerduſht*, (of which none is more memorable than that quoted by *Abulpharagius*;) there is little dependance to be had upon them, considering the uncertainty of the oldest *Persian* manuscripts from whence they are said to be taken, as well as the late date of *Abulpharagius*. Neither can we much depend upon *Confucius*'s pretended prophecy of him among the *Chinese*; nevertheless it seemed not improper to mention them here.

Bishop Chandler Def. of Christian. p.

3—57.

Trav. of Cyrus, vol. ii. Append. part ii.

pass. & p. 127—133, 8vo. p. 300,

&c. 12mo.

Lardn. Cred. l. i. c. v. p. 169—179.

Collins's Literal Scheme, c. i—iv.

Hyde Rel. Pers. c. xxxi. p. 382—386.

Tavernier's Voy. vol. i. p. 484, 485. l.

iv. c. viii.

Confucii Scientia Sinica, Pref. p. 120.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As for the *Sibylline Oracles*, which are said to have been preserved among the *Romans* with so much care, there is great reason to believe they were political forgeries; and it is certain that those which are now extant were forged by some *Christian* writer, after the events there foretold had happened; since those events are much more plainly described there than in any *Jewish* prophet, which we can hardly imagine, especially since the apostle tells us, *Rom. iii. 2.* that the oracles of God were committed to the *Jews*, and never made any appeal at all to the *Sibylline* oracles for the conviction of the *Gentiles*. Yet we allow it very possible, that amongst the collections which were made after the first copies were burnt, some passages might be inserted from *Jewish* writings, (from whom it is certain many things were borrowed by the heathens,) and probably it is to such passages as these, that the earliest of those christian writers alluded, when they mention the *Sibylline* oracles, before the time in which we can suppose those now extant to have been invented.

Whiston Vind. Sib. Or. pass.

Prid. Connect. vol. ii. p. 620—635.

Edwards on Script. vol. i. p. 317—340.

Bishop Chand. Def. p. 10, 11.

Obsop. Sib. Orac. p. 186—192, & 428.

SCHOLIUM 3.

As to the endeavours which have been used to enervate the argument in favour of christianity, drawn from the prophecies mentioned in the proposition, by shewing that they are capable of other senses from which the Messiah may be excluded; see the places referred to as glossed upon by *Collins* in his *Grounds and Reasons*, &c. and the *Literal Scheme*, and the commentaries of *White*, and *Grotius*, who have studied to strain almost all these to some other sense; and some of them in so unnatural a manner, as greatly to establish the interpretation they would oppose.

SCHOL-

S C H O L I U M 4.

The most considerable objection brought against applying these prophecies to the Messiah is, that the prosperity of the *Jews* and their return to their own land is foretold as an event to be accomplished by him; whereas no such event is yet accomplished: see, amongst many other places, *Ezek.* xx. 34—44. xxxvi. 24, 28. xxxvii. 21—28. *Amos* ix. 11—15. *Zech.* xiv. 9—11.

To this (besides what is said *Cor.* 5.) it is answered,

1. That their being rejected for a time is likewise foretold, and their being delivered over to the hands of their enemies. *Vid. gr.* 13, 18.

2. That christians expect a restoration of the *Jews* in the latter days, upon their believing in Christ, *Rom* xi. 11, &c. and none can reasonably pretend, that their restoration is to precede their faith in him.

3. That the preservation of the *Jews* as a distinct people, notwithstanding all their dispersions, leaves evident room for the accomplishment of these prophecies; and is so remarkable a fact especially when their moral character is considered, and so well agrees with the predictions of the Old Testament and the New, as to lay a reasonable foundation of expecting their fullest restoration in God's appointed time.

<p><i>Clarke at Boyle's Lect.</i> p. 431—434. <i>Limb. Coll. cum Judæo,</i> p. 70—72, & 196.</p>	<p><i>Berriman at Boyle's Lect.</i> vol. i. <i>Serm.</i> xi. p. 326—336.</p>
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S C H O L I U M 5.

Whereas some think it strange, that the prophecies which seem most expressly to fix the time of the Messiah's coming, (such as *Gen.* xlix. 10. *Hag.* ii. 6. *Dan.* ix. 26.) are no where urged in the New Testament, it may be answered,

1. That it could not have been made appear, that the period marked out by them was entirely elapsed, during the time in which most of the apostles wrote, the scepter not being quite departed, nor the temple or city destroyed.

2. That it might have exposed the apostles to additional inconveniencies in their work, to have entered nicely into the discussion of some of these prophecies; as some would have engaged them in tedious calculations, of which the common people were not capable judges, and others in civil controversies between them and the *Romans*, which it was prudent as far as possible to decline. Yet it is to be remembered, that Christ, when quoting a part of *Daniel's* prophecy of the seventy weeks, strongly intimates that the whole of it was worthy of special regard, *Matt.* xxiv. 15.

Sykes of Christianity, c. xvi. p. 297, &c.

PROPOSITION CXIII.

JESUS is worthy of being received as a teacher sent from God, with entire credit to all his declarations, and obedience to all his commands. LECT. CXXXIII.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 112. gr. 27. 1. Many of the most remarkable prophecies relating to the person, state, and condition of the Messiah, had a remarkable accomplishment in *Him*: for it appears from the history of the evangelists, that he was born of a virgin descended from *Abraham*, in the decline of the *Jewish* state, a little before the destruction of *Jerusalem* and the second temple by the *Romans*; that he was a most wise, holy, and excellent person, going about for the kindest purposes of instructing men's minds, and healing their bodies, till at last he was put to death by the *Jews* as a malefactor: nevertheless that he was on the third day raised from the dead, and ascended into heaven; from whence he poured forth an extraordinary spirit upon his followers, whereby they were enabled to perform many surprising works, and to propagate the worship of the one God, and the practice of true religion even among many of the remotest nations.— That such things were fact concerning *Jesus of Nazareth*, appears from the whole tenour of the evangelical story, which we before proved to be credible, *Prop. 108.*

Prop. 112. 2. The *Jewish* prophets intermingled with their predictions such encomiums on the person in whom they should be accomplished, and such attestations of his divine mission, as must recommend him to the highest regard and humblest obedience: particularly speaking of him, as God's servant, whom he anointed to publish glad tidings, whom all men should be obliged to hear; as a king, who should finally triumph over all opposition, and should bring a secure and lasting blessing to all his faithful servants. *Vid. Prop. 112. gr. 5, 6, 8, 12, 14—16, 22, 23.*

3. To the former head we may properly add the testimony of *Angels*, and of persons of the most eminent sanctity about the times of his appearing, who are said expressly to have the spirit of prophecy: particularly of *Gabriel* in his message to *Mary*, *Luke i. 32, 33.* and in that to *Joseph*, *Matt. i. 20, 21.* compare *ver. 23. Elizabeth*, *Luke i. 43.* *Mary*, *ibid. ver. 47.* &c. *Zechariah*, *ibid. ver. 68.* &c. the Angel to the shepherds, *Luke ii. 10, 11.* *Simon*, *ver. 29.* &c. *Anna*, *ver. 38.* and *John the Baptist*, *Matt. iii. 13.* *John i. 29. iii. 27—36.*

5. The *Jewish* religion was constituted in such a manner, that there were many institutions in it, which bore so remarkable a resemblance to circumstances relating to Christ in the New Testament, that they could not but in some degree confirm his claim; and shew on the one hand the harmony between the Old Testament and the New, and on the other, how much Christ was the end of both. On this head, the abode of God in the *Jewish* temple, the sacrifices there
pre-

presented, the purifications appointed, and the intercession made by the high-priest were remarkable circumstances, worthy of regard, as some other more particular ceremonies also were, especially those relating to *the paschal lamb*.

Wilfii, Œcon. Fœd. l. iv. c. ix. § 35 | *Lowman, Heb. Rit. part iii. c. iii. p. 360, —58. ad fin.*

5. The New Testament assures us, that Christ was perfectly innocent and good, *Vid. 1. Pet. i. 19. ii. 22. iii. 18. 1 John ii. 1. iii. 5. 2 Cor. v. 21. Heb. iv. 15. vii. 25, 27.* which he also publicly asserted of himself, *John viii. 29, 46.* The imputations thrown on his character appear to have been false and malicious, nor did any of the most inveterate enemies of christianity, particularly *Celsus* and *Porphyry*, deny the innocence of his life. And the silence of *Judas* as to any accusation against him, nay, the express testimony he bore to his innocence, though he so intimately knew his circumstances, and had so strong an interest to have aspersed and ruined his character, is an important illustration of this, which is set in a most just and beautiful light by *Bonar* on the character and conduct of *Judas*.

Yet our Lord declared himself to be such a person as the proposition describes, and solemnly attests the absolute necessity of regarding him as such, *John iii. 18. viii. 12, 24. Luke xix. 24. Mark xvi. 16.*

Chapman against Morgan, vol. i. p. 241. Note.

6. Christ foretold many things which he could not have foreseen by human prudence, which therefore plainly argued a divine revelation of them to him, considering how expressly they were afterwards accomplished. Particularly such as these: His own death, with the various circumstances of it, *Matt. xvi. 21. xx. 18, 19. xxvi. 23, 31, &c. Mark x. 33, 34. xv. 30. John iii. 14, 15. xii. 32, 33.*—His own resurrection on the third day, or, which according to the Jewish manner of speaking was equivalent to it, *after three days and three nights.* (Compare *1 Kings xxiv. 18.*)

Chandler's Witnesses Re-exam. p. 14—16 | Fam. Exp. vol. i. p. 384. Note d.

Matt. xvi. 21. xii. 40. xxvi. 32. xxvii. 63, 64. John ii. 18—21.—His ascension into heaven, *John vi. 62. xx. 17.*—The mission of the Spirit on his disciples to enable them to perform miraculous works, *John xv. 26. xiv. 12. 16, 17, 26. xvi. 7, 13. Mark xvi. 17, 18. Luke x. 18, 19. xxiv. 49. Acts i. 8.* The persecution of his apostles, *Matt. x. 16—22. John xvi. 2. Matt. xxiv. 9, 10.* The manner of *Peter's* death, *John xxi. 18, 19.*—That *Jerusalem* should be destroyed and trodden under foot by the Gentiles; that its destruction should be signified by several remarkable prodigies; that false prophets and false Christs should come; that the temple itself should be entirely demolished; and that unheard-of calamities should befall the Jewish nation, *Matt. xxiv. Mark xiii. Luke xxi.*—And finally, he foretold the extraordinary success of the gospel

gospel in the world over all the opposition it should meet with, *Matt.* xiii. 31—33. xvi. 11. xxiv. 14. *John* xv. 16. compare *Matt.* xxvii. ult.—The accomplishment of all these predictions sufficiently appears from the history of the New Testament, from *Josephus*, and *Eusebius*, and many other unexceptionable witnesses. Amongst whom some heathens are to be reckoned; particularly *Tacitus*, (*Hist.* l. v. c. xiii.) *Celsus*, (*Orig. against Cels.* l. vii. p. 339.) and *Ammianus Marcellinus*, l. xxiii. *sub init. apud Dod.* 10 *Serm.* p. 295. which last reference relates to that illustrious fact of the miraculous interposition of Providence to defeat *Julian's* malicious project of rebuilding the temple at *Jerusalem*, thereby to confute our Saviour's prophecy of its continuing desolate: a circumstance set in the most convincing and beautiful light in *Warburton's Julian*, part i. *pass.* On this head we might also mention Christ's discovering secrets present or past, particularly to *Nathaniel* and the woman of *Samaria*. *John* i. 48—50. iv. 17, 18.

<i>Whitby's Gen. Pref.</i> vol. i. § 12. <i>ad fin.</i>	<i>Clarke at Boyle's Lectures</i> , p. 386—390.
<i>Whitby's Annot. on Matt.</i> xxiv.	<i>Allix Ref.</i> vol. ii. p. 246, 247.
<i>Tillotson's Serm.</i> vol. iii. p. 547—575.	<i>Jenk. of Christianity</i> , vol. i. p. 25, 26.
<i>Limborch Coll. cum Jud.</i> p. 46, 47.	

7. Christ wrought a long series of various, public, and uncontroled miracles; v. g. turning water into wine; feeding thousands with a very small quantity of provision; casting out devils: cleansing lepers; giving sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, speech to the dumb, limbs to the maimed, and in some instances raising the dead; quieting tempests by his command; and at length raising himself from the dead, and ascending into heaven. See the whole history of the evangelists.

<i>Arnob. adv. Gent.</i> l. i. p. 26—31.	<i>Leland against Tindal</i> , vol. ii. p. 81.
<i>Laflant. Instit.</i> l. iv. c. iv.	<i>Chapm. against Morg.</i> vol. i. p. 248—257.

8. Our Lord often made express appeals to these miracles in proof of his divine mission, *John* v. 36. x. 24, 25, 37, 38. xiv. 11. xv. 24. *Mark* ii. 10. *Matt.* xi. 4, 5, 20, &c. *John* xi. 15. which by the way shews how much Dr. *Chandler* is mistaken, in saying that our Lord, in appealing to his miracles, only argues with the *Jews* upon their own principles, as upon the foot of miracles they acknowledged *Moses* while they rejected him.

<i>Chandler on Miracles</i> , p. 36—43.	<i>Chapm. against Morg.</i> vol. i. p. 257—273.
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9. His disciples also wrought miracles in his name, to prove him to be such a person as the proposition describes, expressly declaring that to be the purport of those miracles, *Acts* ii. 32—36. iii. 12, 13, 16. iv. 9—12. *Rom.* xv. 18, 19.

10. Christ was declared to be the Son of God by a voice from heaven, at his baptism, and his transfiguration, and in effect again afterwards, i. e. a little before his death, *Luke* iii. 22. *Matt.* xvii. 5. 2 *Pet.* i. 17, 18. *John* xii. 28.

11. The proposition is farther illustrated by the new star which appeared at his birth, the angels which brought the tidings of it, the prodigies attending his death; among which, the darkness said to be mentioned by *Phlegon*, and the rending the rock, (the marks of which are still said to remain,) are particularly worthy of consideration.

Whiston, Sykes, and Chapm. of Phleg. Testimony. | *Maundrell's Travels, p. 73, 74.*
Fleming's Christol. vol. ii. p. 97, 98. | *Sandys Travels, l. iii. p. 164.*

To which may be added his visible ascension, and his glorious appearance to *Paul* at his conversion, as well as to *John* in the island of *Patmos*, in a form so nearly resembling that, in which God manifested himself to the prophets of old. Compare *Ezek. i. 26—28. Dan. vii. 9.* with *Rev. i. 13, 15.*

Pilkington's Harm. Diff. i. § 21.

1, 2 & 3, & 5 & 6, 7, 8 & 9 & 10 & 11. | 12. Seeing that Christ was described in the Old Testament prophecies, and represented under its types, as a person worthy of the highest regard; seeing prophetic persons renewed this testimony at the time of his appearance; seeing he whose character was perfectly innocent and holy declared himself to be so, and God bore witness to it, by the prophetic gifts he gave him, and other miraculous powers wherewith he endued both Christ and his disciples, as well as by a voice from heaven, and by so many extraordinary interpositions to attest his mission; considering also that miracles have been already proved to be an evidence of divine revelation; (*Vid. Prop. 94.*) we have just reason to believe that the revelation which Christ made was divine, and that he is without reserve to be credited in all he has asserted, and obeyed in all he has commanded. Q. E. D.

Baxter's Works, vol. iii. p. 70. vol. ii. p. 114—155. | *Blackw. at Boyle's Lect. Sermon. vi. p. 66—73, 78—81.*
Fleetwood on Miracles, p. 144—155.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

LECT. CXXXIV. Considering how much the evidence of christianity depends upon the Old Testament, there is great reason to admire the wisdom and goodness of Divine Providence in preserving the *Jews* as a distinct people, dispersed almost all over the christian world; and thereby adding force to the arguments taken from those sacred books, beyond what they could otherwise have had. Compare *Prop. 112. Schol. 4.*

Speclator, vol. vii. N^o. 495. | *Dod. x. Sermon. N^o. x. p. 277—279.*
Burnet's four Discourses, p. 8—10. | *Lardn. 3 Disc. on the State of the Jews.*

C O R O L-

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

Considering how much the arguments drawn from Christ's predictions of the destruction of *Jerusalem* is illustrated by the writings of *Josephus*, it is also to be acknowledged as an extraordinary providence, that this author was preserved in such a variety of extreme dangers, and that his excellent writings are come down to us so entire; in which we have a more particular account of the desolation of his country, than of any other war of which we read in ancient history.

<i>Burnet's 4 Discourses</i> , p. 10, 11.		<i>Benson's Prop. of Gosp.</i> vol. i. p. 193—
<i>Jos. Bell. Jud.</i> l. iii. c. vii.		195.

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

The *time* in which Christ appeared was peculiarly proper on many accounts; considering that it was marked out by some of the prophecies quoted above, that the vanity of other attempts for reforming the world had been sufficiently tried, that the world was in a peaceful state, and the cessation of the extraordinary gifts of prophecies and miracles in the *Jewish* church, for some preceding ages, would make the appearance of a person so remarkably endowed with them the more honourable and the more remarkable.

<i>Flem. Christol.</i> vol. ii. p. 414—436.		<i>Jenk. Reas. of Christian.</i> part ii. c. 23.
<i>Tillotson's Sermon</i> , vol. ii. p. 462, 463.		vol. ii. p. 387—398.
<i>Harris's Crit. Diff.</i> 4to, p. 166—170.		<i>Law's Considerations</i> , part ii. præf. p.
<i>Foster's Sermons</i> , vol. ii. N ^o . vii.		126—154.
<i>Infancy of the World improper season</i> , &c.		

S C H O L I U M 1.

To say that the miracles referred to in the proposition were performed by *magic*, is very unreasonable: since on the one hand, there is no reason to believe that men of such an excellent character, as Christ and his apostles appear to have been, would have acted in confederacy with wicked spirits, or that these would have lent their aid to advance a cause which had so direct a tendency to destroy their own kingdom; nor can we on the other hand believe, that God would have permitted such things to have been done in consequence of such a confederacy, without interposing with miraculous evidence on the contrary side of the question, seeing these doctrines were far from being so evidently absurd, as to be incapable of being confirmed by miracles.

<i>Whitby's Comment.</i> vol. i. Pref. p. 20.		<i>Blackwell at Boyle's Lectures</i> , p. 73—78.
<i>Turret Loc.</i> 13. Quest. ii. § 19.		

S C H O L I U M 2.

If we should grant (as many have maintained, though they have not been able to prove it) that the case of those who are called *Demoniacs* in the New Testament,

tament, was nothing more than common *madness* or *epileptic* disorders, the cure of these by merely speaking a word would be as true a miracle as casting out devils: but how far this would be reconcileable with the honour of the authors of the New Testament, in the report they have made of these miracles, will be considered at large hereafter, *Prop.* 161. *Schol.* 1.

S C H O L I U M 3.

That the miracles wrought by Christ were on the whole superior to those of *Moses*, is shewn by a large and beautiful comparison of them, in

Limberch Collat. p. 131, 132, 151—158.

S C H O L I U M 4.

The *cessation* of oracles among the heathens, might have been justly added under the eleventh step, could it be proved to satisfaction (as perhaps it may), on the one hand, that there was any thing supernatural in them, and on the other, that they did cease at the time of Christ's appearance. But as this is matter of controversy, it seemed sufficient to have touched upon it here, referring it to further examination in a more proper place. But if granted, it is not a consideration proper to shew the suitableness of the time of Christ's appearance; since it might as well have followed upon it, had that appearance been sooner or later. *Cor.* 3. *Prop.* 161. *Schol.* 2.

Atterbury's Sermons, vol. i. *Serm.* iii. p. 120, 121.

S C H O L I U M 5.

LECT. Several heathen writers, and especially *Hierocles*, whose book *Ensebius* has answered, and *Philostratus*, endeavour to bring the miracles of Christ, into disgrace by comparing with them, and preferring to them those of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, of whom it may be proper here to give a short account.—He is said to have been a *Pythagorean* philosopher, contemporary with Christ, remarkable for his temperance and many other virtues. It is said he claimed and exercised an extraordinary power of speaking all languages, and performing all miracles, equal to those which are ascribed to Christ, not excepting even raising the dead. He is also said to have transported himself into the air from one place to another, and at last to have ascended into heaven; and afterwards to have appeared to the emperor *Alexander*. To this story it may be objected,

That according to the account which *Philostratus* gives of the manner in which he was furnished with the materials of his history, the facts must be very uncertain; for he tells us that *Apollonius* had been dead or translated an hundred years before he wrote, and that his history was compiled partly from the commentaries of one *Damis*, which were never published, but given to *Philostratus* by the empress *Julia* as secret memoirs, without any evidence of their being genuine; and partly from the writings of *Maximus Egiensis* and *Meragoras*, the former of which only wrote a few particulars, the latter was, according to the character

acter *Philostratus* himself gives of him, a very fabulous and romantic writer. He does indeed add, there were some monuments of some of these facts; but places them in distant countries, as *India* and *Ethiopia*, where no writers pretend to have found them: and as for the letters of *Apollonius* himself, he owns they related not to his miracles, but to the curiosities of the countries through which he had travelled: so that had *Philostratus* himself been ever so honest, and his design in writing ever so good, it is difficult to see what satisfaction he could have had himself, or have given his readers as to any of those facts.

2. The manner in which *Philostratus* has written his history, gives us but an ill idea of his own character, and lays a foundation for great suspicion; for it is very affected, extravagant, and most unlike the beautiful simplicity of style which is observable in the New Testament, full of an ostentation of learning, and discovers a disposition to aggravate all facts to the utmost, which might tend to the reputation of his hero.

3. Many of the miracles which *Philostratus* ascribes to *Apollonius* were according to him done in secret, or before very few witnesses, or were self-contradictory, and others were vain and foolish; not a few appear to have been borrowed from the history of the evangelists, and applied to *Apollonius*, with the change of a few circumstances.

4. The occasion of writing his book, seem to have been the author's desire to ingratiate himself with *Julia* the wife of *Severus*, and with *Caracalla* the succeeding emperor, by detracting from christianity, to which they had both a great aversion.

5. The story so soon died, and the disciples of *Apollonius* were so few, that there is little reason to believe he was so extraordinary a person as *Philostratus* represents, especially since none of his followers pretend to have received from him a power of working miracles.

6. It has also been answered, that should the truth of this most incredible story be allowed, no certain argument could be brought from thence against the credibility of the gospel; since *Apollonius* did not profess to work his miracles in confirmation of any doctrine contrary to any inconsistent with it. Yet, after all, the truth of the story would so far derogate from the honour of christianity, though it does not directly oppose it, that it is most reasonable to rest the stress of the answer on the remarks under the preceding heads.

Tillemont's Life of Apollonius and Jenkins's Observations.

Smallbrook against Woolston vol. i. p. 16—18.

Whitby Com. vol. i. Pref. p. 19.

Fleetwood on Miracles, p. 249—256.

Kidder on the Messiah, part i. p. 63—64.

Jackf. Cred. l. i. part ii. § 3, c. xi. apud *Op.* vol. i. l. i. c. xvii. p. 65—68.

Weston's Rejection of Mir. &c. c. iv. p. 94—110.

L' Histoire des Empereurs, par M. Crevier, vol. vii. l. v. § 5.

Ancient Universal History vol. vi. l. iii. c. xix. p. 691—698. fol.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Some of the same remarks may be made on most of the miracles which heathen writers mention as performed by *Æsculapius*, *Adrian*, *Vespasian*, and others. The pretended number of them was small, the evidence very uncertain, most of them being reported by distant hear-say, and some others of them connected with circumstances, which would render it a dangerous thing to examine into them: so that upon the whole, the wisest of the *Heathens* themselves did not appear to believe them. Or if it should be granted they were facts, since they were not wrought in confirmation of any proposition, the evidence of christianity would not be impaired by them. On the contrary, as some of the most credible among them were signally subservient to the intended vengeance of God upon the *Jews*, taking them in all the circumstances, they give additional evidence to christianity rather than detract from it. As for any extraordinary facts ascribed to the *Philosophers* in *Enapius*, the distance of time in which he wrote, and the uncertainty of his information, sufficiently obviates any argument to be drawn from them: they probably were the effect of the same enmity to christianity, which engaged *Zosymus* to throw so many slanders on those great men who professed it.

<i>Huet. Dem. Pr. ix. c. 142. § 5—12.</i>	<i>Gastr. at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. p. 280—286.</i>
<i>Whitby ibid. vol. ii. Preface p. 26.</i>	<i>Fleetwood on Miracles p. 239—249.</i>
<i>Suetonius Vesp. c. vii. Pitisc. in Loc. Et c. v.</i>	<i>Jenkin's of Christian. vol. i. p. 29.</i>
<i>Spart. Hist. c. xxv. op. Pitisc. p. 957.</i>	<i>Jackson's Cred. ubi sup. p. 131—139. apud Op. l. i. c. 23. vol i. p. 92—97.</i>
<i>Jos. Ant. l. viii. c. ii p. 257, 258.</i>	<i>Pitisci Lex. Ant. Rom. in Verb. Ager, vol. i. p. 416.</i>
<i>Col. Ed. l. viii. c. ii. § 5. p. 339.</i>	<i>Weston's Rejeet. p. 45—49, 110—112.</i>
<i>Huds. Ed.</i>	
<i>Grotius de Verit. l. iv. c. viii.</i>	

How extremely difficult it was for the most artful and bold impostor to secure to himself the reputation of a prophet, and any general regard to pretences of working miracles, may also further appear from the story of *Alexander*, in the *Pseudomantis* of *Lucian*; which is an admirable contrast to that of *Christ* and his apostles, and as such is compendiously represented with great force in

Lyttelton's Obs. on St. Paul, p. 62—67. | Anc. Univ. Hist. vol. vi. p. 646. fol.

SCHOLIUM 7.

The miracles of the church of *Rome* hardly deserve any mention upon this occasion; many of them being ridiculous tales, according to their own historians, others of them being performed without any credible witnesses, or in circumstances where the performer had the greatest opportunity for juggling: and it is particularly remarkable, that they are hardly ever wrought where they seem

seem most necessary, *i.e.* in countries where those doctrines are renounced, which that church esteems of the highest importance.

Kidder of the Messiah, part i. p. 59—62. | *Brevint's Saul and Samuel at Endor, c. iii.*
Tillot's. Serm. vol. iii. N^o. 117. p. 511. | *præf. p. 52—60.*
 —513. | *Douglas's Criterion.*

PROPOSITION CXIV.

The system of *doctrines* delivered to the world in the *New Testament*, is in the main worthy of being received as *true and divine.*

LECT.
CXXXVI.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 108, 113. 1. Many important doctrines contained in the New Testament, were taught by Christ in his own person, and reported by the apostles as spoken by him; now we have already proved that he was worthy of universal credit, and that their testimony of facts deserves great regard.

2. The apostles received from Christ the promise of extraordinary divine assistance in the discharge of their office and ministry; which must at least extend to the furnishing them with the knowledge of all necessary truth, and preserving them from gross and dangerous mistakes: *John* xiv. 16, 17, 26. xv. 26, 27. xvi. 13. xx. 21—23. *Matt.* x. 19, 20. *Luke* xii. 11, 12. xxiv. 49. *Acts* i. 4, 5.

3. The Holy Spirit was in a visible manner poured out upon the apostles on the day of *Pentecost*, in consequence of this promise; and they professed to have received such assistance from him, as empowered them to declare the mind and will of Christ as authorized interpreters of it, and to challenge a regard to what they said as to a message from heaven. *Acts* ii. *pass.* *1 Cor.* ii. 9, 10, 12, 13, 16. vii. 40. xiv. 37. *2 Cor.* ii. 10. iii. 5, 6. *1 Thess.* iv. 8. *Gal.* i. 11, 12, 15—17. Compare *1 Cor.* xi. 23, &c. *Eph.* iii. 5. *1 Pet.* i. 12. *2 Pet.* iii. 2, 15, 16. *1 John* iv. 6. To which we may add all the passages, in which the gospel taught by the apostles is called *the gospel of God*, *2 Cor.* xi. 7. *1 Tim.* i. 11. *et sim.* as also *Eph.* iii. 7—11. *Gal.* ii. 8, 9. and all those passages, in which the *gospel dispensation*, as declared in the discourses and writings of the apostles, is represented as vastly superior to the *Mosaic law*, of whose divine authority nevertheless the apostles speak (as we shall afterwards see at large) in such strong terms. Vid. *Prop. 118. gr. 12.*

4. There is a great deal of reason to believe that this was not merely an empty boast, or a mistaken conclusion of their own; considering, not only the general probability of the thing, that after Christ had taught a doctrine introduced by such extraordinary circumstances, some extraordinary care should be taken in transmitting it, but also the excellent character of the persons themselves, and the miracles which were performed and the prophecies which were delivered by them, some of which have already had a remarkable accomplishment, especially those

those relating to the *apostasy of the latter days*, and the arising of the *man of sin*, i. e. the papal kindom; not to mention the whole book of the *Revelations*. Vid. 1 *Tim.* iv. 1—3. 2 *Thess.* ii. *pass.*

Newton on the Proph. part ii.

Benson's Diff. on the Man of Sin.

Nath. Tayler of Faith, p. 105—109.

Duchal's Sermon. N^o vii.

5. The primitive christians, who professed to have received their religion from the apostles, and who expressed the highest regard for the authority of their writings, (as will be more fully shewn in the following proposition) were attended with a remarkable power of working miracles, which continued in the church for more than an hundred years after the apostles time.

Irenæus c. ii. § 31, 32, 56, 57. c. v. § 6. *ap.*

Chapman's Euseb. vol. i. p. 305.

Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. v. c. vii.

Cyprian. ad Demet. p. 191.

Tertull. ad Scap. § 4.

Just. Mart. Apol. N^o i. *ap. Op.* p. 45.

Just. Mart. Dial. with Trypho. *ap. Op.* p. 258. *Paris.*

Orig. contra Cels. p. 124.

Minut. Felix, c. xxvii.

Tertull. Apol. c. xxiii.

Reeves's Apol. vol. ii. p. 136. *Note.*

Whit. Com. vol. ii. *Pref.* § 20. p. 26—30.

6. God appears to have borne witness to the truth of christianity, by the extraordinary *success* which attended it, and by the support which was given to those who endured martyrdom for it. This success of the gospel appears wonderful indeed, if we consider on the one hand, how speedy and extensive its progress was, and on the other, what opposition was made to it from the prejudices of education, from the corrupt affections of men, which would render them exceedingly averse to so humbling a scheme, and so strict a system of morality. To this may also be added the candour with which the whole scheme was laid open at once, not excepting those parts which might give the greatest disgust, the want of the advantage of human literature, and other recommendations of a secular nature on the side of the persons by whom it was preached, the wit and eloquence which were engaged against it in so polite an age and country, and the terrors of persecution which were so early armed for its utter extirpation: that such exquisite torments, as were often inflicted on *Christians* in these times should be supported by the youngest and weakest with such patience and joy, and that the christian cause should be promoted by them, seems evidently to prove, not only that the sufferers had convincing evidence of the truth of the gospel, but likewise that God was present with them in so remarkable a manner as to acknowledge their cause for his own.

Bennet of Inspiration. p. 128.

Addison's Works, vol. iii. p. 314—317.

Eus. Eccles. Hist. l. v. c. i, p. 202, 203, 208. l. iv. c. xv. p. 163. l. viii. c. vii.

Atterb. Sermon. vol. i. N^o iii. p. 95—127.

Whitby's Certainty of Christian Faith, c. vi. p. 140—160.

Burnet's four Disc. p. 37—48.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 225, 226.

West's Observ. on Christ's Resur. p. 410—435.

1—6. | 7. Since so much of the system of doctrines delivered in the New Testament came from Christ's own mouth, and the apostles were so well furnished for acquainting us both with them and other particulars; since such a testimony was borne to them both by the effusion of the Spirit upon them, and the miracles wrought by them and succeeding *Christians*, and by the extraordinary success of that doctrine they taught; there is great reason to believe and admit it as a system of divine truth. Q. E. D.

C O R O L L A R Y.

When it is considered how very large a part of this argument is derived from the testimony of *Paul* and his writings, it will appear that his extraordinary conversion was a circumstance most wisely adjusted by Providence; as on the other hand, what relates to him contains a compendious demonstration of the truth of christianity; as is largely and excellently proved in

Lyttelton on the Conversion of St. Paul, pass.

S C H O L I U M 1.

Though it must be acknowledged, that traditional testimony is in some degree weakened by passing through a succession of hands, and on that account the evidence of christianity must in some degree diminish with time; yet that may be balanced by the accomplishment of prophecies referred to *gr.* 4. as well as by growing observation on other parts of the internal evidence. Vid *Prop.* 97. *Schol.* 2.

Sharp's Sermons, vol. i. p. 218—224. | Warburton's Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 1, 2.

S C H O L I U M 2.

It is most evident that the extraordinary progress of the *Mahometan* religion in the world, is a fact by no means comparable to the propagation of *Christianity*, considering the different genius of it and the different methods by which it was effected.

Limborch Collat. p. 136, 137.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 75.

Barrow's Works, vol. i. p. 375, 376.

Sale's Koran, p. 25, 409, 410.

*Prideaux Lett. to the Deists, § 1, 5, 7. apud
Life of Mahomet.*

Atterb. Serm. vol. i. N^o. iv. p. 126, 127.

S C H O L I U M 3.

It is urged, that *martyrdom* is no argument of a person's being in the right; since there have been martyrs of all religions, and enthusiasts have died for notorious errors with the greatest readiness and zeal.

Ans. It shews at least that people are *persuaded* of what they die for: and the thing for which the primitive christians suffered was not a point of speculation,

lation, but a plain matter of fact, in which (had it been false) they could not have been mistaken.

Burnet's History of his own Times, 8vo. vol. ii. p. 888—890.

S C H O L I U M 4.

The power of working miracles in the christian church was pretty universally ceased before *Chrysostom's* time. As for what *Augustine* says of those wrought at the tombs of the martyrs in his time and some other places, the evidence is not always so convincing as might be desired in facts of such importance. But we are not to wonder that miracles are generally ceased; seeing if they were to be frequently repeated for many succeeding ages, they would lose much of their convincing power, and so would be less capable of answering the end proposed by them.

August. de Civit. Dei, l. xxii. c. viii.

Arnobius, l. i. p. 27.

Lactant. Instit. l. ii. c. xv. l. iv. c. xxvii.
l. v. c. xxi.

Burnet's 4 Disc. p. 58—60.

Tillotson's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 509, 510.

Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 484—488.

Jurieu's Past. Lett. p. 605—661.

S C H O L I U M 5.

Though we ought not to be over credulous in believing stories of miracles wrought in our own days, yet it would be a very groundless presumption to say, that God never does nor will work them. We are not judges of what it is fit for him to do; and where facts appear with such evidence as would be admitted in other cases, it seems very unreasonable to reject it here.

Account of Maillard's Mirac. Cure. | *Calamy's Life of Baxter*, vol. i. p. 400, 401.

D E F I N I T I O N LXXII.

LECT. Any *supernatural* influence of God upon the *mind* of a rational creature, CXXXVII. whereby he is formed to any degree of intellectual improvements, to which he could not or would not in fact have attained in present circumstances in a natural way, is called in general DIVINE INSPIRATION.

D E F I N I T I O N LXXIII.

That is called in general AN INSPIRATION OF SUPERINTENDENCY, in which God does so influence and direct the mind of any person, as to keep him *more* secure from *error* in some various and complex discourse, than he would have been merely by the use of his natural faculties.

COROL.

COROLLARY I.

A book may be written without any error at all, where yet there is *no* superintendent inspiration, if the nature of the subject, and the genius of the man be such, as to be capable of such a composition.

COROLLARY 2.

A book may be written by assistance of such an inspiration, in which there are *some errors*, provided they be *fewer* than in a course of nature must have been expected.

DEFINITION LXXIV.

PLENARY SUPERINTENDENT INSPIRATION is such a degree of inspiration, as excludes *any mixture of error at all* from the performance so superintended.

COROLLARY I.

A book, the contents of which are entirely true, may be said to be written by a *Plenary superintendent inspiration*, even though there are *many* things contained in it, the truth of which might have been known and recorded *without* such extraordinary assistance, if there are *others* which could not; or if on the whole, a freedom from all error would not otherwise have been found there.

COROLLARY 2.

A book may be written by such a superintendent inspiration, in which there are many imperfections of *style* and *method*, provided the whole contents of it be *true*, and the subject of it so important as would make it consistent with the divine wisdom thus to interpose, to preserve that entire credibility.

DEFINITION LXXV.

AN INSPIRATION OF ELEVATION is said to take place, where the faculties act in a *regular* and (as it seems) a common manner, yet are *raised* to an extraordinary degree; so that the composition shall upon the whole have more of the true sublime, or pathetic, than natural genius could have given.

COROLLARY I.

In many cases, it may be impossible to judge how far this inspiration may take place; since it is so difficult to know how far natural genius may extend, or how far corporeal causes may work upon the animal frame, so as to produce a performance greatly above the common standard.

T t 2

COROL-

*He, in his general Preface has distinguished the
of Suggestion, which was more especially peculiar to
Prophecy, and the Inspiration of Direction, which was more approp-
riate to the Hagiographer. He has some admirable remarks
on the relative merits of these two kinds of Inspiration.*

COROLLARY 2.

There may be such an inspiration as this, where there is none of superintendency, and much less any that is plenary.

DEFINITION LXXVI.

INSPIRATION OF SUGGESTION takes place, when the use of the faculties is superseded, and God does as it were *speaking directly to the mind*, making such discoveries to it as it could not otherwise have obtained, and dictating the very words in which such discoveries are to be communicated, if they are meant as a message to others.

COROLLARY 1.

There may be a *plenary superintendency*, where there is neither the inspiration of elevation nor suggestion.

COROLLARY 2.

Where there is an inspiration of *suggestion*, we may depend upon the certain truth of what is so suggested; for it is not to be imagined that God would dictate or declare a falsehood to any of his creatures, considering the veracity of his own nature: and we may also conclude there will be a plenary superintendency of direction in *reporting* it, if such superintendency be necessary to the exactness of that report; for it seems inconsistent with the divine wisdom to suppose, that God would suffer an inspired person to err through natural infirmity, in delivering a message with which he has been pleased so expressly to charge him.

Doddridge Fam. Exp. vol. iii. N^o. iii. p. 38—42.

SCHOLIUM 1.

All the kinds of inspiration which have been described above are possible to the almighty power of God; since there is nothing in any of them contradictory to itself, or which appears contradictory to any of the divine perfections.

SCHOLIUM 2.

There may be various ways, whereby God communicates himself to his servants in the inspiration of *suggestion*: he may sometimes do it by immediate *impressions* on the *mind*, at other times by *sounds* formed in the air, or by *visible appearances*, in which the volition of some created spirit may or may not intervene.

Essay on Inspiration, p. 29—97.

Tillotson's Sermon, vol. ii. N^o. ii. p. 16, 17.

Candler on Joel, Diff. p. 108—123.

SCHOL

SCHOLIUM. 3.

Some have thought it improper to distinguish between *divine* and *diabolical* inspiration; seeing on the one hand an evil spirit can suggest nothing without a divine agency to render its volitions effectual, *Prop. 32.* and on the other hand, God's raising a thought immediately in the mind is no argument that it is true, unless he appears to interpose so as to give testimony to it.—But we answer, that allowing but these, an important distinction is to be kept up between what God does as *his own act*, and what he does merely in the general course of his operations, in giving efficacy to the volitions of his creatures. A regard to the common usage of speech, and likewise to the language of scripture, as far as that is to be considered, will require us to maintain this distinction, even while we acknowledge a dependence of all inferior agents upon God, and his constant interposition to carry on the designs of his providence, amidst the greatest opposition which evil spirits are making to them, *Prop. 32. Schol. 3.*

Vandale de Orac. p. 9—12.

| *Baxter Works, vol. ii. p. 100.*

PROPOSITION CXV.

To collect some testimonies of the *primitive Fathers*, expressing their sentiments concerning the *inspiration* of the New Testament.

LECT.
CXXXVIII.

SOLUTION.

1. *Clemens Romanus* says, “that the apostles preached the gospel being filled with the holy spirit: that the scriptures are the true word of the spirit, and that Paul wrote to the *Corinthians* things that were true by the aid of the Spirit.”
2. *Polycarp* tells the *Philippians*, “that none could attain the wisdom of Paul, by which he wrote to them.”
3. *Justin Martyr* says, “that the gospels were written by men full of the Holy Ghost, and that the sacred writers spoke by inspiration.”
4. *Iraeneus* says, “that all the apostles received the gospel by divine revelation as well as Paul, and that by the will of God they delivered it to us as the foundation and pillar of our faith: that the scriptures were dictated by the Spirit of God, and therefore it is wickedness to contradict them, and sacrilege to make any alteration in them.”
5. *Clemens Alexandrinus* says, “that we that have the scriptures are taught of God; that the scriptures are established by the authority of God; that the whole scripture is the law of God, and that they are all divine.”
6. *Origin* says, “that the scriptures proceeded from the Holy Spirit: that there is not one tittle in them but what expresses a divine wisdom; that there is nothing in the law, or the prophets, or the gospels, or the epistles, which did not proceed from the fulness of the Spirit; that we ought with all the faithful to say, that the scriptures are divinely inspired; that the gospels are admitted

“mitted as divine in all the churches of God; that the scriptures are no other
“than the organs of God.”

7. *Tertullian* testifies, “that the scripture is the basis of faith; that all *Chris-*
“*tians* prove their doctrines out of the Old and New Testament; and that the
“majesty of God suggested what *Paul* wrote.”

8. An ancient writer in *Eusebius* says, “that they who corrupt the sacred
“scriptures abolish the standard of the ancient faith, neglecting the words of
“the divine writings, out of regard to their own reasonings: and afterwards,
“that they either do not believe that the Holy Spirit uttered the divine scrip-
“tures, and then they are infidels, or think themselves wiser than the spirit,
“and so seem to be possessed.”

Eusebius Eccles. Hist. l. v. c. xxviii.

9. *Theophilus Antiochenus* says (as *Irenæus* and *Clemens Alexandrinus* also do,) “that the evangelists and apostles wrote by the same spirit that inspired the
“prophets.”

10. The succeeding fathers of the church speak so expressly and copiously on this head, that it seems not necessary to pursue the catalogue any further.

Whitby, Comm. vol. i. Pref. p. 12—15. | *Dupin on the Canon, part i. l. ii. p. 49—*
La Mothe on Inspir. l. i. c. iii—vi. | *52.*

C O R O L L A R Y. I.

It seems to have been the judgment of many of these persons, that the New Testament was written by a *plenary superintendent* inspiration at least, gr. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

It is evident that in many of these passages, they declare not only their own private sentiments, but those of *the whole church*: and it is certain, that their allowing any book to be as they expressed it, *canonical*, was in effect owning its *plenary inspiration*; since that word imported a *rule of faith and manners*, from whence there was no human appeal, gr. 6, 7, 8.

Family Expos. vol. iii. Append. p. 43. Note.

S C H O L I U M I.

Some passages have been brought on the other side of the question from *Jerome*; which seems indeed to allow that the apostles were subjects to some slips of memory.

Five Lett. on Inspir. p. 47.

| *La Mothe of Inspir. p. 44—47.*

S C H O.

SCHOLIUM 2.

A celebrated fable, related by *Pappus* in his *Synodicon*, of a separation made in the grand council of *Nice* between the canonical books of the scripture, and others concerning which there was a doubt, may be seen in

New Transl. of New Testament, vol. ii. p. 874, 875.

PROPOSITION CXVI.

The new testament was written by a *superintendent inspiration*.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 114. Dem. gr. 2. Prop. 113. | 1. The *apostles* were, according to Christ's promise, furnished with all necessary powers for the discharge of their office, by an extraordinary effusion of the Holy Spirit upon them at the day of *Pentecost*. *Acts* ii. 1, &c. and a second time, *Acts* ix. 31.

1. | 2. We may assure ourselves, that they were hereby competently furnished for all those services which were of great importance for the spread and edification of the church, and of so great difficulty as to need supernatural assistance.

3. Considering how uncertain a thing *oral tradition* is, and how soon the most public and notorious facts are corrupted by it, it was impossible that the christian religion could be preserved in any tolerable degree of purity, without a *written* account of the facts and doctrines preached by the apostles; and yet on the other hand, we can hardly suppose that God would suffer a doctrine introduced in so extraordinary a manner to be corrupted and lost.

4. The *discourses* of Christ were several of them so long, and some likewise of so curious and delicate a nature, that it is not to be imagined, the apostles should have been able exactly to record them, especially so many years after they were delivered, and amidst such a variety of cares and dangers, without some extraordinary divine assistance, or in the language of *Def. 73.* without an *inspiration* of *superintendency*.—For the time when the gospels were written (see by the way) *Fam. Exp. vol. iii. Append. N^o. v.*

5. Many of the *doctrines* which the apostles delivered in their writings were so sublime, and so new, that as they could not have been known at first otherwise than by an inspiration of *suggestion*, so they would need an inspiration of *superintendency* in delivering an accurate account of them.

2, 3, 4, 5. | 6. There is reason to believe from the promise of Christ, that such parts of the New Testament as were written by the *apostles*, were written by an inspiration of *superintendency*.

Prop. 114. gr. 3, 4. | 7. It is not to be thought, that persons so eminent for humility, piety, humanity, and other virtues, as the apostles were, would have spoken of their writings as *the words and the commands of the Lord*, as *the test*
of

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of truth and falsehood, and gloried so much in being under the direction of the Spirit, if they had not certainly known themselves to be so in their *writings*, as well as in their preaching; and the force of this argument is greatly illustrated, by recollecting the extraordinary miraculous powers with which they were honoured, while making exhortations and pretensions of this kind, as was hinted above.

8. There was an ancient tradition that *Mark* and *Luke* were in the number of the *seventy* disciples, who were furnished with extraordinary powers from Christ, and received from him promises of assistance much resembling those made to the apostles; compare *Luke* x. 9, 16, 19. And if it were so, as the arguments used to prove both the understanding and integrity of the apostles may be in great measure applied to them, we may on the principles laid down conclude, that they had also some inspiration of superintendency. But considering *Col.* iv. 10, 14. *Acts* xx. 5, 6. xxi. 1—17, & *sim.* *Acts* xii. 25. xv. 37—39. *Phil.* ver. 24. 1 *Pet.* v. 13. there is much more reason to regard that received and ancient tradition in the Christian church, that *Mark* wrote his gospel instructed by *Peter*, and *Luke* his by *Paul's* assistance: which if it be allowed, their writings will stand nearly on the same footing with those of *Peter* and *Paul*. Vid. *Prop.* 101. gr. 20.

<i>Whitby's Pref. to Luke.</i>	<i>Benson on the Propagation of Christian.</i>
<i>Mill's Gr. Test. Prol. ad Marc & Luc.</i>	
<i>Jones against Whiston, p. 46—55.</i>	
	<i>Append. part i. § 1, 2.</i>

9. It may not be improper here just to mention the *internal* marks of a divine original, the particulars of which must be submitted to farther examination. We shall endeavour to shew in the progress of this work, what must be evident to all who are well acquainted with the New Testament in the general, though capable of further illustration, that the excellency of its doctrines, and the spirituality and elevation of its design, the majesty and simplicity of its style, the agreement of its parts, and its efficacy upon the hearts and consciences of men, concur to give us a high idea of it, and to corroborate the *external* arguments for its being written by a *superintendent* inspiration at least.

Prop. 115|10. There has been in the Christian church from its earliest ages a constant *tradition*, that these books were written by the extraordinary assistance of the Spirit, which must at least amount to superintendent inspiration.

6 & 7, 8 & 9, 10 | 11. *Valet propositio.*

<i>Bennet on Script. § 6. p. 163—200.</i>	<i>Lowth on Inspir. p. 5—19.</i>
<i>Whitby's Gen. Pref. Com. vol. i. § 4—7.</i>	

C O R O L L A R Y.

From hence we may certainly infer, that the apostles were not left in their writings to misrepresent any important facts on which the evidence of christianity

nity was founded, or any important doctrine upon which the salvation or edification of their converts depended.

Family Expositor, vol. iii. *Appendix*, p. 43—57.

S C H O L I U M 1.

It is a controversy of considerable difficulty and importance, whether the inspiration and superintendency under which the apostles were, extended to every minute circumstance in their writings so as to be in the most absolute sense plenary. (Vid. Def. 74.) *Jerom*, *Grotius*, *Erasmus*, and *Episcopus*, thought it was not, and *Lowth* himself allows that in matters of no consequence, (as he expresses it) they might be liable to slips of memory. But on the contrary, it seems evident that the emphatical manner in which our Lord speaks of the agency of the Spirit upon them, and in which they themselves speak of their own writings, will justify us in believing that their inspiration was plenary, unless there be very convincing evidence brought on the other side to prove that it was not: and it is to be remembered, that if we allow there were some errors in the New Testament as it came from the hands of the apostles, there may be great danger of subverting the main purpose and design of it; since there will be endless room to debate the importance both of facts and doctrines.

Whitby's Gen. Pref. vol. i. p. 6 | *Lowth on Inspiration*, p. 40, 41.
Five Let. on Inspir. p. 75—84. | *P. Simon sur le Texte du Nouv. Test.* c. xxiii, xxiv.

S C H O L I U M 2.

Against such a plenary inspiration of the New Testament it is objected, that there is no circumstance in which more extraordinary assistances were promised to the apostles, than when they appeared before magistrates; yet some mistakes in their conduct then shew, that even this promise was to be taken with some limitations; and consequently that in other circumstances they might also be liable to mistakes. Compare *Matt.* x. 19, 20. *Mark* xiii. 11. with *Acts* xxxiii. 1—6.—To this we answer,

1. That much is to be said in vindication of the apostles' conduct in the instance to which the objection refers. Vid *Fam. Expos. in Loc.*
2. That the apostles might be preserved from mistakes in their apologies, and yet might be left to some human infirmities as to other circumstances in their behaviour before magistrates.

Five Letters on Inspiration, p. 41—47. | *Lowth on Inspiration*, p. 80—86.

S C H O L I U M 3.

It is further objected, that the apostles did not seem to apprehend each other to be inspired; as appears by their debating with each other in the council at Jerusalem, *Acts* xv. and by Paul's blaming Peter, *Gal.* ii. 24. neither, it is urged, did the Christians in those early days apprehend them to be infallible, since their conduct was in some instances questioned and arraigned, *Acts* xi. 2, 3. xxi. 20—24.

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But to this we answer, (besides what was observed before, that some mistakes in conduct might be consistent with an inspiration of superintendency in their writings,) that in both instances in question the apostles were in the right; and the passages urged will only prove that there were some Christians even then, who did not pay a due regard to those grand ministers in the Messiah's kingdom: to which we may add, that Christ's promise to them did not import, that their first views of things should always be right in the whole administration of their office, but that on the whole, he would make proper provision for their information. And if we consider how strong a temptation they would have been under to think too highly of themselves, if they had been under a constant plenary inspiration; it may appear a beauty in the divine conduct, to have left them in some instances to the natural weakness of their own minds, (compare 2 Cor. xii. 7, 9, 10.) and sometimes to interrupt those extraordinary gifts in particular cases, as he did those of healing, (compare 2 Tim. iv. 20. Phil. ii. 27.) still providing by other hands a remedy for those ill consequences; which might have arisen from an uncorrected mistake: for as to Dr. Morgan's pretence, that the apostles after all went on each in his different opinion; it is entirely a false assertion, and admirably well confuted by Dr. Leland in the passage referred to below.

Lett. on Inspiration, p. 56—61.

Lowth on Inspiration, p. 86—100.

Witsii Meletemata, p. 61—64.

Morgan's Mor. Phil. vol. i. p. 54—81.

Chapm. against Morg. vol. i. p. 317—322.

Leland against Morgan, vol. i. p. 398—

422.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is further objected, that Paul, who asserts himself to have been inferior to none of the rest of the apostles, (2 Cor. xi. 5. xii. 11.) speaks of himself in such a manner, as plainly to shew that he did not apprehend himself under such a plenary inspiration; (Vid. 1 Cor. vii. 10, 12, 25, 40. 2 Cor. xi. 17.) nor do we find that any of the apostles introduce their discourses with such clauses as the prophets used, to declare that they spoke as the oracles of God.

We answer, this will indeed prove that they did not imagine themselves to have been always under an inspiration of suggestion; nevertheless if what they said was proper, and what they determined was just, their inspiration of superintendency might still be plenary; and indeed their distinguishing in this point seems strongly to imply, (especially when compared with the passage quoted before, Prop. 113. gr. 3.) that their decisions in other points of doctrine and duty, were by immediate revelation from Christ.

La Mothe on Inspiration, p. 87—89.

Lowth on Inspiration, p. 40—51.

Whitby's Gen. Pref. to his Com. vol. i.

p. 6—8.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is also objected, that there are several passages in the history of the evangelists, which are directly contrary to each other, so that it is impossible they should both

both be true; particularly in the *genealogy* of Christ, and the story of his *last passover, sufferings* and *resurrection*.—To this we answer,

1. That there are many seeming contradictions which may be reconciled in a satisfactory manner without doing violence to the text, as appears from *our notes* * on many of the passages in question.

2. There are many other difficulties, which may be removed by *various readings*, or at least by altering a few words in the text: now forasmuch as it is evident from the many various readings, that the transcribers were not under a superintendent inspiration, it seems upon the whole more reasonable to suppose an error in some of the first copies, which may have extended itself to all the rest, than to suppose the original erroneous, for the reason given before, *Schol. I.*

3. If any cases do occur, in which neither of the former solutions can take place, it seems reasonable to conclude, (*cæt. par.*) that where the writers of the New Testament differ from each other in their accounts, those of them who were *apostles*, rather than the others, have given us the exact truth, and were under a plenary superintendency, considering the peculiar dignity of the apostolic office: and accordingly some have observed that there is little apparent difference if any, between *Matthew* and *John*. But there seems no necessity for having recourse to this expedient. And as to placing stories in a different order, it is certain that the best historians do not always confine themselves to that of time; and the hasty manner in which the evangelists must write, in the midst of their labours and dangers, may be an abundant excuse for setting things down as they came into their mind.

Beza in Act. vii. 14.

Calvin. Harm. in Matt. xxvii. 9. p.

354. & in *Acts vii. 16.*

Apud Dod. Fam. Exp. vol. iii. Pref. ad fin.

Jones against Whiston, c. iv. p. 21—36.

And it deserves to be seriously considered, whether what of difficulty remains from the agreement of *Mark* and *Luke* in the order of their stories, where they both differ from *Matthew*, may not easily be accounted for by supposing that *Luke* took *Mark* for the ground-work of his gospel, and contented himself with changing his language into purer *Greek*, and adding a great number of important particulars, which had not been recounted by him, but which *Luke* collected from credible witnesses. (Compare *Luke i. 1—4.* where it is possible *αυθεν* may refer to *early* facts omitted by *Mark*.) This seems rather more probable, than that *Mark* was an *abridgment* of *Luke*; which might be another hypothesis for solving the objection.

SCHOLIUM 6.

An objection nearly akin to the former, is taken from the difference there LECT. is between the *quotations* from the *Old Testament*, as they stand in the *New*, CXL.

* Referring to the notes in the *Family Expositor*.

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and the original; which must at least have argued some failure in the memory of the apostles.

This Mr. *Whiston* answers, by supposing that wherever there is a variation, the *Jews* have corrupted the present copies of the Old Testament on purpose to disparage the New. But we waive this, for reasons given *Prop.* 107.—Nor will it be sufficient to say, the apostles quoted from the LXX. since all their quotations do not exactly agree with that, nor indeed perfectly with *each other*. Compare *Matt.* xiii. 14, 15. *Mark* iv. 12. *Luke* viii. 10. *John* xii. 40. *Acts* xxviii. 26. *Rom.* xi. 8. in which *Isa.* vi. 9, 10. is quoted or referred to with some variety.—We therefore chuse rather to allow, that this is indeed an objection against their being under a plenary inspiration of *suggestion*: but forasmuch as they no where assert that their quotations were *literally* exact, they might be under a *superintendent* inspiration, if the *sense* were as they represent it, wherever they *argue* from the quotation: and as for other passages, which are only introduced by way of *allusion*, (as many evidently are) it was much less requisite the quotations should be exact there.—We may also observe, that the variety with which the *Fathers* quote the same texts both from the Old Testament and New, is a further argument against Mr. *Whiston's* hypothesis: and indeed it appears, that the most accurate writers among the ancient *Classics* vary in many places from the originals they quote, which considering the *form* of their books is no wonder.

Whiston's Ess. for rest. the Old Test. p. 12, &c. | *Collins's Grounds, &c.* p. 97—102.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It has been urged as the strongest objection of all, that the apostles often argue from passages in the Old Testament, where not only the words, but the original *sense* appears so different from the purpose to which it is produced, that it were unreasonable to imagine the argument conclusive, and consequently the superintendency of their inspiration *plenary*; since they assert it as a fact, that the things to which they apply such and such passages were referred to in them, of which the following quotations among many others are a specimen, *Matt.* i. 23. ii. 15, 18, 23. viii. 17. xxvii. 9, 10. *Gal* iii. 16.—To this it is answered,

1. That in several of these passages the reasoning of the apostle appears to be well founded, as we have endeavoured to shew in *our notes* upon them, and as will frequently appear upon the justest principles of analogy, even where the direct reference is not so apparent. To which it is to be added, that where the original meaning of a passage on the whole appears *dubious*, the sense given by an *apostle* is certainly to be preferred to another, which from examining the text alone might appear equally probable, especially considering how indeterminate many forms in speaking used in the *Hebrew* language are, and how great an obscurity lies upon many passages in the Old Testament, and may well be expected in prophetic writings. See *Prop.* 112. *Cor.* 2.

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2. The phrase, *this was fulfilled*, or *this was done that it might be fulfilled*, (though Mr. Pierce makes a great distinction between these two) does not always imply, that the passage referred to was a *prediction* of the event; but only that the event recorded was attended with such circumstances, as that the prophecy quoted upon the occasion might with great propriety of expression be *accommodated* to it: and in this solution we chuse to acquiesce, rather than to say, that the misapplication of *prophecies* might be consistent with plenary inspiration as to the truth of *facts*; for, as we shall afterwards more particularly observe, the understanding the prophecies of the Old Testament was a miraculous gift, imparted not only to the apostles, but to other *Christians* inferior to them, and many have thought it to be *the word of knowledge* spoken of 1 Cor. xii. 8.

Collins's Grounds, &c. part i. c. viii. p. 39—50.	Chandler on Mir. part ii. c. xi. p. 338—363.
Sykes on Christian. c. xiii. p. 206—252.	Peirce on Phil. ad fin. Diff. ii.
Jeffries's Review, c. viii. p. 164, &c.	Warb. Div. Leg. vol. ii. l. vi. c. vi.

SCHOLIUM 8.

There is a great deal of reason to believe, that many things contained in the New Testament were written by an inspiration of *suggestion*; since the apostles sometimes expressly assert they received what they wrote by *revelation from Christ*; and this is peculiarly applicable to the prophetic part of their writings; compare *Eph.* iii. 3. 5. *Gal.* i. 12. 1 *Cor.* ii. 10, &c. xi. 23. It is also exceedingly probable that they were frequently instructed in an extraordinary manner, not only as to the *matter* about which they wrote, but likewise as to the *language* they should use, 1 *Cor.* ii. 13. and whoever peruses their writings attentively, will find they frequently express themselves, even when they wrote upon particular occasions, in phrases of such latitude and extent, as would make their writings abundantly more useful to *Christians* in all succeeding ages, than they could have been, had they confined themselves closely to the particular occasion, as some who have paraphrased the writings have done: a circumstance in which it is very probable they had a particular divine direction, and upon observing which the just interpretation of their writings will greatly depend. But it does not seem reasonable to believe, that *every word* which the apostles wrote was dictated to them, by an immediate revelation; for (as was before observed) there are not only many things which they might have written without such a revelation, but moreover on such an hypothesis there could have been no room at all for such a distinction as the apostle makes, 1 *Cor.* vii. 10, 12, 25. between what *he* and what *the Lord* says: nor could we suppose that, if this had been the case, they would ever have quoted the words of the Old Testament otherwise than exactly as they were written, or that they could ever have spoken with that uncertainty, with which they sometimes express themselves as to some future events, 1 *Cor.* xvi. 5, 6. compared with 2 *Cor.* i. 15—17. *Rom.* xv. 24, 28. compare also 1 *Cor.* i. 14, 16. iv. 19. xvi. 7. *Phil.* ii. 19, 23, 24. 1 *Tim.* iii.

14, 15. 2 *John* ver. 12. 3 *John* ver. 14. It must also be acknowledged, that there are some *imperfections* and some *peculiarities of style*, which probably there would not have been, had the apostles always written by an inspiration of suggestion: yet this is upon the whole no dishonour to the sacred scriptures; since by this means they are more adapted to answer their general end, as containing surer marks of their genuineness, and lay open the heart and character of the persons by whom they were written more effectually than they could have done, had these writers been merely the organs of the Holy Ghost, in such a manner as some have supposed.

Edwards of Script. vol. i. p. 32—38.

Lowth on Inspiration p. 62—74.

Owen on Script. c. i. § 22 p. 25—27.

Burnet on the Art. p. 85—88.

Whitby on the New Test. vol. i. Pref.

Tilloison's Works, vol. iii. p. 448, 449.

§ 2. p. 3—6.

DEFINITION LXXVII.

LECT. Where supernatural GIFTS and POWERS are spoken of as distinct, the former CXLI. may express some *inward illumination*, and the latter some extraordinary effect produced by God, in consequence of some word or action of that person, to whom the power is aid to belong.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

To take a more particular survey of the *gifts* and *powers* of the apostles, according that account of them which is given in the New Testament.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

SECT. I. The chief of their spiritual GIFTS, (perhaps so called in allusion to *Psal.* lxviii. 18, compared with *Eph.* iv. 6, 8.) are most particularly enumerated 1 *Cor.* xii. 8—10. and seem most probably to have been thus distinguished. There was,

1. THE WORD OF WISDOM, or a full and clear understanding of the whole scheme of christian doctrines, whereby they were able to make men wise to salvation: 1 *Cor.* ii. 6, 7. *Eph.* iii. 10. compare 2 *Pet.* iii. 15. This fitted them to make the most perfect declaration of the gospel; on account of which the apostles are represented as under Christ the foundation of the christian church, *Eph.* ii. 20. *Rev.* xxi. 14. compare *Matt.* xvi. 18.

Benson Prop. of Christ. vol. i. p. 40—46.

Barrington's Miscellanea Sacra, Eff. i. p.

Candler on Joel, p. 133—135.

39—42.

2. THE WORD OF KNOWLEDGE, which Lord Barrington and Dr. Benson think to have consisted in an extraordinary ability to understand and explain the sense

sense and design of the Old Testament, and especially its reference to Christ and his gospel: compare *Rom.* xvi. 25, 26. *1 Pet.* i. 11, 12. *Rom.* ii. 20. *1 Tim.* vi. 20.—By this gift they were freed from those prejudices which they had imbibed, relating to the perpetuity of the *Mosaic* law, and the temporal grandeur of the Messiah's kingdom; by this their want of skill in the original *Hebrew*, or of acquaintance with the *Greek* version was supplied; and they were enabled to remove scruples arising in the minds of the *Jews*, and to clear up and set in the strongest light that part of the evidence of christianity which depended upon their scriptures.

Barrington's Essay, p. 42—45.

| *Benson, ibid.* p. 46—48.

That this was given to the apostles and primitive *Christians* is certain; but that it was called *the word of knowledge* seems not fully proved by the quotations above.—Dr. *Chandler* supposes that the word of *knowledge* was but a lower degree of the word of *wisdom*; i. e. a capacity of discovering the christian scheme with a convincing evidence to the minds of others, and quotes *Rom.* xv. 14. *1 Cor.* i. 5, 6. *2 Cor.* ii. 14. viii. 7. *Eph.* i. 17, 18. with some other scriptures for that purpose.

3. They had the gift of *DISCERNING SPIRITS*, i. e. of knowing by what spirit a man spoke who pretended to inspiration, of knowing the secrets of men's hearts in some instances, and judging of the fitness of a person's genius and character for any particular office and station in the church: but Dr. *Chandler* explains it only of the *former*, referring the latter effects to *prophecy*.

Benson, ibid. p. 48—50.

| *Foster's 2d Letter to Stebbing.*

Stebbing against Fost. 2d Lett. p. 40—54.

| *Chandler on Joel*, p. 142, 143.

4. They had also the gift of *PROPHECY*, in that *superior* degree which related to foretelling future or discovering secret events, and in that *inferior* sense of the word in which it is often used to express officiating in public worship, by preaching, prayer, or singing, *1 Cor.* xv. *pass. præf. ver.* 24, 25.

Benson, ibid. p. 70, 71.

| *Chandler on Joel*, p. 138—142.

5. They had also the gift of *TONGUES*, or an ability of readily and intelligibly speaking a variety of languages which they had never learnt; which (tho' infamously represented by *Morgan*) was a most glorious and important attestation of the gospel, as well as a suitable, and indeed in their circumstances, a necessary furniture for the mission for which the apostles and their assistants were designed. Nor is there any reason with Dr. *Middleton*, to understand it as merely an *occasional* gift, so that a person might speak a language most fluently one hour, and be entirely ignorant of it the next; which neither agrees with what is said of the *abuse* of it, nor would have been sufficient to answer the end proposed.

Morg. Mor. Phil. vol. ii. p. 231, 232.

| *Benson, ibid.* p. 58, 59.

Leland against Morg. vol. ii. p. 225—230.

| *Chandler, ibid.* p. 143—146.

| *Middlet. on Mir. Powers, ap. Post. Works.*

6. They had also the gift of INTERPRETING TONGUES; so that in a mixt assembly, consisting of persons of different nations, if one spoke in a language understood by one part, another could *repeat* and *translate* what he said into different languages understood by others. Whether these versions were made of the whole discourse when ended, or sentence by sentence, we cannot certainly say; but if the latter method were used, it would not seem so strange to them as to us, if we may credit the account given of the method of interpreting the scripture in the *Jewish* synagogues. Vid. 1 Cor. xiv. 5, 6, 13.

Jones's Jewish Ant. § 318—326, & | *Benson, ibid.* p. 60.

§ 334. MS.

| *Chandler on Joel*, p. 146, 147.

Some have supposed that *Paul* had a gift peculiar to himself, *i. e.* of knowing in some cases what passed in his absence, as well as if he had been present, 1 Cor. v. 3, 4. Col. ii. 5. compare 2 Kings v. 25, 26. vi. 8—12. but it is certain this did not habitually reside in him; as indeed it is uncertain, whether many of the most wonderful of these gifts and powers did without interruption dwell in any mere man whatsoever. Compare *John* iii. 34.

SECT. II. The most considerable miraculous POWERS of the apostles were these.

I. The power of inflicting *supernatural punishment* and even *death* itself, by a word speaking, on bold and daring offenders. Vid. *Acts* v. 1—11. xiii. 10, 11. 2 Cor. x. 6, 8, 9. xiii. 2, 3, 10. And as evil angels might sometimes be the instrument of inflicting these temporal judgments, it is probable these may be referred to, when persons are said to be by the apostles *delivered to Satan*, 1 Cor. v. 4, 5. 1 Tim. i. 20.

Benson, ibid. vol. i. p. 52—56.

| *Barrington's Ess.* ii. p. 51, 53.

2. The apostles seem to have been endowed with an extraordinary degree of *fortitude*, far beyond what they naturally had, but necessary for the scenes of extraordinary difficulty and suffering through which they were to pass. *Acts* ii. 36. iv. 5—13, 19, 33. v. 28. &c. viii. 1.

Benson, ibid. p. 61—63.

| *Garthbut of Christ's Resur.* p. 35—61.

Their extraordinary degree of sincerity, diligence and activity, patience, love to mens souls, and other uncommon virtues and graces might also be mentioned as further illustrating this head.

3. The apostles had also a power of performing the most extraordinary *cures*, and even of *raising the dead*: and some of those kinds of miracles which were not peculiar to them, were wrought by them in a *superior* manner. Vid. *Acts* v. 15. ix. 36—42. xix. 11, 12. xx. 12.

Barrington, ibid. p. 53.

4. The apostles had also a power, (which as it seems was peculiar to themselves,) of giving the miraculous gifts of the Spirit to others by laying on their hands; and there were very few who received it otherwise than by that means. *Acts* viii. 14—19. *John* xiv. 12. *Rom.* i. 11, 12. *2 Tim.* i. 6. *Gal.* iii. 2, 3, 5. *1 Thess.* i. 5. v. 19, 20. *1 Cor.* i. 4—7. *2 Cor.* xii. 12, 13. *Acts* xix. 1—7. For the further illustration of this, Dr. Benson has asserted, that the Holy Ghost never fell immediately on any but our Lord after his baptism, and the apostles, first on the day of pentecost, and a second time mentioned, *Acts* iv. 31. on the eunuch, *Acts* viii. 39. (according to the *Alexandrian* reading;) on Saul after his baptism; on the first-fruits of the devout Gentiles before baptism, *Acts* x. 44. and on the first-fruits of the idolatrous Gentiles of *Antioch* in *Pisidia*, *Acts* xiii. 52. But the instance of the *Eunuch*, with that of the devout *Gentiles* is precarious: and indeed the case of the Gentiles at *Antioch* seems to be far from so extraordinary a one as Dr. Benson would make it; and the foundation for supposing it so, *i. e.* the different periods of preaching the gospel, to the devout, and then to the idolatrous Gentiles, is a mere unsupported hypothesis. That the phrase of being filled with the Holy Ghost, does not signify any thing so singular as he supposes, appears from comparing *Eph.* v. 18. and many other places where the phrase is used. See *Fam. Expos.* vol. iii. on the phrases cited above.

Benson, *ibid.* vol. i. p. 64—66. | Leland against Morg. vol. i. p. 382, 383. Note.
vol. ii. p. 11—19. | Barrington's Essay, i. p. 101—112.

COROLLARY I.

It does not seem reasonable to mention the power which the apostles had of *LECT.* binding and loosing, of remitting or retaining sins, as a gift or power distinct from *CLXII.* the preceding; compare *Matt.* xvi. 19. xviii. 18. *John* xx. 23. for if this be understood, of declaring in an authentic manner what was lawful under the christian dispensation, they were furnished with that by the word of wisdom, with which therefore this gift or power taken in this sense would coincide; if it be taken for inflicting or removing calamities sent as miraculous punishments of sin, it will coincide with that power mentioned § 2. gr. 1, 3. and if it should be explained of declaring to particular persons that their sins were forgiven, they could only do it by virtue of their extraordinary gift of discerning spirits, § 1. gr. 3. whereby they would be able to judge of the sincere faith and repentance of the person concerned.

Benson, *ibid.* p. 50—52, 56, 57.

COROLLARY 2.

This particular survey of the extraordinary furniture of the apostles for their work, confirms the arguments advanced above to prove the inspiration of their writings, which appear in fact to have been intended for the service and guidance of the church in all future ages. To this Dr. Morgan has objected, that as
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these gifts were plainly capable of abuse, (compare 1 Cor. xiv.) no argument could from thence be drawn as to the divine inspiration of those who were possessed of them.—But in answer to this, we must distinguish with respect to these gifts and powers. The word of *wisdom* and of *knowledge*, as explained above, could not be abused as occasion of error, the truth of the things taught being essential to the exercise of the gifts themselves, and false pretences to them being discovered by that of discerning spirits. The gift of *healing* was not a permanent thing: (compare *Prop.* 116. *Schol.* 3. *sub fin.*) and as for the gift of speaking with *tongues*, the miracle of that lay in conferring it by imposition of hands, not in using it after it was conferred. So that on the whole, there is no foundation to believe, that any miraculous gifts or powers were used in confirmation of falshood in any case, though they might be used in confirmation of truth by very bad men, which is all that is insinuated, *Matt.* vii. 22. Compare for further illustration *Gal.* iii. 2, 5. *Rom.* xvi. 18. 1 *Cor.* iv. 18—20. *Cor.* xii. 12. & *sim.* *Col.* ii. 4. *Jude ver.* 16. which passages when compared together further shew, or intimate, that miraculous works or powers were peculiar to the teachers of truth.

Morgan's Mor. Phil. vol. i. p. 80, 81. | *Leland against Morgan*, vol. i. c. xiii.
Chapm. against Morgan, vol. i. p. 300—317. | p. 374—387.

As for 2 *Thess.* ii. 9. it seems the words in question might be rendered *lying signs, wonders, and miracles*, i. e. fictitious and pretended miracles, such as the *Romish* church has apparently dealt in: and *Matt.* xxiv. 24. evidently relates to false teachers in the early ages of christianity, when there was a superior miraculous power in the church; such perhaps as *Elymas* and *Simon Magus*: so that by the way, there is no proof from scripture of any miracles having been wrought to confirm falshood, which have not been opposed by superior miracles; nor can any one prove that this shall ever be the case, as was in part intimated above, *Prop.* 94. *Schol.* 2.

COROLLARY 3.

If it could be certainly made out, which I apprehend it cannot, that there is an irreconcilable difference between any circumstances in the history, and that there was so in the original, it would (*cæt par.*) on those principles seem most reasonable, to adjust the testimony of those who were *not* apostles by that of those who *were*, according to Sir *Isaac Newton's* scheme of the harmony: for it is not so certain that *Peter* reviewed *Mark's* gospel, and *Paul* *Luke's*, as that *Matthew* and *John* were the authors of those published under their name: Vid. *Prop.* 116. *gr.* 8. and the concurrence of *Mark* and *Luke* in their order can be no just objection to this, especially if the conjecture *ibid.* *Sch.* 5. *sub finem* be admitted.

Dodd. Diff. on Newt. Harm. ap. Fam. | *Sir Isaac Newton on Propb.* l. i. c. xi.
Expos. vol. iii. *Append.* N^o. iii.

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COROLLARY 4.

As the endowments of the apostles were so extraordinary and peculiar, there is no reason to believe they had any proper *successors* in the christian church; unless it can be proved, there are some who succeeded to their gifts and powers, by which they were furnished for their extraordinary work.

Boyle's Works, vol. ii. p. 271, 272, 276, 277. | *Barrington's Misc. Sac. Eff.* ii. pass.

COROLLARY 5.

The whole foundation of *Popery*, as a distinct religion, is therefore overthrown; since that not only supposes the contrary to the preceding corollary, but also adds a great many other suppositions still more extravagant: for (as we shall elsewhere more largely shew) there is no evidence that *Peter* had any superiority over the rest of the apostles; or if he had, that he had any who were his successors in that extraordinary power; or that those successors were *Roman* bishops; or that the *present* bishop of *Rome* is legally by succession possessed of it; yet all these things, some of which are notoriously false, and others of such a nature that they can never be proved to be true on their own principles, must be taken for granted, before that authority of declaring the sense of scripture can be vindicated, which the church of *Rome* has arrogated to herself, and upon which her other most extravagant claims and most absurd doctrines are founded.

Lectures against Popery, No. iii. & iv. | *Barrow of the Pope's Supremacy*, pass.
Burnet's Discourses, No. iii.

SCHOLIUM I.

Several of the gifts and powers mentioned in the proposition appear to have been imparted to Christians of *inferior* order; not only to *prophets*, *evangelists*, *elders* or *bishops*, and other *teachers*, but also to those who made up the *congregations* under their care; particularly the gift of prophecy, that of speaking with and interpreting tongues, and discerning spirits: with regard to the former of which Dr. *Benson* thinks some are called *helps*, and with regard to the latter, *governments*, as they were called to assist both in instructing and guiding the church: 1 Cor. xii. 8—10, 28. though Dr. *Chandler* is of opinion, that the *helps* were persons of extraordinary liberality, raised up by God to be helpful to others by their own generous contributions, and that the *governments* were deacons, whose business it was to preside over the distribution of charities, Acts vi. 3. Rom. xvi. 2. which may considerably illustrate Rom. xii. 8. Dr. *Benson* thinks it probable, that there were few if any in the primitive church who did not receive these gifts, though perhaps they might all of

them *meet* in none but the apostles, to whom *the word of wisdom* seems to have been peculiar.

Benson on Prop. &c. vol. i. p. 66—73. | *Chandler on Joel, p. 131—133, & 148*
Barring. Eff. i. p. 118—130. ibid. p. —151.
 74. *Table.*

S C H O L I U M 2.

There is a difficulty attending the gift of *the interpretation of tongues*, which has not been observed by those who have written upon the subject, and may here deserve our notice; *viz.* how a person speaking with tongues should need to *pray that he might interpret*, 1 Cor. xiv. 13. without supposing that he spoke by such a miraculous impulse, as rendered him merely the organ of the Spirit of God, which would be inconsistent with our answer to *Morgan* under the second corollary.—It is obvious to answer, that there might be persons in an audience of various nations, and consequently the person speaking (supposing to both *Romans* and *Persians*, himself being a *Greek* speaking *Latin*,) might not be able to interpret to them all, (as in the given instance into *Persian*.)—But then it may be answered, this was for want of another tongue, which is not here supposed to be the case; and therefore perhaps it will be impossible fully to remove the difficulty, without supposing there were some, who though they could speak no tongue but their own, were yet miraculously enabled to *interpret* into it what should be spoken in any other tongue, which would make this office, though it were only bearing a secondary part, very excellent, and the gift itself very extraordinary.

P R O P O S I T I O N CXVIII.

The *Old Testament* was written by a *superintendent inspiration*.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

LECT. *Prop. 110.* | 1. *Moses* was a person raised up by God for eminent service, favoured with miraculous powers and frequent divine revelations, on the authority with which his whole law was introduced and received.

Hartley on Man, vol. ii. p. 88—90.

2. The work which *Moses* undertook of writing the history, not only of his own acts and institutions, but also the dispensations of God to mankind in preceding ages, was a work of great importance, and of such difficulty, that without extraordinary divine assistance he would not have been able to perform it in such a manner, as might have been depended upon, and consequently might have answered the design.

1, 2. 3. There is reason to believe that *Moses* wrote by a superintendent inspiration.

4. *Joshua, Samuel, David, Solomon, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiab, Jonas, Micah, Nabum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah* and *Malachi*, were all prophets, if the historical part of the Old Testament is to be believed, (which we proved above, *Prop. 110.*) and therefore we have reason to believe, that their minds were so superintended, in writing not only those historical facts which they mention, but likewise those messages which many of them declare they received from God, as that they should be preserved at least from all material mistakes, which would have brought a disgrace upon those messages which in the name of God they delivered, and so have frustrated the design of them; which in many cases could have been answered, without an exact transmission of them to posterity, as several of those predictions referred to distant and some of them to very complicated events, and contain particular circumstances, which if not exactly authentic must have been very hazardous.

5. Many discourses recorded in the historical parts of these writings, as delivered by others, or given to them in charge by God, were so long and so circumstantial, that they could not be exactly recorded without some extraordinary divine assistance; and some of the most important of them, *i. e.* those relating to the Messiah, were not understood by the prophets themselves who delivered them, (*1 Pet. i. 10—22.*) and consequently were less likely to be remembered with such exactness, as according to *gr. 5.* was necessary.

6. *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* were persons of such eminent stations and piety, and so intimately conversant with the prophets *Haggai, Zechariah* and *Malachi*, that we may reasonably believe that proper assistances, either ordinary or extraordinary, as the case required, would be given them in their writings.

7. Though the authors of the books of *Judges, Ruth* and *Kings, Chronicles, Esther*, and *Job*, should be allowed to be unknown, there is great reason to believe they were some of those holy and prophetic men with which the nation of the *Jews* did so much abound; and that what was said under the preceding steps may with considerable probability be applied to them, at least in some degree.

Prop. 110. 8. The provision that was made for conducting the *Jewish* people by divine oracles, given (though we know not particularly how) by the *Urim* and *Thummin*, and by prophets raised up in almost every age, makes it highly probable, that those who were providentially employed in transmitting to us the history of that nation, would have some peculiar assistance greater than could (*cæt. par.*) be expected in other writers.

3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 9. So far as we are able to judge, from surveying the particular characters and circumstances of the author of the various books of the Old Testament, in comparison with the genius of that dispensation under which they lived and wrote, there is reason to believe they were under a superintendent inspiration.

10. Though

10. Though it be extremely difficult to conclude from any excellency in the style and manner of writing, that a book is divinely inspired, and especially that there is that superintendency over the whole of it; yet we must acknowledge, that in the books of the Old Testament as well as the New, there are such important truths, such sublime figures, and such majestic and pathetic expressions, as can hardly be equalled any where else, and which appear so worthy of God, as to give some degree of additional weight to the other arguments brought upon this head. Compare *Prop.* 110. *gr.* 3.

Nichols's Con. vol. iv. p. 139—157. | *Boyle's Style of Script.* p. 7—16.

11. The ancient *Jews* had a tradition among them, that these books were written by divine inspiration; and therefore received them as *canonical*, *i. e.* as a rule of faith and manners.

Joseph. contr. App. l. i. p. 1036. *Col.* 1333. *Huds.*

12. The grand argument of all is, that Christ and his apostles were so far from accusing the *Jews* of superstition, in the regard which they paid to the writings of the Old Testament, (*vid. gr.* 11.) or from charging the Scribes and Pharisees, (whom Christ on all proper occasions censured so freely) with having introduced into the sacred volume mere human compositions; that on the contrary, they not only recommend the diligent and constant perusal of them, as of the greatest importance to men's eternal happiness, but speak of them as divine oracles, and as written by an extraordinary influence of the divine spirit upon the minds of the authors. *Vid. John* v. 39. x. 35. *Mark* xii. 24. *Matt.* iv. 4, 7, 10. v. 17, 18. xxi. 42. xxii. 29, 31, 43. xxiv. 15. xxvi. 54, 56. *Luke* i. 67, 69, 70. x. 26, 27. xvi. 31. *Acts* iv. 25. xvii. 11. xviii. 24—28. *Rom.* iii. 2. xv. 4. xvi. 26. *Gall.* iii. 8. 1 *Tim.* v. 17, 18. 2 *Tim.* iii. 14—17. *James* ii. 8. iv. 5. 1 *Pet.* i. 10—12. 2 *Pet.* i. 19—21. To this list may be added many other places, on the whole more than five hundred, in which the sacred writers of the New Testament quote and argue from those of the old, in such a manner as they would not surely have done, if they had apprehended there were room to alledge, that it contained at least a mixture of what was spurious and of no authority.

Lowth on Insp. p. 185—190.

9 & 10 & 11 & 12. | 13. There is reason to believe, that books written by such persons, under such a dispensation, and in such a manner as has been described, received with such unanimous regard by the *Jewish* church, and recommended in such a manner by Christ and his apostles, were written by a superintendent inspiration. *Q. E. D.*

Jenkins of Christianity, vol. i. p. 226— | *Fam. Expos.* vol. iii. *Append.* N^o. iii.
230. | *Post.* p. 61—64.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

Comparing this with *Prop.* 116. it appears, that the *whole scripture* received by the Reformed is divinely inspired.

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

From hence it will further follow, that in all our inquiries into the nature and will of God, and the genius and design of the christian dispensation, the *scripture* will be our surest rule, and no merely human compositions are to be received with an equal degree of regard.

Chillingworth's Safe Way.

| *Middleton's Introductory Disc.* p. 97, 98.

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

From comparing the demonstration of this proposition with that given *Prop.* 116. it will appear, that the proof we have of the inspiration of the *New Testament*, is on the whole considerably greater than that which we have of the inspiration of the *Old*, if from thence we subtract that grand argument which arises from the testimony of Christ and his apostles. But setting that aside, there will be the strongest evidence of the inspiration of those books, on which the proof of christianity most immediately depends; since that generally follows from the truth of the *historical* part of those books, and of their genuineness, which was before confirmed; for the prophets assert it as a matter of fact, that God gave them such and such revelations.

C O R O L L A R Y 4.

From *gr.* 12. we may certainly infer, that for any to pretend to exalt the character of *Christ* and of *Paul* as divine teachers, while at the same time they pour contempt upon the *Jewish* institutions as a foolish and impious forgery, is a notorious contradiction and absurdity: and common sense will teach us that, such authors, whatever they profess, do equally intend the subversion of the Old Testament and the New.

Eusebius Eccles. Hist. l. v. *ad fin.* | *Leland against Morg.* vol. i. c. iii. p. 80—106.

S C H O L I U M I.

We do readily allow, that there was a great variety in the *degree* of inspiration in the different books and passages of the Old Testament: there is great reason to believe that the *prophecies* were written by an inspiration of *suggestion*; for many of them were so circumstantial, and the particular expressions of them so important, that we cannot imagine that God revealed only to his servants some general thoughts, *v. g.* that *Babylon* should be destroyed, *Jerusalem* rebuilt, and the like, leaving them to enlarge upon it as they thought fit, for then they might

might easily have fallen into certain expressions, which not being exactly answered might have brought a reflection upon the truth of the whole. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that in these suggestions, God might sometimes and in less critical and important circumstances, leave them to follow their own way of conception and expression, to such a degree as might occasion such a variety of style as critics justly remark in different books.

Letter of Inspiration, p. 13—22.

SCHOLIUM. 2.

The arguments used *Prop. 116 Schol. 1.* to prove the inspiration of the *New Testament* to be a plenary superintendency, may in a great measure be applied to the *old*, as we before observed: and it is hard to imagine, that Christ and his apostles would have spoken of it in such high strains, if there had been a mixture of error and falshood with the great and important truths it contained: nevertheless there are so many arguments brought against the plenary inspiration of these books, from the supposed absurdities, immoralities, and contradictions to be found in them, that it will be necessary to give some of them a more particular consideration in the following propositions.

PROPOSITION CXIX.

LECT. CXLIV. To enumerate and vindicate some of the principal of those passages in the Old Testament, which are objected against as *absurd*.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. Many absurdities are charged upon the *Mosaic* account of the *creation*: v. g. the making light before the sun; the dividing the water above and below the firmament by an imaginary solid partition, and the making the sun, moon, and stars in one day: not here to mention the objection which is brought against the descent of the whole human race from one pair.

To this Dr. *Thomas Burnet* answers in his *Theory* by cutting the knot; and maintains that this account was merely a *fable*, though according to his own representation of it, a fable too absurd for a wise man, and much more for an inspired person to have thrown together; and Dr. *Middleton*, in his late controversy with the Bishop of *London*, has declared himself strongly in the same sentiments.—But there can surely be no reason to believe this, since *Moses* never tells us where his fable *ends* and where his true history *begins*; especially considering that Christ and his apostles refer to the story of the creation and that of the fall, (which is inseparably connected with it, and treated by *Burnet* as a tale equally absurd) not as an *allegory*, but a *true history*, 2 Cor. iv. 6. xi. 3. 1 Cor. xv. 45. Matt. xix. 4, 5. 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14. 1 Cor. xi. 8, 9. and it is very harsh to suppose that God would so solemnly from mount *Sinai* make the

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circumstance of a fable the foundation of the fourth commandment, *Ex. xx. 11.*
Heb. iv. 3, 4.

Burnet's Archæologia, l. ii. c. viii, ix. p. 403—446.

Dr. David Jennings, in a very ingenious discourse on this subject, supposes that the sun and the stars were created before the earth, and that the production of light mentioned as the work of the *first* day, was only giving the earth its *diurnal motion*, expressed, as he understands it, by “the Spirit of God moving,” not “upon the face of the water,” but *moving the face of the deep, i. e.* the surface of the unenlightened hemisphere; which might be called *deep*, either as remote from the sun, or in a more fluid state than that hemisphere which might have been turned towards it, and thereby dried and crufted; (which last by the way seems ill to agree with *Gen. i. 9, 10. Psal. civ. 6—9*). He supposes that on the *fourth* day God gave the earth its *annual* motion, and thereby appointed those luminaries of heaven, before created and before visible, to be for signs and seasons, and days and years; so that as the *sun* did in another manner than before *rule over the day*, making it unequal in different seasons, &c. the *moon* did with correspondent variety rule over the *night* and the *stars*.—But it may be objected to this scheme,

1. That such an interpretation offers great violence to several phrases in the history, *v. g.* God's moving on the face of the water, his saying, “let there be light,” his making two lights, and setting them in the firmament of heaven, and appointing them to have dominion over the day and over the night: to which we may add, that the moon could not with any tolerable propriety be said to *begin* to have dominion over the stars, when that little alteration was made in her course, which the annual motion added to the diurnal occasions.

2. That the diurnal and annual motion of the earth being each, if not both together, impressed in a moment, would hardly be described as each of them the work of a distinct day, as the *latter* especially must be on this hypothesis; for it would be very unreasonable to suppose, that when it is said *God made the sun and moon*, that clause should import the creation and formation of the *moon*, and only the alteration of the earth's motion with regard to the *sun*: not to insist upon it.

3. That if the laws of gravity took place, a projectile force must always have been necessary, to prevent the centripetal from prevailing so far as to draw the earth into the sun.

Jennings's Appendix to his Astronomy.

Mr. Whiston supposes the *Mosaic* story to have been a kind of journal, of what would have appeared to the eye of a spectator upon the surface of the earth; and interprets the *making* of the sun, moon, and stars, to have been only the gradual clearing of the atmosphere of that *comet*, of which, according to his hypothesis, the earth was made; this defæcation beginning the *first* day, produced some light, and increasing to the *fourth*, the sun, moon, and stars then

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became visible and distinct. But this seems to be connected with that very absurd part of his theory, which supposes that the earth had at first no *diurnal* motion, but that it was impressed by the comet which occasioned the deluge; otherwise, we can never imagine, that the sun, moon and stars, bodies of such different degrees of magnitude and light, would have become visible the same natural day.

Whiston's Theory, præf. p. 3—33. | Edwards's Exercitations, N^o. i. p. 1—25.

It seems therefore that the most probable hypothesis is that of Dr. *Nichols*; who supposes first, a chaotic state of the whole solar system; then, a separation of the grosser particles of matter, of which the primary and secondary planets were to consist; from whence it would follow, that the luminous particles before blended and entangled with these would acquire a greater lustre, which he supposes the creation of *light* in its most imperfect state. By the *water above the firmament* he understands the atmospheres or seas of the *planets*, though they may mean no more than vapours floating in the expanse of the air, as the original word עֲקֵי־שָׁמַיִם signifies. On the *fourth* day, he supposes the luminous particles, before more equally dispersed, were gathered in *one central body*; whereby the little planet near us became, by the reflection of its rays, a *moon*; which, being the most considerable of the nocturnal luminaries, might by a beautiful figure be said to *rule over* the night and the stars, allowing it very probable that the fixed stars, and planetary systems which may possibly attend them, were created before.—It may possibly be objected against this hypothesis, that at this rate there would be no distinction between day and night before the fourth day; since this imperfect luminous matter equally diffused on every side would give the whole terrestrial globe a kind of equable and universal twilight. It would therefore be an improvement upon the hypothesis, to suppose that the luminous particles were from the first gradually turning towards the center, though not united in it; the consequence of which would be, that the hemisphere nearest the center would then be lighter than the other. Bishop *Patrick* thinks a luminous mass distinct from the sun, and nearer the earth, was first formed, which on the fourth day was perhaps with some alteration to us unknown changed into the sun.

Patrick on Gen. i. 3—15.

The chief objection against this scheme is, that it does not naturally offer itself to the mind from reading the *Mosaic* account. But it may be replied, it is sufficient if by any interpretation it can be shewn that it might possibly have been true: and it would appear an argument of great wisdom in *Moses*, or indeed of extraordinary divine direction, for him, prepossessed as he probably was in favour of the vulgar hypothesis, to give such an account of the creation as should neither directly assert it, not yet so much shock it, as to throw the minds of ignorant and unlearned men into speculations, which might have been detri-

detrimental to his grand design, of confirming them in the belief of one almighty Creator of heaven and earth, and so preserving them from idolatry.

On the whole, supposing that none of these hypotheses should be satisfactory; the objection pretends to no more than this, that God did not observe such a *proportion* as we should have expected in some of his works: but it ill becomes us to limit him in such a circumstance; especially as we know not certainly what great ends either in the natural or moral world might be answered by a deviation from it.

Nichols's Conf. vol. i. p. 90—126. Ed. 12mo. | Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 36—44. fol.

SECT. II. It is said that the *Mosaic* account of the *Fall* is absurd; not only as it represents God as suspending the happiness of mankind on so indifferent a circumstance as his eating the fruit; but also supposes a brute to speak, and yet *Eve* to have taken no alarm at it, and out of regard to what such a creature said to have violated the divine command, and to have been guilty of a weakness, when in the perfection of human nature, of which few of her descendants in the present degeneracy of it would be capable.

Ans. As for the offence in question, it may be shewn elsewhere, that how light soever it might be in itself, there were circumstances of most enormous aggravation attending it, which might abundantly justify God in the punishment inflicted upon account of it.—As to the latter part of the objection, which is indeed the chief difficulty, some (with *Abarbinel*) have replied, that the serpent only spoke by his *actions*, eating the fruit in the presence of *Eve* and seeming rather refreshed and animated than injured by it. But we waive this; nor do we chuse to say with Mr. *Joseph Mede*, that she took the serpent for a wise though fallen *angel*, who might know more of the nature of this new formed world than she, and could have no principle of enmity against her, to lead him to wish her destruction. Neither do we say, with Dr. *Thomas Burnet* at *Boyle's Lectures*, (after *Tennison*,) that she took him for some attendant spirit, sent from God to revoke the prohibition before given. It seems more probable, that the fact might be, as it is beautifully represented by *Milton*, i. e. that the serpent, being actuated by an evil spirit, might pretend to have gained reason and speech by that fruit, and from thence might infer with some plausible appearance of argument, that if it was capable of producing so wonderful a change in *him*, it might exalt the *human* nature even to *divinity*. Compare 2 Cor. xi. 3. and Rev. xx. 2.

Burnet's Archæol. l. ii. c. vii.

Mede's Works, p. 23, 24.

Burn. at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. p. 10—37.

Milton's Paradise Lost, l. ix.

Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. i. p. 16—27.

Berry Str. Lect. vol. i. p. 204, 205.

Barr. Ess. on Div. Disp. Append. Diff. i.

Hunt's Ess. p. 304—313.

Universal Hist. vol. i. p. 59—65.

Tennison of Idol. p. 345—356.

SECT. III. Others have objected against the *sentence* pronounced on *Eve* and the *serpent* as absurd; seeing the woman could not but with pain bring forth, nor the serpent go otherwise than upon his breast, nor indeed be justly punished at all for a crime of which he was only the innocent instrument.

As to what relates to the woman's bringing forth, we answer,

1. That it is not absolutely impossible that some alteration might be made in the structure of the womb on that occasion; perhaps a small alteration might suffice, considering with how little difficulty most women in hot countries go through their labour: or

2. God, knowing the fall would happen, might constitute things in such a manner as to suit a fallen state, when the event was not to take place till after sin was committed; which seems to have been the case as to other instances, *v.g.* the damage done by poisonous and voracious animals, thunder, lightning, and tempests, &c.

As to that part of the objection which relates to the *serpent*, it is probable his form might be considerably changed, perhaps from that of a winged animal: and as this would be the means of confirming the faith of the penitents in their expected victory over the great enemy, (of which it was indeed a kind of miraculous attestation,) and of mortifying that evil spirit whose organ the serpent had been, there could be no injustice in this, nor indeed any cruelty; for beasts being designed for the use of men, we may as well grant, that one species might be debased to a lower kind of life for his instruction and comfort as that such multitudes of individuals should be daily sacrificed to his support.

Mede's Works, p. 229—233.

Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. i. p. 69, &c.

Jenkins of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 246—248.

SECT. IV. It is objected, that the *Deluge* could not possibly have been *universal*, because no stock of water could be found sufficient to overflow the earth to such a degree as *Moses* has represented.

To this we chuse not to answer, by denying the universality of the deluge, as many have done, the words of *Moses* being so express, *Gen.* vi. 12, 13, 17. vii. 4, 19—23. and indeed if it were not universal, there would have been no need of an ark to preserve a race of men and beasts: to which we may add, that the animal and vegetable *fossils*, dug up in all parts of the world, are demonstrative proofs that the deluge extended over the whole earth: and there is little room to doubt but the number of mankind, considering their longevity, would by that time have been abundantly sufficient to people the earth. We therefore rather reply, by observing, that though the quantity of water which could naturally be furnished by *rain* should indeed be allowed insufficient for that purpose, yet it is possible, according to Dr. *Burnet's* scheme, that part of the outward crust of the earth might be broken, and fall into the *abyss*, which might by that means be thrown up and dashed abroad to such a degree, as to overflow the highest mountains, which he thinks then first raised.

Others

Others, as Mr. *Whiston*, suppose a comet (which his antagonist Dr. *Keil* was compelled by his arguments to acknowledge, did probably pass near the earth at that time,) might overwhelm it by its atmosphere.—Others endeavour to account for it, by supposing the center of gravity was changed, or that the waters of the abyss were in an extraordinary manner drawn up on this occasion.—But if none of these hypotheses be admitted, there is no absurdity in supposing a *miraculous* production of water, or a miraculous removal of it: since it is most certain, if the history of the Old Testament be credible, (as we have before proved) miracles have been often wrought upon much less important occasions.

<i>Burnet's Theory</i> , vol. i. l. i. c. ii, iii. p. 10—46. c. vi. p. 89—102.	<i>Rev. exam.</i> vol. i. Diff. x. p. 171, &c.
<i>Whiston's Theory</i> , p. 376—400.	<i>Nichols's Confer.</i> vol. ii. p. 184, &c.
<i>Keil's Exam. of Burn. and Whiston</i> , p. 28—34, 177, 178, 202.	<i>Edw. Exercitat.</i> N ^o . ii. p. 26, &c.
<i>Saurin's Diff.</i> vol. i. p. 95—110.	<i>Univ. Hist.</i> vol. i. p. 95—103.
	<i>Ray's 3 Disc.</i> N ^o . ii.

SECT. V. It is further objected, that an ark of such dimensions as *Noah's*, could not hold creatures of all species, and the stock of provision for a whole year, which yet the history asserts. To this it is answered, LECT. CXLVI.

1. That we do not certainly know the exact length of the *cubit*, by which the dimensions of the ark are computed: but

2. Many critics have shewn, that on the common computation of the cubit, the ark being 150 yards long, 251 broad, and 15 high, was at least as large as one of our first rate men of war; nay, some say, as large as five of them: and they have endeavoured to prove, if it were so, that it might contain both the animals and their provision. The controversy is too large and nice to be represented here, but may be seen in a good abstract in

<i>Wells's Geog. of the Old Test.</i> vol. i. p. 90—91.	<i>Hallet on Heb.</i> xi. 7.
<i>Saurin's Diff.</i> vol. i. p. 86—92.	<i>Wilkin's Real Charact.</i> part ii. c. v. § 6,
<i>Univ. Hist.</i> vol. i. p. 103, 104.	7. p. 162—168.
<i>Calmet's Dict.</i> vol. i. p. 190, &c.	<i>Stillingsf. Orig. Sac.</i> l. iii. c. iv. § 7. p. 551, 552.

SECT. VI. Seeing the *rainbow* appears a phænomenon necessarily resulting from the nature of light, and form and situation of drops of falling rain, it is represented as an absurdity, that *Moses* speaks of it as created after the flood, and as the sign of a covenant then made.

To this Dr. Burnet answers, by supposing that no rain fell before the flood: Mr. *Whiston*, by saying there were no such heavy showers as are requisite to the producing this phænomenon but it seems more reasonable to believe, that God took a phænomenon before appearing, and appropriated it to a particular use, directing that it should be considered as *his* bow; and that when men saw it, they should recollect and rejoice in the assurance which he had given them, that

that the flood should never be repeated; and accordingly, the original of Gen. ix. 14. may be rendered, "and when I bring a cloud over the earth, and the bow is seen in the cloud, I will also remember my covenant."

Nichols's Conf. vol. i. p. 79. &c. Oct. Ed.

Burnet's Theory, l. ii. c. v. p. 319—

329.

Whiston's Theory, l. iii. c. iii. p. 258,

259. *ibid.* l. iv. c. iii. p. 371.

Saurin's Diff. l. i. p. 126—129.

SECT. VII. It is further objected, that as the *Mosaic* history supposes all mankind descended from *Noah*, it will be impossible to account for the original of the *Blacks*, admitting *Noah* and his wife to have been *white*.

Mr. *Whiston* answers this, by supposing that *Ham* was turned black upon his father's curse, as according to him *Cain* had before been. But if Gen. vi. 2. is to be understood (as it probably is) of the descendents of *Seth*, and the daughters of *Cain*, that supposition is directly contrary to *Moses's* account; at best it is a very precarious conjecture; and it seems more probable, that the heat of the climate should have produced that change, or strength of imagination in some pregnant woman, which might as well blacken the whole skin of a child, for any thing we can perceive, as stain some particular part of the body, in the manner which it is plain in fact it often does.

Snelgrave's Guinea, p. 51.

Whiston against *Collins*.

Medley's Translation of *Kolben's History*,
of the *Hottentots*, p. 55, 56.

Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 137—143. Ed.

12mo, p. 79, &c. Oct.

Univ. Hist. vol. i. p. 47, 48.

SECT. VIII. The peopling *America*, and several *Islands*, in which mischievous terrestrial animals are found, though many of the more useful were entirely wanting when they were first discovered by the *Europeans*, is urged as a strong argument against the universality of the deluge, and therefore the credibility of the *Mosaic* history.

The supposition of a north-east passage for men might possibly be allowed; but how those wild creatures should be brought thither, which men would not transport, and which cannot subsist in a cold country, must remain a difficulty which we cannot undertake to solve, if the universality of the deluge be allowed; for that there should have been so vast a tract of land in or near the torrid zone, as must have been necessary for the joining *Africa* to *America*, and that it is now sunk in the sea, is a mere hypothesis, which has not the least foundation in history. But it may deserve enquiry how far it is apparent fact, that voracious animals, not amphibious, and living only in hot countries, are to be found in *America*. It is certain, that some, to whose constitution a hot climate is most suited, will live in a colder and sometimes propagate there; and that there are great degrees of heat in the summer-months to a great height of northern latitude; which, when we consider the velocity with which these creatures run, may account for their travelling to some places where there might be a passage by

by water, or perhaps a passage by land, though since fallen into the sea, the straits of which are well known to be very narrow, where *North America* comes nearest to *Tartary*.

<i>Witsii Misc. Sac. vol. ii. Ex. 13. § 26.</i>	<i>Whiston's Theory, p. 409.</i>
<i>Ex. 14. § 45.</i>	<i>Universal History, p. 104. vol. i.</i>
<i>Nich. Conf. vol. i. p. 133—137, 144</i>	<i>Still. Orig. Sac. l. iii. c. iv. § 4. p. 541—</i>
<i>—158. Ed. 12mo, p. 87. Oct.</i>	<i>543.</i>

SECT. IX. The *confusion of languages* at the *tower of Babel* is represented by some as unnecessary, seeing a diversity of tongues must naturally have arisen in process of time. But it may be answered,

1. That so vast a diversity as there is in the names of the most common things, can hardly be accounted for in a natural way, there not being the least trace of any one common original language.

2. If it might *in time* naturally have happened, it cannot from thence be inferred, that a miracle, whereby it should *instantaneously* have been brought about at first, was therefore unworthy of God, and consequently incredible.

Others have replied, that all that passed at the building at *Babel*, referred to in this objection, was only a division of *counsels* and *sentiments*, or some discord in *affection*, represented by dividing their *speech*, whereas they were before unanimous: or at most, some disorder miraculously produced in their organs of speech, in consequence of which, their language would be unintelligible to each other: both which opinions the learned *Vitringa* has illustrated at large; tho' there does not seem any great necessity for having recourse to them.

<i>Still. Orig. Sac. l. iii. c. v. § 2—4.</i>	<i>Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. ii. p. 105—</i>
<i>Shuckford's Connect. vol. i. p. 124—</i>	<i>111.</i>
<i>140.</i>	<i>Vitringa's Observat. l. i. Diff. i. c. ix.</i>

SECT. X. Others have objected the impossibility of raising such an empire, as the *Assyrian* is said to have been, within 150 years after *Noah*.

To this Sir *Isaac Newton* answers, by fixing the date of the *Assyrian* empire 1300 years later; and Dr. *Winder* has taken great pains to prove, that the account we have of the series of the ancient *Assyrian* monarchs is very precarious. Sir *Isaac's* arguments are largely considered by Dr. *Shuckford*; who by the way supposes *Noah* to have been the *Fohi* of the *Chinese*, in which Mr. *Whiston* also agrees with him. Others make the distance between *Noah* and *Nimrod* to have been much greater than our copies of the Bible represent it.—It is perhaps on the whole most reasonable to conclude, that though the *Assyrian* empire was very ancient, yet the extraordinary accounts, which *Herodotus* and *Ctesias* give us of the greatness of it under *Ninus* and *Semiramis*, are fictitious, as many things related by those authors undoubtedly are.

<i>Newton's Chronology, c. iii.</i>	<i>Winder's Hist. of Knowl. vol. ii. p. 66—</i>
<i>Whiston's Remarks on Newton.</i>	<i>68, 296—299.</i>
<i>Shuckf. Conf. vol. ii. Pref. p. 23—53.</i>	<i>Whiston's Theory, p. 137—141.</i>
<i>Still. Orig. Sac. l. iii. c. iv. § 9.</i>	<i>Jackson's Chronology.</i>
<i>Cumberland, Orig. Gent.</i>	

SECT.

SECT. XI. It is urged, that such a *number* of *inhabitants*, as are said to have dwelt in the land of *Canaan*, could not possibly have been supported there, *viz.* a million and a half of fighting men, (2 *Sam.* xxiv. 19. 1 *Chron.* xxi. 5.) nor such a stock of *cattle* be furnished out there, as are said to have been sacrificed, especially by *Solomon* at the *dedication* of the temple; (*viz.* an hundred and twenty thousand sheep and twenty-two thousand oxen, 1 *Kings* viii. 63.)—To this it may be answered, that if there be no mistake in the numbers, it is to be ascribed to the extraordinary fruitfulness of the soil; to which it may be added, that as some neighbouring princes, who had been subdued by *David*, paid their tribute in *cattle*, they might furnish out the extraordinary sacrifice referred to. See 2 *Kings* iii. 4.

Maund. Trav. p. 65, 69.

| *Delany's Life of David, in Loc.*

SECT. XII. It is urged as an impossibility, that *David*, notwithstanding all his conquests, should be able to amass those vast treasures mentioned 1 *Chron.* xxix. 4. & 7. which are computed by *Le Clerc* at *eight hundred millions* sterling, a sum, which is thought to exceed all the gold of all the princes upon earth put together. To this it is answered,

1. That the value of *gold* not being then so great with respect to *silver* as it now is, their wealth is not to be estimated merely by the quantity of gold which they had; and on this principle Mr. Whiston reduces the gold to less than *one tenth* of the common computation; supposing its value to *silver* as their specific gravities, *i. e.* 19 : 11 whereas the former makes it 16 : 1.

2. There is reason to believe, that a great quantity of the gold then used has long ago been destroyed and lost: yet it must be owned that more gold has probably been dug out of the mines in *America* in one year, than can wear out in many ages: but it is not unlikely that much may have been buried, and so have perished.

3. That there is a great deal of uncertainty in the principles on which the *worth* of those talents is computed; as appears from the different accounts which learned men give of it; and possibly the word *talent* may sometimes be put for *wedge*.

4. That as *numeral letters* were used in the oldest copies of the *Hebrew Bible*, it is not to be wondered if transcribers might sometimes mistake them; and it is to be remembered, that this thought may also be applied to some certain *contradictions*, where *numbers* are in question.

As to that part of the objection, which relates to the impossibility of expending those treasures upon the building described, we are to observe, that none can tell the curiosity of the carved work, the height of wages which artists would demand of so rich a prince as *Solomon*, for so celebrated a building, nor the number of *gems* which might be used in some of the ornaments either of vestments or other furniture, 1 *Chron.* xxix. 2, 8. 2 *Chron.* iii. 6. See *Delany's Life of David*.

Doddridge's Fam. Ex. vol. ii. § 165. | *Whiston's Descript. of the Temp.* c. xiii.

p. 403. Note (a) Ed. 1.

| *Homer's Iliad*, l. xxiii. ver. 750—751.

Le Clerc Eccl. Hist. Prol. p. 39, 40.

SECT.

SECT. XIII. As to the objections that are brought against some accounts of miracles, v. g. that of Balaam's ass speaking, the exploits of Sampson, &c. it is to be remembered in general, that we are very imperfect judges what is fit for God to do; and various things said by good commentators on these heads are well worthy of being considered. *Sampson's foxes*, of which there might be many in that country, might be caught by others, or brought to him by miracle; not to say, that a little alteration in the points of the word *פְּעָלָיו* will justify our translating it *sheaves*, instead of *foxes*.

Memoirs of Lit. vol. i. p. 43—45. | Patrick in loc.

PROPOSITION CXX.

To enquire into and vindicate several passages of the Old Testament, which are charged by the enemies of revelation as *immoralities*.

LECT.
CXLVII.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. The command of God to *Abraham* to sacrifice his own son, is said to have been no other than a command to commit murder in its most horrid form and circumstances.—Dr. Warburton has taken a singular method of removing this difficulty, by maintaining that the command was merely *symbolical*, or an information by *action*, instead of words, of the great sacrifice for the redemption of mankind, given at the earnest request of *Abraham*, who longed impatiently to see *Christ's day*. *John viii. 56. Compare Heb. xi. 19.*

Warburton's Div. Leg. vol. ii. p. 589—627, Ed. 1.

On the common interpretation it may be replied, that God, as the great Lord of life, may, whenever he pleases, command one creature to be the instrument of death to another; though it may be owned, that where such circumstances as these attended the trial, there would have been great reason for *Abraham* to have suspected this pretended revelation to have been a delusion, had he not been before fully and certainly acquainted with the method of God's converse with him, to such a degree as to exclude all possibility of mistake. Vid *Prop. 95. Schol. 2.*

Chubb's Previous Question.

Tillotson's Works, vol. ii. Serm. ii. p. 12—16.

Revelation exam. with Cand. vol. ii.

Diff. vii, viii.

Bayle's Dict. vol. i. p. 95. Note G, H.

Hallet's Immor. of the Mor. Phil. p. 13

—15.

Leland against Morgan, vol. i. c. v. p. 155

—176.

Chandler against Morgan, part i. § 7.

SECT. II. The *Israelites* borrowing by the divine command vessels of the *Egyptians*, upon their retreat from *Egypt*, which they never intended to restore, is objected as an evident act of injustice. To this it has been replied,

Z z

1. That

1. That the word *לָקַח* which we render *borrow*, may be rendered *demand*, and so their vessels might be required as an equivalent for the labours they had for so many years given to the *Egyptians*. Or,

2. Had they intended only *at first* to *borrow* them, the pursuit of the *Egyptians* afterwards, with an intent to destroy them, would have given them a right to have plundered their country, as well as their dead bodies, and therefore much more evidently to retain those goods of theirs already in their hands.

Burnet at Boyle's Lett. vol. ii. p. 190 | *Phœnix*, vol. ii. p. 420.

—193.

Tillotson's Works, vol. ii. p. 24.

| *Hopkins's Works*, p. 195.

SECT. III. The dreadful execution to be done on the *Canaanites* by the divine command, is urged as an act of the greatest cruelty and injustice.—Some have endeavoured to extenuate this, by arguing from *Deut.* xx. 10. compared with *Josh.* xi. 19, 20. that conditions of peace were to be offered them: but waving that, in consideration of *Deut.* vii. 1, 2, 5, 16. and many other parallel texts, (compare *Deut.* xx. 15, 16. *Josh.* ix. 6, 7, 24.) it may with greater certainty be replied,

1. That God as their offended creator had a right to their forfeited lives, and therefore might as well destroy them and their posterity by the sword of the *Israelites*, as by famine, pestilence, fire and brimstone rained from heaven, or any other calamity appearing to come more immediately from himself.

2. The wickedness of this people, especially as aggravated by the destruction of *Sodom*, was such as made the execution done upon them an useful lesson to neighbouring nations. Compare *Gen.* xv. 16. *Lev.* xviii. 20—28. *Jude* i. 4—7. *Wisd.* xii. 3—7.

3. That the miracles wrought in favour of the *Israelites*, not only at their coming out of *Egypt*, but their entrance on *Canaan*, proved that they were indeed commissioned as God's executioners, and consequently that their conduct was not to be a model for conquerors in ordinary cases.

4. That there was a peculiar propriety in destroying those sinners by the sword of *Israel*; as that would tend to impress the *Israelites* more strongly with an abhorrence of the idolatry and other vices of those nations, and consequently subserve the design of keeping them a distinct people, adhering to the worship of the true God, who was so gracious to mankind in general, as well as to them in particular.—After all, had any among the *Canaanites* surrendered themselves at discretion to the God of *Israel*, a new case would have arisen not expressly provided for in the law, in which it is probable God, upon being consulted by *Urim* and *Thummim*, would have spared the lives of such penitents, and either have incorporated them with the *Israelites* by circumcision, or have ordered them a settlement in some neighbouring country, as the family of *Rabab* seems to have had.

Shuckf. Connect. vol. iii. p. 432—446. | *Lowman Heb. Gov.* p. 220—231.

Leland against Morgan.

SECT.

SECT. IV. The punishing *children* for the sins of their *parents* has been charged as injustice. It is replied,

1. That, generally speaking, this was forbidden to the *Israelites*, *Deut.* xxiv. 16. *Ezek.* xviii. 20. excepting the singular instance mentioned *Deut.* xiii. 12, &c.

2. That the general threatening in the *second commandment* may only amount to a declaration, that idolatry should be punished with judgments which should affect succeeding generations, as captivity and war would certainly do.

3. That in particular instances, such as *Josh.* vii. 24, 25. *Numb.* xvi. 27—33. and the destruction of the houses of the wicked kings by a divine sentence, the terrible executions customary in the East abated something of the horror of it; and where innocent children were concerned, God as the Lord of all might make them recompense in a future state: and when we consider him under this character, and to remember that we are to judge of his conduct towards any creatures, not by what befalls them in this life, any more than by what befalls them in any particular day or place of their abode, the greatest part of the objection will vanish; which seems to be grounded on this obvious mistake, that it is not righteous in *God* to do, what it would be unjust for *man* to do in the like circumstances, forgetting the infinite difference of the relation.

4. It is so plain in fact, that children often suffer in their constitutions, and sometimes lose their lives even in their infancy, by means of the sins of parents committed before such children were born; that nothing can vindicate the apparent conduct of Providence in such instances, but such principles as will likewise vindicate the passage of scripture here under consideration.

Dr. *Warburton* has a peculiar notion on this subject; that while the *Israelites* were under an *equal providence*, and the state of future rewards and punishments was little known, this was a kind of additional sanction to their laws, which was afterwards reversed when a future state came more in view, in the declining days of their commonwealth. But perhaps it might rather be intended as an oblique *insinuation* of this state; since certainly with relation to *individuals*, it was an *unequal* providence. Compare *Matt.* xxiii. 29—36.

Warburton's Div. Leg. vol. ii. p. 452—461.

SECT. V. God's *hardening* the heart of *Pharaoh*, in the circumstances in which he threatens to do it, *Exod.* vii. 3—5. is further charged as inconsistent with his holiness and justice.

Ans. By God's *hardening the heart* of any person, we are to understand his exercising such providential dispensations, as he knew in fact would be perverted by that person as an occasion of more obstinate sin, God at the same time not interposing to prevent this effect: compare *Exod.* vii. 22. viii. 15, 32. and thus *prophets* are said to harden men's hearts, by taking measures which, though in their own nature adapted to subdue them, would in fact (as God knew and revealed to them) be attended with their greater hardness. *Isa.* vi. 9, 10.

2. That the foreknowledge of such an event, supposing as we do that it was not rendered *necessary*, would nevertheless leave a righteous God at liberty to take such measures as the circumstances of the case would otherwise admit: for if we did not allow this, it would be equally impossible to vindicate the main course of God's conduct towards his creatures, especially the universality of his providence, and the certainty of his prescience.

3. If we should say with M. Saurin and others, that this hardening the heart was the *immediate operation* of God upon the mind, in consequence of which the obstinacy of Pharaoh became unavoidable, and which was itself a *punishment* of former sin, it must be allowed that it is not inconsistent with justice to inflict such a punishment, which is indeed no other than a terrible kind of *lunacy*: but whether a man in that state could be said to be *punished* for that *hardness*, remains a further question. Compare *Exod.* ix. 12. x. 20, 27. xi. 10. with vii. 22. viii. 15, 32.

Limborch. Theol. l. vi. c. ix.
Fleetwood on Mir. p. 64—81.

Turret. Loc. vi. Quest. 4, 5, 7. § 14, 15.
Saurin's Dissert. vol. ii. p. 116—125.

SECT. VI. The law which appointed *idolatry* to be punished with *death*, is objected to as an invincible bar to all freedom of enquiry, and a foundation for persecution, which has already been proved to be contrary to the light of nature, *Deut. xiii. pass. Vid. Prop. 77.*

Ans. 1. Though we readily allow, that persecution is an evil in a state of nature, yet perhaps it may be asserted, that as the divine Being knows what degree of evidence will attend any doctrine of religion in any given circumstances of time, place, and person, which we cannot judge of, *He* may pass sentence upon idolaters, and other profane persons, where *human* laws cannot safely do it.

2. As God was the *temporal king* of *Israel*, and even their kings were only his *Viceroy*s, idolatry was in the nature of *high treason*, and therefore justly punishable as by their *statute* laws.

3. It is also to be remembered, that God gave the land of *Canaan* with many temporal emoluments to the *Israelites*, as a reward of their obedience to him: it was therefore equitable, that in case of disobedience to some of his most important laws, they should be subject to some peculiar temporal penalties, and even to death itself, if this act were committed during their abode in that land.

4. Nevertheless it is to be observed, that the *Israelites* are never commissioned to make war upon their neighbours, or exercise any violence towards any of them, in order to *compel* them to worship the God of *Israel*; nor to force them to it even after they were conquered: *Deut. xx. 10.* nor are they impowered thus forcibly to attempt to recover any *native Israelite*, who should revolt to idolatry, and go to settle in a gentile country.

5. As God had placed the *Israelites* under such an extraordinary equal providence, that the prosperity of the country should depend upon their adherence to the true God, in opposition to idols, his commanding them to put to death the beginner of a revolt, was a wise precaution; and such an one as in these circumstances even human prudence might have suggested to subordinate governors, if such governors had been permitted to make capital laws.

6. When we consider how great a good it would have been to the *whole world*, that *Israel* should continued to maintain the knowledge and worship of the true God in opposition to all idolatry, it will further appear, that a constitution deterring them from idolatry would be merciful to *the world* in general as well as their nation, in proportion to the degree in which it was severe to any particular offenders.

Burnet's Pref. to Laet. on the Death of | *Locke on Toleration, Lett. i. p. 51—55.*
Persecut. p. 18, 19. | *Doddridge's Serm. on Persec. p. 29—33.*

SECT. VII. The execution of the descendants of *Saul*, 2 *Sam.* xxi. 2. is further urged as an instance of human sacrifice, entirely inconsistent with the light of nature. LECT. CXLVIII.

To this we answer, not by saying that the persons here condemned to death might be personally concerned in the cruelties before exercised on the *Gibeonites*, which some of them on account of their infant age must have been entirely incapable of; neither do we ascribe it to the supposed injustice of keeping possession of the *Gibeonitish* cities, on which Dr. *Delaney* lays so much stress on the slender evidence of 1 *Sam.* xxii. 7. compare 1 *Sam.* viii. 14. and *Josh.* xviii. 25. neither do we say that it was merely an act of cruelty in the *Gibeonites*, and unacceptable to God; since it is said, *he was on this intreated for the land.* It must rather be answered,

1. By saying, on the principles laid down § 4. (to which indeed this instance does properly belong) that we cannot reasonably affirm universally, that it is unjust in God, or unbecoming any of his perfections, to inflict temporal calamities or even death itself on one person, for the crimes of another, to whom the person suffering was nearly related, nor can the death of those descendants of *Saul* be called a *human sacrifice*, on any other principle, than that on which the execution of malefactors with their families in any instance may be so called.

2. That the circumstances of the case here were such, as might well justify some extraordinary severity, and make it on the whole a blessing to the public; as it would be a useful lesson to all succeeding princes, to take care how they violated any of the laws of the *Theocracy*, when they saw the breach of one of those treaties made at the time of their first settlement, so terribly avenged on the house of their first king; and it would probably be a means of awakening the people to some sense of religion, when they saw such a remarkable hand of God interposing, in the death of those persons, to remove the famine which had lain so long upon them.

3. That

3. That sufficient provision was made by the express law of God, to prevent their bringing such extraordinary instances as this into a precedent to direct their own conduct by in common cases. Vid. § 4. gr. 1, compare 2 Kings xiv. 5, 6 *.

Clarius in Loc.

| *Grotius de Jure, l. ii. c. xxi. § 24.*

SECT. VIII. Some have thought that *human sacrifices* in general were authorized by *Lev. xxvii. 28, 29.* on which they suppose that *Jephtha* proceeded in the sacrifice of his daughter. Concerning this precept, (which common sense would teach us requires some limitation,) we observe,

1. It is evident that God expressly forbid the *Israelites* to sacrifice their children to him, *Deut. xii. 30, 31. Jer. vii. 31.* compare *Lev. xviii. 21. xx. 2. Psal. cvi. 37, 38. Ezek. xvi. 20, 21.*

2. There is no reason to believe, that he allowed even of the sacrifice of *slaves*, (1.) Because no peculiar rites are prescribed for that dreadful sacrifice, tho' a distinction is made in the burnt-offerings of herds, flocks, and birds, *Lev. i. pass.* (2.) Because none of the *Canaanites* (accursed as they were) are directed to be reserved for the altar, not even *Kings* taken alive, though they might have seemed the noblest sacrifice. (3.) Because the sacrifice of a *man*, is proverbially used to express what is as abominable to God, as that of a dog or swine, *Isa. lxvi. 3.* (4.) Because a *Jewish priest* would have been rendered *unclean*, and incapable of attending the sanctuary, by the touch of a *dead body*, though it had fallen down in the temple by chance; much less can we imagine he would have been allowed to cut it to pieces and lay it on the altar.

3. Nothing that was *devoted* could be sacrificed at all; so that this text cannot in the clause of it refer to sacrifice. 1 *Sam. xv. 3. 15—22.*

4. This therefore refers to a vow to destroy the inhabitants of any place which they made war against, and was intended to make them cautious in laying themselves under such obligations. Compare *Numb. xxi. 1—3. Deut. xxv. 17—19. Josh. vi. 17, 18. viii. 24—26.* See also *Judg. xxi. 5. 1 Sam. xiv. 24, 39.*

5. The words therefore should be rendered, “no devoted thing which a man shall have devoted to the Lord,” and the *field of his possession* may be equivalent to the *land* of it, and may include any such place as *Jericho*, which by the way might be a lasting and very useful memorial, and (as it were) a sepulchral monument of the pride and strength of *Canaan*. Compare 1 *Chron. i. 46. Psal. lxxviii. 12. Neb. xiii. 10.* in all which places, *field* is put for land or country.

6. On this interpretation, it would by a strong consequence imply, that none had a power of pardoning those that were condemned to death by God's law; which may be more expressly intimated *ver. 29.* compare *Exod. xxii. 20. Deut. xxi. 22, 23. xiii. 12—17.*

* See on this subject Dr. Chandler's answer to the *History of the man after God's own heart.*

7. The law forbidding murder in general, was equivalent to a prohibition devoting any human creature to death, unless in some extraordinary cases by public authority.—As for the invidious turn which is given to the law of *redeeming* the first-born, as if it implied they must otherwise have been *sacrificed*, since says *Morgan*, there is no reason to believe they would have been redeemed from a *benefit*; it may be questioned whether the eldest sons of families would have chosen the life of *Levites*. But waving this, the insinuation may be sufficiently answered by observing, that God having asserted a peculiar right to the *first-born*, and yet by the choice of the *Levites* having precluded other families from serving at his altar; had not such a pecuniary acknowledgment been made, he might probably have punished the neglect of the parents, by taking away their children in their infancy, *Exod.* xiii. 2, 13. Compare *Exod.* iv. 24—26.

Morgan's Mor. Phil. p. 128—137.

Immor. of Mor. Phil. p. 11—13, 15, 16.

Leland against Tindal, vol. ii. p. 468

—476.

Family Exp. on Luke ii. 23. Note b.

Selden, de Jure, l. iv. c. vi. vii. § 9—11.

Hallet on Heb. xi. 32. p. 46.

Festus & Paulus in Verb. sacer & sa-

cratae leges.

N. B. What Dr. Sykes has advanced in favour of his interpretation, which supposes the meaning of *Lev.* xxvii. 28, 29. to be “whatever shall be consecrated to the service of God, shall die in its devoted state,” has not altered my judgment of this text: because it seems that the *הרוג* always implies the death of any living creature, whether man or beast, to which it is applied; and consequently though *מות ימות* signifies *dying* in the general, yet in this connection it must signify (as it is generally allowed to do) being *put to death*: nor does it any where signify, dying in the state in which a person is, but always implies death by a *divine sentence*, if not by a *violent stroke*.

Sykes's Connect. c. xiii.

SECT. IX. The putting a *lying spirit* into the mouth of *Abab's* prophets, is a circumstance often mentioned upon this occasion, 1 *Kings* xxii. 19. But the plain answer to this is, that *Micaiah's* speech was merely a *parable*; and the intent of it, according to the eastern manner, was only to declare, that God had permitted the prophets of *Baal* to impose upon *Abab* by a falsehood.

Patrick in loc.

SECT. X. It is said that the whole book of *Job* turns upon a *wrong moral*, and represents God as over-bearing *Job* by superior power, rather than convincing him by rational arguments. Vid. *Job* xxxviii—xli.

Ans. 1. In these chapters not merely the *power* but also the *wisdom* of God is insisted upon, as illustrated in the works of creation and providence; and nothing could have been more proper to convince *Job* how unfit it was for him

to censure any of the divine proceedings, as in the transport of his grief he had sometimes done.

2. That the awful display here made of the divine power and sovereign majesty was by no means improper, because it would tend to convince *Job* of his fault, in treating this tremendous Being with so little reverence in some of his late discourses, and also as it would by consequence prove the equity of God's administration, since it could be no profit to him that he should oppress; and would give *Job* such a sense of the malignity of every sin, even those imperfections which were consistent with the general integrity and piety of his own temper, as might teach him to accept all his severest afflictions, as no more than what he had justly deserved; and accordingly we find it had this effect on the mind of that good man. *Job* xl. 3—5. xlii. 1—6.

N. B. If Dr. Warburton's ingenious hypothesis concerning the book of *Job* be admitted, that it was written by *Ezra*, upon the plan of a true ancient story, with some particular view to the state of the *Jews* in his time, the difficulty concerning the morality of it, and the foundation of this solution, will continue much the same.

Warburton's Div. Leg. vol. ii. p. 483—542. | *Grey's Lett. to Warb.* p. 121, 122.

SECT. XI. That *inveteracy of spirit*, which is sometimes expressed in the *Psalms*, is excepted against, as inconsistent with humanity, as well as with the spirit of the gospel. Compare *Psal.* lxix. 22, &c. cix. 6, &c. cxxxvii. 8, 9.—To this it is answered,

1. As God was in a peculiar manner the temporal prince of *Israel*, these passages may be considered in the same view as petitions offered to a prince by an oppressed subject, demanding sentence against such criminals as were the proper objects of his public justice: and the natural manner in which the sense of injury and hope of redress are expressed, is no inconsiderable internal argument of the credibility of scripture; as Dr. *Jackson*, according to his usual penetration, has well observed.

2. That in many of these places, the genius of the *Hebrew* language will allow us to suppose, that the *imperative* is put for the *future*; so that they might be understood as *prophetic denunciations* rather than imprecations. Compare *Acts* i. 18—20.

3. That if we suppose the prophets to have received a revelation from God, that such and such calamities should be inflicted on the obstinate enemies of God and his people, it may be defended as a temper of mind no way inconsistent with virtue, thus to pray for their destruction, and thereby to express an acquiescence in the justice and wisdom of the divine proceedings: and accordingly celestial spirits are represented by that benevolent apostle *John*, as addressing such prayers to God, *Rev.* vi. 9—11. xvi. 5—7. xviii. 4—7. Or if none of these, which have all their weight, should be admitted as applicable to every case, it might be said,

4. That

4. That we have no where asserted the degree of inspiration to be such in all the poetical composures of scripture, as to leave no room for small irregular workings of human passions, in the hearts of those good men, by whom the scriptures were written. *Jer. xx. 14—18.*

<i>Jenkins of Christianity, vol. ii. c. xix.</i>		<i>Jackson's Cred. l. i. part ii. § 1. c. iii. p.</i>
<i>p. 335—342.</i>		<i>36, 37. 4to. ap. Op. vol. i. p. 26.</i>
<i>Lowth on Insp. p. 216—228.</i>		

SECT. XII. It is said that in the whole book of *Esther*, there is no mention of *God*, though the interposition of providence there be so remarkable; which seems very little agreeable to the genius of the rest of the Old Testament.

To this some would answer, by allowing it doubtful whether this is to be included among the canonical books: and indeed there is hardly any more dubious. Others conclude that the additional chapters preserved in the *Greek* translation were originally a part of the book, which if they are, there can be no room at all for the objection here proposed. But we choose rather to say, there is a plain acknowledgment of divine providence supposed in *Esther's* fasting, which no doubt was attended with prayer to the God of *Israel*. The custom of speaking, at the time and in the place where this was written, might be different from that used at the time and place in which the other penmen of scripture wrote: and on the whole, the omission of the name of God, where there were so many proper occasions to introduce it, would rather be an argument against its being written by *suggestion*, which there is no apparent reason to assert, than against the *truth* of the history: nevertheless it is proper here to observe, how great an argument it is in favour of the credibility of all the other books, that such a continued regard to God runs through the whole of them; and there is in this respect so great a resemblance and harmony between all the writings of both Testaments, as is well worthy of our admiration.

<i>Jackson's Works, l. i. c. v. vol. i. p.</i>		<i>Five Letters of Inspiration p. 249.</i>
<i>19—21.</i>		<i>Lowth on Inspiration p. 200, 201.</i>
<i>Jenkins of Christian. vol. ii. c. iv. p.</i>		<i>Prideaux's Con. vol. i. p. 251—254.</i>
<i>90—93.</i>		

SECT. XIII. It is objected, that the *Song of Solomon* seems to be an amorous poem, and there are some passages in it which shock common decency.—To this we must answer, either by supposing (as some have done) that it is no part of the canon of scripture, or otherwise, by interpreting it in an allegorical sense, as referring to the Messiah and his church: compare *Psal. xlv. passim* with *Heb. i. 8, 9.* If it be said, that on this interpretation there are some indecent figures in it, as there are in *Ezek. xvi, xxiii.* and in many other places; it is answered, that the simplicity of the eastern nations made some of these phrases much less shocking to them, than the delicacy, or

perhaps the licentiousness of these western parts make them to modest people amongst us.

Patrick on Cant. Pref. pass.

Whiston's App. to Ess. for rest. the Can. of Old Testament, &c.

Saurin's Serm. vol. iii. p. 157, 158.

Carpzov. Def. c. iv. p. 195—227.

SECT. XIV. *Tindal* has endeavoured to shew that there are many passages in the Old Testament, which give us a mean and unworthy idea of God : but the particular passages themselves, and the vindication of them, may be seen in the following references; by which it appears that some of these objections are built upon our translation, others of them upon the want of due candour, which would lead a reader of common understanding to expound those expressions figuratively, and to allow for the idiom of the age and country in which they were written; especially considering how plainly those perfections of God are asserted in other passages of this book, which evidently tend to give us the sublimest ideas of him, and lay in an easy and certain remedy against whatever danger could be supposed to arise from the passages excepted against. Compare *Prop. 125.*

Tindal of Christian. c. xiii.

Foster against Tindal, p. 215—230.

Leland against Tindal, vol. ii. c. xi.

Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 160—164.

Guardian, vol. ii. No. 88.

SECT. XV. As for the objections which *Tindal* and *Morgan* have urged against the character of some of the Old Testament saints, it is answered,

1. That some of those facts are expressly condemned by the historians themselves.

2. That others of them are barely mentioned, without any intimation that they are to be commended or imitated.

3. That God might judge it necessary, that the faults of the great founders and heroes of the Jewish nation should be thus circumstantially recorded, that the Jews might be humbled, who were so very ready to grow vain and insolent, and despise all the rest of mankind on account of their relation to them. For this reason also among others, it may be, that *Melchizedeck* and *Job*, and some other good men, not of the Jewish church, are mentioned with so much honour.

4. That notwithstanding this, if the character of many, who were most faulty, be fairly examined, they will be found on the whole to have been excellent men : as may particularly be evinced in that of *David*, whose blemishes were so remarkably great. See *Delaney's* life of that prince *.

5. That the mention of their imperfections and miscarriages, in such a manner as they are mentioned, is so far from being any argument against those

* See on this subject the *History of the man after God's own heart*, and *Dr. Chandler's* answer.

books, that it is a very convincing proof of the integrity of the persons who wrote them, and a glorious internal proof of the truth of the Old Testament, which must be transmitted with it to all succeeding ages.

SECT. XVI. It is objected that 1 *Kings* xv. 5. seems to intimate, that the character of *David* was blameless, except in the business of *Uriah*; whereas his behaviour in the court of *Achish* and on many other occasions was grossly criminal. It is answered, not equally so as in the case of *Uriah*: not to say, that there is not the same evidence for the inspiration of the history of *Kings*, as most of the other books of scripture; nor to insist on the possibility of some intimation received from God, which might have made it entirely lawful for *David* to have fought against *Israel* under *Achish*.

Nearly akin to this, is the objection, that *Jephtha* and *Samson*, though both men of bad moral characters, are reckoned among *the believing worthies* in the eleventh of *Hebrews*. Some have replied to this, by attempting to defend their characters; but perhaps it is sufficient to say, that *Heb.* xi. 39. only relates to such a faith, as might be found in those who were not truly virtuous and religious, which though it might entitle them to some degree of praise for the heroic actions they performed by means of it, could have no efficacy to secure their future and everlasting happiness. Compare 1 *Cor.* xiii. 2. *Matt.* vii. 22, 23.

Ab. Taylor against Watts, p. 96—98. | *Saurin's Serm.* vol. ix. p. 47—53.
Owen on Heb. c. xi. *ad fin.*

PROPOSITION CXXI.

To enumerate some of the chief *contradictions* charged on the scripture, and to give some general solution of them.

PART I.

The enumeration of the chief passages which appear contradictory.

Besides the difference about the *genealogies*, *passover*, and *resurrection* of Christ, the following passages are urged, in which the Old and New Testament disagree with each other, or the Old disagrees with itself.

I. The Old and New Testament disagree,

<i>Matt.</i> xxvii. 9.	compared with	<i>Zech.</i> xi. 12, 13.
<i>Mark</i> ii. 26.	- - - -	1 <i>Sam.</i> xxi. 1.
<i>Luke</i> iv. 25.	- - - -	1 <i>Kings</i> xviii. 1.
<i>Acts</i> vii. 4.	- - - -	<i>Gen.</i> xi. 26, 32. xii. 4.
<i>Acts</i> vii. 14.	- - - -	<i>Gen.</i> xli. 27.
<i>Acts</i> vii. 16.	- - - -	<i>Gen.</i> xxxiii. 18—20.
<i>Gen.</i> xxiii. 9.	- - - -	—xlix. 29—32.
<i>Joshua</i> xxiv. 33.	- - - -	—xxv. 9, 10.
<i>Acts</i> vii. 43.	- - - -	<i>Amos</i> v. 27.

<i>Aels</i> xiii. 20, 21. }	compared with	1 <i>Kings</i> vi. 1.
2 <i>Sam.</i> v. 4. }		
1 <i>Cor.</i> x. 6. - - - -		<i>Numb.</i> xxv. 9.
<i>Heb.</i> ix. 4. - - - -		1 <i>Kings</i> viii. 9.

2. In the Old Testament the following passages are objected to as contradictory.

<i>Ezra</i> ii. - - - -	<i>Neb.</i> vii. 6, &c. [38.
<i>Deut.</i> x. 8. - - - -	<i>Numb.</i> xx. 23—29 xxxiii. 30, 37.
<i>Exod.</i> vii. 19, 22. - - - -	<i>Exod.</i> vii. 22.
<i>Isa.</i> vii. 4, 8. - - - -	2 <i>Kings</i> xvii. 1, &c.
2 <i>Sam.</i> viii. 13. }	<i>Psal.</i> lx. title.
1 <i>Chron.</i> xviii. 12. }	
1 <i>Sam.</i> xviii. 8, 19. }	1 <i>Sam.</i> xxv. 44.
2 <i>Sam.</i> xxi. 8, 9. }	2 <i>Sam.</i> iii. 15.
2 <i>Chron.</i> xv. 19. }	1 <i>Kings</i> xv. 16, 33.
— xvi. 1. }	— xv. 8.
1 <i>Kings</i> xxii. 43. - - - -	2 <i>Chron.</i> xvii. 6.
2 <i>Sam.</i> xxiv. 24. - - - -	1 <i>Chron.</i> xxi. 25.
1 <i>Kings</i> vii. 26. - - - -	2 <i>Chron.</i> iv. 5.
2 <i>Sam.</i> xxiv. 13. - - - -	1 <i>Chron.</i> xxi. 12.
1 <i>Kings</i> ix. ult. - - - -	2 <i>Chron.</i> viii. ult.
2 <i>Kings</i> i. 17 - - - -	2 <i>Kings</i> vii. 16, 17.
1 <i>Kings</i> iv. 26. - - - -	2 <i>Chron.</i> ix. 25.
1 <i>Chron.</i> xviii. 4. - - - -	2 <i>Sam.</i> viii. 4.
2 <i>Sam.</i> x. 18. - - - -	1 <i>Chron.</i> xix. 18.
1 <i>Chron.</i> xxi. 5. - - - -	2 <i>Sam.</i> xxiv. 9.
1 <i>Chron.</i> xi. 11. - - - -	2 <i>Sam.</i> xxiii. 8.
2 <i>Chron.</i> xxxvi. 9. - - - -	2 <i>Kings</i> xxiv. 8.
2 <i>Chron.</i> xxii. 2. - - - -	2 <i>Chron.</i> xxi. 20.
	2 <i>Kings</i> viii. 26.
2 <i>Chron.</i> xiii. 2. }	
1 <i>Kings</i> xv. 2. }	2 <i>Chron.</i> xi. 20—22.
2 <i>Chron.</i> xxvii. 29. - - - -	2 <i>Kings</i> ix. 27.
2 <i>Chron.</i> xxviii. 20, 21. - - - -	2 <i>Kings</i> xvi. 7—9.

PART 2.

To give the general solution of them.

It may be observed concerning these difficulties in general, that most of them, though not all, relate to *numbers, names, measures, dates, and genealogies*. For the particular solution, see the commentators on each of the places. We shall only offer the following remarks by way of general solution.

1. Many of the *seeming* contradictions may be reconciled to each other, without doing any violence to either of the texts opposed; as the commentators have

have often shewn : the reigns of kings being supposed by different writers to begin from different æras, as they reigned alone or in partnership, and the same person being often called by different names, and different men by the same name.

Newton Chron. præf. p. 255, 266.

2. In other cases, it cannot greatly affect the religious use and end of the Old Testament, to acknowledge that some *numeral* mistakes at least may have crept into our present copies, though perhaps they were not to be found in the first original.

3. It is also to be remembered, that by far the greatest part of these difficulties, indeed near three fourths of them, arise from the book of *Chronicles*, the author of which is unknown, and the evidence of its inspiration less than that of most other books in the Old Testament. See *Prop. 118. Grad. 7.*

Ridgley's Div. vol. i. p. 39, 40.

Burnet's four Disc. p. 60—64.

Turret. loc. ii. Question v.

PROPOSITION CXXII.

To state and answer those objections against the authority of the Old Testament, which have been taken from the fundamental branches of the whole *Jewish æconomy*, and are not referred to *Prop. 120.*

LECT.
CL.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. It is urged, that an institution so over-loaded with *ceremonies* as the *Mosaic* was, could not be of divine original. It is answered,

1. That the genius and circumstances of that people required a more pompous form of worship, than God would otherwise have probably chosen; especially considering their education in the land of *Egypt*, where such worship was so much practised. And thus far *Spencer* seems right, in the general design of his celebrated piece *on the laws of the Hebrews*, though he has carried the matter too far in his particular illustrations.

2. Some of the ceremonies prescribed appear not even to *us* useless and unaccountable, but on the contrary answered some valuable ends : *v. g.* they might serve to guard them against the idolatries and superstition of their neighbours, many of which these rites are so far from imitating, as some learned men have maintained, that (as *Witsius* has largely and excellently proved in his *Ægyptiaca*) they directly oppose them : a subject, which Dr. *Young* has well illustrated in his late discourse *on idolatry*, c. iv, v. They might also bring to their frequent recollection illustrious deliverances wrought out for them, or some important hints of morality, which they represented in such an emblematical way as suited their apprehensions : and above all, they were fitted to make way for the dispensation of the *Messiah* ; partly by the affecting and perpetual display that

there was therein made of the divine majesty, purity and justice, (which not only tended in general to promote morality, but might especially shew how proper and needful it was that such mean, polluted, and guilty creatures should approach him by a mediator,) and partly by the representation of many gospel doctrines, especially relating to the incarnation, atonement and intercession of Christ, as is shewn at large by the apostle in his epistle to the *Hebrews*.

3. It is exceeding probable, that if we had a more particular account of the usages of the neighbouring nations, we might find out of the reasonableness of many of those institutions, which at present appear to us unaccountable; and what we know of the wisdom of some of them, should engage us to judge favourably of others.

4. Those precepts for which we can give no other reason at all, did at least serve to keep the *Jews* a distinct people from all others, which was very proper in order to preserve the worship of the true God among them, and has since been the foundation of all that evidence which arises to christianity for their continuing so distinct, even in the midst of all their dispersions. Compare *Prop. 113. Cor. 1, 2.*

5. They were expressly assured again and again in the plainest words, that the principal stress was not to be laid on ceremonial observances, but that the great duties of morality were of much higher esteem in the sight of God. Vid. *1 Sam. xv. 22, 23. Micah vi. 6—8. Prov. xxi. 3. xv. 8. Hos. vi. 6. Jer. vii. 4—15. Isa. lxvi. 1—3. lviii. 3—10. i. 11—17. Amos v. 21—24. Psal. 1. 8—23.* To which we may add the distinction made between the ceremonial and the moral law, by writing the chief branches of the latter on tables of stone, after they had been pronounced by an audible voice from heaven: not now to insist upon such precepts in the Pentateuch, as *Deut. vi. 4, 5.* and the many parallel passages; which must be sufficient to shew that no ceremonial observances could in themselves alone render them acceptable to God. Compare *Deut. xxvii. 14—26.*

Leland against Tind. vol. i. p. 63—65.

Limb. Collat. Resp. iii. Quest. iv. c. ii, v.

Witsii Aegyptiaca, pass.

Watts's Miscell. N^o. lix. p. 251—258.

Leland against Morg. c. ii. p. 45—59.

Lowman on Heb. Ritual, pass.

SECT. II. To *circumcision* it is objected, that it was cutting off a part of the human body, which had it been superfluous would not have been given to man in his most perfect state, and that it was an operation attended with some danger. It is answered,

1. That it is plain in fact it is not attended with danger; and allowing there might be pain in it, yet that mortification was by no means comparable to the advantages accruing to the *Jews* from that covenant of which it was the sign.

2. That very mortification might be intended to remind them of their obligations to mortify their irregular desires and sensual affections. Vid. *Deut. x. 16. xxx. 6. Jer. iv. 4 Acts vii. 51. Rom. ii. 25—29.*

3. Such

3. Such an indelible mark thus impressed might be a proper token of that covenant, in which succeeding generations were interested, and which contained so great and important a reference to a person who was in future ages to be born, and who was the foundation of the blessings promised to *Abraham* in that covenant of which circumcision was the sign. Not to insist upon what *Drake* has observed, as to the *natural* benefits which might attend this rite, by which as he supposed it was recommended to some neighbouring nations.

Rev. exam. with Cand. vol. ii. Diff. v. | *Answer of Circum. pass. præf.* p. 10—18,
p. 162—168.

Christianity as old as the Creat. p. 90.

Letter to Waterland, p. 33—38.

30—32.

Leland against Tindal, vol. i. p. 65, 66.

Drake's Anat. vol. i. l. i. c. xx. p. 127, 128.

SECT. III. It is also objected, that *sacrifices* are in themselves an absurd and cruel rite, and therefore could not be made a part of a divine institution.

We acknowledge, that without a divine revelation, there could be no reason to believe they would be pleasing to God; but as it is plain they were of very early date, *Gen.* iii. 21. iv. 4. and prevailed almost universally, it is more probable they were of divine original, compare *Heb.* xi. 4.) They might be intended to promote humiliation, by impressing the mind of the offerer with a conviction that death was due to sin; and, as a more perfect atonement was gradually revealed, might lead on their thoughts to it. And when the death of beasts might serve this end, it must certainly be lawful to kill them for sacrifice, as well as for food.—As to their being so much multiplied under the *Mosaic* law, it is to be remembered, that a great part of them went to the priest, and in many cases to the offerer: not to insist on the opinion of some, that the burnt-offerings were not entirely consumed. In some instances, (*v. g.* in the case of sin-offerings) sacrifices were to be considered as a kind of *fine* imposed on the offender, and in many others, as a *tribute* paid to God, the great proprietor and king of the country, for the support of the offices of his household: and there is from the genius of that religion great reason to believe, that a peculiar blessing attended those who presented them, and gave them a more abundant increase in proportion to their pious zeal. Compare *Prov.* iii. 9, 10. *Mal.* iii. 8—11. *Ezek.* xlv. 30.

Blount's Oracles of Reason.

Burnet at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. p. 75,

76, 85—99.

Tindal of Christian. p. 78—80, 91, 92.

Perf. Sat. ii. ver. 44—51.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 95, 96.

Whitby on Hebrews, ix. 19. Note x.

Taylor of Deism, p. 219, 220.

Rev. Exam. &c. vol. i. Diff. viii.

Leland against Tindal, vol. i. p. 66—69.

Philemon to Hydaspes, Lett. v.

SECT. IV. It has further been objected, that the whole mystery of the *Jewish* religion was a contrivance to enslave the people to the power of *priests*, and exhaust

exhaust their revenues to maintain that order. Compare *Deut.* xvii. 8—13. To this it is answered,

1. That the tribe of *Levi* had a right to the *twelfth* part of the land in common with their brethren; so that the allotment of the *cities* mentioned *Numb.* xxxv. 1—8. cannot be fairly brought into the objection, unless it could be proved that in consequence of this allotment, the *Levites* possessed *above* one twelfth of it.

2. That the *tithes*, *first fruits*, &c. appointed to be paid them, were in part a just equivalent for their attendance upon the service of the sanctuary, as well as their care in instructing the people out of the law, and in the payment of this, an extraordinary blessing might be expected, as above.

3. That there was also a *magistracy* among the people, to which the *Priests* and *Levites* were in the same subjection as the rest of the *Israelites*: nor does there appear to be any such exemption in their favour, as many laws established in *Popish* countries have since given to their clergy.

4. That it can never be proved the *Urim* and *Thummim* was an oracle of such a kind, as to put it in the power of the high-priest to produce any new model of government, or in particular instances to rescind such acts of the state as were disagreeable to him, or to grant protection to whom he pleased: for all this goes upon a very precarious supposition, that the high-priest might consult the oracle whenever he pleased, and on whatever question he thought fit, and that the way of answering in that oracle was by the supposed inspiration of the person wearing the breast-plate. And indeed when we consider in how awful a manner God punished *Nadab*, *Abihu*, *Korah* and his associates, *Uzzah* and many more, who presumed to adulterate or profane his institutions, one can never imagine he would have permitted a high-priest in this greatest solemnity to deliver a false oracle in his name, without immediately inflicting some remarkable judgment upon him: and it seems, that had he pretended to be inspired in any case, about which he was not consulted, he would have been liable to be tried, as another person falsely pretending to prophecy.

Morgan's Moral Phil. vol. i. p. 141, | *Lowman's Civ. Gov. of the Heb.* c. xi. p.
267, 268, 272. | 191—217, 245—252.
Leland against Mor. vol. i. p. 218—221. |

SCHOLIUM I.

It may not be improper to observe here, that the very foundation of Dr. *Morgan's* strange calculation, to justify his assertion, that the *Jewish* priests had *twenty shillings* in the *pound*, or that the people paid the value of a *rack-rent* for their pretended free holds, depends upon several falsities, especially this, that he takes it for granted without any proof, that every male was obliged to pay half a *shekel* at each of the yearly feasts which he computes at 1,200,000*l.* per *Annum*.

Morgan, ibid. vol. ii. p. 136, 142—148.

SCHO-

S C H O L I U M 2.

Much in the same strain is that instance of priest-craft, which *Morgan* pretends to find in the institution of the *water of jealousy*, which he represents as a contrivance to make it safe for women to commit adultery with the priests and none but them, *Numb. v. 11—31*.

In answer to this impious thought, it is sufficient to observe, that nothing can be more unjust than to charge so stupid and villainous a contrivance upon so wise and virtuous a person as *Moses* appears to have been, who in the system of his laws has made adultery punishable with death, no less in a priest than any other person. Considering the consequences attending this trial, in case either of innocence or of guilt, it would, on *Morgan's* supposition, be a very ill-judged contrivance: and all that was said under the preceding section concerning the danger of a priest's solemnly profaning the name of God to any fraudulent purpose, would here have the most apparent weight: besides that, the person appointed to preside on this occasion was to be the chief of the *priests then in waiting*, which would render such a conspiracy as *Morgan* supposes utterly impracticable.

SECT. V. It has further been objected, that the *Mosaic* law does not lay a sufficient stress upon the duties of *sobriety*, *temperance*, and *chastity*, nor make a proper provision against the contrary vices: but to this it is replied,

1. As to *riot* and *drunkenness*, it is spoken of with great abhorrence, *Deut. xxix. 19.* and in order to discourage it, there was a special law, which empowered parents even to put their children to death by a legal process, if they continued incurably addicted to it; which was such a provision against the first advances to debaucheries of this kind, as is quite unequalled in the laws of any other nation, *Deut. xxi. 18—21.* To which it may be added, that such provision was made for punishing injurious acts which drunkenness often produces, as would consequently have a further tendency to restrain it.


2. As to *lewdness*, it was provided against, (1.) By a general law, forbidding whoredom in any instance, *Deut. xxiii. 17.* and making it dreadfully capital in case of a *priest's daughter*, *Lev. xxi. 9.* (2.) Adultery was punished with death, *Lev. xx. 10. Deut. xxii. 22.* which extended not only to women whose marriage had been consummated, but those who were only *betrothed*; *Deut. xxii. 23.* and considering how young their girls were generally betrothed, this would have a great effect. (3.) Rapes were also punished with death, *Deut. xxii. 25—27.* (4.) If a person debauched a young woman *not betrothed*, he was obliged to marry her, how much soever his inferior in rank, and could never on any account divorce her, *Deut. xxii. 28, 29.* (5.) A person lying with a female *slave* was fined in the loss of her ransom, *Deut. xxi. 14.* (6.) Universally, if a woman pretended to be a virgin and was not, whether she had been debauched before or after her espousals, she was liable to be put to death: which was such a guard upon the chastity of all young women, as was of a very singular and elsewhere unequalled

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nature,

nature, *Deut.* xxii. 20, 21. (7.) The law by which *bastards* in all their generations were excluded from *the congregation of the Lord*, *i. e.* probably from the liberty of worshipping among his people in the place where God peculiarly dwelt, (*Deut.* xxiii. 2.) was a brand of infamy, which strongly expressed God's abhorrence of a lewd commerce between the sexes; and considering the genius and temper of the *Jewish* nation, must have a great tendency to suppress this practice.—So that upon the whole, sufficient care was taken in the *Mosaic* institution to convince the *Jews*, that lewdness and other kinds of intemperance were highly displeasing to God: and there seems to be no remaining objection, but that *future punishments* were not denounced against them; and that is only one branch of the objection taken from the omission of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, which will be considered elsewhere.

PROPOSITION CXXIII.

LECT. To propose and answer some other objections against the inspiration of scripture,
 CLI.  taken from the general manner in which the books of it are written, and some other considerations not mentioned above.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. Some have objected the *inelegancy* of the *style*, especially in several parts of it: to which we answer,

1. That the inspiration of a book is not to be judged of by its *style*, but by its *fitness* to answer its *end*, which was something of greater importance than to teach men to write in an elegant and polite manner.

2. The different genius of different nations is to be considered, in judging of the style of books; and it would be absurd to condemn everything in *eastern* and ancient books, which does not suit the *western* or modern taste.

3. Many of the supposed solecisms in scripture may be vindicated by parallel passages in the most authentic writers, as *Dr. Blackwell*, and many others mentioned in the *Preface* to the *Family Expositor*, have largely shewn.

4. There are multitudes of passages not only in the original, but even in the most literal translations, which have been accounted inimitably beautiful, pathetic, and sublime, by the most judicious critics, and those in which there seems to be least of artful turn and antithesis, do so much the more suit the majesty and importance of the occasion.

Burnet's four Discourses, p. 66, 67. | *Spectator*, vol. vi. No. 405.

Boyle's Style of Scriptures pass.

| *Family Expositor*, vol. i. Pref. p. 5.

Nichols's Conf. vol. iv. p. 120—139.

SECT. II. Others have objected the want of a regular *method* both in the Old Testament and the New, which makes it a work of great labour to collect the several doctrines and arguments therein dispersed, and to a place them in an

an orderly and systematical view. To this, besides what is said above, it may be answered,

1. That it now gives agreeable employment to those that study the scriptures, thus to range and collect the several passages, relating to the same subject, which are dispersed up and down.

2. That considering the scripture as a book intended for the common people, who are by no means exact judges of method, this is no important deficiency : and indeed on the contrary, the way of teaching men doctrines and truths in such loose discourses, especially as illustrated by historical facts, is much more fit for popular use, rendering these things more easy to be understood and retained.

3. By this means, such a foundation is laid for arguing the truth of a revelation from the genuineness of those books which contain it, as could not otherwise have taken place ; as will abundantly appear by consulting the demonstration of *Prop. 108.*

Nich. Conf. vol. iv. p. 157—167. | Owen of Underst. Scrip. c. iv. p. 163—175.

SECT. III. The *obscurity* of many passages both in the Old and New Testament, and the number of controversies amongst *Christians* to which they have given rise, is also objected, as a further argument against their divine authority. To this it is answered,

1. That it was humanly speaking impossible, that there should not be many obscure passages in such very ancient writings, the languages of which have been so long dead. And indeed in any language it might be expected that there would be some obscurity, when some of the subjects were so sublime, and in many respects so incomprehensible, and when others related to future events, which were to come to pass so long after the prediction, the clearness of which might have frustrated their accomplishment.

2. That this obscurity generally lies upon those things which are of the least importance ; and where it relates to momentous doctrines, as sometimes it must be acknowledged it does, it affects what is circumstantial rather than essential in them.

3. That the difficulties in many passages in scripture afford an agreeable exercise to pious and learned men, by whose labours many of them have been happily cleared up.

4. That in other instances, they may tend to promote our humility, as the secrets in nature and providence do.

5. They leave room for the exercise of mutual candour among those of different opinions, which, were it generally to prevail, would do a greater honour to christianity, than the most exact agreement in principle, or uniformity in worship, could possibly do.

Nich. Conf. vol. iv. p. 167—177. | Atterb. Post. Serm. vol. i. Serm. ix. p. 235—351.

Limb. Theol. l. i. c. vi. § 7, 8. | Foster against Tindal, c. iii. p. 191—215.

Leland against Tind. vol. ii. c. vii. | Rymer of Rev. Rel. p. 247—255.

SECT. IV. Another set of objections is drawn from the *trivial* nature of some passages, which are to be found especially in the Old Testament, and sometimes in the New. The vast *abundance of words* used to relate some facts, (v. g. *Gen.* v. *Numb.* viii. *Exod.* xxv—xxviii, xxxv—xxxix.) while others perhaps of much greater importance are entirely omitted, or passed over in a very slight manner, as also the frequent *repetition* of the same story and the same sentiments, are objections nearly akin to this. It is answered,

1. That great allowance is to be made for the genius of *eastern* nations, in many of whose modern histories we find the persons concerned introduced as speaking, and a much greater number of words used than was necessary for giving us some competent idea of the fact.

2. Nevertheless, this makes the story more popular, and tends in a more forcible manner to strike the minds of common readers, suggesting many instructive and entertaining thoughts, which in a more concise abstract could not have been introduced, at least with so great advantage.

3. An exactness in many particulars might be useful to those for whom these writings were more immediately intended, where it is not so to us.

4. Nevertheless, we do not insist upon it that the scripture is the most perfect model of style, nor pretend to establish such a degree of inspiration as would make that assertion necessary.

5. The *repetitions* were often very necessary: the same circumstances of the same or of different persons required the review of the same important thoughts, in the poetical, prophetic, and epistolary writings; and the repetition of the same fact by different historians, who do not appear to have borrowed from each other, is a great confirmation of the truth of it.

Nich. Conference, vol. iv. p. 177—193.

LECT. CLII. SECT. V. It is further objected, that if the Old and New Testament had been of divine original, we can hardly imagine they would have been the cause of so much *mischief* in the world, which is imputed to the great stress laid on *believing* certain doctrines. To this it is replied,

1. That the genius of them both, and especially of the *New Testament*, is so apparently full of meekness, benevolence, and goodness, that nothing can be more unjust, than to charge the bigotry and persecuting zeal of its professors upon that.

2. That this evil has its origin in those lusts of men, which this revelation was peculiarly intended to restrain.

3. That there have been penal laws, and some considerable degree of persecution among *Heathens* on religious accounts, where christianity has not been in question.

4. That if there has been more among or against *Christians*, it has generally been, because christian principles have spirited up those who have cordially received them to bear greater hardships, as well as engaged them more openly to

to profess their own religion, and more expressly to condemn those follies and crimes which have passed for religion among other men, much to the danger as well as reproach of those by whom they have been maintained.

5. Because that hereby occasionally greater evidence has been derived to christianity, as appears from the preceding argument.

6. That the eternal salvation of a few, is, upon the whole, a rich equivalent for the greatest temporal damage sustained: nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that they have much to answer for, who, by persecuting under pretence of defending the gospel, have brought such a reproach upon it.

7. It is also observable, that men have seldom been persecuted by *Christians*, for denying those doctrines which are evidently contained in the gospel, but much oftener for refusing to submit to human explications, and very frequently to most corrupt additions; which has been the case of *Popish* persecution, which indeed furnishes out the greatest part of this argument.

8. The extraordinary piety, temperance, and charity, especially of the primitive *Christians*, and the joy of good men in the midst of the severest persecutions, must be allowed an evident proof that the world has been generally the better for christianity, and a vast balance to what is urged in the objection: not to mention the influence christianity has had in reforming the doctrines of morality among the *Heathens*; as appears from comparing the writings of the pagan philosophers *after* Christ's time with those *before* it.—For the illustration of the former part of this step, see *Cave's Primitive Christianity*, and the latter, *Tillard against Warburton, ad finem*.—And we may further add here, that the good effects to be produced by the expected prevalency of true christianity at last, are to be taken in as further balancing the account.

9. When all possible allowances are made to the objection, it can be of no weight; for since *reason* is the accidental occasion of all this persecution about christianity, and of all others, whether among *Mahometans*, *Jews*, or *Pagans*, they will as well prove that God is not the author of our *reason*, as that he is not the author of the *christian religion*: and indeed nothing can be more apparently absurd than to say, that God could not give what man may grossly abuse.

10. As to the stress laid upon *believing* the gospel, it is ridiculous to make that an objection against the truth of it; for if the disbelieving of it had not been represented as a very dangerous thing, it had been in effect acknowledging its own evidence so defective, as not to be sufficient for the conviction of an honest inquirer, and its own importance to be so small, as almost to bespeak a neglect, when yet its pretended apparatus was so amazing, as at the very first view it must appear to have been: so that here would in effect have been a self-contradiction, which few writers on either side the question seem to have been sufficiently aware of.

Juvenal's Sat. xv. pass.

Chandler of Pers. p. 1—20, & 30—32.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 296—305.

Ed. 2.

Letter to the Minister of Moffat.

Answer to it.

Hoadley's Tracts, p. 67—97.

Leland against Tind. vol. ii. p. 576—581.

SECT.

SECT. VI. It has further been objected, that the scripture rules of morality are given in very *loose terms*, without such particular *limitations* as particular circumstances require, or without the *reason* on which they are founded. To this it is replied,

1. That if this concludes against any thing, it will conclude against all books of morality whatever; since they can do no more than lay down general rules, without being able to descend to every personal circumstance.

2. Though God might have written such a book, it would have been too voluminous ever to have been read.

3. There are many excellent general rules, which if men would honestly attend to, they would seldom be at a loss as to their particular duty, especially that of studying to shew ourselves approved to God, of doing all to his glory, and of doing unto others as we would they should do unto us.

4. The reasons are sometimes suggested, especially those taken from the consequence of men's actions.

5. If there had been such a laboured deduction as in our ethical writers, few would have understood it.

6. It would not have suited the majesty of the great Legislator, since even human laws do not use this method. The declaration of the will of God, and a view to the sanctions and other motives suggested in scripture, are of far greater importance than numerous decisions in casuistry, and laboured refinements of abstract argument.

Leland against Tind. c. x. p. 298—302. | Atterbury's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 268.
Dod. Fam. Expos. vol. i. § 39. Note (t.)

SECT. VII. The *imperfect promulgation* of the *Jewish* and christian religions has always been reckoned one of the chief objections against their divine authority, and urged as entirely inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, if he be supposed the author of them. To this it is replied,

1. That the objection seems to take it for granted, that it is a part of the revelation that the express knowledge of it is absolutely *necessary* for the final happiness of every human creature, otherwise God was not (for ought appears) obliged to give it to *any*, and if not to any, then certainly not to *all*.

2. Though it be acknowledged that revelation has given great advantages, especially that of the New Testament, yet that can be no reasonable objection against its being true, though not universal; since it plainly appears, that if there be a universal providence and God be just and good, then it must be consistent with justice and goodness to give different men very different advantages for religious improvement, since (considering the diversity of men's tempers and circumstances) it is plain in fact God has done it.

3. The supposition of the truth of scripture, (allowing as above, N^o. 1.) is so far from *increasing* the difficulty of accounting for the divine conduct which would arise on the foot of natural religion, that indeed it rather *lessens* it, both with

with respect to those who *have* enjoyed and embraced this revelation, and those who have *not* : for as to *Jews* and *Christians*, it represents them not as being left to error and superstition, (which if scripture be false it must be allowed they are,) but as having received several distinguishing favours from the divine Being, and glorious advantages for eternal happiness. And as to *others*, it shews us, *First*, That God has already done more for them, than it can otherwise be proved that he has : particularly in the following instances, (1.) By discovering himself in various methods of revelation to *Adam* and *Noah*, (who had such extraordinary facts to relate with such peculiar advantage from their relation to the rest of mankind; (see *Winder's Hist. of Knowl.* vol. i. c. iii, & v.) and also to others in the earliest ages of the human race, from whom on this supposition useful traditions might be handed down to posterity, the remainders of which seem evident in *Job* and his friends, *Melchizedeck*, *Abimelech*, and many others, and even in some of the *Heathen* writers. Compare *Prop.* cix. *sub unit.* (2.) By the remarkable removes and dispersions of the *Abrahamic* family, and the singular appearances of God for them and the *Jewish* nation, previous to their settlement in *Canaan* ; which were peculiar advantages to *Egypt* and *Canaan*, had they been wise enough to have improved them, (3.) In constituting the *Mosaic* religion in such a manner, as to encourage strangers to live among the *Jews*, and to oblige the *Jews* to endeavour to promote the knowledge of the true God abroad as well as at home. (4.) By remarkable appearances of God in their favour, both in the conquest of *Canaan* under such great natural disadvantages, and during their abode in it, especially in the victories of *David*, the fame of *Solomon's* magnificence and wisdom while he continued faithful to God, which he no doubt would improve for the spreading of religion among the many sages and princes who resorted to his court : (compare *1 Kings* iv. 29—34. x. 23.—25.) but especially by the train of providences to *Israel* in and after the *Babylonish* captivity, which occasioned remarkable proclamations through the whole *Babylonian* and *Persian* empires, by which vast numbers of people must be admonished. (5.) By the dispersion of the *Jewish* scriptures themselves when translated into *Greek*. (6.) By the mission of *Christ* and his apostles, and the early and extensive propagation of his gospel by them. (7.) By all the advantages which have since been given, by the settlement of *European* and *Christian* colonies in almost all the principal, especially the *maritime* parts of *Asia*, *Africa* and *America*, whereby indeed immense numbers have been converted ; and the number might have been yet greater, if those advantages had been properly improved.—*Secondly*, Revelation encourages us to hope that the time will come, when there shall be an universal prevalence of the knowledge of God, and all the *Heathen* nations shall be gathered in, *Prop.* 112. *Schol.* gr. 1.—*Thirdly*, In the mean time, it not only assures us that God will make all gracious allowances for the circumstances and disadvantages in which they have been placed ; but seems to point out a way, in which virtuous and pious *Heathens*, if such there be, may be accepted with God, (*i. e.* though
the

the atonement and mediation of Christ,) with greater honour to divine justice, than we could otherwise conceive.

<i>Jenkins of Christian.</i> vol. i. part ii. c. ii. p. 43—132.	<i>Foster against Tind.</i> c. ii. —Serm vol. ii N ^o . vii. p. 144—146.
<i>Waterland's Script. Vind.</i> part ii. Postscr.	<i>Young on Idol.</i> vol. ii. c. iv. p. 217—231.
<i>Tindal of Christian.</i> pass.	
<i>Leland against Tindal,</i> vol. ii. c. xvi. p. 554—576.	<i>Ridley on the Spirit,</i> Serm. vi. p. 235. Note.

DEFINITION LXXVIII.

LECT. The books of the APOCRYPHA, are those books, which are added by the
CLIII. Church of Rome to those of the Old Testament received by *protestants*; and take
their name from their having been supposed to have *lain hid* a considerable time after they were written.

SCHOLIUM.

The names of these books, as they stand in the *Vulgar Latin Bible*, are two of *Esdras*, *Tobit*, *Judith*, the remainder of *Esther*, *Wisdom of Solomon*, *Ecclesiasticus*, *Baruch*, with *Jeremiah's* epistle, the *Song of three children* the story of *Susannah*, of *Bel and the Dragon*, the prayer of *Manasseh*, and two books of the *Maccabees*. The second of *Esdras* is not extant in *Greek*, but the most authentic copy of it is the *Latin*: but in some copies of the *Greek Bible* there are two other books of *Maccabees*. added; the third of which contains chiefly the history of the *Jewish* affairs under *Ptolemy Philopator*.

Prideaux's Connect. vol. ii. p. 185, 186, III, II2.

PROPOSITION CXXIV.

The books of the *Apocrypha* are not to be received as written by a plenary superintendent inspiration.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. *Josephus* only mentions 22 books of the Old Testament as inspired, in which these cannot be included: and he expressly says, that those which were written after the time of *Artaxerxes*, (*i. e.* probably *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, from whom *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* had their commission) were not looked upon by the *Jewish* church as of equal authority. Compare *Prop.* 105. gr. 4.

Joseph. contr. App. l. i. c. viii. p. 1333. *Huds. Ed.*

2. They never appear to have been quoted in the New Testament, as most of the books of the old are, though some passages of them might have been much to the purpose of the sacred writers.

3. The

3. The author of the *first* book of *Maccabees*, which is one of the most valuable in the whole collection, intimates that there had not for a considerable time been any prophet in *Israel* divinely inspired, 1 *Mac.* iv. 46. x. 27. and the author of the *second* book seems expressly to own, that he had no supernatural assistance, 2 *Mac.* xv. 38, 39. ii. 19—28.

4. There are some passages in these books which seem in themselves absurd and incredible, v. g. the angel's lying to *Tobit*, and afterwards driving away the devil by a fumigation, *Tobit* v. 12. compared with *Tobit* xii. 15. *Tobit* vi. *pass.* the story of fire being turned into water, and *vice versa*, 2 *Mac.* i. 19—22. the march of the tabernacle and ark after *Jeremiah*, *ibid.* ii. 4—8. to which most writers add what they think the inconsistent and contradictory account of the death of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who is said to have died of grief, 1 *Mac.* vi. 8, 16. and to have died miserably in the mountain consumed with worms, 2 *Mac.* ix. 5—12, 28.—2 *Mac.* i. 16. is also quoted, as relating that his brains were beaten out, but that *Antiochus* must probably have been another person.

5. There are other passages which are inconsistent with some parts of the Old Testament; v. g. *Judith* (c. ix. 2.) justifying the murder of the *Shechemites*, condemned *Gen.* xlix. 7. the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, speaking in the person of that prince, represents *Israel* as under oppression, which it was not in *Solomon's* days, *Wisd.* ix. 7, 8. xv. 14. compared with 1 *Kings* x. 27. (yet some have urged 1 *Kings* xi. 14, 25. as an answer to this objection.) *Baruch* is here said to have been carried into *Babylon*, at the same time when *Jeremiah* tells us he was carried into *Egypt*, *Bar.* i. 2. *Jer.* xliii. 6. to which we may add the false account of the fact related, *Lev.* x. 16—20. in the reference to it, 1 *Mac.* ii. 11. Compare also *Esth.* xii. 5. with vi. 3, 6. to which may be added the applause of self-murder, 2 *Mac.* xiv. 41, &c.

6. There are some other passages relating to the history of foreign nations, so inconsistent with what all other historians say, as not to be admitted without much greater evidence than belongs to the books, 1 *Mac.* i. 6, 7. viii. 16.

1 & 2 & 3—6. 7. From comparing all these steps on the one hand, and considering on the other that there is no positive evidence for their inspiration, it follows, that these books are not to be admitted as written by a plenary superintendent inspiration. Q. E. D.

Burnet on the Art. p. 89, 90.

Turret. Loc. ii. *Quæst.* ix.

| *Limborch, Theol.* l. i. c. iii. § 5—12.

| *Bennet against Popery*, p. 71, 72.

C O R O L L A R Y.

The insisting upon reading some portion of these books, instead of lessons from scripture, in the daily offices of the church, was an unreasonable and cruel imposition in those who fixed the terms of conformity in *England* in the year 1662.

Hist. of Nonconformity, p. 235—237. | *Old Whig*, vol. ii. N^o. lxxxiii.

S C H O L I U M I.

We allow that some of the christian fathers cited these books with great regard: nevertheless, most of them place the *Apocryphal* books in a class inferior to those which they call *canonical*: and the first council which is said to have received them was the provincial council of *Carthage*, *A. D.* 397, who evidently come too late to be more competent judges of this question than the *Jews* themselves were. Nevertheless, we acknowledge these books to have been of considerable antiquity: and as some of them are very valuable, on account of the wise and pious sentiments they contain, so the historical facts, and references to ancient notions and customs in others of them, make them well worthy an attentive perusal.

Dupin on the Canon, l. i. c. i. § 4—6. | Cofins's Hist. of the Can.

S C H O L I U M 2.

It is exceedingly probable, that the chief reason for which the authority of these books is maintained by the church of *Rome* is, that some passages in them countenance their superstitions, particularly the intercession of angels, *Tobit* xii. 15. and praying for the dead, *2 Mac.* xii. 40—45. which is represented as prevalent even in favour of those who died idolaters.

S C H O L I U M 3.

A more particular critical account of most of these books may be found in

<i>Lewis's Antiq.</i> vol. iv. l. viii. c. 46—54.		p. 111, 112, 185—187. & p. 303,
<i>Prideaux's Connect.</i> vol. i. p. 36—42, 50,		304.
51, 54, 73, 74, 164, 165. vol. ii.		

The END of the SIXTH PART.

PART

P A R T VII.

Containing an Account of the Scripture Doctrine relating to the Existence and Nature of GOD, and the Divinity of the SON and SPIRIT.

P R O P O S I T I O N CXXV.

THE account given us in the *Scriptures* of the Old and New Testament, of the *nature, perfections* and *providence* of God, is agreeable to that which the *light of nature* discovers concerning them. LECT.
CLIV.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. The scripture expressly asserts that there is a God, the *creator* of all things, *Gen. i. 1. Psal. xxxiii. 6. Acts xiv. 17. Heb. xi. 3.*
2. The scripture asserts that God is an *eternal Spirit*. *John iv. 24. Heb. xi. 27. 1 Tim. vi. 16. Deut. xxxiii. 27. Psal. xc. 2.*
3. That he is *omnipresent*. *1 Kings viii. 27. Psal. cxxxix. 7—10. Jer. xxiii. 24.*
4. That he *knows* all things. *1 Sam. ii. 3. Job xxxvi. 4. xlii. 2. Psal. cxlvii.*
5. *Jer. xxxii. 19. Acts xv. 18.* And that future *contingencies* are not excepted from this general assertion, appears from his having foretold some of the most contingent events, (*Vid. Prop. III, II2.*) as well as from the following passages, *Isa. xlii. 9. xlviii. 3. xlv. 10. xli. 22—26. Psal. cxxxix. 2.*
5. He is perfectly *wise*. *Job ix. 4. 1 Tim. i. 17. Isa. xl. 13, 14.*
6. That he is *omnipotent*. *Jer. xxxii. 17. Rev. xix. 6. Psal. cxlv. 3. Job ix. 4. &c. 1 Chron. xxix. 11, 12.*
7. That he is perfectly *good*. *Psal. lii. 1. cxlv. 9. Matt. xix. 17. James i. 17. Exod. xxxiv. 6. 1 John iv. 8.*
8. The *justice* of God is asserted, *Psal. xxxvi. 6. cxxix. 4. cxix. 137. Rom. ii. 6. Acts x. 34, 35. Rev. xv. 3.*
9. That he is *true* and *faithful*. *Numb. xxiii. 19. Deut. vii. 9. 2 Sam. vii. 28. Tit. i. 2.*
10. That he is perfectly *holy*. *Isa. vi. 3. xliii. 15. lvii. 15. Psal. cxlv. 17. Rev. xv. 4.*
11. That he is *immutable*. *Exod. iii. 14. Mal. iii. 6. Heb. i. 10—12. James i. 17.*
12. That he is *incomprehensible*. *Job xi. 7. Psal. cxxxix. 6. Eccles. iii. 11. viii. 17. 1 Tim. vi. 16. Rom. xi. 33.*

C c c 2

13. That

The scripture account of the being and perfections of God. PART. VII.

13. That his *providence* extends to every event, preserving, disposing, and governing all things, *Psal.* xxxvi. 6. cxxxvi. 25. civ, cvii, cxlv. 13, &c. *Job* xii. 10. *Acts* xiv. 17. xvii. 28. *Matt.* v. 29, 30. And it may be observed in the general, that all the vast number of scriptures, in which the operations of inanimate bodies, such as the sun, rain, &c. as well as the actions of brutes are ascribed to the *divine agency* and direction, do entirely agree with *Prop.* 32. Vid. *Prop.* xvi. 33. *Psal.* lxxv. 9, &c. civ. 13—30. cxlv. 15, 16. cxlvii. 16—18. *Amos* iii. 6. ix. 7. *Job* xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix.

14. That he is the *only one God*, is expressly asserted, *Deut.* vi. 4. iv. 39. 2 *Sam.* vii. 22. *Psal.* lxxxvi. 10. *Jer.* x. 10, 11. xlv. 5. *Matt.* xix. 17. *John* xvii. 3. 1 *Cor.* viii. 4—6. 1 *Tim.* vi. 15. ii. 5.

15. That he is a being of *all possible perfections*, *Matt.* v. 48. 1 *Chron.* xxix. 11. *Psal.* viii. 1.

Gastrel's Christian Institutes, c. ii.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

So great an agreement between the doctrine of scripture and reason with regard to the being and attributes of God, is a considerable internal evidence in proof of the revelation itself, considering how much of religion depends upon forming right notions of the supreme Being.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 318—338.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

Considering how very clearly these things are taught in the forecited passages, and in such a multitude of others parallel to them, there can be no just reason to apprehend, that those *popular* passages, in which the members of the human body, or the passions of the human mind, are ascribed to God, should be taken in a *literal* sense, so as to mislead any impartial and attentive reader, how moderate soever his capacity may be: so that no just objection against the preceding corollary can be drawn from such passages. Compare *Prop.* 120. gr. 14.

S C H O L I U M I.

To the scriptures urged gr. 4. in proof of the prescience of future contingencies it has been replied, that those passages only relate to God's knowledge of *his own works*: but as this solution can only be applied to *some* of those scriptures, so it is evident with regard to *them*, that as the equity, wisdom, and goodness of God's works towards his rational creatures, depends upon the correspondency between them and the moral character of those creatures, God would not have a complete view of his dispensations towards them if he were ignorant of future contingencies; nor can the contrary doctrine be reconciled with those other scriptures, which represent the divine volitions as im-
mutable.

PROP. CXXV. *God not the author of sin, tho' foreseen by him.*

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mutable. Compare 1 Sam. xv. 29. Job xiv. 5. xxiii. 13, 14. Psal. xxxiii. 11. Isa. xlv. 10. Mal. iii. 6. Acts xv. 15—18. xvii. 26.

Limborch, Theol. l. ii. c. xviii. § 27—29.

SCHOLIUM 2.

To that part of the argument gr. 4. which is drawn from *predictions*, it has been replied, that when God foretels future events, he determines to make them *certain* by making them *necessary*; and in order to reconcile this with his justice, it has been added, that his creatures in these actions are not considered as in a state of probation, but that in these particulars it is suspended: but this objection is sufficiently answered, *Prop. 111. Cor. 1.* and may further be illustrated by comparing *Gen. xv. 16. Exod. iii. 19, 20. vii. 3, 4. Matt. xxvi. 24.* to which may perhaps be added *Acts i. 16—20.* See (besides *Colliber* in the place referred to above)

Saurin's Sermons, vol. ii. p. 199, 200. | Ridgley's Divin. vol. i. p. 69.

SCHOLIUM 3.

That God is not *the author of sin*, expressly appears from all the texts relating to the holiness of God, and those relating to his justice and goodness when compared with the threatenings denounced against sin, as well as from *James i. 13.* whence it appears that scriptures urged on the contrary side, such as *Prov. xvi. 4. 2 Sam. xii. 11. xvi. 10.* are to be interpreted, as not to express an irresistible influence on the mind of man, but only proposing in the course of his providence such occasions and temptations, as he knew would in fact, though not necessarily prevail, to draw man to the commission of sin: and that God should act thus, is not a difficulty peculiar to scripture, since it is agreeable to what we see every day, if we allow the universality of his providence.

Limborch, ibid. l. ii. c. xxx. § 1—7.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Scripture does expressly assert, not only that all things are foreknown by God, but that he *works all according to the counsel of his own will*, *Eph. i. 11.* and that even *the death of Christ* happened *according to his determinate purpose*, *Luke xxii. 22. Acts ii. 23. iv. 28.* whence it follows, that to make this consistent with what is said elsewhere, we must allow that in scripture language those things are said *to be determined*, or decreed by God, not only which he wills himself by his own irresistible agency to effect, but which he *foresees* will come to pass, in consequence of his previous volitions relating to preceding circumstances, through the intervention of free agents, and which on that foresight he determines to permit: and in this sense it must be admitted on the preceding principles, that all things which happen are *decreed* by him, and that the light of nature teaches us they are so.

SCHOLIO-

S C H O L I U M 5.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding this agency of God even about the sinful actions of his creatures, which the light of reason evinces, and those passages of scripture assert; forasmuch as the word *temptation* carries with it an ill sense, and implies some malignity of design in the being said to tempt another, we acknowledge, according to *James i. 13.* that it is not proper to apply it here: and great care should be taken in popular discourses to avoid this way of presenting things, which though it be strictly and philosophically true, yet may be so mistaken by common hearers, as to be injurious rather than subservient to the purposes of practical religion.

P R O P O S I T I O N CXXVI.

LECT. That glorious person, who appeared in the world by the name of JESUS
CLV. CHRIST, did not begin to exist, when he was conceived by his *Virgin Mother*,
but had a being, not only before that period, but before the creation of the world.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N.

1. It is he, who is spoken of by *John*, under the name of the LOGOS, and is expressly said to have been *in the beginning with God*, and afterwards to have been *made flesh*, i. e. to have appeared in a human form. *John i. 1, 2, 3, 14.* Compare *Rev. xix. 12.* See also *Heb. ii. 14.*

2. Our Lord himself frequently asserted his *coming down from heaven* as his father's messenger, which he could with no propriety have done, had he not existed before his incarnation: for what the *Socinians* assert, that he ascended into heaven before he opened his public ministry, to receive instruction from thence, is a fact which cannot be proved, yet was surely important enough to have been recorded; since Moses's converse with God in the mount, and Christ's *temptation* are both so largely mentioned. It will also be found, that some of the texts quoted below refer to a *settled abode* in heaven previous to his appearance among men, and not as a transient visit thither, *John iii. 31. vi. 38, 50, 62. xiii. 3. xvi. 28. xvii. 5.* As for *John iii. 13.* the latter clause is a much stronger argument *against* the opposite hypothesis, than the former is *for* it.

Clarke on the Trin. N° 574, 575. | Fam. Expos. vol. ii. § 179. Note (f) p. 487.

3. *Paul* asserts that Christ *emptied himself* of some glory which he was before possessed of, that in our nature he might become capable of suffering and death, *Phil. ii. 6, 7. (Greek)* with which may well be compared the following texts, which though not equally evident with the former, seem to have some reference to the same matter, *John viii. 58. 1 Cor. xv. 47.*

Clarke on the Trinity, N° 535, & 591.

4. Christ

4. Christ seems to have been the person who appeared to *Isaiab*; (compare *Isa. vi. pass.* with *John xii. 41.*) from whence, as well as his being called the *Logos*, and some other considerations hereafter to be mentioned, it seems reasonable to conclude, that Christ is the person who is called the *angel of God's presence*, by whom he revealed himself to *Abraham, Jacob, Moses*, and the other Old Testament saints: *Isa. lxiii. 9. Exod. xxiii. 20, 21.* but the particular examination of this branch of the argument will be reserved for a distinct proposition.

Watts's Script. Doct. of the Trin. Prop. viii. p. 51—54.

5. The work of creation is so expressly ascribed to him in scripture, that this alone might be a sufficient proof of his having a real existence before the world was made, *John i. 3. Col. i. 15, 16. Heb. i. 2, 8, &c. Eph. iii. 9.*

1, 2, 3 & 4 & 5 | 6. *Valet propositio.*

<i>Pearson on the Creed, p. 107—119.</i>	<i>Watts on the Glory of Christ, Diff. ii.</i>
<i>Fowler's Descent of Christ, pass.</i>	
<i>Watts's Diff. on the Trin. N^o iv. § 1,</i>	
2, 4,	<i>Emlyn's Vindic. of Fowler, apud Tracts, vol. i.</i>

C O R O L L A R Y I.

Forasmuch as in several of the preceding scriptures there is such a *change* and *humiliation* asserted concerning Christ, as could not properly be asserted concerning an eternal and immutable Being, as such, there is reason to believe that Christ had before his incarnation a *created* or *derived* nature, which would admit of such a change: though we are far from saying he had *no other* nature, and that all the texts quoted above refer to this.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

This glorious spirit or *Logos* must undoubtedly have been a most wonderful person, possessed of vast and unknown degrees of natural and moral perfections, (for both must be included in the expression of the *image of God*,) beyond any of the creatures both in heaven and upon earth who were produced by his operation. Vid. *Ax. 10.*

Watts's Diff. on Trin. N^o iii.

C O R O L L A R Y 3.

His emptying himself for our sakes, and taking upon him the form of a servant, (as it is expressly said he did, that he might become capable of suffering and death for us, Vid. *Phil. ii. 7, 8. Greek, Heb. ii. 9—17.*) was a most amazing instance of condescension, and lays those, for whose benefit it was intended, under the highest obligation to love, reverence, and obey him.

C O R O L L A R Y

COROLLARY 4.

The ample revelation of such a person, who by the light of nature was entirely unknown, must be a glorious peculiarity of the christian scheme, which recommends it to our highest regard, and demands our most serious attention.

COROLLARY 5.

They, who, neglecting to enquire into the evidences of christianity, bring themselves under a necessity of disregarding this glorious person, bring guilt upon themselves by their neglect, proportionable to the excellency of his nature, the greatness of our obligation, and the opportunity they had of being acquainted with him, if they had diligently improved the talents lodged in their hands.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. There are many who will not allow of any pre-existent, created or derived
CLVI. nature of Christ, but explain all the phrases quoted above relating to his *coming into the world*, by the glory he originally possessed, and understand his *emptying himself* of it at his incarnation, merely as expressing a more or less *sensible manifestation* of a nature properly *divine* or *immutable*; alledging, that whatever may be asserted concerning either the divine or human nature, may be predicated of Christ as *θεανθρωπος*. To prove this doctrine and interpretation, they plead, not only that God is said to have redeemed the church with his blood, and to have laid down his life for us, *Acts* xx. 28. (Vid. *Mills, Enty, and Hallet in Loc.*) and according to some copies, *1 John* iii. 16. (Vid. *Mills in Loc.*) but that *Heb.* ii. 9, 11, 16. are utterly inconsistent with the notion of such a pre-existent *superangelic* spirit as is supposed *Cor.* i.

Ans. It is difficult to say what inconsistency there is between that doctrine and the two former of these forecited texts, if we allow the glorious spirit of Christ (which there is no reason at all to call *human* in its pre-existent state) to have been reduced to the condition of a human infant; since we have no notion of the nature of a *human* soul, but that of a created rational spirit united to and acted by a human body, as our own spirit is: and as to *Heb.* ii. 16. if *ἐπιλαμβανέσθαι* be interpreted *took hold of*, as it may naturally signify, and is plainly used, *Luke* xxiii. 26. all form of objection from these words will vanish.

Ab. Taylor against Watts, p. 82—89. | *Whiston's Prim. Christian.* vol. iv. p. 229
Hughes's 2d Def. Pref. p. 12—15. | —295.

SCHOLIUM 2.

What *change* was made in the *Logos* when united to human flesh, must be acknowledged to exceed our conceptions, and therefore to be incapable of full
expli-

explication. The *Fathers* frequently speak of a *quiescence* of its perfections.— If it be objected, that to suppose such a being divested of its will, of its knowledge, and power, as it must certainly have been, if it became the human soul of Christ, (*Luke* ii. 52. *xxii.* 43. *2 Cor.* xiii. 4.) is in fact to suppose it *annihilated* and *another* being substituted in its room; it may be answered, that whether we do or do not suppose some degree of actual thought and perception essential to the human mind, such a consequence will not follow from such a supposed change; seeing here will still continue in the same subject either actual thought, or a power of thinking.

Emlyn's Examination of Dr. Bennet's New | Fortuita Sacra, p. 217—219.
Theory, c. ii. ap. Tracts, vol. ii.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The sentiments of the ancient *Jews* concerning the *Logos*, are to be found in *Philo Jud.* p. 195, 341, 465.

Euseb. Prep. Evang. l. vii. c. xiii, xiv.
l. xi. c. xv.

Watts's Diff. N^o iv. §. 3.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. iii. p. 559. Note
b & c, & p. 565.

Pearson on the Creed, p. 118.

Taylor on the Trin. p. 258.

To which it may not be improper to add, that the *Mahometans* held an eternal ancient word, subsisting in God's essence, by which he spoke, and not by his simple essence; and the *Platonics* had a notion nearly resembling this, tho' Dr. *Cudworth* insists upon it, that it was not the same with that which the *Arians* afterwards held.

Ockley's Saracen. Hist. Pref. p. 88, 89. | Cudworth's Intel. Syst. p. 573—577.

APPENDIX TO PROPOSITION CXXVI.

PROPOSITION.

CHRIST was the person, in and by whom God appeared to men under the Old Testament, by the Name of *JEHOVAH*.

LECT.
CLVII.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. There was often a visible appearance of *Jehovah* the God of *Israel*, *Gen.* xviii. *pass.* *Exod.* xxiv. 10. *Isa.* vi. 1.

2. Scripture as well as reason assures us, the *Father* was not and could not be seen, *John* i. 18. v. 37. *1 Tim.* vi. 16. *Heb.* xi. 27.

3. The person spoken of as *Jehovah*, when visibly appearing to men, is sometimes expressly called *the angel of the Lord*, *Gen.* xviii. 1, 2. *xxii.* 15, 16. *xxxi.* 11, 13. *Exod.* iii. 2, 4. *xiii.* 21, compared with *xiv.* 19, 24. *Exod.* xxiv. 9—11. *Gen.* xlvi. 15, 16. *Numb.* xx. 16. compared with *Exod.* xx. 2. *Judges* vi. 12, 13. *Isa.* lxiii. 9. *Zech.* iii. 1, 2. *xii.* 8. He is also called *the captain of the Lord's host*, *Josh.* v. 14, 15. compared with *vi.* 2. and *the angel in whom the name of God was*, *Exod.* xxiii. 21.

4. There is no hint of a plurality of persons, successively employed as the medium of those divine manifestations.

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5. When there is a reference to past transactions, they are referred to one person as speaking, though numbers be sometimes described as present, *Psal.* lxxviii. 17. lxxxviii. 15, &c. *Hos.* xiii. 4, 5.

1—5. 6. There was one glorious person, called both *Jehovah*, and his *angel*, who was, as above, under the Old Testament the medium of divine manifestation.

6|7. It is exceeding probable, that some great regards would be paid to this glorious person in the whole dispensation of God, and that we should learn something of his dismissal, if he were dismissed from that office, or of his present state, if he were not.

8. We learn from various passages in the *New Testament* that *Christ* is the *Logos* of the Father, (*John* i. 13. *Rev.* xix. 1—3, 16.) by whom he made the world, and by whom he governs the kingdom of providence. See the texts quoted *Prop.* 120, gr. 5.

9. We do not read in the *New Testament* of any *other* person, who had *before* been the medium of the divine dispensations, but upon this occasion *resigned* his office to *Christ*.

7—9. 10. From the general character of *Christ* in the *New Testament*, compared with the account of the divine manifestations in the Old, and the silence of both with regard to any other person who was such a medium, we may infer, that it is most probable *Christ* was that person.

11. Various things said to be spoken by or addressed to *Jehovah* in the Old Testament, are said in the *New* to be spoken of, done by, or addressed to *Christ*, when such passages are referred to in the *New*, 1 *Cor.* x. 9. *Heb.* xi. 26. i. 8—12. compared with *Psal.* cii. 25, &c. *John* xii. 41. compared with *Isa.* vi. 9, 10. But *Acts* vii. 31. cannot properly be introduced here; for the word *σὺ* there, must rather be understood of *Moses* than of *Christ*.

12. Several scriptures not directly testifying this, will admit the easiest interpretation, by supposing a reference to it, *John* i. 11. *Heb.* xii. 25—27. compared with *Psal.* lxxviii. 1 *Cor.* x. 9.

13. The primitive Fathers of the christian church represented this as the case: see especially *Justin Martyr's* Dialogue with *Trypho*.

14. It is also urged, that the *Chaldee Paraphrase* shews it to have been the sense of the ancient *Jews*: and that there are many passages in their other most ancient writings, which speak the same language, and which can only be understood on this hypothesis.

10—14. 15. *Christ* was the person, by whom God appeared under the Old Testament by the name of *Jehovah*. Q. E. D.

Momma, vol. i. l. ii. c. vii § 34.

Watts on the Glory of Christ, Diff. i.

Lowm. on the Civ. Gov. of the Heb. App.

Clarke on the Trin. N^o. 616—618.

Tenison on Idol. c. xiv. p. 333—336.

Wits. Œcon. Fæd. l. iv. c. iv. § 4.

Harris on the Mess. Serm. v. p. 130—139.

Barringt. Ess. on Div. Dispens. part i. App. pend. Diff. ii.

ibid. cv. p. 457.

Flem. Christol. vol. ii. l. iii. c. iii. p. 255.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that this weakens St. Paul's argument in *Heb.* xiii. 2. and utterly destroys that in *cap.* ii. 2, 3. as both *Grotius* and *Pierce* have urged. As to the *former* of these texts it is said, that if the hypothesis in the proposition were true, the apostle would have recommended hospitality not merely from those instances in which persons had unawares entertained *angels*, but in which they had received *Christ* himself, appearing under the character of the *angel of the Lord*.—But it may be sufficient to answer, that it does not seem necessary, in order to maintain the honour of scripture, to assert, that upon every occasion the apostles urged the *strongest* arguments that could possibly be proposed: besides that this argument would not really have so much force in it, as at first view it might appear to have, for as *Christ* had now left the earth, there would no longer be any opportunity of shewing such hospitality to him again. Compare *Acts* iii. 21.—As to *Heb.* ii. 2, 3. it is pleaded, that if *Christ* was personally concerned in giving *the law*, there was no room to argue (as the apostle does) the superiority of the *gospel* dispensation from its being published by our *Saviour's* ministry; since in this respect they were both equal. With regard to which, if it should not be allowed (as some have thought) that *angels* in this place only signify *messengers*, which indeed the context does not seem to favour, yet this may be reconciled with the hypothesis in the proposition, if we suppose *Christ* to have been present in some visible form on mount *Sinai*, but to have used the *voice of angels* in proclaiming that law which he publicly gave to *Israel* from thence: not to urge, that these texts may in general refer to *any* message delivered by angels, and not particularly to *the law*; for it must be owned, that the following scriptures shew that the giving law on mount *Sinai* must be comprehended, if it were not principally referred to. See *Acts* vii. 53. *Gal.* iii. 19. *Psal.* lxxviii. 17. On the whole, considering that in the places quoted above, God is said to have been among those angels, it seems impossible to defend the apostle's argument, if we suppose an extraordinary presence of the *Father* among them, on any topic, which will not also sufficiently defend it if we suppose *Christ* to have been so present. His appearance in human flesh, to preach the *gospel* with his own mouth, and seal it with his blood, was so much greater condescension, than his encamping among the legions, whom he used as his heralds to proclaim his will; that it argues the *gospel* to lie much nearer his heart than the law, and consequently the danger of despising the former to be greater than that of despising the latter.

Pierce on *Heb.* ii. 2. Note b.

| *Saurin's Diff.* vol. ii. p. 170—173.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is further objected, that God himself must sometimes have spoken as a distinct person from *Christ*, of which *Exod.* xxiii. 20—23. xxiii. 1—3. are urged as probable, and *Matt.* iii. 17. xvii. 5. *John* xii. 28. as certain instances. To this it is replied, that though we allow the *Father* to have spoken sometimes without the mediation of the Son, it will not follow from thence that

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he was not the medium generally made use of, especially when there were visible appearances to the church of the Jews.

Owen on the Heb. vol. i. Exerc. x. p. 164.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Mr. Lowman has objected, that the name of *the angel of the Lord* might be given only to a *material substance*, which was not animated by any inferior spirit whatever, (which seems indeed to have been the *Sadducean* hypothesis with regard to angels in general.) Lowm. Civ. Gov. App. p. 45—58.—But it is answered, as this does not agree with several other passages quoted above, so least of all with *Exod. xxiii. 20, &c.* and since the phrase *angel of the Lord* does generally at least signify a distinct rational being, (as will afterwards be abundantly proved,) it is necessary to interpret it so in the present case, unless convincing reasons could be assigned for confining ourselves to this unlikely interpretation.

SCHOLIUM 4.

As for Mr. Pierce's hypothesis of Christ's undertaking the care of the Jewish people, in such a manner as that he might be called their *guardian angel*, while other angels were guardians in other countries, (*Dan. x. 13.*) and that for administering his province so remarkably well, he was appointed by God to be the head over all principalities and powers; and that those angels were divested of their former authority that they might be made subject to him, to which he refers *Eph. iv. 8. Col. ii. 15.* there is this great objection against it, that it seems not to make sufficient allowance for that superior dignity which the *Logos* must be possessed of, as the creator of angels, and as more excellent than any of them. Vid. *Heb. i.*

Pierce on *Col. ii. 15.* & *Append. and on Heb. i. 9.*

SCHOLIUM 5.

What has been said above may perhaps give light to that much controverted text, *Phil. ii. 6, 7.* the sense of which seems to be, "that Christ, who when he appeared in divine glory to the Old Testament saints, did not think he was guilty of any usurpation, in speaking of himself by those names and titles which were peculiar to God, nevertheless divested himself of those glories that he might appear in our nature."

Clarke on the Trinity No 934.

Taylor on the Trinity p. 190—200.

Pierce and Whitby in Loc.

Pearson on the Creed, p. 121—124.

Moor's Prop. p. 168—171.

Confut. p. 25, 26, 38, 39.

Bos Exercit. c. xxiv. § 5. p. 127—132.

Ed. 2. p. 196—203.

Fortuita Sacra, p. 171—228.

PROPOSITION CXVII.

LECT. To enumerate the principal scriptures, in which the names, titles, attributes, works, and honours, which are frequently appropriated to God, are or seem to be ascribed to Christ.

CLVIII.

SOLV.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. As for divine names.

1. The name *Jehovah*, which is appropriated to God, *Psal.* lxxxiii. 18. *Isa.* xlv. 5. xlii. 8. is given to Christ, *Jer.* xxiii. 6. *Isa.* xlv. 23—25. compared with *Rom.* xiv. 10—12. *Isa.* xl. 3. compared with *Luke* i. 76. and *Isa.* vi. 1, 6, 10. with *John* xii. 40, 41. To these some also refer *Zech.* xi. 12, 13. and whereas some urge on the other side *Exod.* xvii. 15. *Judges* vi. 24. *Ezek.* xlviii. 35. in which names compounded of the word *Jehovah* are given even to *inanimate* beings, it is answered, that there is a great deal of difference between that and the case of giving it to *persons*, since in such instances as those here produced there was so evident a reference to the divine presence, that there could be no mistake concerning the meaning of the name: see also *Jer.* xxxiii. 16. But if the reasoning in the preceding proposition be allowed, there is no need of insisting on such particulars; it being indisputable, that on those principles Christ is called *Jehovah* many hundreds of times.

2. He is not only called *God* frequently, *Matt.* i. 23. *John* i. 1, 2. xx. 28. *1 Tim.* iii. 16. (Vid. *Mills. in Loc.*) and perhaps *2 Pet.* i. 1. but he is called *the true God*, *1 John* v. 20, 21. compare *1 John* i. 2. and *John* xviii. 3. *the great and mighty God*, *Tit.* ii. 13. *Isa.* ix. 6. compare *Deut.* x. 17. *Jer.* xxxii. 18. Christ also seems to be called *the only wise God*, *Jude*, ver. 24, 25. compare *Eph.* v. 26, 27. see also *Rom.* xvi. 27. *the only God*, *Isa.* xlv. 15, 17, 21, 22, 23. compared with *Rom.* xiv. 11. and *God blessed for ever*, *Rom.* ix. 5. compare *2 Cor.* xi. 31. and *Rom.* i. 25.

It is pleaded in answer to these texts, that the word *God* is often used in a *subordinate sense*, v. g. *1 Cor.* viii. 5. *2 Cor.* iv. 4. *Exod.* vii. 1. *Psal.* xcvi. 7. lxxxii. 6. *John* x. 34—36. But it is answered,

1. That in most if not all of these places, a subordination is expressly intimated.

2. That such *additional titles* as those mentioned above are never used: to which some add,

3. That *ὁ Θεός* is never used concerning any who are Gods only in a subordinate sense: but *2 Cor.* iv. 4. is an instance of the contrary.

SECT. II. *Titles* appropriated to God, are also applied to *Christ*.

1. He, (if the preceding reasoning be allowed) calls himself *the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, *Exod.* iii. 6. compare *Acts* vii. 30—32. *Hos.* xii. 3—5.

2. *Lord of hosts*, *Isa.* viii. 13, 14. compared with the following passages, *1 Pet.* ii. 6—8. *Psal.* cxviii. 22. *Matt.* xxi. 42. and *2 Sam.* vi. 2. to which some add *Isa.* liv. compared with *2 Cor.* xi. 2.

3. *King of Kings and Lord of Lords*, *Rev.* xvii. 14. xix. 13—16. compared with *Deut.* x. 17. *1 Tim.* vi. 14, 15.

4. *The first and the last*, *Rev.* i. 17, 18. ii. 8. compare *Isa.* xli. 4. and xlv.

6. To the former of these especially it is objected, that Christ though a created being

being might use such language, as the *embassador* and therefore *representative* of God. It is answered, it is not usual for embassadors to assert that they are the persons from whom they are sent: upon the same principles, any angel or prophet might have used the same language, and the temptation to idolatry would have been greater than it is reasonable to suppose God would have permitted. These arguments are further confirmed, by considering on the one hand, how averse to idolatry the *Jews* were at the time when the New Testament was written, and how propense the *Gentiles*, which would have made such bold figures of speech in that book peculiarly dangerous.

Burnet on the Art. p. 44, 45.

| *Harris on the Messiah*, p. 137, 138.

SECT. III. Attributes sometimes appropriated to God, are applied to Christ

1. Omniscience, *Col.* ii. 3. *Rev.* ii. 23. to which many add *John* xxi. 17. ii. 24, 25. *Matt.* xii. 24. compared with *1 Kings* viii. 29. and *Jer.* xvii. 9, 10.

2. Omnipresence, or a power of perception and operation in distant places at the same time, *Matt.* xviii. 20. xxviii. ult. *Col.* i. 17. to which many add *Heb.* i. 3. compare *Jer.* xxiii. 24. To these some add *John* i. 18. iii. 13. compare *John* ix. 25. *Greek*; and *Gen.* xix. 24. concerning which see *Calvin's* notes on that place, and compare *Hos.* i. 7.

3. Almighty power, *Phil.* iii. 21. to which many add *Rev.* i. 8. it is indeed debated, whether that be spoken of Christ or the Father, but *Rev.* i. 11, 17, 18. ii. 8. xxii. 12, 13, 20. make it probable, that it refers to Christ. See also *Prop.* 126. gr. 5.

4. Eternity, *Rev.* i. 11, 17. *Heb.* vii. 3. Some also add *Heb.* xiii. 8. *Prov.* viii. 22, 23. compare *Psal.* xc. 2.

5. Immutability. *Heb.* i. 12. xiii. 8. compare *Mal.* iii. 6. *James* i. 17. and some have argued from *John* xvi. 15. that this, and all the other attributes of God are claimed by Christ as his: see *John* v. 26.

LECT. SECT. IV. Divine works of creation and universal support are ascribed to
CLIX. Christ as above, (see *Prop.* 126. gr. 5) with this remarkable circumstance, that all things are said to have been made *for* as well as *by* him, *Col.* i. 16, 17. It is objected, that God is said to have created all things *by* Jesus Christ in several texts: compare *1 Cor.* viii. 6. *Eph.* iii. 9. to this it is replied, that *dia* often signifies *for* as well as *by*, so that it may import their being made *for the glory* of Christ, or rather that the *created* or *derived* nature of Christ was the *instrument* by which the world was made. Compare *Rom.* xi. 36.

Moore's Prop. 121—129.

SECT. V. Religious worship, though appropriated to God, *Deut.* vi. 13, 15. x. 20. *Matt.* vi. 10. was by divine approbation and command given to Christ, *Heb.* i. 6. *John* xx. 28. *Acts* vii. 59. *Phil.* ii. 9—11. compare *Rom.* xiv. 11. *John* v. 23. To this it is in the general objected, that we are to distinguish between *supreme* and *subordinate* worship, the former of which is due to God alone,

alone, the latter may be given to creatures : compare 1 *Chron* xxix. 20. *Matt.* xviii. 26. It is replied, that in this case the worship addressed to man was apparently a *civil* not a *religious* homage ; and that if it be the christian scheme to introduce any *inferior* God, to whom religious adoration is to be paid, *i. e.* to whom we are to pray, whom we are to praise, in whom we are to confide, by whom we are to swear, (all which acts of worship are addressed to Christ in the following passages, *John* xiv. 1. (answered by *Exod.* xiv. 31. and 2 *Chron.* xii. xx. 20.) *Rom.* x. 13. 1 *Cor.* i. 2. *Rom.* xv. 12. 2 *Cor.* xii. 8. *Rom.* ix. 1.) one would have supposed, that there should have been the strictest care to adjust the degree of worship due to him, that it might not interfere with that of the *supreme* God : and it is hard to reconcile this with its being so often declared to be the design of the gospel to bring men to the worship of *the only true God* ; (*Acts* xiv. 15. xvii. 23, 24. *Gal.* iv. 8. 1 *Thess.* i. 9.) or with the force of Christ's reasoning in *Luke* iv. 8. This branch of the argument is likewise much illustrated by a multitude of texts, in which the apostles express an unlimited veneration, love, and obedience to Christ, and that dependence upon him and devotedness to him, which can only be justified in this view, and would indeed be very criminal, if he were, to be considered only as *an exalted man*, or *a mere creature* ; (which two expressions, by the way, when applied to Christ in his present state, seem to coincide more than some have been willing to allow.) Compare *Phil.* i. 20, 21. *Col.* iii. 11. *Rom.* xiv. 7—9. and many other texts quoted by Mr. *Jennings* in his discourses on *preaching Christ*.

C O R O L L A R Y.

It appears by the tenour of this proposition, that *most* if not absolutely *all* those names, titles, attributes, and works which are ascribed and appropriated to the one eternal and ever-blessed God in scripture, are also ascribed to *Christ* ; and that such divine worship is required or encouraged to *him*, as is elsewhere appropriated to the one eternal and ever-blessed God.

Watts on the Trin. p. 35—84.

Clarke and Taylor on the Trin. pass.

Moore's Prop. p. 129—144.

Emlyn's Humble Enquiry, ap. Tracts,
vol. i.

Boyse's Answer.

Emlyn's Vindicat. of the Worship of Christ,

&c. ap. Tracts, vol. i.

Shuckford's Hist. vol. i. p. 293, 294.

D E F I N I T I O N LXXVIII.

The word **PERSON** commonly signifies one single, intelligent, voluntary agent, or conscious being ; and this we chuse to call the *philosophical* sense of the word : but in a *political* sense, it may express the different *relations* supported by the same philosophical person ; *v. g.* the same man may be father, husband, son, &c. or the same prince King of *Great-Britain*, Duke of *Brunswick*, and Treasurer of the *Empire*.

Dr Daniel Scott's Ess. toward a Demonstrat. of the Scripture Trinity, Def. ii.

C O R O L-

COROLLARY.

One *philosophical* person may sustain a great number of persons in the *political* or as some call it the *modal* sense of the word.

Watts's Diff. N^o vi. p. 180—184.

SCHOLIUM.

Besides this, some have given various definitions of *person* in the *theological* sense of the word; of which few are more remarkable than that of *Markius*, that "personality is a positive mode of being, ultimately terminating and filling "a substantial nature, and giving to it incommunicability." To describe the personality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as "expressing that perfection of "the divine nature, whereby it subsists three different ways, the Father, Son, "and the Holy Ghost, each of which, possessing the divine essence after his "peculiar manner, thereby becomes a distinct person," may perhaps be a definition much of the same import.

Markii Compend. l. v. c. iii.

| *Slofs on the Trin.* p. 28, 29.

PROPOSITION CXXVIII.

God is so *united* to the derived nature of Christ, and does so *dwell* in it, that by virtue of that *union* Christ may be properly called *God*, and such regards become due to him, as are not due to any *created* nature, or mere creature, be it in itself ever so excellent.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 127. *Cor.* | 1. Such divine names, titles, attributes, and works, are ascribed, and such divine worship demanded or encouraged to Christ, as are elsewhere appropriated to God.

2. Christ cannot be a being distinct from God, and yet co-ordinate with him; since that would infer such a plurality of Gods as is contrary both to natural and revealed religion: (*Prop.* 39, 125. *gr.* 14.) besides, a multitude of things are said of Christ in scripture, which undoubtedly prove him to have been really and truly a *man*, and cannot be said of the one living and true God in himself considered: v. g. that he hungered, felt pain, died, &c. Compare 1 *Tim.* ii. 5.

1, 2, 3 | 3. There must be some wonderful union of God with the man Christ Jesus, to lay a foundation for such ascriptions and regards.

4. The scripture expressly speaks of such a union, and of God as *dwelling* in Christ. *John* x. 28—30, 38. xvii. 11, 20—23. *Col.* i. 19. (compare *Eph.* iii. 19. *Col.* ii. 19.) *John* xiv. 9, 10.

4 & 5 | 5. *Valei propositio.*

Calamy on the Trin. *Serm.* ii. p. 31—64. | *Watts's Dissertation*, N^o ii.

SCHOLIUM I.

Against this it is objected, that Christ acknowledges himself *inferior* to the Father, *John* xiv. 28. that the Father is called *his God*, *John* xx. 17. *2 Cor.* xi. 31. that he disclaims the infinity of knowledge, power, and goodness, *Mark* xiii. 22. *John* v. 18, 19. *Matt.* xix. 17. that he often prays to his Father; that he declares himself to have received from the Father those things for which he is most eminent: and that throughout the whole of his administration he is described as *the servant of God*; *Isa.* xlii. 1. lii. 13. liii. 11. (by which some have explained his *taking upon him the form of a servant*, *Phil.* ii. 6.) referring all to his glory, and assisting his creatures in their approaches to him, to whom he shall finally give up the kingdom, *1 Cor.* xv. 24—29.

With regard to all these texts it is to be observed, that we by no means assert, (as some few have done,) that the human nature of Christ is *absorbed* in the divine, which would indeed make the objection unanswerable; but acknowledging the *reality* and *perpetuity* of it, we reply, that all these things must be understood as being spoken by or of him *as man* and *mediator*, with a reference to that union with God established in the preceding proposition.

<i>Emlyn's Humble Enquiry, ap. Tracts,</i>		<i>Hallet on Script. vol. ii. p. 214—224.</i>
<i>vol. i.</i>		<i>Dr. Dan. Scott's Eff. toward, a Demonst.</i>
<i>Calamy on the Trin. Sermon. iii—v.</i>		<i>of the Script. Trin. Prop. vi. & vii.</i>
<i>Watts's Diff. N^o ii. p. 40—43.</i>		

SCHOLIUM 2.

Dr. Clarke asserts the *Logos* to be something *between* a created and a self-existent nature. But it is difficult to enter into the foundation of this distinction, unless the idea of a *creature* be, not a thing produced *out of nothing* by the *divine power*, but a thing produced by the Father, through the *agency of the Son*, which is a very unusual sense of the word.

Clarke on the Trin. part ii. Prop. xiv, xvii.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The doctrine of the divinity of Christ has generally been expressed, by saying that the human and divine nature of Christ are united in one person, which has generally been called *the hypostatic* or *personal union*: and those were condemned as *Heretics* in the *fourth* century, who either on the one hand maintained there was but *one nature*, or on the other, that there were *two persons* in Christ. It is evident that scripture does not use this language in what it teaches us on this head; nor is it easy to determine the idea which has been affixed to the word *person*, when used in this controversy. It has been pleaded, that we may as well conceive the union of the divine and human nature in one person, as

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of

of the soul and body in man: but it is plain this is far from being entirely a parallel case, since here are not two *conscious* beings united; and that God and the creature should have *one* and the *same consciousness*, certainly exceeds our comprehension. It seems therefore, that those who have fixed any idea at all to the term *person* here, rather mean it in a *political* sense, to express the concurrent operation of the Deity with the human nature of Christ, in order to constitute a perfect mediator.

Dr. *Waterland's* definition of the word *person* as used in this question, is this; "A single person is an intelligent agent, having the distinct characters *I*, *Thou*, *He*, and not divided or distinguished into more intelligent agents capable of the same characters:" where it is proper to observe, he does not say it is not *divisible* or *distinguishable*, which is not here the case, but not *divided* or *distinguished*.

<i>Waterland's 2d Vind. of Christ's Divin.</i>		<i>South against Sherlock</i> , iii. p. 72.
<i>Quest. xv.</i>		<i>Emlyn's Humble Enquiry</i> . c. ii. § 2. ap.
<i>Watts's Diff.</i> ii. p. 43—47.		<i>Traets</i> , vol. i. N ^o ii. Ed. 1746. N ^o
<i>Pearson on the Creed</i> , p. 161—163.		i. p. 16—22. Ed. 1731.
<i>Baxt. End of Contr. Pref. c. iii. § 5—8.</i>		<i>Taylor against Watts</i> , p. 76—82.

S C H O L I U M 4.

It has been hotly debated, whether Christ be called *the only begotten son of God*, with regard merely to his being the promised Messiah, or to his extraordinary conception, and exaltation to his kingdom as mediator; or whether the expression refer to the eternal generation of the divine nature. The texts brought to prove the latter, are chiefly *Psal.* ii. 7. *Prov.* viii. 22, 23, 25. *Micah* v. 2. *Heb.* i. 2, 3. *Col.* i. 15. *John* i. 14, 18. but others have explained the texts of the production of the *created* or *derived* nature of Christ, which according to the preceding hypothesis was prior to the creation of the world; and with regard to some of them, have attempted to prove their application to Christ's deity uncertain, and that the first of them relates to his *resurrection*, compare *Acts* xiii. 33. urging that it is utterly inconceivable, that a nature truly and properly *divine* should be *begotten*, since *begetting*, whatever idea is annexed to it, must signify some kind of *derivation*.

<i>Owen on the Person of Christ</i> , c. vii. p. 138; &c. apud.		<i>Proced. of the Underst.</i> p. 302—308.
<i>Waterland's Vind.</i> p. 199, & p. 209—216.		<i>Burnet's Script. Doct. of the Trin.</i> p. 104—118.
<i>Ridgley's Divin.</i> vol. i. p. 124—131.		<i>Watts's Useful and Important Quest.</i> qu. i. p. 45—62.

L E M M A TO P R O P O S I T I O N CXXIX.

LECT. CLX. It is evident that frequent mention is made of the HOLY SPIRIT, in the New Testament, as an agent of great importance in carrying on the christian cause.

P R Q.

PROPOSITION CXXIX.

To enumerate the principal of those scriptures, in which divine names, titles, attributes, works, or worship are, or seem to be ascribed to the HOLY SPIRIT.

SOLUTION.

1. Many plead that the Holy Spirit is called *Jehovah* in the Old Testament, by comparing *Aets* xxviii. 25. with *Isa.* vi. 9. and *Heb.* iii. 7—9. with *Exod.* xvii. 7. *Jer.* xxxi. 31—34. with *Heb.* x. 15, 16. That he is called *God*, *Aets* v. 4. seems probable; to which some add *1 Cor.* iii. 16. vi. 19. *2 Cor.* iii. 17.

2. Divine *perfections* are certainly ascribed to the Spirit of God; particularly *Omniscience*, *1 Cor.* ii. 10, 11. *Isa.* xl. 13, 14. to which some add *1 John* ii. 20. *Omnipresence*; *Psal.* cxxxix. 7. *Eph.* ii. 17, 18. *Rom.* viii. 26, 27. *Omnipotence*; *Luke* i. 35. *1 Cor.* xii. 11. *Eternity*; *Heb.* ix. 14.

3. Divine *works* are evidently ascribed to the Spirit; *Gen.* i. 9. *Job* xxvi. 13. xxxiii. 4. and *Psal.* xxxiii. 6. civ. 30. & *sim.* Some likewise add those texts, in which miracles, inspiration, and saving operations upon the heart of man, are ascribed to the Spirit.

4. The chief texts produced to prove that divine *worship* is given to the Spirit, are *Isa.* vi. 3. compared with *ver* 9. and *Aets* xxviii. 25, &c. *Rom.* ix. 1 *Rev.* i. 4. *2 Cor.* xiii. 14. and above all *Matt.* xxviii 19.

Calamy on the Trinity, Serm. vi.

Emlyn's Traets, vol. ii. p. 255—261.

Ed. 1731. p. 392—398. *Ed.* 1746.

Burnet on the Art. p. 38.

Watts on the Trinity, Diff. v. § 2.

—*Christian Doct. of Trin.* p. 85—97.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 367, 368.

COROLLARY.

The blessed Spirit is spoken of in such a manner, as we cannot imagine would be used in speaking of a mere creature, and consequently must be possessed of a nature properly divine.

Clarke on the Trin. l. i. c. iii.

| *Taylor on the Trin. part* iii. p. 477—517.

SCHOLIUM I.

The chief controversy on this head is, whether the Spirit of God be a person in the *philosophical* sense, or merely a divine *power* or *energy*. That he is a *person*, is argued, from his being described as having understanding, *1 Cor.* ii. 10, 11. willing, *1 Cor.* xii. 11. speaking and sending messengers, *Isa.* vi. 8. compared with *Aets* xxviii. 25. viii. 29. x. 16, 20. xiii. 1—4. *1 Tim.* iv. 1. yea, as Dr. *Barrow* interprets it, sending Christ, *Isa.* xlviii. 16. as pleading, *Rom.* viii. 26. as being grieved, *Isa.* lxiii. 10. *Eph.* iv. 30. as teaching and reminding,

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ing,

Whether the Spirit be only a divine power considered. PART VII.
ing, *John* xiv. 26. as testifying, *John* xv. 26. as reproving, *John* xvi. 8, &c.
as executing a commission received from God, *John* xvi. 14.

Owen on the Spirit, l. i. c. iii. § 9—23.

Taylor against Watts, p. 64—72.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 361—364.

Pearson on the Creed, p. 311.

Clarke on the Trin. part ii. § 22.

Emlyn's Tracts, vol. ii. p. 205—212. Ed.

1731. p. 342—349. Ed. 1746.

Dr. Dan. Scott's Ess. towards a Demonst.
of the Scrip. Trin. Prop. iii.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Those who assert the Spirit to be a divine *power*, plead chiefly the sense of the word in the *Old Testament*; where they say it generally has that signification; and that it would be absurd to suppose, that the idea should be so greatly changed, when Christ and his apostles addressed those who had been bred up in the *Jewish* religion, and must therefore have been used to conceive of the Spirit according to the representation made in their sacred oracles. It is also pleaded, that the *pouring out one person* on another, is both unscriptural and unintelligible language, but not so, if it relates to a divine *power*, influence, or operation. They urge in favour of this explication of the doctrine, *Luke* i. 35. and reply to the scriptures urged above, by observing, that nothing was more common among the ancients, and especially the *eastern* nations, than to represent powers, properties, and attributes, by personal characters: thus *wisdom* is represented as contriving, rejoicing, inviting, pleading, reproofing, &c. *Prov.* i. 20, &c. iii. 13, &c. iv. 6, &c. viii. 1. ix. 1, &c. *charity*, as believing, rejoicing, &c. *1 Cor.* xiii. and *death*, as being plagued, *Hos.* xiii. 14. the *scripture*, as foreseeing and preaching, *Gal.* iii. 8. the *sun*, as rejoicing, *Psal.* xix. 5. a *famine*, as coming at God's call, *2 Kings* viii. 1. *righteousness*, as walking before him. Compare *Psal.* lxxxv. 10—13. and the *wind*, as willing, *John* iii. 8. But it is answered, that none of these come up to the preceding texts; especially considering how frequently the personal term *σπς* is used, when spoken of the Spirit, and that not in poetical, but most plain and simple discourses: but the strongest objection against this opinion arises from the form of baptism, and the forementioned *John* xvi. 13, 14.

Watts's Dissertation, p. 144—149.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Among those who grant the Spirit to be a person, it is debated whether he be the same philosophical person with the Father, or another distinct from him: to suppose the latter, (supposing him at the same time equal with the Father,) is making him *another God*: some therefore have represented him as a created spirit, in his own nature inferior both to Father and Son; against which the passages enumerated in the preceding proposition have been strongly urged; as it has

has also been, that the Spirit is mentioned as a creature called upon to praise God, when a large enumeration of such is made: Others consider him as a created Spirit, (called as one thinks *Michael the Arch-angel.*) so united to God, and so acted by him, as by virtue of that union to become capable of such representations and regards as the Son is, though acting in some subordination to him in the œconomy of our redemption: while many others have contented themselves with asserting, that there is only a *political, modal, or œconomical* distinction, in the personality of Father, Son, and Spirit. Others again have maintained that the Spirit is a *third* distinction in the Deity; and when he is called a *person*, the word is to be taken in a sense below the philosophical and above the modal; though what determinate idea is to be affixed to it, they do not more particularly say.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 368.

Burn. Script. Doct. of Trin. p. 58, 59.

Clarke on the Trin. part ii. § 3, 19—21.

Dr. Dan. Scott's Ess. towards a Demonst. of the Script. Trin. Prop. vii.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Divines have commonly taught, that the Holy Spirit *proceeds from* the Father and the Son: and the *Popish* school-men introduce the phrase of *spiration*, to signify the manner in which his personality was derived from them. He is indeed said to *come* or to be *sent forth* from the Father, *John* xv. 26. and Christ often promises that he would *send him*: but for that notion of his *spiration* mentioned above, it cannot be explained, and therefore cannot be defended.

Watts's Diff. v. p. 155—162. *ibid.* p. 166—169.

Burnet on the Trinity p. 118.—123.

SCHOLIUM 5.

On the whole, forasmuch as the Spirit is plainly spoken of in scripture under a personal character, it is proper to retain that language in discoursing of him and praying for him, even though we should not be able certainly to determine in our own minds, as to the nicety of some of those questions, which have been touched upon in the preceding scholia.

Clark on the Trinity, part ii. § 53, 54.

PROPOSITION CXXX.

The scripture represents the Divine Being as appearing in, and manifesting himself by the distinct persons of FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST; each of which has his peculiar province in accomplishing the work of our redemption.

LECT.

CLXI.

redemption and salvation, and to each of which we owe an unlimited veneration, love, and obedience.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. That God appears under the character of *Father* in scripture, *i. e.* the Father of Christ, and through him the Father of all his people, is so clear from the whole tenour of the New Testament, that it would be superfluous to enumerate particular texts in the proof of it. *John* xx. 27. *2 Cor.* i. 3.

Prop. 127. and *Cor.* 12. The scripture represents the *Lord Jesus Christ*, the Son of God, as a divine person, in whom the fulness of the Godhead dwelt, by whom the Father manifested himself to us, and who with the Father is God over all.

Prop. 129. *Cor.* 13. The scripture also represents the *Holy Spirit* as a divine person, possessed of those attributes and perfections which are to be found in God alone.

4. There are various texts of scripture, in which Father, Son, and Spirit are mentioned *together*, and represented under distinct *personal* characters, *v. g.* *Matt.* xxviii. 19. *iii.* 16, 17. *1 Cor.* xii. 4—6. *2 Cor.* xiii. ult. *Eph.* iv. 4—6. *Heb.* ix. 14. to which some add *Rev.* i. 4, 5. As for *1 John* v. 7. the authority of it is contested, nor is the importance of it so very great as some have imagined; since it does not exactly determine *in what respects* the *three* there spoken of are *one*. Vid. *Calv. in Loc. & Instit.* l. i. c. xiii. § 5, 6.

5. It is every where represented in scripture, that our redemption was *contrived* by the Father, *purchased* by the Son, and is *applied* by the Spirit, thro' whose assistance, in the name of Christ, we are to make our approaches to the Father, *Eph.* i. 3, 4. *Tit.* iii. 4—7. *Rom.* xv. 16. *Eph.* ii. 18.

5. 6. Hence it appears, that correspondent regards are due to each, which are accordingly required in many passages of scripture, *John* v. 23. *1 Cor.* xvi. 22. *Eph.* iv. 30.

1—6. 7. *Valet propositio.*

Berry-Street Lect. vol. i. p. 94—107.

Butler's Anal. p. 153, 154. 4to.

Whitby's Last Thoughts, pass.

| *Dr. Dan. Scott's Ess. towards a Demonst.*
| *of the Script. Trin.* pass.

SCHOLIUM I.

If it be asked, *how* these divine persons are *three*, and how *one*; it must be acknowledged an inexplicable mystery: nor should we wonder that we are much confounded when enquiring into the curiosities of such questions, if we consider how little we know of our own nature and manner of existence. Vid. *Prop.* 18.

SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 2.

If it be enquired, in what sense the word *person* is used in the proposition, we answer, it must at least be true in a *political* sense, yet cannot amount to so much as a *philosophical* personality, unless we allow a plurality of Gods: and if there be any medium between these, (which we cannot certainly say there is not) we must confess it to be to us unsearchable; and the higher our notions of distinct personality are carried, the more difficult does it appear to our feeble reason, to clear up the supreme divinity of each, and *vice versa*.

Watts's Diff. N° vi.

SCHOLIUM 3.

We must acknowledge that scripture seems sometimes to neglect this distinction of persons, and *God dwelling in Christ*, is sometimes called the *Father*, and sometimes the *Holy Spirit*. Vid. *John* xiv. 9, 10. *Matt.* xii. 28. *John* i. 32. *Heb.* ix. 14. 1 *Pet.* iii. 18. *Acts* x. 38.

Watts's Useful Quest. N° iv, v. p. 133—152.

SCHOLIUM 4.

From several texts above quoted compared with some others, (*viz. Isa.* lxi. 1, 2. *John* iii. 34. *Acts* x. 38. *Matt.* xii. 28. *Heb.* ix. 14. *Rom.* i. 4. viii. 11.) in which Christ is spoken of as qualified for his work by the descent of the Spirit upon him, and its indwelling in him, an argument has been deduced in proof of the deity of the Spirit; which is also hinted at by Dr. Barrow.

Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 367, 368.

SCHOLIUM 5.

As to the celebrated controversy concerning the genuineness of 1 John v. 7. a view of the most considerable arguments on both sides may be seen in

Emlyn's Tracts, vol. ii. N° i, ii, iii,

Ed. 1731. N° iv. v. iv. 1746.

New Translation of New Testament

vol. ii. p. 921—935.

Twells's Examples part ii.

Martin's Dissertation in Loc.

Calamy's Sermon in Loc. N° i—iii.

Ab. Taylor on the Trinity p. 31—58.

Mills's Greek Testament in Loc.

Cyprian Epist. p. 203. Tract. p. 109.

Edition Fell.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some have supposed that the plurality of persons in the Deity is every where intimated in the Old Testament, by the use of the plural **אלהים** to signify the one living and true God: (which word by the way Mr *Hutchinson* and his followers would read *Elabim*, or *Aleim*, as supposing it refers to the *oath* or *covenant*, into which they have entered each with other and the church.) To confirm this opinion, it is further argued, that plural verbs, *Gen* xx. 13 xxxv. 7. and plural adjectives, *Jer*. xxiii. 36. compare *Deut*. xxxii. 17. are sometimes joined with it.

Ridley at Moyer's Lectures, Serm. ii. p. 74—81. | *Forbes's Lett. to a Bishop, p. 40—42.*
Forbes's Thoughts of Rel. p. 134—139. | *Sharp's Diff. on the Word Elohim, pass.*

PROPOSITION CXXXI.

To enquire into the opinions of the most ancient christian writers concerning the doctrine of the trinity.

SOLUTION.

LECT. For a more paticular solution we chuse to refer to *Bull de Fid. Antenicenâ*, CLXII. *Waterland*, *Clarke*, and *Jackson*; especially the notes of the latter on *Novatian*, which contain an enumeration of all the most important passages which are urged from them on any side of the controversy. The chief passages from the writers of the *two first centuries* may be seen in the *fourth* volume of *Whiston's Primitive Christianity*: a particular account of what each has said would take up a disproportionate room here, we must therefore content ourselves with the following general remarks.

1. Most of these writers speak of Christ and of the Holy Spirit as *distinct persons* in the *philosophical* sense of the word, and as the objects of the worship of Christians.

2. Before the council of *Nice*, they generally spoke of the Son as having had a glorious nature pre-existent to his incarnation: they represented him as derived from the Father, and nevertheless so partaking of the Father's nature, as to be called *God of Gods*, *light of light*; and they illustrate this in general by the simile of one taper being kindled by another, and of rays proceeding from the sun: this after the council of *Nice* was explained by the word *ὁμοουσιον*, and it was reckoned heretical to say that the Son was *ὁμοιουσιον*.

3. They about the time of that council counted those to be *Heretics*, who asserted the Son to have been produced *ἐκ ἑκ ὀντων*, or who reckoned him in the number of *creatures*.

4. This doctrine is only touched upon by the *earliest* Fathers in an incidental manner: *Origen* and *Tertullian* treated most largely of it, and *Novatian* is the only writer of the three first centuries, whose entire treatise on this subject is come down to us.

5. It

5. It must be acknowledged that several of the fathers talked in a very loose and sometimes a very inconsistent manner, and several of them used expressions, which after the council of *Nice* would have been condemned as heretical.

6. After the time of this celebrated council, which was near the beginning of the *fourth* century, they ran into several subtilities of expression, in which one would imagine they studied rather to conceal than to explain their sentiments; yet they grew so warm upon the subject, as to anathematize, oppose, and murder each other on account of some of those unscriptural phrases, much to the dishonour of their common profession.

Chandler's Hist. of Pers. p. 39, &c.

7. Most of the oldest *Post-Nicene* fathers carried their notions of the distinct personality and supreme divinity to a very great height; and seemed to have imagined they sufficiently supported the unity of the God-head by asserting that Father, Son, and Spirit, had each of them the same *divine*, as three or more men have each of them the same *human* nature.

Le Clerc's Life of Greg. Naz. p. 249—257 | Burnet on the Trinity p. 135, 136.

S C H O L I U M.

The subject of this proposition may receive some further illustration by mentioning some of the most considerable of those opinions, which were generally accounted *heretical* by the ancient Christians.

1. That of the *Cerinthians*, *Ebionites* and *Carpocratians*; who seem to have asserted, that Christ was a mere man, and had no existence before his incarnation: this is the same doctrine, which was revived in the *fourth* century, by *Photinus*, as it had been before by *Paulus Samasotenus*.

2. The *Arians*, who held him to be only the first and most glorious creature of God, denying he had any thing which could properly be called a *divine nature*, any otherwise than as any thing very excellent may by a figure be called divine, or his delegated dominion over the system of nature might entitle him to the name of *God*: and they seem also to have thought, that the *Spirit* was another distinct inferior being, created by the Son, but they did not employ themselves much in this part of the controversy. This is a heresy which most largely prevailed, and in some places and times seems to have almost entirely swallowed up what is commonly called the *orthodox*, or *catholic* faith.

3. That of *Nestorius*, who asserted there were *two persons* in Christ, as well as two natures; to which was directly opposed that of *Eutychus*, who asserted but *one nature*, as well as one person, teaching that the human nature was *absorbed* in the divine: all these different extremes occasioned the most violent agitations in the disordered churches, during the *fourth* and *sixth* centuries.

4. That of *Macedonius*, who denied the Holy Spirit to have any proper divine substance, and represents him only as a created power, which was diffused over all other creatures.

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5. That

5. That of *Sabellius*, who taught that the Father, Son, and Spirit were only names and offices of the same person, who was in heaven called the Father, on earth the Son, and as exerting his power on the creation, the Holy Spirit.

For the most ancient account of these, consult *Eusebius*, *Sozomen*, and *Theodoret* in their Ecclesiastical History, and also *Bayle* or *Collier* under their names. Many of the most material passages are collected and exhibited by *Dr. Berriman* and *Dr. Ab. Taylor* in their treatises on the Trinity.

PROPOSITION CXXXII.

LECT. To give a brief account of some of the most celebrated of the opinions
CLXIII. among the *Moderns*, concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, especially of the *English* writers.

SOLUTION.

1. Mr. *Baxter* seems, as some of the school-men did, to have thought the three divine persons to be one and the same God, *understanding*, *willing*, and *beloved* by himself; or wisdom, power, and love; which he thinks illustrated by the three *essential formalities*, (as he calls them) in the soul of man, *viz.* vital active power, intellect, and will; and in the sun, motion, light, and heat.

Baxter's End of Contr. c. ii. | Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 132. ibid. vol. iii. p. 568.

2. Dr. *Clarke's* scheme is, that there is one supreme Being who is the Father, and two subordinate derived and dependent beings: but he waves calling Christ a creature, as the ancient *Arians* did, and principally on that foundation disclaims the charge of *Arianism*.

Clarke on the Trinity part ii. Prop. 7, 12, 14—16, 19—22.

3. Dr. *Thomas Burnet* maintains one self-existent and two dependent beings; but asserts that the two latter are so united to and inhabited by the former, that by virtue of that union divine perfections may be ascribed and divine worship paid to them.

Burnet's Script. Doct. p. 173, 174.

4. Mr. *Howe* seems to suppose that there are three distinct, eternal spirits or distinct, intelligent hypostases, each having his own distinct, singular, intelligent nature, united in such an inexplicable manner, as that upon account of their perfect harmony, consent, and affection, to which he adds their mutual self-consciousness, they may be called *the one God*, as properly as the different corporeal, sensitive, and intellectual natures united may be called *one man*.

Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 560—568.

5. Dr.

5. Dr. *Waterland*, Dr. *Ab. Taylor*, with the rest of the *Athanasians*, assert three proper distinct persons, entirely equal to and independent upon each other, yet making up one and the same being; and that though there may appear many things inexplicable in the scheme, it is to be charged to the weakness of our understanding, and not to the absurdity of the doctrine itself.

Taylor on the Trinity, part i. pass. præf. c. i. | Waterland's Vindication and Sermon.

6. Bishop *Pearson*, with whom Bishop *Bull* also agrees, is of opinion, that though God the Father is the fountain of the deity, the whole divine nature is communicated from the Father to the Son, and from both to the Spirit; yet so as that the Father and Son are not separate, nor separable from the divinity, but do still exist in it, and are most intimately united to it. This was likewise Dr. *Owen's* scheme.

Bull's Sermons, vol. iv. p. 829, 830. | Pearson on the Creed, p. 134—138, 322
Owen on the Heb. i. 3. p. 53, 54, 57. | — 326.

7. Dr. *Wallis* thought that the distinction between the three persons was only *modal*: which seems also to have been Archbishop *Tillotson's* opinion.

Wallis's Letter on Trinity. | Tillotson, vol. i. p. 492—494.

8. Dr. *Watts* maintained one supreme God dwelling in the human nature of Christ, which he supposes to have existed the first of all creatures; and speaks of the divine *Logos*, as the wisdom of God, and the Holy Spirit, as the divine power, or the influence and effect of it; which he says is a scriptural person, i. e. spoken of figuratively in scripture under personal characters.

Watts's Dissertation, N^o vii. | Fleming Christol. vol. i. l. ii. c. v. p. 188.

9. Dr. *Jeremiah Taylor* says, “that he who goes about to speak of the mystery of the Trinity, and does it by words and names of man's invention, talking of essences and existences, hypostases and personalities, priorities in co-equalities, &c. and unity in pluralities; may amuse himself and build a tabernacle in his head, and talk something he knows not what: but the good man, that feels the power of the Father, and to whom the Son is become wisdom, sanctification, and redemption, in whose heart the love of the Spirit of God is shed abroad, this man, though he understands nothing of what is unintelligible, yet he alone truly understands the christian doctrine of the Trinity.”

Jer. Taylor on John vi. 17. apud | Besse's Defence of Quakerism, § 8.

COROLLARY I.

Considering the excellent character of many of the persons abovementioned, whose opinions were most widely different, we may assure ourselves, that many

things asserted on the side one and on the other relating to the Trinity, are not fundamental in religion. See Mr. Simon Browne's *Sober and charitable disquisition concerning the importance of the Trinity*.

COROLLARY 2.

We may hence learn to be cautious, how we enter in unscriptural niceties in expressing our own conceptions of this doctrine, which is by all allowed to be so sublime and so peculiar to revelation.

Fleming Christol. vol. i. p. 187—191.

SCHOLIUM I.

Some traces of this doctrine are supposed by many in the writings of *Plato* and yet more probably in those of *Pbilo the Jew*, and in some of the *Targums*. See the references to *Prop.* 126. *Schol.* 3.

<i>Kidder on the Messiah</i> , part iii. c. v, vi. p. 92—128.	<i>Tenison on Idol.</i> c. v. p. 77, 78. <i>Witsii Econ. Fæd.</i> c. iv. p. 4, 5.
<i>Fleming Christol.</i> vol. i. l. ii. c. i. p. 136 —148.	<i>Cudworth Intelleſt. System</i> c. iv. § 36, &c. p. 546, &c.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many have supposed there are some traces of this doctrine imprinted on all the works of God.

<i>Baxter's Works</i> , vol. ii. p. 14, 15.	<i>Collib. of Rev. Rel.</i> p. 99—113.
<i>Cheyne's Phil. Princ. of Rev. Rel.</i>	


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PART

P A R T VIII.

*Of the FALL of human Nature, and our Recovery by the
mediatorial Undertaking of the LORD JESUS CHRIST.*

P R O P O S I T I O N CXXXIII.

Mankind is at present in a *degenerate* state: and there is reason to believe LECT.
CLXIV. that there never has been, since the transgression of *Adam*, and never will be among his adult descendants, a sinless mortal on earth, Christ excepted. 

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

1. Our own observation on ourselves, and those adult persons with whom we are conversant may convince us, that the philosophical liberty of our minds and theirs is in some considerable degree impaired; (*Prop. 17.*) and so far as the most credible history of all nations can inform us, this seems to have been a universal phænomenon. See *Prop. 89.* and *Schol.*

2. There are many passages in scripture, which assert, not only that this was in fact the case with regard to those generations in which the authors lived, but some of them plainly intimate that it always had been, and was likely to continue so: *Gen. vi. 5.* compared with *viii. 21.* *2 Chron. vi. 36.* *Psal. xix. 12.* *cxxx. 3.* *cxliii. 2.* *Prov. xx. 19.* *Eccles. vii. 20.* *Rom. vii. 14.* *Eccl. Gal. iii. 22.* *v. 17.* *24.* *Eph. ii. 1—3.* *Tit. iii. 2—7.* *James iii. 2.* *1 John i. 8.* to which we may add all those texts that assert the necessity of *regeneration*, and of *mortification*, and which speak of the sinful principle as *the old man*: *Rom. vi. 6.* *Eph. iv. 22—24.* *Col. iii. 9.* And indeed the whole of the apostle's argument in the beginning of the *Epistles to the Romans and Galatians*, as well as all those other texts, that are afterwards to be produced, to prove the universal necessity of believing in Christ for salvation, are conclusive to the same purpose; because they suppose mankind to be in a state of death and ruin brought upon them by sin: compare *John iii. 16, 36.* *v. 24.* *1 John ii. 14.* *Mark xvi. 15, 16.* *Luke xxiv. 47.* and especially *Rom. iii. 9—20.* in which the apostle seems expressly to assert, that the passages there quoted from the Old Testament contain a just representation of what is in general the moral character of mankind; and to this last argument *John* seems evidently to refer, *1 John i. 10.*

3. Many of these evil inclinations begin to work very early, and appear even in children from the first dawn of reason: compare *Psal. lviii. 3.* *Isa. xlviii. 8.* *Prov. xxii. 15.*

1, 2, 3. | 4. Mankind is at present in a very corrupt and sinful state.

5. It seems in the nature of things very improbable, that so holy and good a God should have formed mankind in the original constitution of their nature in so corrupt and sinful a state.

Prop. 89. *Cor.* 3. 109. *gr.* 3. | 6. There has prevailed among many nations a tradition, that mankind was once in a much more holy and happy state.

7. There are various passages of scripture, besides the *Mosaic* history of the fall, which plainly intimate that mankind was once in a better state, but that now a corrupted nature is derived from one generation to another: *Eccles.* vii. 29. compare *Gen.* i. 31. v. 1, 3. *Job* xi. 12. xiv. 4. xxv. 4. *Psal.* li. 5. *Ezek.* xxxvi. 26. *John* iii. 5. compare *Rom.* viii. 7.

4, 5, 6, 7 | 8. Mankind is in a state of degeneracy, in which the original rectitude and glory of the human nature is in great measure lost.

9. That Christ is not comprehended in this assertion, appears from *Prop.* 113. *gr.* 5.

8, 9. | 10. *Valet propositio.*

Limb. Theology l. iii. c. iv. § 1, 2.

| *Taylor of Original Sin.*

Turret. Instit. loc. ix. qu. x. p. 694, &c. | *Jennings's Answer, pass.*

SCHOLIUM I.

Against that part of *gr.* 7. which relates to the propagation of a corrupt nature from one generation to another it is objected, that the phenomenon of universal corruption in all the adult may be accounted for another way, *i. e.* by ascribing it entirely to *imitation*.

Ans. 1. The scriptures quoted there seem evidently to place it higher.

2. There often appear in children propensities towards those vices, of which they have seen no examples.

3. There are many examples of eminent virtue in the world, which yet are not so frequently or easily imitated as those of a vicious nature, which plainly shews a bias on the mind towards vice.

4. In consequence of this, those who have most carefully studied human nature even among the *Pagans*, have acknowledged (and that in very strong terms), an inward depravation and corruption adding a disproportionate force to evil examples, and rendering the mind averse to good.

Watts's Ruin and Recovery, p. 37— | § 4—6. *ap. Op.* vol. i. p. 147—150.

41, 45—48. *Ed.* 2.

| *Ridley on the Spirit*, *Serm.* v. p. 169—

Howe's Living Temple, part ii. c. iv. | 172.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is objected that a propensity to sensual enjoyments is the inseparable consequence of our existence in a body, and of the weakness of reason in our infant state, when the sensitive and passionate powers are so strong.

Ans.

Ans. 1. This propensity is not merely in proportion to the degree requisite for the good either of the individual or the species, and consequently is itself (so far as it prevails) the very corruption of our nature of which we speak.

2. That the degrees of goodness observable in the natural tempers of some children, may evidently convince us, that it would have been very possible for the human constitution to have been so adjusted, that from the beginning the temptations to sin should have been much smaller than they generally are.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is further objected, that it is inconsistent with the *goodness*, and even the *justice* of God, to form creatures with evil propensities, and afterwards to leave them to condemnation and ruin in consequence of them: it is also said to be inconsistent with his *holiness*, to make a creature corrupt in its first original.

Ans. 1. The difficulty is considerably lessened, if we suppose that things are so constituted upon the whole, as that a man is not *necessarily* impelled to any irregular actions, which shall end in his final destruction.

2. What remains of the difficulty, after such a solution, is that which arises from the observation of plain facts, and not peculiar to the christian scheme; nor is it at all increased, by supposing that man was once in a better state, but on the contrary rather much diminished.

SCHOLIUM 4.

As to the *manner* in which this hereditary corruption of our nature is *conveyed*, we acknowledge we cannot particularly explain it; but it seems exceedingly probable, that it may result from the constitution of the *body*, and the dependence of the mind upon it, *Prop.* 3.

Lime-street Lect. vol. i. p. 304—314. | *Turret. Instit. Loc.* ix. *Quest.* xii. vol. i.
Watts's Ruin and Recov. p. 149—155. | p. 706, &c.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Those passages of scripture, in which infants are said to be innocent, have been thought by some an objection against the proposition; *v. g.* *Deut.* i. 39. *Jonah* iv. 11. *1 Cor.* xiv. 20. *Matt.* xviii. 3, 4. but this objection can only lie against that manner of expressing and stating the doctrine, which represents this corruption of nature as properly speaking a *sin*. Now as to this part of the controversy, it is evidently to be determined by the manner in which *sin* is defined: if it signify (as it commonly does) “an action contrary to the divine law,” these evil propensities are *not* sins, but rather the *root* whence sin proceeds; if it be defined, “a conformity to God’s law,” as well as a transgression of it, they must be allowed sinful: but if sin be taken in a more indeterminate sense, for any thing which God will or might punish with final misery,

misery, the question must be considered in a further extent, and is referred to the *scholia* of the following proposition.

<i>Limborch, Theol. l. iii. c. iv. § 3—11. p. 20—25.</i>		<i>Light. Works, vol. ii. p. 569—570.</i>
<i>Taylor's Supplem. to Orig. Sin, § vii.</i>		<i>Hor. Heb. on John ix. 2.</i>
		<i>Watts's Ruin and Recov. p. 41—44.</i>

PROPOSITION CXXXIV.

LECT. To enquire into the account which is given in scripture of the *fall* of our first
CLXV. parents.

SOLUTION.

1. It is evident that they were created free from sin and vicious inclinations, *Gen. i. 31. Eccles. vii. 29.* there is reason also to believe that the natural capacities of *Adam's* mind were good, and his genius at least equal to that which is to be found in any of his descendants; as well as that his bodily form was regular and beautiful, and his constitution so framed as to contain no principles of distemper; but perhaps some have carried the matter too high, in the representation they have given of the vast strength of his understanding, and the strong bias there was upon his will towards the choice of virtue and obedience.

Bury-Street Lect. vol. i. p. 178—189. | South's Serm. vol. i. p. 124—150.

2. God forbid to our first parents the eating the fruit of some certain tree, (the kind of which is now unknown, and perhaps the whole species destroyed,) on the penalty of *death*; which must at least comprehend the loss of that happy state in which they then were, *Gen. ii. 16, 17.*

Bury-Street Lect. ibid. p. 189—193.

3. By the seduction of an evil Spirit, (compare *Gen. iii. 4.* with *Rev. xii. 9. xx. 2.* and *Gen. iii. 15.* with *Col. ii. 15. Rom. xvi. 20. 2 Cor. xi. 3.*) they were prevailed upon to violate that precept, and thereby exposed themselves to the sentence of death by an act of aggravated guilt. To the texts mentioned above may be added all that the scripture says of the character of the devil as *the tempter*, and it being the purpose of Christ to triumph over him. Compare *John viii. 44. 1 John iii. 8.*

<i>Bate's Harm. of Div. Attrib. c. ii.</i>		<i>Goodman's Prodigal, part i.</i>
<i>Wits. Econ. Fæd. l. i. c. viii. § 3—9.</i>		<i>Bury-Street Lect. vol. i. p. 206—209.</i>

4. When this sin was thus committed, the sentence of death, though not immediately executed in its fullest extent, evidently began to lay hold upon them,

them; as their minds appeared under the distress and the consternation of guilt, *Gen.* iii. 10. as they were deprived of the pleasures of paradise, and made to live a life of toil and sorrow, as they were exposed to the disorders of a vitiated constitution, and so death begun to work in them, till at last they were brought down to the grave, *Gen.* iii. 16—19, 24. v. 5.

Collier's Sac. Int. vol. i. p. 135, 136. | *Cumberland's Orig. Gent.* p. 409.

SCHOLIUM I.

Any transgression of God's natural law would probably have been punished with at least as much severity, as the breach of this positive appointment: but the circumstances, in which *Adam* was at his first creation, were such, as removed him from all temptations to, and in some instances from all possibility of committing many of those sins, which now most frequently abound among his posterity; which is one thought of considerable importance to vindicate the divine wisdom in that constitution, under which he placed him.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Had *Adam* continued in a state of innocence, there is a great deal of reason to believe that he would have been happy. It has indeed been pleaded, that God, being the author of the creature's existence, and of all his capacities both of action and enjoyment, cannot be obliged to continue to him his being and comforts; so that, supposing the creature ever so innocent and ever so virtuous, he should be able of right to claim them. Nevertheless, it was what an innocent creature would naturally expect from a being, of whose infinite goodness he had such abundant evidence and rich experience: and when there was, (as in the case of *Adam*,) an express threatening annexed to disobedience, that seems to imply, that while he continued obedient he should continue happy.

Wits. Œcon. Fœd. l. i. c. iv. § 1—3, | *Clarke's Post. Sermon.* vol. i. p. 409, &c.
6, 7. | 8vo Ed.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is questioned whether *Adam*, in case of innocence, would have had reason to expect the continuance of a happy life on earth, or a translation to a nobler state of being elsewhere. Had he abode on earth, his felicity must have been continually increasing, by the exercise of his rational faculties in the contemplation of God, and new discoveries made of his works, as well as by the multiplication of his posterity, on supposition of their continued innocence. But it may be added, that on this supposition, in succeeding generations earth would have been too small to receive and sustain the growing numbers of mankind: and it must be acknowledged, that this seems to be an intimation, that some way or another, colonies would in that case have been transplanted from hence

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to some other abode; and on supposition of *Adam's* own removal, he would have had some reason to hope it should have been to some more excellent state and abode; at least he could have no reason to infer a change for the worse, while he continued innocent and obedient.

Turret. Instit. Loc. viii. Quæst. vi. § 9. | Wits. Œcon. Fæd. l. i. c. iv. § 9.

SCHOLIUM 4.

The revelation, which was made to *Adam*, did not (so far as we can learn) contain any intimation of *pardon*, in case of transgression; and had the sentence been executed in its utmost rigour, he would have had no room to accuse the divine justice: and if, (which seems not improbable from comparing *Gen. iii. 24.*) *Adam* had any sight of and converse with other intelligent beings of a superior order, he might justly conclude, that God would act in such a manner towards him in case of his transgression, as to prevent any encouragement to moral evil, which they might derive from his impunity: and if he had any suspicion of a posterity to be derived from him, (which the sentence on *Eve* gave him room notwithstanding his offence to conclude) there would be further reason for such an apprehension.

Emlyn's Serm. N^o. iii. p. 43, 44.

SCHOLIUM 5.

LECT. CLXVI. The extent of that *death*, which was annexed to the transgression of the divine command given to *Adam*, might not perhaps be certainly known by him, unless it were more fully expressed to him, than it is to us in the *Mosaic* history. He must certainly apprehend, that it included the loss of that happiness which he then possessed; and perhaps the extinction of being, and entire loss of all happiness, might be the punishment due to the least transgression of the divine law. That argument for the immortality of the soul, which is drawn from the unequal distribution of rewards and punishments, could not be known to *Adam*; but that which arises from the nature and capacities of the human mind, must appear to him in all its evidence: and therefore, (so far as we can imagine) he would, from the light of nature, have reason to apprehend some state of future existence, and to fear, that if temporal death was brought upon him by his transgression of the divine law, that future existence would be a state of punishment rather than enjoyment: nor can we say, how he should be able to assign any point of time, in which the punishment of so aggravated an offence must necessarily terminate.

Bury-Street Lect. vol. i. p. 554—557. | Grove's Thoughts on a Future State, c. viii.
Locke's Reas. of Christian. vol. i. p. 1—7. | § 6, 7. p. 104—108.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Hence it follows, that according to the *Mosaic* history, when God placed *Adam* in paradise, he did in effect enter into a covenant with him, whereby he
 encour-

encouraged him to expect continued life and happiness, on condition of perfect obedience; but threatened him with death, in case he should in any instance transgress his moral or his positive law; which is the same thing that Divines generally mean, by what they call *the Covenant of Works*. And it seems, that so far as the light of nature reaches in discovering our duty, we are *all* so born under such a covenant, as by sin to be exposed to death; which may be considered as including not merely the separation of our souls from our bodies, and the consequent dissolution of the mortal part; but likewise such degrees of future punishment, as it shall seem to the supreme Judge righteous and fit to inflict. Compare *Rom. vi. 23. Rev. xxi. 8. Deut. xxvii. 26. Gal. iii. 10, 13. Ezek. xviii. 20.*

Rawlins of Justification, p. 8—19.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It is evident that the transgression in eating the forbidden fruit was the *first* sin committed by *Adam*, because the sentence of death followed it; which must (according to the nature of that dispensation he was under) be the consequence of the first offence, *Gen. iii. 17, &c.*

SCHOLIUM 8.

It is difficult to determine certainly what we are to understand by the *tree of life*. Some have thought that it was no more than a *pledge* of life to *Adam*, in case of obedience, and might in that view have been indifferently chosen from among any kind of trees in the garden: others have conjectured, that it had some cordial virtue, of an excellent use for reviving the spirits and preserving the health; compare *Rev. xxii. 2.* with *Ezek. xlvii. 12.* and some have carried this so far as to conclude, that the mortality of *Adam's* nature was the natural consequence of his being excluded from that tree, even though we should suppose no change to be made in his constitution after his sin, *Gen. iii. 22.* Mr. *Kennicot* has endeavoured to prove, that the tree of life signifies all the trees of the garden, which were intended for the preservation of life; and another writer has attempted to prove, that the tree of *knowledge* and of *life* were the *same*. This is not a place in which to discuss their respective opinions; but on the whole, that opinion which makes it a *single* tree of *cordial* virtue, (as above,) seems most probable. Compare *Prov. iii. 18. xi. 30. xiii. 12.*

<i>Kennicot's Dissert. on the Tree of Life,</i>	<i>Barrington's Ess. on var. dispens. p. 14.</i>
<i>pass.</i>	<i>note 4. p. 17. note 6.</i>
<i>Witf. Econ. Fœd. l. i. c. vi. § 11, 12,</i>	<i>Turret. Instit. Loc. viii. Quæst. v. § 4, 5.</i>

SCHOLIUM 9.

Many Divines have likewise thought, that the *tree of knowledge* was a slow poison, which so vitiated the fluids of the human body, as in process of time

to occasion the death of *Adam*, and of all those, who should descend from him after the infection was taken: and they have likewise thought it possible, that his blood and spirits might be so altered by the juice of it, as that sensual propensities, and other passions, might be thereby made much stronger than they were before, and so that symmetry of the faculties broken, on which philosophical liberty depends. (Vid. *Def.* 26. *Cor.* 2. *Prop.* 17. *Cor.*)—It is objected, that upon this hypothesis, the corruption and distemper of human nature must grow less and less, as every generation is further removed from *Adam*, in whom there must surely have been vastly more of this supposed poison, than there can be in any of his descendants. But it is replied, that it is the nature of poisons so to assimilate the blood to themselves, as to corrupt the whole mass of it, and to render an infection transmitted through many persons as dangerous as at first hand; as in the case of the bite of a mad dog, the small-pox, &c.

Barr. Ess. ibid. p. 20—25. Note 7.

Burn. Art. p. 111.

Moliere's Life, p. 17. note 6.

Burn. at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. p. 55—61.

Delany's Rev. exam. vol. i. *Diff.* i. p. 8.

S C H O L I U M 10.

It is generally supposed, that the sin of *Adam* not only brought a curse on the Ground, *Gen.* iii. 18. (which by the way Dr. *Woodward* supposes not to have taken place till the deluge, and Bishop *Sherlock* to have been then removed;) but also, that it brought confusion and disturbance into the whole frame of nature in our world, both in the elements, occasioning greater inclemencies of weather than would otherwise have been, and also upon the animal creation, who it is supposed would not otherwise have devoured each other: compare *Isa.* xi. 6—8. *lxv.* 25. *Rom.* viii. 19—22. It is indeed exceeding probable, that those animals, which are now dangerous to mankind, had at first such an awe impressed upon them, as effectually to secure him from any danger of their assaults; but we confess it is difficult to conceive, how those animals, whose present frame shews them to have been of the carnivorous kind, could without a miracle have subsisted upon vegetables. Vid. *Prop.* 119. § 3. N°. ii.

Milton's Par. Lost, l. x. ver. 651—719.

Whitby, Hammond and Locke, on Rom. viii. 19, &c.

Woodward's Nat. Hist. p. 73—106. Ed. 1.

Sherlock on Propb. Disc. iv. p. 87—118.

Grove's Post. Sermon. vol. i. *Serm.* vi. p. 155—170.

S C H O L I U M 11.

Some have conjectured, that our first parents, in their state of innocence, were cloathed with a visible glory, or lucid appearance, which according to these writers was a part of the image of God, in which they were created: they suppose that the departure of this glory, as soon as they transgressed, was the nakedness which they were conscious of: and on this principle suppose that the like glory will

will be restored to the righteous at the *resurrection*; and argue, from those passages, which favour that doctrine, the probability of man's being possessed of it in its primæval state. Compare *Matt.* xiii. 43. xvii. 2. *Phil.* iii. 21. *1 Cor.* xv. 43. and with reference to this some authors explain *Rom.* iii. 23. *2 Cor.* v. 1—5. *Rom.* viii. 3. and even *Phil.* ii. 6. though not all with equal reason.

Mede's Diatribe, ap. Opera.
Barrington's Ess. p. 11—14.

Flem. Christol. vol. ii. p. 246, & 251.
with the Note.

DEFINITION LXXX.

The actions or sufferings of A, might be said to be *IMPUTED* to B, if B should on the account of them in any degree be treated, as if he had done or suffered what A has done or suffered, when he really has not, and when, without this action or suffering of A, B would not be so treated. LECT.
CLXVII.

COROLLARY 1.

The *sin* of A may be said to be *imputed*, if B though innocent be upon that account treated in any degree as a sinner.

COROLLARY 2.

The *righteousness* of A may be said to be imputed to B, if upon the account of it B, though a sinner, be treated as if he were righteous.

COROLLARY 3.

There may be *real*, when there is not a *total* imputation either of the righteousness or sin of another.

SCHOLIUM.

The justice of such imputation, on one hand or the other, can in the *general* be neither affirmed or denied, but is to be determined in particular cases, by a view of particular circumstances, and especially by considering the degree of the imputation.

PROPOSITION CXXXV.

The *sin* of *Adam* is in some degree *imputed* to all those who descended from him in the way of ordinary generation.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 133. | 1. We are all born with such constitutions as will produce some evil inclinations, which we probably should not have had in our original state; which evil inclinations are represented in scripture as derived from our

our parents, and therefore may be ultimately traced up to the first sinful parent, from whom we descended.

2. Infants are plainly liable to diseases and death, though they have not committed any personal transgression, which, while they are incapable of knowing the law, it seems impossible they should be capable of, *Rom. v. 12—14.*

2. 3. The seeds of diseases and death are no doubt derived to children from their immediate parents, and from thence may be traced up through preceding generations to the first diseased and mortal parent, *i. e. Adam.*

4. The scripture teaches us to consider *Adam* as having brought a sentence of death upon his whole race, and expressly says, "that by his transgression many were constituted sinners," *i. e.* on account of it are treated as such, *1 Cor. xv. 22. Rom. v. 12—19.*

5. The sin of *Adam* brought upon himself depraved inclinations, an impaired constitution, and at length death. *Prop. 134.*

6. There is no reason to believe, that had man continued in a state of innocence, his offspring would have been thus corrupt, and thus calamitous from their birth.

1—6. 7. *Valet propositio. Def. 80. Cor. 1.*

Locke & Whitby on Rom. v. 12, &c. | Tayl. of Orig. Sin, p. 25—64. with Jennings's Answer. Burn. at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. p. 38—65.

COROLLARY 1.

Hence it appears, that the covenant was made with *Adam*, not only for himself, but in some measure for his posterity; so that he was to be considered as the great head and representative of all, that were to descend from him.

COROLLARY 2.

It may seem probable, in consequence of this damage which *Adam's* posterity was to become liable to by his transgression, that they would have received some additional advantages from his continued obedience; but what those advantages were, the scripture does not expressly say, nor is it necessary for us particularly to know: in general, we are sure they must have been such, as would secure the honours of divine justice in the establishment of such a constitution; but more will be said concerning this below.

SCHOLIUM 1.

This imputation of the sin of *Adam* to his posterity, is what Divines generally call, with some latitude of expression, *original sin*, distinguishing it from *actual sin*, *i. e.* from personal guilt. *Vid. Prop. 133. Schol. 5.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is plain in fact, that children frequently fare the worse for those faults of their parents, which it was not in their power to help, especially as hereditary disorders are often communicated, which lay a foundation for a miserable life and a more early death. If therefore a righteous God does in fact govern the world, we must allow it consistent with justice that it should be thus; nor will there appear any inconsistency, if we consider, that justice determines not the manner, in which the creature shall be treated in any given time in the beginning of its existence, but the manner in which it shall *on the whole* be treated; a thought, which might be sufficient to vindicate those passages, in which God threatens to punish the iniquity of parents by the calamities of their children, *Exod. xx. 5. 1 Kings xiv. 9, 10, xxi. 21, 22. Lam. v. 7. Matt. xxiii. 35.*

Turret. Instit. Loc. ix. Quæst. xix. § 20. | Grove's Poet. Works, vol. iv. p. 198—
Ruin and Recov. Quæst. iii, iv. p. 106— | 205.
 137. | *Saur. Serm. vol. vii. p. 372—379.*

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is debated how far the imputation of *Adam's* sin reaches; particularly, whether it extends to eternal death, or everlasting misery, supposing that everlasting misery is the consequence of personal guilt.—We do here readily allow, that God might righteously have put a period to the whole human race, immediately after the transgression of *Adam*, and consequently that we might have been said to be *lost for ever* by that transgression: we also allow, that God might, for ought we know, consistently with his own perfections, suffer the souls of those, who die in their infancy, to be utterly extinguished, and to sink into everlasting insensibility; and in that case the transgression of that ancestor which made them mortal, might in a qualified sense be said to *destroy* their souls. But that one rational creature should be made finally and eternally miserable for the action of another, which it was no way in his power to prevent, does so ill agree with our natural notions of divine justice, and the repeated declarations of scripture, (*v. g. Ezek. xviii. 2, 3, 4, 20. Jer. xxxi. 29, 30. Deut. xxiv. 16. 2 Kings xiv. 6.*) and with what God is pleased to say concerning his compassion for infants, *Jonah iv. ult.* that we must at least wait for the plainest and fullest decision of scripture, before we can admit it as true.

Ridgl. Body of Div. vol. i. p. 330, | Ridgley of Orig. Sin, p. 42—53, 61—66.
 331, 335, 336. | *Watts's Ruin and Recov. p. 330, 331.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

The most considerable argument to prove the imputation of *Adam's* sin to the eternal condemnation of his posterity, is taken from those passages of scripture,

ture, as well as those rational evidences, which prove eternal death to be the wages of sin, compared with those mentioned above, in which it is said, that *all died in Adam*: but it is so evident, that *death* does not always include *eternal misery*, and that a person may be said to die for the sins of another, who is not made eternally miserable for them, that one cannot but be surprized at the stress that has been laid upon it.

Calv. Instit. l. ii. c. i. § 8.

SCHOLIUM 5.

To shew that a constitution, whereby all mankind should become obnoxious to eternal misery for the transgression of one common head, is consistent with divine justice, many have pleaded, that in consequence of such an appointment, we stood so fair a chance for happiness, that if we had then existed, and the proposal had been made us, we must in reason have been contented to put our eternal all on that issue; so that God might reasonably impute that to us *as our act*, which he knew *would have been* our act, if we had been consulted on the occasion. But nothing would seem sufficient to vindicate such a proceeding, unless we were to suppose, (as an obscure writer has done) that the souls of all the race of *Adam* were for that moment actually brought into being, and gave personal consent to that covenant, after which they were reduced to a state of insensibility, till the appointed moment came for their animating their respective bodies.

Sale's Koran, c. vii. p. 135. Note e. | *Blackw. Schema Sac. p. 165—168.*
Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 253, 254.

SCHOLIUM 6.

As a counterpart to the hardships put upon *Adam's* race, by such a covenant as has been represented, it has been asserted, that all his posterity would after his short trial have been confirmed in a state of immutable happiness; and Dr. *Guyse* in particular conjectures, it might have been as soon as the fruit of the forbidden tree dropped off: but all this seems to be said without any express warrant from scripture. Had any of the race of *Adam* committed any act of moral wickedness, we may conclude that such an offender, and probably his posterity, would have received some detriment; and had *Cain* for instance, at least, when adult, eaten of the forbidden fruit, the *natural* consequences flowing thence to all mankind on *Adam's* transgression, must, (so far as we can judge) have descended to the race of *Cain* alone. Now that the one of these was possible, none can deny, unless they suppose that the whole race would on the obedience of *Adam* have had such extraordinary degrees of divine influence entailed upon them, as would in fact have been an everlasting security to them against every degree of temptation: this was indeed *possible*, but we cannot

cannot discern such evidence of it from scripture, as should embolden us to such an assertion.

Berry-Street Lect. vol. i. p. 189—196.

SCHOLIUM 7.

On the whole, the most plausible thing which is said to prove the probability of a covenant, in which eternal misery should be brought upon all men by the guilt of the first sin, is this; that we see in fact that mankind is brought into such a state, that every man does in some instances or other break the law of God himself, when he grows up; and this, in consequence of an original corruption, derived from *Adam*, as most at least acknowledge, even of those who deny the *total* imputation of his sin; now it is said, that it is as just to punish an innocent person *directly* for the guilt of another, as upon account of that other person's guilt to bring him into such a condition, that he *must necessarily sin*, and then inflict that punishment upon him for his own necessary act, which was objected against as unjust in the former case.—It is hard to say how this argument can be answered, unless we deny that any act of sin whatsoever is *necessarily* committed: on the other side it is urged, that upon this supposition, it is a *possible* thing that any man even in this fallen state may continue perfectly innocent throughout the whole period of his life. The consequence cannot be denied: therefore it must on the whole be considered, whether it be more rational to believe, that every man does *in fact* sin, though he *might possibly* in every instance have avoided it, or that God should plunge the whole race of mankind into perpetual and necessary ruin for the guilt of one of them.

Burn. on the Art. p. 111—114.

Burn. de Fide, p. 141—151.

Schema Sacrum, p. 164, 165

Baxt. End of Controv. c. x.

Limborch Theol. l. iii. c. iii. § 20. c. iv. § 3

—*II. c. v. § 3—10.*

Calv. Inst. l. ii. c. i. § 5—7.

SCHOLIUM 8.

It may not be improper here to mention the singular opinion of Dr. *Watts*, in his very ingenious treatise on the *Ruin and Recovery of mankind*; which is, that the sin of *Adam* has subjected all his posterity not only to natural death, but to the utter *extinction of being*; the consequence of which is, that all those who die in their *infancy* fall into a state of *annihilation*, excepting those who are the seed of God's people, who by virtue of the blessings of the covenant made with *Abraham*, and the promise to the seed of the righteous, (compare particularly *Isa. lxv. 23. Jer. xxxi. 15, 16, 17.*) shall through the grace and power of Christ obtain a part in a happy resurrection, in which other infants shall have no share.—It is certain *Rev. xx. 12.* will not disprove this opinion, because it may refer to persons of *all ranks in life*, as it often does, *Vid. Rev. xi. 18.* compare *xx. 13.* But on the whole, it seems best to acknowledge that we know nothing

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certain

certain concerning the state of *infants*, and therefore can assert nothing positively; but that they are in the hands of a merciful God, who, as he cannot consistently with justice and truth give them a sense of guilt for an action they never committed, so probably will not hold their souls in being, merely to make them sensible of pain for the guilt of a remote ancestor.—Their existence in a state of everlasting *insensibility*, (which was Dr. Ridgley's scheme,) seems hardly intelligible: we must therefore either fall in with the above-mentioned hypothesis, or suppose them *all* to have a part in the resurrection to glory; which seems to put them all on a level, without a due distinction in favour of the seed of believers; or else must suppose they go through some new state of trial, a thing concerning which the scripture is wholly silent.

Ruin and Recov. Quest. xvi. p. 324—347.

DEFINITION LXXXI.

LECT. CLXIX. Whatever that is, which being done or suffered either by an offending creature himself, or by another person for him, shall secure the honours of the divine government in bestowing upon the offender pardon and happiness, may properly be called a SATISFACTION OR ATONEMENT made to God for him.

Watts's Redeemer and Sanctifier, p. 28—32.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It is not here our intention to assert, that it is in the power of an offending creature to *satisfy* for his *own* sins, but only to shew what we mean when we speak of his doing it.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Such a sense of the word *satisfaction*, though not in strict propriety of speech amounting to the payment of a debt, is agreeable to the use of the word in the *Roman law*; where it signifies *to content a person aggrieved*, and is put for some valuable consideration, substituted instead of what is a proper payment, and consistent with a remission of that debt or offence, for which such supposed satisfaction is made; which is a circumstance to be carefully observed, in order to vindicate the doctrine we are about to establish, and to maintain the consistency between different parts of the christian scheme. See this sense abundantly confirmed by citations from *Grotius, Caius, Ulpian, and Pomponius*.

Chapm. Euf. vol. ii. p. 406—412.

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Christ has made *satisfaction* for the sins of all those who repent of their sins, and return to God in the way of sincere though imperfect obedience.

DEMON-

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Although Christ was innocent, nevertheless he endured very grievous sufferings both in body and mind, *Isa.* liii. 3. *Matt.* xxvi. 38. and this he did spontaneously, *Heb.* x. 7, 9.

2. It is expressly asserted in scripture, that these sufferings were brought upon Christ, *for the sake* of sinful men, *in whose stead* he is sometimes also said to have suffered, *Isa.* liii. 5, 6, 10. *Matt.* xx. 28. *Rom.* iii. 25. v. 6—8. 2 *Cor.* v. 21. *Gal.* iii. 13. *Eph.* v. 2. *Heb.* vii. 27. ix. 26. x. 12. 1 *Pet.* ii. 24. iii. 18.

Raphelii Annot. in Rom. v. 8. (*ex Xenoph.*) *apud Op.* vol. ii. p. 253—255.

3. The offers of pardon and eternal salvation are made in scripture to those that repent and return to God for the sake of what Christ has done and suffered, *in whom* they are therefore declared to be accepted by God, and *to whom* they are hereupon taught to ascribe the glory of their salvation, *John* iii. 14—17. *Acts* x. 35, 36, 43. ii. 38. iii. 18, 19. *Rom.* iv. 25. *Col.* i. 20—22. 2 *Cor.* v. 18—20. *Eph.* i. 5—7. *Heb.* i. 3. ix. 14. x. 4—10, 14. *Rev.* i. 5, 6. v. 9, 10. vii. 13, 14.

4. It is evident, that according to the gospel institution, pardon and life were to be offered to *all*, to whom the preaching of the gospel came, without any exception, *Mark* xvi. 15, 16. *Acts* xiii. 38, 39. 1 *John* ii. 1, 2. *Isa.* liii. 6. *John* i. 29.

5. It is plain from the whole tenor of the *epistolary* part of the new testament, as well as from some particular passages of it, that there was a remainder of imperfection, generally at least to be found even in the best *Christians*, notwithstanding which they are encouraged to rejoice in the hope of salvation by Christ, *Phil.* iii. 13. *Gal.* v. 17. *James* iii. 2. 1 *John* i. 8—10. ii. 1, 2.

6. Whereas, so far as we can judge, the remission of sin, without any satisfaction at all, might have laid a foundation for mens thinking lightly of the law of God; it is certain, that by the obedience and sufferings of Christ a very great honour is done to it, and mercy, communicated to us as the purchase of his blood, comes in so awful as well as so endearing a manner, as may have the best tendency to engage those, who embrace the gospel, to a life of holy obedience.

Whitby on John iii. 16. and *Eph.* i. 8.
and on *Heb.* x. 14.

Burnet on Art. N^o. ii. p. 52, 53.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 204.

Tillot's Works, vol. i. p. 477—487.

Turner at Boyle's Lect. *Serm.* viii.

Emlyn's Tracts, vol. i. p. 235—442,

71—74. *Ed.* 1731. vol. ii. p. 43—
50, 80—82. *Ed.* 1746.

Tomkins's Christ the Mediat. c. i. p. 6—45.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. v. *præf.* p. 207
—209. 4^{to}.

Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. v. N^o. ix. p. 203.

Oft. p. 125, 126. 12^{mo}.

COROLLARY 1.

It is a very peculiar glory of the gospel, that it gives so satisfactory an account of the method whereby sin may be pardoned, in a manner consistent with the honours of the divine government; and thereby relieves the mind from that anxiety, to which, if left merely to its own reasoning, it might otherwise be exposed on that account.

Leland against Tind. vol. i. c. vi. p. 168, &c.

COROLLARY 2.

From comparing what has been said in this proposition with *Def. 80. Cor. 1, 2.* it appears, that on the one hand, *our sins* were imputed to *Christ*, and on the other, that we are *justified* by the *imputation* of *Christ's righteousness* to *us, i. e.* we, though guilty, on complying with the gospel, are finally *treated* by God as *righteous persons, (i. e.* as if we had never offended him at all, or had ourselves satisfied the demands of his law for such offences,) out of regard to what *Christ* has done or suffered; whereas we should not otherwise have been so treated. Compare *Isa. xlv. 24, 25. liii. 11. Jer. xxiii. 6. Rom. iii. 22. v. 17, 18, 19. x. 3. iv. 4, 5, 6. 2 Cor. v. 21. Phil. iii. 9. 2 Pet. i. 1.*

Turret. Loc. xvi. Quæst. ii. § 12.

Le Blanc's Thes. de Justif. Christi Imput. § 13, &c.

Boyse's Works, vol. i. p. 443, 455, 456.

Whitby's Comment. vol. ii. p. 217—227.

Rawlin's Sermon. Just. p. 262—278.

COROLLARY 3.

It is plain from *gr. 3, 4.* that there is a sense, in which *Christ* may be said to *have died for all, i. e.* as he has procured an offer of pardon to all, provided they sincerely embrace the gospel: compare *John iii. 16. vi. 50, 51. Rom. v. 18. viii. 32. 1 Cor. viii. 11. 2 Cor. v. 14, 15, 19. 1 Tim. ii. 4, 6. Heb. ii. 9. 1 John ii. 2.*

Whitby on John iii. 17. and 2 Pet. ii. 1.

Turret. Loc. iv. Quæst. xvii. § 29—31.

Lime-street Lect. vol. i. p. 454—462.

Ruin and Recov. Quæst. xii. p. 244—

252. Quæst. xiii. p. 265—268.

Calv. on Matt. xxvi. 8. Rom. v. 18. 1 Cor.

viii. 11, 12. 1 John ii. 2. 2 Pet. ii. 1.

Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 50—52.

COROLLARY 4.

From the scriptures mentioned above it appears, how wrong it is to represent the death of *Christ*, as merely the *natural* consequence of his undertaking the reformation of so corrupt an age, in the manner in which he did it: nothing can be plainer, than that *Christ* came into the world *on purpose* to die, *Matt. xx. 28. John vi. 50, 51. x. 17, 18. xii. 27, 28. Acts ii. 23. Gal. i. 4. Heb.*

PROP. CXXXVI. *The justice of Christ's sufferings argued from being voluntary.* 421

Heb. ii. 14. *x.* 4, &c. *1 Pet.* i. 19, 20. *1 John* iv. 10. which is much illustrated by the apparent power which Christ had, and in many circumstances of his life and sufferings shewed, of delivering himself by miracle whenever he pleased.

Foster against Tind. p. 316—325. | *Hallet on Script.* vol. ii. *Disc.* 3. p. 283.
Tomkins's Christ the Mediat. p. 45—56. | —295.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Though Christ were perfectly innocent, he might be afflicted in the manner *LECT.* in which scripture represents, by reason of the imputation of our sins to him, *CLXX.* seeing it appears that he *voluntarily* consented to it, and that ample recompence is made him, *Heb.* x. 7. *Phil.* ii. 9. *Psal.* cx. 7. to which may perhaps be added *Heb.* xii. 2.

Christ the Mediator, p. 119—122. | *Bates's Harm. of Div. Attrib.* p. 244—246.
Tind. of Christian. p. 376. | *Butler's Anal.* p. 210—214.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It appears from *Luke* xxiii. 43. *John* xix. 30. that the soul of Christ after his death did not go into a state of punishment, but that his sufferings ended when he expired. As for the argument brought from *1 Pet.* iii. 19. it is well known there are many other interpretations of that text; of which the most probable seems to be this, that Christ by his spirit in *Noah* preached to those who continuing disobedient were destroyed by the flood, and whose separate spirits are now confined, and reserved to future punishment.

Barringt. Ess. on Disp. App. N^o. iii. | *More's Theol. Works*, p. 17, 18.
Burn. on Art. iii. p. 55—58. | *Harris's Diff.* p. 73, 74.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is greatly debated, whether we are justified by Christ's *death* alone, or by the imputation of his *active* and *passive* obedience: but this seems to be a controversy of much less importance than it has generally been represented. All that Christ did or suffered to repair the violated honours of the divine law, and to secure the rights of God's government in the pardon of sin, must be taken into the view of his satisfaction, according to the definition given of it above: nevertheless, forasmuch as his *death* was a most glorious instance of his concern for the honour of God and the happiness of man, and that whereby the divine honour was most eminently secured, the scripture does in many places ascribe our acceptance to this. See the texts quoted before, especially those under *gr.* 3.

Williams's Works, vol. iv. p. 19—27.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Hardly any controversy on this head has been more insisted upon, than that which arises from this question, *viz.* Whether such a satisfaction as the gospel represents were absolutely *necessary*; or whether God might have pardoned sin without it by a mere sovereign act. For the necessity of a satisfaction, the chief scripture argument is taken from *Heb. ii. 10.* but it is said on the other hand, that this text only proves the way actually taken to have been a way *worthy of God*, not that it was the *only* way that could have been so. It is likewise urged, that it is never to be imagined, that God would have subjected so glorious a person to such sufferings, if any other way could have been discovered equally eligible. On the whole, we must acknowledge that we can conceive of no other method so happily contrived to illustrate the divine glory, and secure the gratitude, obedience and happiness of the creature. Compare *Rom. iii. 26.*

Goodw. Rest. of Man, l. i. c. iv. p. 13.

Emlyn's Tracts, vol. i. p. 242—263.

Ed. 1731. vol. ii. p. 50—72. Ed.

1736.

Locke on Rom. iii. 24.

Witsii Œcon. Fæd. l. ii. c. viii.

Owen de Just. Div. pass.

Christ the Mediator, p. 90—101.

Hallet on Script. vol. ii. p. 299—307.

SCHOLIUM 5.

The prevalency of *sacrifices* in the world, although from the light of nature there appears to have been no rational foundation for them, seems on the one hand, to intimate an apprehension in the mind of man, that some satisfaction for sin was requisite, and on the other may perhaps intimate, that there had been some *tradition* concerning an expiatory sacrifice appointed by God, which the sacrifices of animals were intended to represent. See the references under *Prop. 122. § 3.*

Tillot's Works, vol. i. Sermon. 47. p. 478,

479.

Outram de Sacrif. l. i. c. xxi, xxii.

Sykes on Sacrifices.

Taylor on Deism, p. 249—251.

SCHOLIUM 6.

To shew with what propriety the *death of Christ* may be called a *sacrifice*, it may be proper more particularly to reflect on the nature and efficacy of those *Jewish* sacrifices, which were called *sin-offerings*, to which there is so plain a reference in the epistle to the *Hebrews*, and other passages.—Concerning such sacrifices then it may be observed,

1. That in all the instances in which they were allowed, they were the *terms* or conditions on which men were *pardoned*; *i. e.* on which the penalties denounced against such offences by the *Mosaic* law were remitted, without which they could

could not have been so remitted on any pretence of repentance, or any satisfaction made to their injured neighbour; and for this reason, where crimes were declared *capital*, no sacrifices might be admitted at all; *Psal.* li. 16. and on the other hand, the *value* of the sin-offering was sunk so low in some instances, that the poorest of the people might be able to bring it. *Lev.* v. 11, 12.

2. They were standing evidences of the evil and desert of sin; and

3. Of God's being ready to forgive those who in appointed circumstances presented them: but

4. They could not possibly *take away sin*, *i. e.* remove the moral guilt even of the least offence, so as to procure in any instance a remission of any thing more, than the particular sentence pronounced against the offender, by God, as the *king* of the *Jews*.

From this survey, it appears, by the preceding proposition, that the death of Christ was a proper sacrifice, and much more excellent than any other, in that it takes away the final sentence of condemnation; whereas the *Mosaic* sacrifices left the *Jews* still subject to death, and future punishment too, without such a sincere repentance, as made no part of the condition of procuring a *legal* remission. Compare *Heb.* x. 4, 11. and also *Acts* xiii. 39.

Hallet on Script. vol. ii. *Disc.* iii. p. 269—283—295—299, 307—309.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Dr. *Thomas Burnet* puts the doctrine of the satisfaction in something of a peculiar view. He says, that the death of Christ has not itself satisfied divine justice, but only put us in the capacity of doing it, by confessing our sins, and applying to God for pardon, with an humble dependence upon Christ's death; which he thinks so necessary a condition of salvation, that no man can obtain it without submitting to it: he thinks this to be the language of an attendance upon the Lord's supper; which he lays a very great stress upon, to such a degree as to think, that no man has a covenant claim to the mercy of God in Christ, if he does not by engaging in this ordinance declare his trust in Christ's sacrifice, and so atone the divine displeasure.

Burnet on Redemption.

DEFINITION LXXXII.

FAITH IN CHRIST is in general, committing our souls to him for salvation LECT. in his appointed way: or more largely, such a persuasion that he is the Messiah, CLXXI. and such a desire and expectation of the blessings which he has in his gospel promised to his people, as engages the soul to fix its dependence upon him, and subject itself to him in all the ways of holy obedience.

Grove of Faith, p. 5, 14—18

Rymer on Rev. p. 211, 212.

Tillot's Works, vol. iii. *Serm.* 173. p. 481
—483.

COROL-

COROLLARY 1.

Faith in Christ is a very extensive principle, and includes in its nature and inseparable effects the whole of moral virtue; since the precepts of Christ evidently require that we should love God with all our heart, that we should be perfect as he is perfect, and pursue whatever things are pure, and lovely, virtuous, and honourable. *Matt. xxii. 37. v. ult. Phil. iv. 8.*

COROLLARY 2.

Those who assert, that under the gospel a man is *justified by faith*, cannot justly be accused of subverting or injuring practical religion, if faith be taken in the sense here defined

Saur. Serm. vol. ix. p. 245—249, 257—261.

SCHOLIUM 1.

If the account of faith here given, should appear to be agreeable to the scripture notion of that faith to which the promises of gospel-salvation are annexed, then it will follow, that Dr. *Whitby* is much mistaken, when he represents faith as consisting merely in *an assent to the gospel as true*; and says, that upon declaring that assent, a man was justified from all past sins, without good works; but that good works were necessary in order to *continue* in a justified state: unless by this he means, that a person sincerely and fully resolved for good works would have been in a state of salvation, though he had died before he had any opportunity of putting these pious purposes into execution. If this be his sense, he has not expressed it clearly, and it would be very unsafe in the general to define faith according to his notion of it.

Locke's Reas. of Christianity, vol. i. p. 16—26. | *Whitby's Pref. to Gal. p. 292—297.*

Dr. *Taylor* of *Norwich* seems to have entertained a notion much resembling this of Dr. *Whitby's*, but with this difference, that his idea of justifying faith seems to be a faith, upon professing which, a person was justly entitled to enter into the society of those, who were called *the justified ones*, or the *sanctified* people of God, *i. e.* into the visible church of Christ, who receive the visible signs of pardon and favour from him, and are set apart as his peculiar people, as the *Jewish* nation in general once was. This is what he calls the *first* justification, and on that principle attempts to explain St. *Paul's* discourse of justifying faith in the epistles to the *Romans* and *Galatians*, thereby, as it seems, sinking the passages in question, and others, in which the apostle speaks of the privileges of believers, far below their original sense. It seems much more reasonable to say, the apostle addressed the several churches as consisting of *sincere* Christians,

as most of their members were, without taking particular notice of those few who might be otherwise.

Taylor on the Romans.

| *Dodd. on Regen. Postscr. to 2d Ed.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some Divines have chosen to call this purpose of holy obedience, essential to true faith, by the name of *internal good works*, and the fruit actually produced in life, *external*: and in this sense of the words it must be acknowledged, that according to our definition of faith, compared with the following proposition, we maintain the universal necessity of good works as much as any can do: but it may be questioned whether this is the most natural sense of the word. Compare *John vi. 29.*

Waterland's Serm. vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

SCHOLIUM 3.

We allow that the word *faith* has various significations in scripture besides this: *viz.* It is sometimes put for what is called a *miraculous faith*, *i. e.* a persuasion in a person who was endued with miraculous gifts, that God would perform some miracle, correspondent to some present impression made on his mind, *Matt. xvii. 20. Mark xi. 22, 23. 1 Cor. xiii. 2.* sometimes it signifies only an assent to the truth of the gospel, though perhaps ineffectual, in which sense it is taken in many passages of the epistle of *James*; Vid. *Jam. ii. 14—26. Acts viii. 13.* sometimes an assent to the truth of any proposition, whether the evidence of it were that of testimony, reason, or sense, *John xx. 8, 25, 29. Heb. xi. 3.*

Tillotson. vol. iii. Serm. 165. p. 428—430.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

The gospel absolutely requires such a faith, as is here defined, of all those who would partake of the benefits of it; and also makes a promise of salvation to all those in whom such a faith is found.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Everlasting life is in the gospel promised to believers, and appropriated to them, whatever the import of that faith shall afterwards appear to be, *John iii. 16—18, 36. Mark xvi. 15, 16. Acts xvi. 31.*

2. That this faith implies a persuasion that Christ is the Messiah, or a person sent into the world under the character of the Saviour of fallen man, appears from *John xvi. 27. Acts viii. 37. Rom. iii. 22, 26, 27. iv. 24, 25. x. 9. 1 John iv. 15. v. 1.*

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3. It

3. It is evidently asserted in scripture, that all true believers *receive Christ*, and *rejoice in him*, that he is *precious to them*, &c. *John* i. 12. *Phil.* iii. 1. *1 Pet.* ii. 7. and for this reason believing in Christ is expressed *by coming to him*, *John* vi. 35. and considering the etymology of the word *πιστις* from *πιστευω*, and especially the import of *πιστευειν εν τω*, this seems to be the primary idea of *faith*, though necessarily connected with the view given of it in the last step, and in that which follows, in order to distinguish a true faith from such a presumption, as would affront Christ rather than honour him. Compare *2 Tim.* i. 12.

Watts's Div. Dispen. p. 64, 65.

4. That no degree of persuasion, desire, expectation, or dependence, will be accepted of God, without a firm and prevailing resolution of sincere obedience appears, not only from *James* ii. 14—26. but also from all those passages, which declare holiness to be necessary in order to salvation, and which pronounce a sentence of final condemnation on all those who are disobedient to the truth; *Rom.* ii. 8, 9. *Heb.* xii. 14. *2 Thess.* i. 7—9. *Matt.* vii. 21—23. all which would be utterly inconsistent with those promises made to faith *gr.* i. if faith did not imply such a prevailing resolution of holy obedience. Compare *John* iii. 36. (*Greek.*)

1—4. *Def.* 81. | 5. *Valet propositio.*

Limborch Theol. l. v. c. viii. § 5. | *Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 46, 47.*

COROLLARY I.

They who represent faith, as merely a firm persuasion that we *ourselves* are justified, or that Christ particularly died *for us*, do greatly misrepresent it; and lead their followers into a dangerous error: not to insist upon the contradiction in such a definition of faith, which seems to imply, that we must have our interest in Christ revealed to us, before we can believe, and yet must believe before it can be revealed to us; unless that revelation were supposed to have no foundation, or a person were allowed to be justified while actually an unbeliever, which is directly contrary to the whole tenour of the scriptures mentioned above, and to many more which declare the displeasure of God against the workers of iniquity, which all unbelievers are.

Williams's Gosp. Truth, c. ix. p. 72—79. | *Baxter's End of Contr. c. xx. § 34.*
Calv. Instit. l. iii. c. ii. § 15, 16, 19. | *Truman's Mor. Impot. p. 162, 163.*
Barrow's Works, vol. ii. p. 50, 51.

COROLLARY 2.

Those who are received into the divine favour in the method before described, can have no cause to *glory* before God, it being matter of pure favour that

that such a constitution should be established for the salvation of sinful creatures, *Eph.* ii. 8, 9. *Rom.* iii. 27. iv. 2—5. xi. 6.

Doddridge's Serm. on Salvat. by Grace, p. 19—25.

SCHOLIUM I.

It has been greatly debated, whether faith be the *condition* of our salvation. LECT. CLXXII. If by *condition*, be intended something which is a valuable equivalent for a benefit received, or something which is to be performed entirely in our own strength, it is certain that nothing done by us can merit that title, considering on the one hand the great and glorious rewards of eternal happiness proposed in the gospel, and on the other, the weakness of our created, and the degeneracy of our corrupted, nature: but if *condition* only signifies, as it generally does, something insisted upon, if we would receive a benefit, and upon the performance of which we shall in fact be entitled to that benefit, it is the very thing asserted and proved in the proposition, that *faith* is in this sense the condition of our salvation. Nevertheless, since so strong a prejudice is by many weakly and foolishly imbibed against that phrase, it may generally be matter of prudence to decline it; since it can express no more than is expressed by saying, that they who do believe, shall, and they who do not, shall not, be saved; which is so scriptural a manner of speaking that it offends none.

Witsii Œcon. Fœd. l. iii. c. i. § 8, 9, 12—15. | Williams's Gosp. Truth, c. viii.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Much of the same kind with the former, is that question, whether the Gospel consists merely of *promises*, or whether it can in any sense be called a *law*. The answer plainly depends upon adjusting the meaning of the words *gospel* and *law*: if the *gospel* be taken for the declaration God has made to men by Christ concerning the manner in which he will treat them, and the conduct he expects from them, it is plain that this includes *commands*, and even *threatenings* as well as *promises*: but to define the gospel so, as only to express the favourable part of that declaration, is indeed taking the question for granted, and confining the word to a sense much less extensive than it often has in scripture: compare *Rom.* ii. 16. 2 *Thess.* i. 8. 1 *Tim.* i. 10, 11. and it is certain, that if the *gospel* be put for all the parts of the dispensation taken in connection one with another, it may well be called on the whole a *good message*, *εὐαγγέλιον*. In like manner, the question whether the gospel be a *law* or not, is to be determined by the definition of a law and of the gospel as above; if *law* signifies, as it generally does, the discovery of the will of a superior, teaching what he requires of those under his government, with the intimation of his intention of dispensing rewards and punishments, as this rule of their conduct is observed or neglected; in this latitude of expression, it is plain from the proposition, that the gospel, taken for the declaration made to men by Christ, is a *law*, as in scripture

ture it is sometimes called: *James* i. 25. *Rom.* iv. 15. v. 13. viii. 2. but if *law* be taken in the greatest rigour of the expression, for such a discovery of the will of God and our duty, as contains in it no intimation of our obtaining the divine favour, otherwise than by a perfect and universal conformity to it, in that sense the gospel is not a law, as appears likewise from the proposition.

Witsii ubi sup.

| *Williams's Gospel Truth*, p. 133—137.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It has been denied, that any who are already *Christians* can be rationally exhorted to believe in Christ; and Dr. *Whitby* expressly says, there are no instances of it in the new testament. But it is to be considered, that faith is not any one act of the mind to be performed once for all, but it expresses the temper which a man is to carry along with him throughout his whole life; compare *Gal.* ii. 20. *2 Cor.* v. 7. and *1 Pet.* ii. 4, 5, 7. and the more lively the impressions and acts of it are, the more firmly may we be said to believe; or in other words, there may be different *degrees* of this faith; and consequently it is not an absurd or unprofitable thing to address to those who have already believed, for the *establishment* and *increase* of their faith; as it appears the apostles did, *John* xx. 31. *1 John* v. 13, compare *John* xi. 15. xiii. 19. xiv. 1, 29. *Eph.* iii. 17.

Whitby on the New Test. vol. ii. p. 296, 297.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is further questioned, how far *faith* can be said, as *Rom.* iv. 5. to be *imputed for righteousness*, if it be by the *righteousness of Christ* imputed to us, that we are justified, as was asserted before, *Prop.* 136. *Cor.* 2. To this some have answered, that faith is there put for the *object* of faith, as hope is for the object of hope, *Jer.* xiv. 8. *Heb.* vi. 18. *1 Tim.* i. 1. and fear for the object of fear, *Gen.* xxxi. 53. and this solution is maintained by

Rawlins on Just. p. 209—213. | *Guyse in Loc.*

We answer, that any thing may be said to be imputed to us for righteousness, or in order to our justification, which, being as it were set down to our account, serves in any degree as the means of our justification, as faith evidently does, though not by virtue of its own merit and excellency, but with regard to the righteousness of Christ, on the account of which God is pleased thus graciously to regard it; or as *Witsius* states it, “faith is set down to our account in the book of God, as an evidence that we are in the number of those, who by the righteousness of Christ, according to the tenour of the gospel, are to be justified.”

Witsii Œcon. Fœd. l. iii. c. viii. § 56. | *Dod. on Salv. by Grace*, p. 13—19.
Will. Gosp. Truth, c. xii. p. 102—112. | *Brine's Effic. of Christ's Death*.

SCHOL-

SCHOLIUM 5.

It has been questioned how far the precepts requiring faith in the gospel on the penalty of damnation, can be supposed to extend.—As to the *Heathens*, we shall briefly consider their case in the eighth *scholium*. It seems this declaration must at least extend to those who have an opportunity of enquiring into the truth of christianity, and who may by an honest enquiry attain to satisfaction in the truth of it. If there be any adult person in a christian country, who not by his own fault, but by the circumstances in which providence has placed him, lies under difficulties absolutely invincible, it is as rational to suppose God will allow for such, as for the ignorance of infants: but where persons have genius and opportunity to enquire; it is hard to imagine how their difficulties should be invincible, unless we suppose that God has left the christian religion in such circumstances, that those who enquire most fully into its evidence, with the greatest sincerity and impartiality, may not see sufficient reason to embrace it, which is utterly incredible: (compare *John* vii. 17.) so that the case of most infidels in christian countries must be exceeding dangerous; and consequently the denunciation *Mark* xvi. 16. must not be limited to those who heard the apostles preach, and saw their miracles, as some suppose.

Watts of Infid. Sect. 3. Quest. vii. p. 83—95. | *Welstead's Con. of Prov. p. 131—134.*
| *Barker's Sermon. N°. vii. p. 147—151.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

The damnatory sentence which christianity pronounces on those who reject it, has been urged as in itself a most unreasonable thing, since faith depends not upon ourselves, but on the degree of evidence in the things to be believed.

But to this it may be answered,

1. That it evidently appears from *Def. 82.* that faith is not merely the assent of the *understanding* to a speculative truth, but implies our reposing such a confidence in Christ, and holding our souls in such a subjection to him; as depends upon the human *will* as much as any disposition and action of the mind, both as to the impartiality of enquiring and the manner of acting, when evidence is proposed and apprehended. Compare *Isa.* xxix. 13, 14. *Dan.* xii. 10. *Matt.* vi. 23. xi. 25. xiii. 11, 12. *John* iii. 19. v. 44. *1 Cor.* ii. 14. *2 Cor.* iv. 4. *2 Tim.* iii. 13.

Whiston's Princ. of Rel. Pref.

2. That there is in general no absurdity in supposing, that a divine revelation may be attended with a sentence of condemnation against those who reject it; since it is certain, God may contrive an evidence, which he knows to be reasonably sufficient for the conviction of every one to whom it is addressed, and on that supposition may condemn those who will not submit to it; which
if

if he has determined to do, it is wise and gracious in him to add such a threatening: and indeed on the whole, it is most probable that this will be the case with regard to every revelation whatever.

3. That these general reasonings have peculiar weight when applied to *christianity*, considering the representation which scripture makes of the degree of its evidence; the nature and circumstances of the scheme itself, bringing the guilty creature such important blessings in so extraordinary a way; the manner in which it was introduced, and the difficulties it was to struggle with, which required such strong sanctions.

<i>Dodd. Anf. to Christian. not founded on</i>		<i>Tayl. on Rom. iii. 10—19. p. 265.</i>
<i>Arg. Lett. 2. p. 28—47.</i>		<i>Butler's Anal. part ii. c. vi. p. 228—235.</i>
<i>Watts on Infid. Quest. ii. p. 42—47.</i>		

SCHOLIUM 7.

It is a question of the utmost difficulty, how much of the gospel must be believed in order to salvation, or in other words, what articles of faith are *fundamental*. To this some have answered, by saying, it is only fundamental to believe that the scriptures are the word of God, and all things contained therein are true. But this answer is liable a double objection; as on the one hand, it supposes it absolutely necessary that every man should believe both the plenary inspiration, and the extent of it to all the books of scripture, which can never be proved to be a thing absolutely required; on the other hand, such an implicit belief of this might be consistent with the ignorance of, and mistakes about many of the most important doctrines of christianity; and therefore this will determine nothing in regard to the main question: though it may be indeed admitted, that where a person is possessed of such a belief, and appears not to contradict it by gross errors, it may be expedient, to avoid endless disputes, for christian societies to acquiesce in such a declaration, rather than to insist upon others more critical. Mr. *Locke* and many others with him, maintain, that the only fundamental of christianity is, that Christ is the Messiah: but here a question arises concerning the extent of these words: perhaps it may be sufficient to answer it by saying, that wherever there appeared to be such a persuasion of the dignity of Christ's person and the extent of his power, as should encourage men to commit their souls to his care, and to subject them to his government, those who professed such a persuasion were admitted to baptism by the apostles, and ought to be owned as *Christians*: and it seems necessary in the general to acquiesce in some such determination; for the demand of drawing up a list of fundamentals, *i. e.* of doctrines without the belief of which none can be saved, seems to be founded on a mistaken supposition, that the same things are fundamental to *all*; whereas according to persons different capacities and opportunities of enquiry, that may be fundamental to *one*, *i. e.* necessary to be believed by him, in order to ap-
prove

prove the general sincerity of his heart before God, which is not so to another.

Turretin on Fundamentals.

Locke's Reas. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 74—92.

Bennet's Irenicum, p. 54—58.

Baxt. Direct. for Peace, N^o. xxvi.

Baxt. Saints Rest, part ii. c. iii. § 2.

Chillingw. Safe Way, c. ii. § 159. c. iii. § 13.

Rymer on Rev. l. i. c. x. p. 253—258.

SCHOLIUM 8.

It has been much disputed, whether it be possible that the *Heathens* should be saved. Some have absolutely denied it, upon the authority of the texts mentioned in the proposition, which universally require *faith in Christ*: but to this it is answered, that they can only regard such to whom the gospel comes, and are capable of understanding the contents of it. The truth seems to be this, that none of the *Heathens* will be condemned for not believing the gospel, but they are liable to condemnation for the breach of God's natural law: nevertheless, if there be any of them in whom there is a prevailing love to the divine Being, and care in the practice of virtue, there seems reason to believe, that for the sake of Christ, though to them unknown, they may be accepted by God: and so much the rather, as the ancient *Jews*, and even the *apostles* of Christ, during the time of our Saviour's abode upon earth, seem to have had but little notion of those doctrines, which those who deny the salvability of the *Heathens* are most apt to imagine fundamental. Compare *Rom. ii. 10, &c. 26. Acts x. 34, 35. Matt. viii. 11, 12.* to which may be added *1 John ii. 2.* which Mr. *Rymer* supposes intentionally decisive on this question, as to the application of Christ's merits to all virtuous men, who may not have opportunities of hearing of his name. Some also add *John i. 29.*

Rymer's Repres. of Rev. Rel. c. v. p. 88—133.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. ii. p. 265—268.

Owen on the Spirit, p. 535.

Taylor's Key to the Rom. c. xiii. p. 104—106.

Turret. Loc. i. Quæst. iv. § 1, 2, 17.

Baxt. Saints Rest, p. i. c. viii. § 2.

Mede's Works, p. 166.

Baxt. Works, vol. iii. p. 846, 847. vol. iv. p. 959.

Barclay's Apol. p. 181—196.

Strength. and Weakn. of Human Reason, p. 264—276.

Goodw. Heathens Debt and Dowry, pass.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

To take a brief survey of what seems most important in the late controversy, especially between Dr. *Foster* and Dr. *Stebbing*, concerning *Herefy*.

LECT. CLXXIII.

SOLU-

SOLUTION.

1. It seems to be agreed on both sides, that *Christians* are to be concerned that they may maintain the purity of the faith as delivered in the scriptures; and that in proportion to the degree in which any particular error is apprehended to be pernicious, it is to be discouraged, and by all rational and christian methods opposed by private persons and religious societies. *Rom. xvi. 17. 1 Tim. i. 19, 20. 2 Tim. ii. 16—18. Jude ver. 3. 2 John ver. 10, 11.*

2. Nevertheless, the frequent exhortations that every where occur in scripture to maintain mutual candour and love towards each other, should teach us to use the greatest tenderness on this head, and will oblige us to put the kindest construction on the different expressions, and even the mistakes of our fellow-christians that we rationally can. See the texts quoted at the end of *Turretin on Fundamentals*.

3. When these two points are allowed, if the question be, what those peculiar errors are which are to be discountenanced, so as to refuse acts of religious communion with those that hold them, the question is much the same with that of the *fundamentals* of christianity treated of before: if it be, whether persons censured and avoided as erroneous are to be called *Heretics*, or are so called in scripture, it is only then a debate concerning the particular use of a word, which indeed is the chief thing that seems in question between the two accurate and ingenious writers mentioned above; and with regard to that it may be remarked,

(1.) That the word *αἵρεσις*, from *αἵρεσις eligo*, seems to answer most exactly to the *English* word *sect*, and consequently though it may sometimes admit of an *indifferent* signification, is generally taken in an *ill* sense: so it certainly is in *Gal. v. 20.* compare *2 Pet. ii. 1.* and though some have disputed it, yet it seems on the whole most probably to bear such a sense in *1 Cor. xi. 19. Acts xxiv. 5, 14. xxviii. 22.* but the last instance seems the most doubtful.

(2.) It seems dubious, whether heresy does in the new testament signify any thing different from a high degree of *schism*, or breaking the peace of the church by uncharitable divisions and separations; the chief place where any pretend to find a difference is *1 Cor. xi. 19.* compared with *ver. 18.* but if the word *καὶ* in the 19th verse be supposed an *expletive*, the argument drawn from thence is inconclusive, or the two words may only express different *degrees* of the same thing.

(3.) Nevertheless, we acknowledge that in the early ages of the church, the word *Heretic* signified those who erred in fundamentals, or doctrines reckoned of the greatest importance, and *Schismatics* were those who separated from others with a regard to discipline only.

Suiceri Thes. vol. i. p. 120 & 124.

(4.) It

4. It is further questioned, whether a *Heretic* in St. Paul's sense, *Tit.* iii. 10, 11. is one, who *contrary to his conviction* maintains any doctrine in debate, or whether it may take in the case of one, who is *mistaken in his judgment*. Dr. Foster, following Dr. Whitby, is of the first of these opinions; and would infer from it, that as none can ordinarily tell who is *self-condemned* without the gift of discerning spirits, the use of this rule was peculiar to the apostles time. His chief argument is, not so much that such a person is said to *sin*, but that he is said to be *αὐτοκατακρίθης*, which he supposes must signify *condemned by his own conscience*. But Dr. Stebbing thinks the meaning is, that such a person does not, like many other offenders, study to conceal his crime, and thereby oblige others to prove it, but that openly declaring and maintaining his sentiments, he is accused and condemned out of his own mouth: compare *Heb.* xi. 7. *Matt.* xii. 41, 42. *Acts* xiii. 46. where persons are said to be condemned by those, who furnish out matter for their condemnation. Compare also *Job* xv. 6. *Luke* xix. 22. It is a strong objection against Dr. Foster's scheme, that the *truth* or *falsehood* of the doctrine professed has, upon his principles, nothing to do with the question of a person's being a *Heretic*; but the most orthodox professor might be condemned under this view, if by a secret revelation, or otherwise, it should be manifested, that he was a deist; whereas in this case, all the world would own he was condemned for *infidelity*, or for *knavery*, rather than *heresy*.

5. Some have urged, that if this text refers to the case of those who actually separated themselves from the church upon the account of *Jewish ceremonies*, which the context favours, they might be said to condemn or pass sentence on themselves, as by their separation they justified the conduct of the church in excluding them from their communion; but there seems no necessity for having recourse to this interpretation.

Fost. and Steb. on Heresy, pass.

Whitby and Hammond in Loc.

Baxter on Tit. iii. 10, 11.

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. Hallet's notion of *heresy* is, that there is only a *gradual* difference between *schism* and *heresy*, and that schisms grow up into heresies, when *separations* are occasioned: all *heretics* are therefore *sectaries*, and no *doctrine* alone can constitute a person a *heretic*. *Sects* in the christian church are evils, and wherever there is a needless and contentious separation, there is somewhere a guilt. The only rule, he says, to determine which is heresy in all places and all ages, is the declaration which God has made in scripture of the terms of acceptance with him; and when any thing more than this is insisted upon, in order to continue communion, there is the guilt of heresy on that side which insists on those unnecessary and unscriptural things. On this foundation, he concludes that the *Pope* is the chief *Heretic* in the world, and others in proportion to the usurpation of an authority not given by Christ; and adds, that wicked men can from him have no authority in the church at all.

Hallet's Disc. vol. iii. N^o. ix. p. 358—408. *præf.* p. 358—364, 384—390.

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SCHOLIUM 2.

Some have objected it as a defect in christianity, that there is no *infallible rule*, whereby exactly to judge what heresy is, though it be so expressly condemned, supposing it to signify such an error, as exposes a man to the regular censure of his christian brethren.—It is answered, that a scheme of doctrine is laid down in scripture, to which all are obliged to assent so far as they can understand it: men may indeed mistake in the sense of these rules; and how far these mistakes are important, particular persons and particular societies are to judge for themselves: and though it is a necessary consequence of this, that some will disapprove the determination of societies, as well as the opinion of private persons, yet this is an imperfection of human nature for which there could be no imaginable remedy, unless it were to make every man infallible; for whatever decisions were given, and whatever living judge were to interpret these decisions, there would still be room for putting various senses even upon these interpretations themselves. And if men do not proceed to hate and persecute those whom they think erroneous, the consequences of mens thus condemning each other for mere mental errors will not be very important: and probably leaving the matter in this latitude, will on the whole be attended with fewer inconveniencies than any other scheme whatsoever; and it may deserve serious consideration, whether the way of arguing in the objection may not also affect Christ's rule, *Matt. xviii. 15—18.* and indeed all other rules and laws human or divine, in the interpretation or application of which it is certain fallible men may err

Lett. to Stebb. in Lond. Mag. for 1735. p. 542. | Burnet's four Disc. p. 186—191.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought the only remedy for the abovementioned defects would be, to introduce some *human form* as a *standard of orthodoxy*, wherein certain disputed doctrines shall be expressed in such determinate phrases, as may be directly levelled against such errors as shall prevail from time to time, requiring those especially who are to be public teachers in the church to subscribe, or virtually to declare their assent to such formularies. On this head we may observe,

1. Had this been requisite, it is probable the scriptures would have given us some such formularies as these, or some directions as to the manner in which they should be drawn up, proposed, and received.

2. It is impossible that weak and passionate men, who have perhaps been heated in the very controversy thus decided, should express themselves with greater propriety than the apostles did.

3. It is plain in fact, that this practice has been the cause of great contention in the christian church, and such formularies have been the grand engine
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of dividing it, in proportion to the degree in which they have been multiplied and urged.

4. This is laying a great temptation in the way of such as desire to undertake the office of teachers in the church, and will be most likely to deter and afflict those who have the greatest tenderness of conscience, and therefore (*cat. par.*) best deserve encouragement.

5. It is not likely to answer the end proposed, *viz.* the preserving a uniformity of opinion; since persons of little integrity may perhaps satisfy their consciences, in subscribing what they do not at all believe, as *articles of peace*, or in putting the most unnatural sense on the words. And whereas in answer to all these inconveniencies it is pleaded, that such forms are necessary to keep the church from heresy, and it is better there should be some hypocrites under such forms of orthodoxy, than that a freedom of debate and opinion should be allowed to all teachers, the answer is plain; that when any one begins to preach doctrines, which appear to those who attend upon him, dangerous and subversive of christianity, it will be time enough to proceed to such an animadversion, as the nature of his error in their apprehension will require, and his relation to them will admit.

Dunlop's Pref. to the Scotch Confess.

vol. i. præf. p. 52—58.

Evans's Script. Standard.

Occas. Pap. vol. ii. N^o. i.

Hales's Tracts, p. 28—31.

Conybeare's 6 Serm. N^o. ii.

Gbandler of Subscription.

Burnet's Hist. of his Times, Conclus. p.

34. fol.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Nevertheless, it is very consistent with what we have said under the preceding scholium, that voluntary societies should demand such satisfaction, as they shall on serious enquiry think fit, of the orthodoxy of one who is to minister among them: nor can this be said to intrench at all upon christian liberty and the right of private judgment, since every private *Christian* has the same right of judging who is fit to teach him, as every teacher has of judging for himself what is the true christian doctrine. And the like may be said with respect to *ministers*, when desired to concur in any solemn act, by which they are to declare their approbation of the admission of any particular person to that office.

DEFINITION LXXXIII.

Any degree of divine influence on the mind, inclining it to believe in Christ and to practise virtue, is called GRACE.

L E C T.

CLXXV.

SCHOLIUM.

There are in scripture many other senses of the word *grace*, which does in the general signify any favour of God freely bestowed upon his creatures: compare 1 *Cor.* x. 30. 2 *Cor.* viii. 4, 5. *Eph.* iv. 7. but forasmuch as those which relate to the improvement of their temper, and their fitness for final happiness, are favours of the greatest importance, this name is by way of eminence applied to them, as we shall shew in what follows.

Clarke's Post. Serm. N^o. xxix. vol. ii. p. 265—275. 8th. Ed.

DEFINITION LXXXIV.

The communication of grace given to any soul in such a degree, as actually to bring that soul to faith in Christ, and consequently into a state of salvation, may properly be called SPECIAL GRACE.

COROLLARY.

Special grace is the work of the Spirit of God; *Tit.* iii. 5, 6. *Gal.* iv. 6. v. 18, 22. *Rom.* v. 5. viii. 9, 13, 14. 2 *Cor.* iii. 3. v. 5. to which may be added 2 *Thess.* ii. 13. and many other texts, several of which will be mentioned under the following proposition.

DEFINITION LXXXV.

Those divine influences, which leave the mind short of faith and sincere obedience, may be called COMMON GRACE; but those which *introduce* special, though they do not yet amount to it, may with respect to that introduction be called PREPARATORY.

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

All those who do indeed believe in Christ, and in the main practise virtue, are to ascribe it not merely or chiefly to their own wisdom and goodness, but to the special operation of divine grace upon their souls, as the original cause of it.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. None can deny, that God has such an access to the minds of men, that he can work upon them in what manner he pleases: and there is great reason to believe, that his secret influence on the mind gives a turn to many of the most important events relating to particular persons and societies, *Prov.* xxi. 1.

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as it is evident many of the public revolutions mentioned in the old testament are ascribed to this cause. *Ezra* i. 1.

Religion of Nat. p. 105—107.

2. Though the mind of man be not invincibly determined by motives, yet in matters of great importance it is not determined without them: and it is reasonable to believe, that where a person goes through those difficulties which attend faith and obedience, he must have a very lively view of the great engagements to them, and probably upon the whole a more lively view than another, who in the same circumstances in all other respects acts in a different manner.

Prop. 32. 3. Whatever instruments are made use of as the means of making such powerful impressions on the mind, the efficacy of them is to be ascribed to the continual agency of the first cause.

1—3. 4. The prevalence of virtue and piety in the church is to be ascribed to God, as the great original author, even upon the principles of *natural religion*.

5. Good men in scripture, who appear best to have understood the nature of God and his conduct towards men, and who wrote under the influence and inspiration of his Spirit, frequently offer up such petitions to God, as shew that they believed the reality and importance of his gracious agency upon the heart to promote piety and virtue, *Psal.* li. 10—12. xxxix. 4. xc. 12. cxix. 12, 18, 27, 33—37, 73, 80, 133. 1 *Chron.* xxix. 18, 19. *Eph.* i. 16, &c. *Col.* i. 9—11, & *sim.*

6. God promises to produce such a change in the hearts of those to whom the other valuable blessings of his word are promised, as plainly implies, that the alteration made in their temper and character is to be looked upon as his work, *Deut.* xxx. 6. *Psal.* cx. 3. *Jer.* xxxi. 33. xxxii. 39, 40. *Ezek.* xi. 19, 20. xxxvi. 26, 27. compare *Heb.* viii. 8—13.

7. The scripture expressly declares in many places, that the work of *faith* in the soul is to be ascribed to God, and describes the *change* made in a man's heart when he becomes truly religious in such language, as must lead the mind to some strength superior to our own, by which it is effected, *John* i. 13. iii. 3, 5, 6. *Acts* xi. 18. xvi. 14. 2 *Cor.* iii. 3. *Eph.* i. 19, 20. ii. 1, 10. iv. 24. *Phil.* i. 29. *Col.* i. 11, 12. ii. 12, 13. Vid. *James* i. 18. 2 *Tim.* ii. 25. To this catalogue we scruple not to add *Eph.* ii. 8. though some have objected that *τὸ* cannot refer to *πίστεως*; since the like change of genders is often to be found in the new testament; compare *Acts* xxiv. 16. xxvi. 17. *Phil.* i. 28. 1 *John* ii. 8. *Gal.* iii. 16. iv. 19. *Matt.* vi. ult. xxviii. 19. *Rom.* ii. 14.

Elfner's Observ. vol. i. p. 128.

Raphelli Obs. ex Herod. in Matt. xxviii.

19.

Glassii Op. l. iii. *Tract.* ii. de pr. Can. xvi. p. 524—526.

8. The *increase* of Christians in faith and piety is spoken of as the work of God; which must more strongly imply, that the first *beginnings* of it are to be ascribed

ascribed to him, *Psal.* cxix. 32. *Phil.* i. 6. ii. 13. *1 Cor.* vii. 25. iii. 7. iv. 7. xv. 10. *2 Cor.* v. 5. *Heb.* xiii. 20, 21. *1 Pet.* v. 10. *Jude ver.* 24, 25.

9. The scripture does expressly assert the absolute necessity of such divine influences on the mind, in order to faith and holiness, and speaks of God's giving them to one while he withholds them from another, as the great reason of the difference to be found in the characters of different men in this important respect, *Deut.* xxix. 4. *Matt.* xi. 25, 26. *John* vi. 44, 45, 46. xii. 39, 40. *Rom.* ix. 18—23.

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. It appears probable from the light of nature, and certain from the word of God, that faith and repentance are ultimately to be ascribed to the work of special grace upon the hearts of men. Q. E. D.

Time-street Lect. vol. ii. p. 242—245.

Tillot's Works, vol. ii. p. 80, 81.

Limb. Theol. l. iv. c. xiv. § 4, 21.

Brandt's Hist. of the Ref. vol. ii. p. 75.

Doddridge on Regen. Sermon. vii. p. 221—

233.

COROLLARY 1.

LECT. CLXXVI. We may learn with what dependence gospel-ministers should undertake their work, and to what they should ascribe the success it, *1 Cor.* iii. 4. & xv. 10.

Somes's Fun. Sermon for Mr. Saund. pass.

COROLLARY 2.

Those who are finally brought to faith, repentance, and salvation, have great reason to acknowledge the divine goodness to them, and no room to boast of themselves, *1 Cor.* i. 29, 30.

COROLLARY 3.

It is a gross mistake, to assert, as some have done, that *grace* never signifies the operation of God upon mens minds, but only intimates his *gracious acceptance* of their repentance, brought about by the motives and assistances of the gospel, *i. e.* as it must here mean, by the discovery of the christian scheme: compare *Acts* xiv. 26. xv. 40. xviii. 27. *1 Cor.* xv. 10. *2 Cor.* i. 12. *Heb.* iv. 16. *Gal.* vi. 18. in all which place, and many more, *grace* makes very good sense, if taken for a *divine operation* on the heart, which on the interpretation opposed it would by no means do: and it may further be observed, that when *grace* is used to express *moral virtues* and good dispositions in our hearts, they are so called, not merely or chiefly, as recommending us to divine favour, but as produced by divine influence, though still working in a manner suited to the freedom of our nature. Compare *Eph.* iv. 29. *2 Pet.* iii. 18. *2 Cor.* viii. 1, 6, 7.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 328—330.

Clarke's Post. Sermon. vol. ii. N^o. xiii, xiv.

Balguy's Sermon. vol. ii. N^o. xix. *præf.* p.

361—369.

Lardner's Sermon. N^o. xiv. p. 297—305.

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COROLLARY 4.

They are greatly mistaken, who assert, that the assistances of God's Spirit were peculiar to the primitive ages; and who interpret such texts as those quoted above, merely of a miraculous agency on the *apostles* and *primitive* christians. See the scriptures under *Def. 84. Cor.* and *Benson* on the texts quoted above.

Whitby on the New Test. vol. ii. p. 283—288.

COROLLARY 5.

Forasmuch as *gratitude* is so powerful a principle in human nature; and the obligations arising from the divine goodness in imparting special grace to believers are so high and important, it must be the duty of those who preach the gospel, to lead their people diligently to reflect upon it, and to appear themselves under an affectionate sense of its value and excellency.

COROLLARY 6.

On the principles of the proposition it will appear proper, that the distinction between the *regenerate* and *unregenerate* should be kept up in preaching. And though there be some, on whom divine grace has wrought so early, that perhaps it is difficult to find a time from the first dawning of reason, when they did not appear in the main under the influences of it, yet such instances are comparatively few: and as those early good dispositions must appear to be in a peculiar manner the work of God's Spirit, considering the strength of appetite and passion in children, and the weakness of reason, it would be extremely wrong to exempt such out of the class of the regenerate, and to confine the phrase to those who have been reclaimed from a vicious and immoral course.

SCHOLIUM I.

As it appears that by the corruption of our nature the whole symmetry of it is broken, it has generally been maintained by those who assert the doctrine in the proposition, that divine grace may work, not only by enlightening the understanding, and awakening the affections, but also by some immediate influences upon the *will*; in order to restore that harmony of all the faculties, in which the perfection of our nature consists: and many have thought that the *body* as well as the mind may be the subject of such divine operations: compare *1 Thess. v. 23.* and *Def. 26. Cor. 2. Prop. 17. Cor.* but it is extremely difficult to conceive of the distinction in all its branches, and it does not seem of so much importance as some have thought.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As to the *manner* in which divine grace operates upon the mind, considering how little it is we know of the nature and constitution of our own souls, and of the

the frame of nature around us, it is no wonder that it should be unaccountable to us: (*John* iii. 8.) perhaps it may often be, by impelling the animal spirits or nerves, in such a manner as is proper to excite certain ideas in the mind with a degree of vivacity, which they would not otherwise have had: by this means various passions are excited; but the great motives addressed to *gratitude* and *love* seem generally if not always to operate upon the will more powerfully than any other, which many divines have therefore chosen to express by the phrase of *delectatio vittrix*: compare *Deut.* xxx. 6. *Psal.* cxix. 16, 20, 32, 47, 48, 97, 103. *Psal.* xix. 10, 11. *Rom.* vii. 22. 1 *John* iv. 18, 19. *Rom.* v. 5.

Le Blanc's Thes. p. 532. § 53.

Burnet's Life of Roch. p. 43—51

Barclay's Apol. p. 148.

Burnet on Art. p. 120.

Whitby Comment. vol. ii. p. 289, 290.

Scougal's Works, p. 6—10.

Seed's Serm. vol. i. p. 291.

Ridley on the Spirit, p. 210.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It enters into the definition of *special grace*, that it is never on the whole finally *rejected*, so as to fail of working faith in those who are the happy objects of it. But there is a great controversy, whether these operations be in their own nature *irresistible* or not; or in other words, whether it was possible that those who in consequence of it do believe, should in these circumstances have continued in their infidelity, and finally have rejected the gospel. To prove that special grace is irresistible, the following arguments have chiefly been insisted upon.

1. That the scripture represents men as by nature in a condition entirely helpless; compare *Eph.* ii. 1. *Luke* iv. 18. *Acts* xxvi. 18. *Rom.* viii. 7.

2. That the action of God in the conversion of a sinner is described in such terms, as plainly to shew it is *invincible*, v. g. by *raising from the dead*, by *giving a new heart*, by *writing the law of God in the soul*, &c. Compare *Prop.* 139. gr. 5, 6.—But to both these arguments it is answered, that these are figurative expressions, which are not to be interpreted in the utmost rigour: that they do indeed intimate a strong disinclination in men to faith and repentance, and a powerful, but not therefore irresistible operation of God upon the mind: compare *Rom.* vi. 2. 1 *John* iii. 9. and other texts of the like import.

3. It is said; that if special grace were not irresistible, then it would be uncertain whether any would believe or no, and consequently possible that all which Christ had done and suffered in the work of redemption might have been done and suffered in vain.—To this it is answered, that the event may be certain where it is not necessary, or otherwise there can be no foundation for a certain foreknowledge of future contingencies, which those who maintain this doctrine of irresistible grace do generally grant; this likewise will answer the arguments brought from those scriptures, in which conversion to God is made the subject of a divine *promise*. Those who are on the other side of the question allow, that in *some* instances divine operations on the mind may be irresistible, as in the case of *St. Paul's conversion*; but they say, that to maintain that it is thus

thus in every instance, is to destroy the liberty of the mind in all these cases, and consequently to leave no room for the exercise of justice in conferring rewards and inflicting punishments; not to say, that the grace of God itself cannot be said to *assist* us, if there be no co-operation of our own with it. Compare *Phil.* ii. 12, 13.

<i>Turret. Loc. xv. Quæst. vi. § 1—21.</i>	<i>Tillotf. Works, vol. ii. p. 371—374.</i>
<i>Limborch Theol. l. iv. c. xiv. præf.</i>	<i>Barclay's Apol. Prop. v, vi.</i>
§ 11, &c.	<i>Saurin's Sermon. vol. vii. N^o. xiii. p. 471</i>
— <i>Collat. cum Jud. p. 83—85.</i>	—495.
<i>Lime-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 251—255.</i>	

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is also questioned, whether *common* grace be *sufficient*: and here it is to be observed that the question has some ambiguity. If that grace alone is to be called *sufficient*, which is such, as to put it into a man's power immediately to believe, without any further or higher influence on his mind, it seems that the sufficiency of common grace cannot be proved; but if that is sufficient, by which a man is enabled to take some steps, on his taking which further grace will be communicated, till at length, by a longer or shorter train of convictions, *special* grace is given, it is difficult to reconcile the denial of such a sufficiency of common grace, with the divine justice in condemning men for their infidelity, and the frequent declarations which God makes in scripture, that he does not desire the death of a sinner, *Prov.* i. 21—25. *Ezek.* xviii. 23. xxxiii. 11. *Isa.* v. 1, &c. *Ezek.* xii. 2. *Matt.* xi. 21—24. xxiii. 37, 38. xxv. 26, 27. The most considerable argument for the negative is, that grace which is always in fact ineffectual, (as common grace is by the very definition of it,) cannot properly be said to have been always sufficient: but not to insist upon its being taken for granted in this objection, that there is a *specific* difference between common and special grace; the objection seems only to be saying in other words, that the mind of man is so formed, that it *could not* be determined by considerations by which it *is not in fact* determined, which is only an obscure way of denying the liberty of choice; for if that be allowed, it must be owned, that in every crime which has been committed from the first original of mankind, there have been sufficient reasons against it, which yet have never in fact prevailed in any one of those instances.

<i>Limb. Theol. l. iv. c. xiii. pass.</i>	<i>Baxt. End of Controv. c. xiii.</i>
<i>Tillotf. Works, vol. ii. p. 380—382.</i>	<i>Guyse's Paraph. on Matt. xxv. 26, &</i>
<i>Turret. ubi sup. § 22—34.</i>	<i>Note.</i>

SCHOLIUM 5.

This may teach us in what sense God may be said to *will* the salvation of those that *perish*, i. e. he wills it *conditionally*, and determines to do what may

be sufficient to effect it, if it be not their own fault; but he does not will it to such a degree, as to do the utmost which his almighty power could effect for that purpose, nor to do any thing more for their salvation, than he knows in fact will by their own perverseness be overborne. Fact proves that this is the highest sense in which he can be said to will their salvation; and it seems that any thing short of this, would not be a foundation for using the phrase at all, especially with such great solemnity as is observable in some of the passages quoted above, *Schol.* 4.

<i>Howe's Redeem. Tears, ap. Op. vol.</i>	<i>Watts's Ruin and Recov. Quest. xiv. p.</i>
ii. p. 13, 22, 51, 52.	292—319.
<i>Howe on Prescience, § 11, 12, 19.</i>	

SCHOLIUM 6.

Whether the mind be entirely *passive* in the first moment of its conversion; or whether there be any co-operation of *our own* together with the influences of divine grace upon our heart, is a question which has also been very much disputed. It chiefly depends on what is meant by *conversion*: if a man is then only said to be converted, when his heart is in a prevailing degree really determined for the service of God through Christ, he is plainly *active* in such a determination, though there may have been some preceding scenes in which he has been passive, *i. e.* while God has made those impressions on his mind which have led to this determination: and as according to the natural constitution of our mind, some motives must precede the volition leading towards this final determination, it is proper to own God as the first mover in this blessed work, and to acknowledge that in this sense as well as others we love him because he has first loved us. Compare 1 *Cor.* i. 30, 31. *Psal.* xciv. 7, 8. *Eph.* iv. 30. *Rev.* iii. 20. *Phil.* ii. 13. *Ezek.* xi. 19, with *Ezek.* xviii. 31. *Deut.* xxx. 6. with *Jer.* iv. 4. *Acts* ii. 40. 1 *Tim.* iv. 16.

<i>Saurin's Serms. vol. i. p. 78—80.</i>	<i>Tillot's vol. ii. p. 374—376.</i>
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SCHOLIUM 7.

The question, whether the work of regeneration and conversion be accomplished in an instant, is nearly akin to the former. It must be acknowledged, there is some one moment, in which there is the first preponderancy of religious impressions and resolution, in the soul; but if all that the Spirit does to bring a man to real religion, is called, (as with some latitude of expression it may,) the work of his converting or regenerating grace, it is evidently a gradual thing; and it would certainly have an ill influence upon practical religion, to encourage men to expect an instantaneous miraculous change in the neglect of proper means.

<i>Witt's Econ. Rad. b. iii. c. vi. § 8.</i>	<i>Tillot's vol. ii. p. 383—386.</i>
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SCHOLIUM 8.

We most readily allow, that the rules by which God proceeds in dispensing his special grace are to us unaccountable; for it plainly appears, that it is not always given in proportion to the use that has been made of common grace, since many who have been the most abandoned sinners are in a very sudden and surprising manner brought to repentance and faith, while others of a fairer character go on in impenitence and unbelief: compare 1 Cor. vi. 9—11. 1 Tim. i. 14, 15, 16. Nevertheless, it would be very unjust to accuse God of partiality on that account, because in his final judgment he will distribute rewards and punishments according to the characters of men, Rom. ii. 6. and dealing justly by all, so far as to inflict no undeserved punishments, he may certainly be allowed to dispense his favour, as he pleases, Matt. xx. 13—15. and if we will not allow this, we shall find invincible difficulties in the dispensations of nature as well as of grace, considering the vast difference which God is pleased to make in the circumstances of various creatures, even where there has been no correspondent difference in their previous character and behaviour.

Le Blanc's Thes. p. 635. § 8. p. 634. | *Clarke's Post. Sermon.* vol. i. p. 235—239,
§ 2. | 374—378, 380—385. *Oct.*
Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 27, 28.

SCHOLIUM 9.

Some of the *Heathens* seem to have had a notion of divine influences on the mind as necessary to make them wise and good, and have ascribed their virtues as well as their intellectual endowments to it; though others have spoken in a very haughty manner upon this head.

Seneca's Epist. N°. 73.
Wiss. Misc. vol. ii. Ex. 6. § 10.
Simplic. in Epictet. ad fin.
Maxim. Tyr. Diff. 22. apud
Barrow's Works, vol. iii. p. 331.
Xenoph. Cyrop. l. viii. c. vii. § 1.
Plato de Repub. l. vi. apud
Whitby on Matt. vi. 13.
Arrian in Epict. l. iii. c. xxi. p. 306.
Tull. de Nat. Deor. l. ii. ad fin.

Hierocles ap. Lucas on Happiness, vol. i. c.
ii. § 1. p. 112.
Minute Philos. vol. ii. p. 47.
Æschines, Max. Tyrius, and Plat. apud
Chapman's Euseb. vol. ii. p. 179. not.
Dodd. on Regen. N°. vii. p. 212—214.
Æschin. Dial. i. pass.
Apuleii Herm. Trismegist. ap. Op. vol. ii.
p. 309, 310.

DEFINITION LXXXVI.

That is said to be A STATE OF SALVATION, in which if a person die, he would partake of the future salvation and happiness promised in the gospel.

DEFINITION LXXXVII.

The doctrine of the PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS, is that doctrine which asserts, that all who ever believed in Christ according to *Def.* 82. or who have ever been in a state of salvation, are never suffered finally to perish, but do either continue in that state to the end of their lives, or if they fall from it are again recovered to it.

COROLLARY I.

A person may be said to believe the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints in this sense, who believes their apostasy to be in the nature of things *possible*, provided he believes it in fact certain that they will not actually apostatize.

COROLLARY 2.

A person may be said to believe the doctrine of perseverance in this sense, who admits of a total apostasy *for a time*, from which the person so fallen away is afterwards recovered; but whether this belief be consistent with scripture or not will be afterwards enquired.

PROPOSITION CXL.

LECT. To enquire whether the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, as stated CLXXIX. above, be or be not the scripture doctrine.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. For the *negative*, that it is not a scripture doctrine, the following arguments are produced.

Arg. I. There are various threatenings denounced against those who do apostatize, both under the old testament and under the new, which the patrons of the doctrine of the perseverance allow to have contained the same covenant of grace, *v. g.* *Ezek.* iii. 20. xviii. 24. *Heb.* vi. 4—8, 29. *Psal.* cxxv. 3, 4, 5. To this it has been answered, that some of these texts do not so much as *suppose* the falling away of a truly good man; and to all of them it is said, they only shew what would be the consequence, *if* such should fall away, or at most prove it in the nature of things *possible*, but cannot prove that it ever in fact happens. Compare *James* ii. 10. *Matt.* xviii. 8, 9, 22. *Luke* xvii. 4. xvi. 26, 31.

Limborch Theol. l. v. c. lxxxi. § 1—6,

—19.

Tillotson's Works, vol. ii. p. 490.

Owen on Apost. p. 2—10.

Maurice's Serm. N^o. i.

Arg.

Arg. II. It is foretold as a future event, that some *true* Christians shall fall away, *Matt.* xxiv. 12, 13. *John* xv. 6. *Matt.* xiii. 20, 21.

To the *first* of these passages it is answered, that their *love* might be said to *wax cold*, without totally ceasing; or there might have been an outward zeal where there never was a true faith.—To the *second*, that persons may be said to be in *Christ*, only by an external profession; see *John* xv. 2. compare *Rom.* viii. 1. *Gal.* iii. 27.—As to *Matt.* xiii. 20, 21. it is replied, that this may refer to the joy with which some may entertain the offers of pardon, who never attentively considered them, nor cordially acquiesced in the method in which that and the other blessings of the gospel covenant were proposed.

Limb. Theol. ibid. § 5—9.

Arg. III. It is urged, that many have in fact fallen away, as *David* and *Solomon*, and those mentioned *1 Tim.* i. 19, 20. *2 Tim.* iv. 10. compare *Phil.* iv. 3. *Col.* iv. 14. *Philom.* ver. 24. *2 Pet.* ii. 18.

To those instances it is answered,

1. By some, that with regard to *David* and *Solomon*, there might be some habits of grace remaining in their hearts, even when they were overborne by the remainders of corruption.

2. By others, that *David* and *Solomon* were recovered, and that *Demas* might possibly be so; and as to *others*, that there is no proof of their ever having been sincere Christians and truly good men, which is particularly applicable to *Alexander* and *Hymeneus*.—As for *1 Tim.* v. 12. which some add to the above-mentioned instances, it is answered, that their *first faith* might be a mere ineffectual assent; or that it may mean only their promise given to the church that they would continue widows.

Robertson's Clavis Biblica, p. 86, 87. | *Hammond on 1 Tim.* v. 12.

Limb. ibid. l. v. c. lxxxii. § 5.

Arg. IV. It is urged, that the doctrine of perseverance supercedes the use of means, and renders those exhortations and motives insignificant, which are so often to be found in scripture, *v. g.* *Luke* xii. 5. *Rom.* xi. 20. *1 Cor.* ix. 27. *Heb.* iii. 12. iv. 1. *Rev.* ii. 10. iii. 11. *2 Tim.* ii. 12. To this it is replied, that these admonitions and exhortations have their use, being the means by which God continues his saints in their holy course, it being still true, that continued holiness is absolutely necessary in order to their salvation, with which the *certainty* of their salvation in that way is not by any means inconsistent. Compare *Acts* xxvii. 22—24, 31.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxxxiii. § 1—10.

Arg. V. It is urged, that the doctrine of perseverance gives great encouragement to carnal security and presumptuous sin.

Ans.

Ans. 1. We allow that it may be abused, but that will not prove it to be false, though it is a reason against admitting it to be true without clear evidence; but the free pardon of the greatest sins upon repentance and faith, tho' so certain a truth, is also liable to as fatal and obvious abuse.

2. None can assure themselves of their own perseverance, (allowing the doctrine in general to be true,) any further than as they have an evidence that they are already true believers: to all therefore who are in any doubt with regard to the sincerity of grace in their hearts, the argument taken from the fear of eternal condemnation and misery must have its full weight.

3. As for those who are true believers, and know themselves to be such, allowing the doctrine of perseverance, they may nevertheless receive great damage by sin. There is on this very principle so much the more reason to believe that God will visit it, (as he remarkably did in the instance of *David*;) with temporal afflictions; and the diminution of future glory in proportion to the degree in which sin prevails, will still remain as a consideration of great moment with the most excellent saints.

4. If the motive taken from the fear of everlasting misery be weakened, that from love and gratitude, which is the most powerful and acceptable principle of obedience, is greatly strengthened: so that upon the whole, this doctrine is not likely to prove a snare to man, except when he is in so ill a situation of mind, that nothing but the fear of immediate damnation will restrain him from the commission of sin; and the probability of dying immediately upon the commission of sin, before there is room for renewed acts of faith and repentance, is so small, that few persons who do not believe perseverance will be restrained from guilt merely by that fear. And to conclude, before a man can with any plausible appearance draw an argument from this doctrine to encourage himself to sin, he must be sure he is a believer: but how can he know it? if by a pretended revelation, strong proof must be demanded; for it will seem in theory very improbable that such a favour should be granted to a wretch disposed so vilely to abuse it: if by rational evidence, what past impressions which he may have felt can give a stronger evidence of true piety, than arise to the contrary from so detestable a disposition as is now supposed to prevail? So that, though on the whole it is possible this doctrine may be abused, the probability of such an abuse is less, and the absurdity of it much greater, than persons on the other side the question have seemed generally to apprehend.

Limborek *ibid.* § 11.

|| *Lime-str. Lect.* vol. ii. p. 343—346.

LECT. SECT. II. To enumerate the principal arguments in favour of the doctrine.
CLXXX. And,

1. It is argued from the promises of persevering grace, *Jer.* xxxii. 38—40. *John* iv. 14. vi. 39. x. 28. xi. 26.—To the first of these it is answered, that the clause on which the argument turns, may be translated, “that they may not depart from me:” but it is replied, that the apostle quotes this text, *Heb.* viii.

viii. 10. in a manner not liable to this ambiguity. As to the other passages, some understand them merely as a *conditional* promise, expressing the safety of believers while they adhere to Christ: but the relation of a *shepherd*, professed in some of them, intimates a care to prevent a seduction of the flock, as well as to defend them from violence. To these texts some add all those passages, in which Christ owns such a relation to his church, and expresses such a care of it, as must in fact be a security to every true member; as when he calls himself its head, husband, Saviour, &c.

Limborch ibid. l. v. c. lxxxiv. § 3—5 | Lime-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 331—336.

Arg. II. The doctrine is argued from the chearful hope and persuasion which the apostles often express of their own persevering, and that of their fellow saints, as will appear from consulting the following texts.

Rom. viii. 35—39.—Ans. The apostle only expresses his confidence, that none of those evils should hurt them, while they continued stedfast to Christ. But this is sinking the sense very low: it could never have been imagined or suspected, that *calamities* alone should alienate the love of God from good men, especially when a regard to the cause of God brought on those calamities; but it was very important to assure them, that God would so strengthen them under their trials, that they should be enabled to bear them without final apostasy.

Limborch ibid. § 10, 11.

Pbil. i. 6.—Ans. It expresses what appeared *probable* rather than certain. It is replied, that, admitting the answer, it must be granted that the perseverance of good men is at least *probable*, and the reason insinuated, which is God's having begun a good work in them, is applicable to all believers; as the following words intimate, that it is through the divine inspection, and care to finish his work, that they are secured.

1 Pet. i. 4, 5.—Ans. The apostle speaks of their having been kept *hitherto*, but does not assert that they shall *still* be kept. But this does not seem to amount to their being kept to *salvation*.

1 Cor. i. 8, 9.—Object. This refers to the confirming the saints in a state of perpetual holiness at the last day.—*Ans.* It would not be so proper to say, they were then confirmed *unto the end*; and there may be (as our version supposes) an ellipsis in the expression, *q. d.* "He shall confirm you even to the end, *that ye may be blameless,*" &c.

Whitby in Loc.

1 Thess. v. 23, 24. The turn of phrase here is so much the same with the last text, that the same objection and the same answer may easily be applied; as there is indeed a remarkable resemblance between the two texts.

Arg. III. Those passages are pleaded, in which this doctrine is said to be expressly asserted, *v. g.*

Rom.

Rom. viii. 28—30.—Dr. *Whitby* understands the phrase, *who are called according to his purpose*, of their being called to a profession of christianity, and by being glorified, their receiving the Spirit of God, whereby a very considerable glory was conferred upon them: compare 1 *Pet.* iv. 4. But it is certain this is a very uncommon sense of the word; to which we may add, that *the called* are spoken of as *lovers of God*; not to insist upon that part of the argument, which is taken from the mention of God's purpose and predestination concerning them.

Matt. xxiv. 24.—*Ans.* Εὐδαιμον only implies the exceeding difficulty, not impossibility of the case.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxxxiv. § 8.

1 *John* iii. 9. *Object.* It is only, *q. d.* an allowed course of sin is inconsistent with true christianity.

Ans. Such an explication will by no means suit the phrase of *the seed abiding in such*, (compare 1 *Pet.* i. 23.) even though it should be granted that *abiding* signifies no more than *is in them*.

Limborch *ibid.* § 12, 13.

Matt. vii. 25.—It is answered, that by *storms* and *tempests* are to be understood persecution, or the final trial all are to expect from God; and in either sense the meaning will only be, that he who does the will of Christ shall have a secure foundation of hope and confidence under this trial. Compare *Prov.* iv. 18. *Job* xvii. 9. *Psal.* xcii. 12—15. *Isa.* xl. 31. to which texts nothing can be answered, but they express either the happiness of good men, or what is generally their character.

Arg. IV. There are many passages in which it is asserted, that those who have fallen away from their profession were never sincere in it, which plainly implies that those who are sincere do never fall away. They are such as these,

1 *John* ii. 19. compare *Deut.* xiii. 13.—*Object.* The apostle speaks of what would *probably*, though not certainly have been the case: or, considering the peculiar evidence which attended christianity, he might have peculiar reason to say, that no sincere professor would be ashamed of the gospel: but even this must only be on a supposition that there is a certain degree of wickedness, into which no one who had once been good could fall, which few grant who deny perseverance.—Matt. vii. 23.—*Object.* Christ might say this concerning *many*, though not *all*; and if it might be said of the greater part, it would justify such a general representation; as it may be only of the greater part of sinners he speaks, when he describes all at the left hand as condemned for uncharitableness, *Matt.* xxv. 42, 43.—*Luke* viii. 4—15. where *only* those who brought forth fruit to perfection, are said to have received the word *in on honest heart*. *Object.* It is only a circumstance of a parable, therefore not to be strained too far.

Ans. It is a very material circumstance, and not merely incidental.—It is further urged, by way of objection to this argument, that they may be called

good

good ground, who receive it with an honest heart, and bring forth fruit, even though their fruit should wither and they themselves perish. But it is replied, that this is the very case of the *stony ground* hearers; nor can those be said to bring forth fruit *to perfection*, who never attain to more than an imperfect state, and at last fall from that, and incur aggravated guilt and ruin.

Lime-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 284—311.
Baxter End of Controv. chap. xxvi.
Baxt. of Persever. pass.

Witsii Œcon. Fœd. l. iii. c. xiii.
Aët. Syn. Dordt, part ii. p. 403, &c.

COROLLARY

There is on the whole, reason to believe, that the doctrine of *perseverance*, as stated and limited above, is indeed the scripture doctrine.

SCHOLIUM I.

Most of those who believe that the saints shall not *finally* fall away, so as ac- LECT.
 tually to *perish*, do likewise believe that they never *totally* apostatize, even for CLXXXI.
 a *time*; and consequently allow that *David*, under his greatest guilt, was still
 in a state of favour and acceptance with God, as having a secret principle of spi-
 ritual life, though at that time overborne by the prevalency of sin. The chief
 stress of the argument lies on *Heb. vi. 4, &c.* and it is urged, that if this text be
 allowed to speak of those who fall short of real piety, as the patrons of perseve-
 rance generally suppose, yet in pronouncing *their* recovery impossible, it must
 much more strongly conclude against the recovery of a *true* saint, if he should
 fall away. But we answer, if it be allowed, (as perhaps there may be reason to
 allow it) that the *falling away*, here spoken of, is such a total apostasy from chris-
 tianity, as implies the sin against the Holy Ghost, then it will follow, that what-
 ever argument there is to prove final perseverance, will prove that true believers
 shall not be suffered to fall into that sin; and if it be supposed only to express
inferior degrees of apostasy, then it must be granted that ἀδυνατον only signifies
extremely difficult; and so on either supposition, no certain conclusion can be
 drawn from this passage. Compare *Heb. x. 26—29.*

Witsii Œcon. Fœd. l. iii. c. xiii. § 10, | *Lime-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 297—299.*
 11, 26.

To this it has been added by some, that if several of the texts urged above
 have any weight to prove perseverance at all, it must be a *total* as well as *final*
 perseverance: compare particularly 1 *John ii. 19. iii. 9.* 1 *Pet. i. 4, 5.*

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxxxv. § 4, 5. | *Hale's Gold. Rem. p. 129—133.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Perseverance is owing to the continued influence of the Spirit of God upon
 the hearts of true believers, Vid. *Prop. 139. gr. 7, 8.* and this seems to be the
 M m m foun-

foundation of that metaphor, by which the Spirit is said to dwell in them, and they are described as his temple, *Rom.* viii. 2. *1 Cor.* iii. 16. vi. 19. *Eph.* ii. 22. *John* vii. 37—39.

Howe's Liv. Temple, apud Op. vol. i. p. 215. | Lime-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 336, &c.

S C H O L I U M 3.

The preceding scholium may serve to explain the foundation of that metaphor, by which Christ is represented as the *head of the church*, which together with him makes up one *mystical body*. For his created nature being thus inhabited by the Holy Ghost, and the influences of that Spirit being communicated from him to believers, to animate them to the same great end of cultivating holiness and glorifying God, it is evident that such an allegory as we have mentioned above is just and beautiful; since the several parts of the human body are actuated by the same mind, and have sensation and motion communicated to them by virtue of their union with the head. Compare *John* i. 16. xvii. 21. xv. 5. *1 Cor.* vi. 17. xii. 12, 13. *Eph.* iv. 15, 16. *Col.* ii. 19.

Witsius ubi sup. § 25.

| Lime-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 331, &c.

S C H O L I U M 4.

From those texts, in which God engages to cause all things to operate for the good of his people, such as *Rom.* viii. 28. v. 3. *1 Cor.* iii. 21, 22. many have inferred, that God will order all events in such a manner, that the good of every particular believer shall in fact be advanced and promoted thereby; and some have carried this so far as to say, that even *sin* itself shall be for the believer's advantage; though some have contradicted themselves again, by adding, that to have resisted the temptation would have been much more so. But it seems that the design of those texts will be sufficiently answered, if we allow that God's dispensations are so adjusted, that good men, if they are not wanting to themselves, may receive some good from all, and probably in general do so.

Turret. Loc. xvi. Quest. vi. § 14.

S C H O L I U M 5.

It seems from some of the texts enumerated, *Prop.* 133. *gr.* 2. that none have made such a progress in piety, as to be entirely free from the remainders of indwelling sin, and *Rom.* vii. 14, &c. is often urged as a confirmation of this doctrine. It is answered, that the seventh chapter to the *Romans* describes the state of an *unregenerate man*. The arguments on both sides may be seen in the commentators: but on the whole, it seems most probable, that the context there describes the state of a *good man* under the imperfection of the *Mosaic* dispensation, and therefore is not so much to the purpose of the present question

as some suppose. It is certain St. Paul sometimes speaks in the *first* person, when he means to represent the circumstances and sentiments of *another*, (*Rom.* iii. 7, 8. *1 Cor.* iv. 4—6.) and perhaps upon the whole, the true key to this much controverted passage may be this: St. Paul first represents a man as ignorant of the law, and then insensible of sin, but afterwards becoming acquainted with it, and then thrown into a kind of despair, by the sentence of death which it denounces, on account of sins he is now conscious of having committed: he then further shews, that even where there is so good a disposition, as even *to delight in the law*, yet the motives are too weak to maintain that uniform tenor of obedience, which a good man greatly desires, and which the gospel by its superior motives and grace does in fact produce.

1 John iii. 9. if it prove the perfection of *any* man, would prove, contrary to the most evident experience, the perfection of *all* believers: and whereas it is said, the precepts of the gospel require us to aim at perfection, it is replied, they may answer their end by exciting us to press after it, though in the present state it be not actually attained: and as for those who are said in scripture to have been *perfect*, such as *Noah* and *Job*, it appears from the infirmities which attended their character, that the most which can be meant by it is, that they were not only sincere in religion, but had made eminent progress in it. On the whole, none can pretend to say, that it is absolutely impossible for us to do our best, or that God now requires of us to do better than we possibly can in present circumstances; nor can we certainly say, that no one has ever exerted the utmost of the capacities God has given him in any particular act of duty: but we find in fact those who seem the best of men, generally most ready to acknowledge their own remaining imperfections; and the perfection that some have talked of, seems only to be a freedom from known, wilful, deliberate sin, which it is to be hoped many have attained for some considerable time, who yet lament numberless imperfections attending the best of their services. *Christians* would in general be better employed in seeking greater degrees of perfection, than in disputing in a subtle and abstruse manner the nicety of such questions, as have sometimes been started upon this head. And we may add, that where the progress towards perfection is greatest, the remembrance of past sins, only pardoned by the free grace of God in Christ, and of our continued dependance upon the aids of God's Spirit for every step we take in our holy course, may be sufficient to keep us humble; and it is certain, that pride in our religious attainments, is one of the greatest of the imperfections to be found in good men: compare *Job* ix. 20.

Barclay's Apol. Prop. viii.

Besse's Def. of Quak. p. 193—202.

Lucas's Enq. vol. iii. p. 11—42. i. e.

§ 1. c. i, ii.

Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. ix. N°. v.

Law of Perfection, p. 1—9.

John Wesley's Serm. on Perfection.

SCHOLIUM 6.

LECT. CLXXXII. The Spirit of God produces in the hearts of good men the hope of eternal life, which in various persons and circumstances prevails in various degrees. Some who are fully persuaded of the doctrine of perseverance, and have a clear evidence that they are true believers, grounded on extraordinary attainments in piety, or approved fidelity in some great and remarkable trials, may have an undoubted certainty of their own salvation: and it appears in fact that this is the case with many, if we may credit the living and dying testimony of some, on their own experience, who seem to have been among the best persons of their age. It is probable, that in times of difficulty and persecution, this persuasion may be more common, than in persons of equal attainments in religion, in more peaceful circumstances; which may be one reason, why it is sometimes spoken of by the apostles as so common a case in their days: Vid. 1 *John* ii. 5. iii. 14, 19—21. v. 13. *Heb.* vi. 11. x. 34, 35. 2 *Pet.* i. 10. 1 *Thess.* i. 4. *Rom.* viii. 16, 17. and something like this may be traced in the writings of our first reformers. Where there is not such a full *assurance*, there may nevertheless be a chearful and prevailing *hope*; and this even in those, who do not apprehend the doctrine of perseverance to be universally true; since they may see, that there is at least a degree of probability, that every particular saint, whose case may be under consideration, will in fact finally persevere, though the conclusion may be attended with some degree of uncertainty. How far full assurance is to be ascribed to the immediate testimony of the Spirit, is a question difficult to decide: it is allowed that God can by an immediate impression reveal such truths to the soul beyond all possibility of doubt, and cause us to apprehend it as his own voice speaking to us; but this is a thing, the idea and evidence of which can be communicated to none: it seems therefore improper to lay a stress upon it, as absolutely necessary to a well grounded comfort and hope; though it is on the other hand great rashness, universally to deride all pretences of this kind, especially when coming from persons of wisdom and piety. That the generality of Christians are exercised with so many doubts about their own state, is generally to be ascribed to the imperfection of their attainments in religion, to their entertaining wrong notions of it, especially their laying too great a stress upon present frames, and regarding the lively exercise of the passions more than the steady determination of the will, which is the only sure standard by which to judge.

Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 342—348.

SCHOLIUM 7.

There are a great variety of different methods in which the work of religion is carried on in the hearts of believers, in order to their final perseverance, and their improvement in piety. Sometimes certain texts of scripture

ture occur with such power and efficacy to the mind, as at other times they have never had; and these scriptures are not always applied in a sense most agreeable to the context, but frequently according to the most obvious sense of the words, considered as alone, and compared with some present occasion on which they are given: sometimes a strong persuasion arises in the mind of a Christian, as to the answer of some particular request, which takes off a heavy and almost overwhelming burthen which before lay upon his heart: and in a variety of other instances, consolation is sometimes so strongly poured in upon their minds, from principles before known, considered and believed, yet not attended with any such sensible effects, that all who believe the fact must acknowledge it an extraordinary phænomenon; and considering the great usefulness of such experiences for establishing Christians in the way of piety, it seems reasonable to suppose, that these impressions may (frequently at least) be the extraordinary work of the Holy Spirit on their minds. It is observable, that these peculiar experiences are most frequent, where persons natural faculties are weak; or that if they are imparted to persons of higher genius and stronger reason, it is generally when under the pressure of some uncommon calamity, or when called out to any service which requires an extraordinary share of courage and resolution.

From considering these things, it appears, that all, especially christian *ministers*, should be cautious how they deride and expose such impressions as mere enthusiasm. If it be asked, how they can be distinguished from those which are indeed so, (as many warm impressions no doubt are,) it may be answered, that in order to prevent any dangerous mistake here, the *tendency* of them is by all means to be regarded: it would be very dangerous to venture on any thing, which in other circumstances would be evil, from the apprehension which some have entertained, that the common rules of morality are to be dispensed with, in consequence of such a supernatural impulse; for no impulse in such cases is to be believed, without stronger evidence than can commonly be given: but where they lead only to a more cheerful acquiescence in the divine care, and a more zealous discharge of certain duties, they may safely be regarded as coming, whether in a more or less natural way, from God; unless any medium of argument be thus suggested, which is evidently absurd and ridiculous.

Howe's Life, p. 229—231. *Off. ap.*
Op. vol. i. p. 75, 76.

Goodwin's Works, vol. iv. *Pref. p. 95,*
96.

Baxter's Cure of Church Div. Direct.
28.

Watts on Prayer, c. iv. § 3. *Caut. 3.*

Bennet's Christian Orat. vol. i. p. 388—
391.

Fleming of fulfil. Script. pass. præf. p. 197
—210.

Watts's Evang. Disc. N^o. xii. præf. p. 251
—266.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Besides these *particular* revelations, which seem intended only or chiefly for the use of the persons to whom they are made, some have thought that there may

may still continue in the church, something of what was before called an *inspiration of elevation*, (Def. 75.) chiefly imparted to those who are to lead the devotions of public assemblies: but how far in any given instance uncommon enlargements are supernatural, it is impossible for us to discover, who know so little of the constitution of our own minds, and of the degree in which they may sometimes be influenced by something peculiar in the state of the brain and animal spirits; but as for those gifts and powers which attended the *apostolic* ages, Prop. 117. they seem to be so generally ceased, that none pretending to them ought to be believed, without the most clear and convincing proof.

Doddridge's *Ans. to Christian. not* | *Barcl. Apol. Prop. iii. p. 82—91.*
founded, &c. N^o. iii. p. 24, 25. |

PROPOSITION CXLI.

LECT,
CLXXXIII.

To enquire into the scripture doctrine of *the unpardonable sin*.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. The scripture declares, that there was at least in the *first* ages of christianity, a sin, that *should not be forgiven*, Matt. xii. 31. Mark iii. 28, 29. compare 1 John v. 16. which has been interpreted by some as referring to the cure of diseases by prayer; but there seems to have been no note given, by which a sin could be known to be *to death*, in that sense: it seems therefore more rational to refer it to those cases, upon which God had so expressly decided; and the refusing upon any occasion ever to pray for one who had committed it, might be a proper expedient to keep up a due horror of it, and care to stand at the greatest distance from it.

Horberry of future Pun. p. 130—132. | Chapm. Euf. vol. ii. p. 448—455.

2. This plainly appears to have been some sin of *the tongue*, by which a particular affront and injury was offered to the Holy Spirit, and therefore it is called by way of eminence, *the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost*.

Waterland's Serm. vol. ii. p. 167—176.

It is plain that the occasion on which our Lord uttered the words referred to above, was the *Pharisees* ascribing those miracles to the *devil*, which he wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost: and undoubtedly, any, who under the ministry of the apostles, after the effusion of the Holy Ghost, on the day of *Pentecost*, had ascribed the miraculous operations of the Spirit in them to *Satan*, would have incurred an equal degree of guilt. But we cannot certainly say, that this *last* was the *only* case in which it could be committed, and that what our Lord said, gr. 1. was only a *caution* addressed to the *Pharisees*, lest they should in time come to be guilty of it; though Dr. *Whitby* has advanced

vanced some considerable arguments to support this hypothesis, which deserve to be attentively weighed.

4. If any in these latter days manifest an obstinate enmity to the truth, so far as to contradict a degree of evidence, on the whole equal to that which those persons had, who in the primitive ages were said to have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost, there is reason to believe, that the guilt being equal, it would be equally fatal and unpardonable; but how in present circumstances this can be, it is not easy to conceive.

Whitby's fourth Append. to Matt.

Turret. Loc. ix. Quest. xiv. § 4.

Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 46, &c.

Tillot's Serm. vol. i. N°. xvii. pass.

Saurin's Serm. vol. i. N°. vi, vii.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. iv. § 24—27.

Bani. Works, vol. ii. p. 299—305. &

p. 354. b.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Many have defined this sin to be *a malicious opposition to known truth*, or as others have expressed it, to truth, *as truth*: but it may be doubted whether the human mind be capable of the latter, nor does the former enter into the account of this sin as given in scripture; nor can we imagine that every wilful opposition to truth is absolutely unpardonable, since every known and deliberate sin seems to carry in it this guilt, 1 John i. 6. John iii. 20.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The reason why this sin is declared *unpardonable*, seems to be, that persons who commit it cut themselves off from the very possibility of being convinced by other arguments for the truth of christianity, and can never be brought to conviction, without such a miraculous influence of God upon the soul, as in righteous judgment he sees fit universally to deny to all such.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Those celebrated texts *Heb. vi. 4—6. x. 29.* refer to an apostasy from christianity, and such an impious contempt of Christ and his gospel, as one can hardly imagine any one in the primitive ages could be guilty of, who did not ascribe the miracles wrought in confirmation of it to some evil spirit; and this indeed seems intimated in the phrase of *crucifying Christ afresh*, and *judging his blood an unholy thing*, which they must surely do, who esteemed him a *magician*, and consequently by the *Jewish* law worthy of death: and therefore these texts may perhaps be considered as referring to the same purpose with those in the proposition.

Maurice in Loc.

SCHOL-

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is said, that according to the account of the unpardonable sin given above, *Paul* must have committed it, who could not with any consistency have opposed the christian cause, unless he believed the miracles wrought in confirmation of it to have been of an *infernal* original. To this it is answered,

1. That possibly, not being an eye-witness to any of them, (which we are not sure that he was,) he might make a shift, with a great deal of artifice and prejudice, to disbelieve the facts. Or,

2. That if he believed they were miraculous, he might think, (as Bishop *Fleetwood* plainly did,) that miracles wrought in the cause of falsehood, might be wrought by God, and not the devil, and might expect that, as in the case of the *Egyptian* magicians, God would at length visibly interpose to overbear them, and turn the balance on the contrary side; and that text *Deut. xiii. 3.* might be so interpreted by him as to favour this hypothesis: or possibly he might have recourse to some foolish hypothesis of the influence of the stars, the power of imagination, a secret charm in the name of God, or the like, which we know some *Jews* have acquiesced in, when they could not dispute the facts of Christ's miracles: Vid. *Prop. 99. gr. 8.* This is something illustrated by the account which *Josephus* gives of *Solomon's* skill in dispossessing *Demons*, and the traditional art which he left behind him, of which see below.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Though perhaps this sin cannot be committed now, at least by any who continue to retain an external profession, yet it is of great importance that the strictest care be taken to keep at the remotest distance from all the appearances of it; and perhaps it was expressed the more obscurely in scripture, on purpose to promote such a caution. But in dealing with those dejected souls, who fear they have committed it, it is generally the safest way to assure them, that such a tender concern lest they should have been guilty of it, implies such a reverence for Christ and the gospel, and such remaining operations of the Spirit on their hearts, as plainly proves they have not.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 30—37. b.


SCHOLIUM 6.

Dr. *Waterland* seems to intimate a doubt, whether the sin in question be absolutely unpardonable, pleading that *ἀδύνατον* signifies only *exceeding difficult*; and this if granted might afford another solution for the difficulty started in the *fourth* scholium: but it seems the texts in the first step are too determinate to admit of these softenings.

Waterland's Serm. vol. ii. N^o. ix. p. 177—183.

DEFI.

DEFINITION LXXXVIII.

Those are said to be PREDESTINATED TO LIFE, whom God did from all LECT. eternity intend actually to make partakers of the gospel salvation in a future CLXXXIV. state: and those are said to be PREDESTINATED TO DEATH, whom God did  from all eternity purpose finally to condemn.

COROLLARY.

It follows from this definition, that if, (as many grant) an event may be allowed *contingent*, though it will *certainly* in fact happen; divine *predestination*, as stated above, does not imply the *necessary* salvation or condemnation of any.

SCHOLIUM.

It may perhaps be questioned whether this be the scriptural sense of the word; but considering that the ruin of sinners is in scripture charged not upon the necessitating act of God, but the abuse of their own liberty, (Vid. *Prop.* 139. *Schol.* 4.) it is necessary, in order to make scripture consistent with itself, as we shall afterwards see, to suppose that this is the precise sense in which the word is to be taken.

PROPOSITION CXLII.

All those who do finally partake of eternal life by the gospel, were from *all eternity predestinated* unto it.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 35. 1. God from all eternity did foreknow all events, and consequently the salvation of every particular person who is or shall finally be saved.

1. 2. God from all eternity willed the salvation of those who are finally saved, in the circumstances in which he saw they would then be: for it is by his act they must be made finally happy, and whatever determines him to will their happiness in the moment when it is accomplished, must on the same principles have determined his volitions, upon a full view of the case, even from all eternity.

1, 2. 3. The *light of nature* assures us, that all those who are finally happy were predestinated by God to eternal life.

4. The *scripture* frequently asserts the doctrine laid down in the proposition: Vid. *Matt.* xxv. 34. *Rom.* viii. 29, 30. *Eph.* i. 3—6, 11. 2 *Tim.*

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i. 9. 2 *Thess.* ii. 13. 1 *Pet.* i. 1, 2. *John* vi. 37. xvii. 2, 9, 10, 24. *Rev.* xiii. 8. compared with xvii. 8.

3, 4, 5. *Valet propositio.*

Burnet on Art. xvii. *pass.*

Whitby in Loc. Cit.

Saurin's Serm. vol. i. p. 202—218.

Archbishop King on Predest. § 33—36.

Account of Holland, p. 189.

Lime-street Lect. vol. i. p. 162—205.

COROLLARY I.

It evidently appears from hence, that they who represent the election and predestination spoken of in scripture, as relative only to *nations*, and not to particular persons, are greatly mistaken: several of these scriptures lie directly against such a notion, particularly those in the epistle to *Timothy*, and the *Revelations*: and whatever arguments could be brought to prove that God had a respect to nations as such, or indeed that he before the foundation of the world foresaw any thing concerning the idolatrous Gentiles under that character, would certainly prove on the like principles a regard to particular persons; since we cannot suppose the views of God to be merely general and indeterminate.

COROLLARY 2.

If the reasoning of *Prop.* 139 & 140. relating to the special influences of divine grace, and to the perseverance of the saints, be admitted, it will follow, on the same principles with those in the proposition, that all those who are predestinated to life, are also predestinated to receive special grace, and to persevere in a holy course; and on the other hand, that all those who are predestinated to holiness, are also predestinated to perseverance and life.

COROLLARY 3.

From hence it will further appear, that the reason of God's predestinating some to everlasting life, was not fetched from a foresight of their faith and obedience, considered as independent upon any communication of grace from him, but that it is to be referred into his sovereign mercy and free grace; which is also the language of many other scriptures, *Tit.* iii. 4, 5. *Eph.* ii. 8, 9.

COROLLARY 4.

It further appears, that if any represent divine predestination, as a determination to save such and such persons, let their temper, character, and behaviour be what it will; and on the other hand, assert a corresponding purpose of making such and such finally miserable, without any regard at all to their temper and behaviour, they greatly misrepresent the scripture doctrine on this head:
but

but this is by no means the *Calvinistical* scheme, which always teaches that the *means* are decreed as well as the *end*, and that God purposes to save none but such as by his grace he shall prepare for salvation by sanctification: and it is very remarkable, that though this doctrine of predestination is expressly asserted and often referred to in scripture, (which shews that the apostles esteemed it of considerable importance,) yet the process of the final judgment is described, as turning, not upon the secret decrees of God, but upon the actions and characters of men.

SCHOLIUM I.

On the same principles, those who finally *perish*, may be said to have been *predestinated to death*: compare *Prov.* xvi. 4. *John* x. 26. *Rom.* ix. 17. *1 Pet.* ii. 8. *Jude* 4. On the whole, comparing one part of scripture with the other, there seems to be this remarkable difference between the predestination to *life* and to *death*, that in the former case, God determines by the influence of his grace to work such a change in the hearts of his elect, as that their salvation should on the whole be ascribed to him, and not unto themselves: whereas he determines to bring others into such circumstances, that though their ruin should in fact happen, yet they themselves should be the authors of it, and the blame lie as entirely upon themselves, as if it had not been so much as foreknown. Vid. *Rom.* ix. 22, 23. *Matt.* xxv. 34, 41.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The *Remonstrants* generally believed that God's electing some to everlasting life, was only a purpose of making believers finally happy, and of giving all to whom the gospel came sufficient means of faith; and that predestination to death was only a purpose of making all unbelievers finally miserable; that God did not purpose the happiness of one more than another, and that neither of these predestinations could properly be said to be *personal*, wherein their notion evidently differed from that stated above. It is indeed answered, that this predestination of all believers in general, implies a predestination of every particular believer, on condition of his faith; and on the principles of the proposition and scholium, it may be allowed, that none are chosen but on this condition, provided we further add, that every particular person who does believe was chosen freely by divine grace to receive those assistances, which God saw would in fact prevail to bring him to faith, and so by consequence to salvation.

Limborch's Theol. l. iv. c. i. § 3—14.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The chief objection against this doctrine is, that it tends to make those who believe themselves predestinated to life careless, and to make others desperate. It is replied, that as those only are in scripture said to be predestinated to life,

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who

who are also chosen to be saints, there can be no reason for any who do not find a prevailing principle of holiness in their hearts, to conclude they are in that number: and on the whole, this objection nearly coincides with that against perseverance, more largely considered, *Prop.* 140. § 1. *gr.* 5. and if persons will venture to argue themselves into negligence in matters of everlasting importance, from principles, on which (though they are equally applicable to them) they will not neglect their lives or their secular business, it is perverseness, for which they are justly responsible before God. As to the second part of the objection, if it be granted, that *sufficient* assistances are given to *all*, none will have reason to despair, nor will any have an excuse to plead before God, in consequence of his secret purposes, which will not be made a rule of his final judgment. If it be said, that nevertheless those who are not predestinated to life are left under a necessity of perishing, and an impossibility of salvation; it must be owned, that it is difficult to say, how the doctrine, as explained by some, can be freed from this objection; but this consequence does not necessarily follow from it, as we have stated it above.

Berry-street Lect. vol. i. p. 241—244. | *Ruin and Recov. Quest.* xiii. p. 278—
Note. 291.

S C H O L I U M 4.

The *Supralapsarian* and *Sublapsarian* schemes agree in asserting the doctrine of predestination, but with this difference, that the *former* supposes, that God intended to glorify his justice in the condemnation of some, as well as his mercy in the salvation of others; and for that purpose decreed that *Adam* should necessarily fall, and by that fall bring himself and all his offspring into a state of everlasting condemnation: the *latter* scheme supposes, that the decree of predestination regards man as fallen, by an abuse of that freedom which *Adam* had, into a state, in which all were to be left to necessary and unavoidable ruin, who were not exempted from it by predestination. The chief difficulties which may be urged against the former, do likewise attend the latter; but the scheme stated in the proposition does properly agree with neither.

Le Blanc's Theses, p. 121—158.

D E F I N I T I O N LXXXIX.

LECT. CLXXXV. The *mutual stipulation* between Christ and the Father, relating to the *redemption* of sinners by him, previous to any act on Christ's part under the character of *Mediator*, has generally been called by divines the COVENANT OF REDEMPTION.

S C H O L I U M.

That there was such a covenant, either tacit or express, we may assuredly conclude, considering the importance of the work undertaken by Christ, and the

the expensive rate at which it was to be accomplished: and the scriptures afterwards to be produced, relating to the *particulars* of this covenant, will consequently prove the *existence* of it in the general: as indeed all those *prophecies*, which relate to what was to be done by the Messiah on the one hand, and what benefits and rewards were to be conferred upon him and his people on the other, may properly be considered as intimations of such a covenant, supposing (what has been already proved) the existence of Christ as a *distinct person* from the Father, in the *philosophical* sense of the word, and his interposition in the suggestion and promulgation of those prophecies, 1 *Pet.* i. 11. compare *John* xvii. 1—5, 24. vi. 37. *Tit.* i. 2. 2 *Tim.* i. 9. *Rev.* xiii. 8. *Psal.* lxxxix. 19, &c.

PROPOSITION CXLIII.

To enquire into the tenour of the *Covenant of redemption.*

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. By this covenant, Christ undertook to become incarnate, to dwell a certain time upon earth, subject not only to the law of the human nature, but likewise to that of the *Jewish* dispensation; directing the whole of his conduct, while he should continue here, in such a manner as most effectually to promote the honour of his Father and the salvation of his people: that at length he would voluntarily deliver himself to sufferings and death, and remain for a time in the grave; and also, that after his resurrection and ascension into heaven, he would employ his renewed life and extensive authority in the mediatorial kingdom to the same great purposes, which engaged him to become incarnate. See *Psal.* xl. 6—9. *Heb.* x. 5—10. *Isa.* lxi. 1—3. *Luke* iv. 18, &c. *Isa.* i. 5, 6.

. *Peirce on Heb.* x. 5. *Note r.*

2. God the Father on the other hand stipulated, that he would by his miraculous power produce Christ's human body in the womb of the virgin, that he would strengthen him by the gifts and graces of his Holy Spirit for the extraordinary work before him, that he would raise him from the dead, and set him at his right-hand, giving him an universal command over the whole created world, as the judge of which he should at length appear; in the mean time, that he would send forth the influences of his Spirit to confirm his doctrine, so that hereby it should be established even among the Gentile nations; and that, besides all the advantages which others might receive, they who were predestinated to life, and were in a peculiar manner given to him, should in fact be regenerated by divine grace, and strengthened even to the end, and after death should be made compleatly happy in their whole persons in his heavenly kingdom for ever. See, (besides the scriptures quoted *Def.* 89. *Schol.*) *Isa.* vii. 14. xi. 2, &c. lii. 13, 15. liii. 10—12. lv. 4, 5. xlix. 1—12. compared with *Luke*

Luke ii. 32. *2 Cor.* vi. 2. and *Rev.* vii. 16, 17. *Psal.* ii. 7—9. *cx.* i. *Micah* v. 4. *Luke* xxii. 29. *John* v. 22—29.

<i>Berry-Street Lect.</i> vol. i. p. 232—241.	<i>Flavel's Fount. of Life, Sermon.</i> iii.
<i>Wits. Œcon. Fœd.</i> l. ii. c. ii, iii.	<i>Harris's Observ.</i> p. 184—186.
<i>Rymer of Rev. Rel.</i> part. i. c. iii. p. 37—62.	<i>Burnet on Redempt.</i> p. 11—15

COROLLARY.

As we before observed, *Def.* 89. *Schol.* that the reality of this covenant would follow from the distinct personal existence of Christ, and his interposition in the prophecies, so on the other hand, from those scriptures here enumerated, which more directly prove that covenant, we may draw another argument for the pre-existence of Christ, as a distinct philosophical person from the Father, distinct from and independent upon those arguments urged *Prop.* 126.

Burnet on Redempt. p. 25—33.

SCHOLIUM I.

This may seem a proper place to enquire into the *extent* of redemption, or that celebrated question, *for whom Christ died*: but all that is important on that head has been said under the preceding propositions, *Prop.* 139, 140, 142. If those relating to predestination and special grace be allowed, as also those concerning the divine prescience and decrees in general, then it evidently follows, there was a sense, in which Christ might be said to die for *all*; as all men partake of some benefit by his death, and such provision is made for their salvation, as lays the blame of their ruin, if they miscarry, entirely upon themselves: but it was in a very peculiar and much nobler sense, that he died for *the elect*, intending evidently to secure for them, and only for them the everlasting blessings of his gospel: and it seems, that the scripture uses such a latitude and variety in the sense of the phrase; otherwise it will be very difficult to make one part of it agree with another: compare on the one hand, the texts quoted, *Prop.* 136. *Cor.* 3. and on the other, *John* x. 15, 16, 26. xvii. 2, 9, 16.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is objected, that if Christ 'did in any sense die for *all*, then forasmuch as all are not saved, the purposes of Christ's death are in many, and probably in most instances, frustrated.

Ans. Were we to say, that the *only* end of Christ's death was, that all men might actually obtain eternal life, the objection might be just: but it may be said, the purposes of Christ's death are *various*, and the *ultimate end* of it was, to glorify God in the actual salvation of all believers, and the giving others such advantages, as should silence them, and justify God in their condemnation and punish-

punishment, for wilfully rejecting his mercy. It plainly appears in fact, that this matter can be carried no further, for the hypothesis of the actual salvation of all at last, is so contrary to scripture, as to be entirely insupportable, as we shall shew in the progress of this work: (Vid. *Prop.* 163. *Schol.* 3.) and indeed, the granting this great absurdity would not thoroughly relieve us from the difficulty here mentioned; for the coming of Christ into our world is represented as in prosecution of a design, to prevent the condemnation of men, not to rescue and to recover them from the final sentence of the judgment day, 1 *Thess.* i. 10. *John* iii. 16—18. v. 24.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is urged, that instead of magnifying it rather asperges the divine goodness, to say, that he appointed Christ to bring those into a salvable state whom he certainly knew would never be saved; since this instead of being any favour to them, lays a foundation for tormenting reflections at last. It is answered, that on these principles it is unkindness in God to bestow any advantages of genius or circumstances, which he knew men would through their own wilful folly abuse to their detriment: but God is to be considered as dealing with rational creatures in a way suitable to their rational nature; and if they will turn the gifts of his providence or grace to their own disadvantage, they only are responsible for it; nor will they find either their refuge or comfort in an ungrateful denial of the reality or importance of the mercies they abuse.

Lime-street Lect. vol. i. p. 395, 396, | *Baxt. End of Controv.* c. xi, xii. § 5.
400, 403, 446, 454—462. | *Witf. Econ. Fed.* l. ii. c. ix.

SCHOLIUM 4.

There is perhaps a reference to this covenant of redemption in *Heb.* vii. 22. and Christ is commonly said to have been the *surety* of the elect, as he undertook for them that they should through the influences of divine grace, be in fact brought to faith and salvation: compare 2 *Cor.* i. 20. from hence some have inferred, that they were actually *justified from eternity*, and consequently are in a justified state, even while they are going on in a course of unrepented sin: but this seems most directly contrary to the whole tenor of scripture; and it is certain, that on the same principles on which they may be said to be justified, they may also be said to be *glorified from eternity*: If the expression be intended to signify no more, than that God *purposed* to justify them, it is not denied; but it is a most improper way of speaking, and the arguments drawn from thence in favour of any kind of licentiousness are utterly inconclusive.

Williams's Gospel Truth, c. i.

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SCHOLIUM 5.

Some have thought that the whole human race would have been destroyed by the death of *Adam*, immediately on his first transgression, if God had not purposed by Christ to bring them into such a state, as should make necessary provision for their deliverance from those evils, to which they were subjected by his sin, *Rom. v. 12—21*.

PROPOSITION CXLIV.

LECT.
C XXXVI.

To lay down the scripture doctrine relating to the *intercession* of Christ.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Christ is expressly said in many places of scripture to *intercede*, *i. e.* to plead with God in favour of his people, *Rom. viii. 34. Heb. vii. 25. 1 John ii. 1.*

2. The appearance of the high-priest among the *Jews* in the presence of God, on the day of atonement, when he presented before him the blood of the sin-offering, is at large referred to by St. *Paul*, as illustrating the intercession of Christ, *Heb. ix. 11—14, 22—26. x. 19—21.*

3. The appearance of Christ in his Father's presence, in that body wherein he suffered on the cross, though with such alterations as are suited to the heavenly state, may be considered as a *virtual* intercession, as the appearance of the high-priest on the day of atonement, referred to above seems to have been; for we find no form of words prescribed on this occasion, as there are upon some others, where they might seem less necessary, considering the manner in which the mind would be over-awed in circumstances of such unparalleled solemnity: Vid. *Lev. xvi. pass.*

4. Nevertheless, it does not seem proper to take upon us positively to assert, that our Lord does never *verbally* intercede for his people; that being a point which scripture does not appear to have absolutely determined either way.

5. However it be that our Lord expresses his fixed and determined desire and demand in favour of his people, we may assure ourselves, that on the one hand, it is in a manner consistent with that dignity and authority to which he is now advanced; and on the other, that it is always successful for the vindication and preservation of his people, and the acceptance of their services; (compare *Zech. iii. 1, 2. Rom. viii. 33, 34. Rev. viii. 3, 4.*) with reference to which he is described as an advocate or patron of his own people continually residing in the court of heaven.

Hopkins's Serm. xv. p. 525, 526.

Christ the Mediat. p. 73, 74.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. iii. p. 757—765.

Owen on the Spirit, p. 445.

Dodd. x Serm. N°. iii. p. 64—81. Ed. 2.

Berry-street Lect. N°. xviii.

Harris's Observ. Diff. i. p. 49—64.

COROL.

COROLLARY I.

It must be the duty of Christians, to maintain frequent regards to the intercession of Christ in their addresses to God, and to comfort themselves with the thoughts of such a guardian and advocate, in the midst of those dangers to which they are here exposed.

COROLLARY 2.

The consideration of Christ's intercession is an engagement to serious humility, faith, and fervour in prayer, peculiar to the christian dispensation.

Law of Christian Perfection. p. 257, 258.

SCHOLIUM I.

If there be any thing *verbal* in the intercession of Christ, there is no reason to believe that he is actually speaking to God at all times without intermission, which would be inconsistent with other things which the scripture tells us, relating to that state of majesty and authority in which he appears. There is a sufficient foundation for saying, as the apostle does, that *he makes continual intercession for us*, if, perhaps at some stated seasons of peculiar solemnity, some express declaration be made, of his habitual desire, that his people may receive the benefits purchased by his death, and of his readiness to appear under the character of their mediator and advocate, in any particular instances, as occasion may require; or even if his appearance in the body in which he suffered be intended as such a virtual declaration, though *words* should never be used. Compare *Luke ii. 37. 1 Thess. i. 2, 3. ii. 13. v. 17. Exod. xxix. 39, 42. 2 Sam. ix. 7. Job i. 5.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

It may be questioned, what *end* the intercession of Christ can answer. It cannot be intended to remind the divine Being of any thing which he would otherwise forget, nor to persuade him to any thing which he is not disposed to do; but it may serve to illustrate the majesty and holiness of the Father, and the wisdom and grace of the Son, not to say, that it may have other unknown uses with respect to the inhabitants of the invisible world; it is certainly a great comfort and encouragement to believers under their many infirmities; and indeed it is impossible to enter into the beauty of the gospel scheme in general, without observing how it is accommodated to the nature and circumstances of fallen imperfect creatures.

Berry-street Lect. vol. i. p. 391—396.

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SCHOLIUM 3.

LECT.
CLXXXVII.

It has been urged as an objection against the christian scheme in general, that it appoints our worshipping God through a mediator; which (say some) derogates from the divine goodness, leads us into a neglect of God, is a sort of indecency, when we consider that we are always in his presence, and may lay a foundation for many superstitions, as it is said in fact to have done in the Roman church. To this it is replied,

1. That the goodness of God is most eminently displayed in that constitution, by which his guilty creatures may be most effectually emboldened in their addresses to him, and yet at the same time reminded in every approach of their own sinfulness and unworthiness, and of the displeasure of God which is consequent upon it; which ends seem to be excellently answered, by appointing his Son to be the mediator of our approaches.

2. The christian scheme directs us not to terminate our regards in the Mediator, but to address our petitions to God through him, and every where represents it as his office to bring us to God.

3. It is so far from being an indecency to approach a sovereign by the person he appoints to introduce us to him, that if such an appointment be made, (for which in some cases there may be an apparent reason,) it would be a great indecency to come directly and immediately to him.

4. The propensity of mankind to make use of mediators of their own chusing and inventing, which appeared among the Heathens, and still appears in the church of Rome, plainly shews how well the notion of a mediator is suited to the common apprehension of mankind; and it seems that no wiser provision could be made, to prevent their multiplying such mediators, than appointing one such illustrious person as the scripture exhibits under this character, who consequently would be wronged by such a supposed multiplication.

Tindal's Christian. as old, &c. p. 73—

75.

Leland against Tind. vol. ii. c. xv. p. 529—538.

Blount's Oracles of Reason, p. 89.

Butler's Anal. part ii. c. v. p. 284, 285.

Tillot's Sermon. vol. i. N^o. xlvi. p. 468—472.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is to be remembered, in all the christian doctrine relating both to the atonement and intercession of Christ, that we are to consider him as a person graciously appointed by God to this purpose; which, if it be duly attended to, will prevent the apprehension, as if God were the less gracious, or our obligations to the Father at all diminished, by those we are under to the Son, 1 Cor. i. 30. 2 Cor. v. 18. Eph. i. 3—6, 9, 11, 12. 1 Pet. i. 2—5. Heb. v. 4, 5.

Doddridge on Education, p. 16.

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SCHOLIUM 5.

The *priestly* office of Christ has generally been explained, as executed in his offering himself as a sacrifice to God for us, and interceding with God upon this sacrifice; but Mr. *Peirce*, and most of the *Socinians*, suppose it only to consist in the *latter*: and Mr. *Peirce* argues from *Heb.* viii. 4. that the execution of it *begun* upon Christ's entering into heaven: but the text in question only proves that Christ, being of the tribe of *Judah*, could not, according to the *Mosaic* law, be a priest to minister in the *Jewish* temple, which none can reasonably maintain that he was: compare *Heb.* vii. 14. Nevertheless, as the apostle often assures us that he is a priest of a higher order, all that he has done and suffered to make atonement for the sins of men, may, according to the most common acceptation of the word, be called a series of sacerdotal actions; as it is certain there were many acts of atonement performed by *Mosaic* priests, besides that which passed on the great days of atonement, and sacrifices were sometimes offered with acceptance by those who were not regularly priests. Compare *Judges* vi. 25, 26. xiii. 16. 1 *Kings* xviii. 33, 38.

Peirce on *Heb.* v. 5, 6. viii. 4. Note 2. | *Essay on Christ's Priesthood.*
Emlyn's Sermon. N^o. xvi. p. 326—333. | *Owen's Dissertation on Heb.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

Some have thought the comparative smallness and meanness of this earth of ours, as it appears upon the justest principles of astronomy, to be something inconsistent with the system of doctrines laid down in several preceding propositions, in which so great and glorious a person is represented as dying and suffering so much to promote our happiness. But it may be answered,

1. That we know not what influence the history of our redemption by the death of the Son of God, and salvation by his continued care, may have throughout all eternity upon the rest of God's rational creation, to whom it may be made known. Compare *Eph.* iii. 10. 1 *Pet.* i. 12. The monuments of God's displeasure against sin, and compassion to sinners, will no doubt for ever remain, and perhaps the happiness of all the redeemed from among *men* may bear a very small proportion to the whole sum of happiness arising to *other* beings, from the knowledge and remembrance of it: compare *Rev.* v. 11—14.

2. That if we consider, as we shall afterwards endeavour to shew, that the appearance of God's own Son in the flesh is a glorious victory which he has obtained over the prince of darkness; the meanness of those creatures, who are made finally triumphant through Christ, as the great captain of salvation, may render the power and grace of God in him more illustrious than it could have been, had the creatures so redeemed and delivered been originally of a nobler order, and fixed in a more considerable state and abode.

3. That if, (as may hereafter be shewn) the *angelic* order of beings are by this means confirmed in a state of indefectible happiness, and incorporated with the glorified saints in one holy and triumphant society, (*Eph.* i. 10. iii. 15. *Heb.* xii. 22—24.) it is an important circumstance added to both the former to obviate the objection, and seems to have proceeded on the same principles, which determined God to chuse that the Redeemer should appear in the form of a poor and destitute infant, and that of a mean man, rather than of some mighty prince, while here upon earth.

<i>Baker's Reflections on Learning</i> , p. 97,		<i>Taylor's Key to Rom.</i> § 131—133. p. 52,
98.		53.
<i>Whist. Theory</i> , Introd. p. 58, 59.		

The END of the EIGHTH PART.

PART

P A R T IX.

A Survey of the chief DUTIES which the Gospel requires; and more particularly of its POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS; in which the Doctrine of the CHRISTIAN SABBATH, the SACRAMENTS, and the Constitution of the CHURCH, are particularly considered.

D E F I N I T I O N XC.

THE covenant which is made between God and those who believe the LECT. CLXXXVIII. gospel, whereby they declare their subjection to him, and he declares his acceptance of them and favour to them, is commonly called by divines the COVENANT OF GRACE.

D E F I N I T I O N XCE.

Any covenant whereby God requires *perfect obedience* from his creatures, in such a manner as to make no express provision for the pardon of offences to be committed against the precepts of it, on the repentance of such supposed offenders, but pronounces a sentence of death upon them, may be called A COVENANT OF WORKS, whatever the particular duties required by it may be.

C O R O L L A R Y I.

The covenant made with *Adam*, as described above, *Prop. 134.* and *Cor.* was a covenant of *works*.

C O R O L L A R Y 2.

What was peculiar to the covenant made with *Israel* at mount *Sinai*, seems to have been at least in a great measure a covenant of *works*; for though it made some provision for purification from *ceremonial* pollutions, and for the pardon of the offender, *i. e.* for his restoration to the privileges of the *Jewish* republic, upon his offering the appointed sacrifices for sins of *ignorance* and *inadvertency*; yet it pronounced sentence of death on all that *presumptuously* offended, appointing no sacrifice at all for such, but declaring the curse of God to be upon all that continued not in all things which were written in the book of the

The constitution of the Covenant of grace explained. PART IX.
the law to do them, *Numb.* xv. 30, 31. *Deut.* xxvii. 26. *Gal.* iii. 10—12.
Rom. x. 5.

Berry-street Lect. vol. i. *Serm.* xiii. | *Witsii Econ. Fœd.* l. iv. c. iv. § 51—57.
p. 274—276.

PROPOSITION CXLV.

To enquire into the constitution of the *covenant of grace*, or the mutual stipulations of it.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. God promises to believers the full pardon of all their past sins, how great and aggravated soever they may have been, the influences of his Spirit, whereby they may be enabled to resist temptations, to discharge the duties of life, and to persevere in their christian course to the end of it. He also engages to dispose all the affairs of life for them in the most gracious manner, and at death to receive their departed spirits to a state of happiness, till at last their bodies be raised, and their whole persons made compleatly and eternally blessed, *Heb.* viii. 10—12. *Jer.* xxxii. 38—40. *Ezek.* xxxvi. 25—27. *Rom.* viii. 28. *Psal.* lxxiii. 24. *Rev.* xiv. 13. *Tit.* i. 2. *John* vi. 40.

2. They on the other hand engage, that, by the assistance of his grace, they will make it their care and endeavour to render sincere and universal obedience to all the discoveries and intimations of the will of God, with regard to their duty to God, to the Redeemer, to their fellow-creatures, or to themselves, not making a reserve in favour of any sin whatsoever; and they engage to make this their main care even to the end of their lives; and that they will openly maintain their christian profession, whatever circumstances of danger or difficulty may arise, and how expensive soever such a series of faithful services may prove; on the whole, depending for their acceptance with God, not upon the merit of their own compleat obedience, but on the riches of his free grace manifested in and by Christ, *Rom.* vi. 13. xii. 1. *Heb.* xii. 9. *Tit.* ii. 11—14. *Matt.* x. 32, 39. xvi. 24—26. *Luke* xvii. 9, 10. *Gal.* v. 4, 5. The demonstration of most of these particulars may be found in the preceding propositions, or will be more particularly exhibited in those that follow; and the whole tenor of scripture does so plainly run this way, as to render it less necessary to attempt a full enumeration of all the passages, which may be brought to illustrate what has been asserted.

COROLLARY.

They misrepresent the nature of this covenant, who consider it merely under the notion of an *absolute promise* on God's part, which indeed can, properly speaking, be no *covenant* at all; (compare *Def.* 45.) and who represent

sent all that we have to do, as consisting in casting ourselves upon that promise, and passively leaving ourselves to God, to do what he pleases with us, in subserviency to his own gracious purpose concerning us. Compare

Bostock on the Covenant.

Ramsay's Princ. vol. i. p. 307.

Dodd. Rise and Prog. c. xvii. p. 161—163.

SCHOLIUM I.

There have been various dispensations of this covenant to the people of God in different ages of the church. Obscure intimations were given to the patriarchs, and to *Israel* by *Moses* and the prophets, as was shewn above; and it seems to have been gradually opened, till at length it was fully revealed to the apostles, after the effusion of the Spirit upon them, and was probably the *word of wisdom* in their mouths. Vid. *Prop. 117. § 1. gr. 1.* Perhaps the gradual openings of it are no where better represented than in

Watts's Harm. of Div. Dispens. pass.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It has been debated, whether the covenant made with *Abraham*, of which *circumcision* was the appointed token, were that covenant of grace, or merely a *temporal* covenant, relating to the land of *Canaan*, and other secular blessings to be conferred upon his seed. It seems most reasonable to conclude, that it comprehended *spiritual* blessings.

1. Because otherwise there would not have been a proper foundation for God's calling himself *their God*, which must import being their friend with regard to their highest and most important interests, *Matt. xxii. 32. Heb. xi. 16.*

2. The apostle seems expressly to have decided this question, both when he calls *circumcision* a *seal of the righteousness of faith*, *Rom. iv. 11. (i. e. the token of Abraham's being accepted with God as righteous, upon his believing;)* and also, when he declares that believers are *the children of Abraham*, as heirs of the blessings promised to him, *Rom. iv. 11—17. Gal. iii. 6—9, 14—17, 29.* compare *Gen. xvii. 4—12.* which contains the greatest and most excellent promises any where made to *Abraham* and his seed, and consequently must include *spiritual* blessings, if such blessings are any where included, as we have shewn they are*.

Witsii Econ. Fœd. l. iv. c. iii. § 10—23.

SCHOLIUM 3.

We readily allow, that there were temporal promises made to *Abraham*, of the multiplication of his seed, of an inheritance in the land of *Canaan*, and the

* See Doctor Taylor's *Covenant of grace.*

deliverance of his descendants from the *Egyptian* bondage; and some of those promises were undoubtedly sealed to them by circumcision, on condition that they submitted to the particular statute law given by God to the *Jewish* nation; but it seems reasonable to suppose that circumcision, considering the view in which it was originally instituted, did likewise import, that the infants circumcised should be considered, not as under a covenant of works, but that, on their believing, as their father *Abraham* did, they should also be entitled to those spiritual blessings which he by faith received; as the seeming rigour of the *Sinai* covenant might be intended to awaken their minds, to search for those intimations of gospel grace which were given; (though with such degrees of obscurity as suited the gradual openings of the grand scheme) and to endear to them any such discoveries, when they were convinced of the necessity of seeking justification and life, in that way of humble faith, in which *Abraham* their father found it: and in this view they are likewise a lesson to all *Christians*: *Rom.* iv. and *Gal.* iii. 24, 25. *Rom.* v. 20, 21. and the awful solemnity with which the *Mosaic* law was promulgated from mount *Sinai*, might not a little subserve this great purpose, *Heb.* xii. 18—29.

Watts's Harm. of Div. Dispens. c. vi. p. 40—54.

PROPOSITION CXLVI.

LECT. CLXXXIX. To enquire into the principal heads of *christian duty*, as they are laid down in scripture.

LEMMA.

We do not intend a large enumeration of scriptures on each head, by which it might easily be shewn, that all the most considerable particulars mentioned above in our *ethical lectures*, as branches of the *law of nature*, are recommended in the *old and new testament*: we shall here content ourselves with a general survey; only hinting that it might not be an unprofitable employment, to add such texts of scripture in their proper places to this lecture, to which purpose the collection in *Dr. Gastrel* and *Dr. Wright* may be very serviceable.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. With regard to *God*, we are evidently required to love him above all, to consecrate ourselves entirely to his service, to submit in all things to his will, and to imitate his universal holiness, which must necessarily imply all those branches of divine virtue, mentioned *Prop.* l. *Matt.* xxii. 37. *Rom.* vi. 11. xii. 1. *Heb.* xii. 9—11. *Matt.* v. 48. *Eph.* v. 1.

2. With regard to the *Lord Jesus Christ*, we are required not only to receive him by such a faith as has been before described, but to maintain such habitual regards to him, as our instructor, atonement, intercessor, governour, guardian, strength,

strength, example, and forerunner, as are correspondent to those relations in which he is represented as standing to us in the scriptures urged under preceding propositions, to which may be added *John* x. 27. *Phil.* iii. 3. *Gal.* ii. 20. *1 Pet.* i. 8. *Heb.* xii. 2. *1 Cor.* xvi. 22. *Eph.* vi. ult.

3. As to the *Holy Spirit*, we are required to pray for it, to endeavour at all times to behave ourselves in such a manner as that we may not offend it, and forfeit his influences, but on the contrary, may engage a fuller communication of them, *Luke* xi. 13. *1 Thess.* v. 19. *Eph.* iv. 30. v. 18. *Gal.* v. 25.

4. Towards *each other*, we are required not only carefully to maintain a harmless and inoffensive conduct, but to take all opportunities of doing good to the bodies and souls of our fellow-creatures; and as a foundation of all friendly offices towards them, to love our neighbour as ourselves, and to do to others as we would they should do to us, and this universally to all our fellow-creatures, not excepting even the worst of our enemies, *Phil.* ii. 4. *Gal.* vi. 2, 10. *Matt.* xxii. 39. vii. 12. v. 43—48. *Rom.* xiii. 8—10. *Col.* iii. 12—14. *Eph.* v. 2. *Rom.* xii. ult.

5. With regard to *ourselves*, we are required to mortify our corporeal appetites, and so to regulate our passions, that we may not be transported into any degree of intemperance, unchastity, rash anger, excessive grief, or any other disorder of mind; but may keep ourselves in such a posture, as to be always fit for the service of God in the duties of our respective stations and callings, in which we are to employ ourselves therefore with diligence and vigour, always maintaining an humble opinion of our own abilities and improvements, arrogating nothing to ourselves of merit before God, nor seeking among men our own applause and honour, dominions, or possessions, but willingly giving place to others, and in honour esteeming them better than ourselves: and, as such great prospects are opened upon us in another life, we are cautioned against being excessively attached to the things of the present world, and urged to set our affections on those of a better, *Eph.* v. 18. *Col.* iii. 5, 6. *Rom.* xiii. 11—14. *Matt.* v. 27—30. *Luke* xii. 35. *Rom.* xii. 11. *Matt.* xviii. 3, 4. *Phil.* ii. 3, &c. *John* xiii. 14. *Luke* xvii. 10. *Matt.* vi. 19, 20. *Col.* iii. 1, 2.

Wright's great Concern and subsequent Treatises, pass. | *Gastrel's Christian Institutes*, c. vi—ix.

COROLLARY.

Such an evident agreement between the moral part of christianity, and the law of nature, as deduced in the preceding parts of this work, is a great confirmation of the divine original of the gospel, especially when compared with its external evidence; and makes it apparent, that neither good men nor angels would have published such a system of morality, in connection with a fraud, most contrary to many of its fundamental branches.

Doddridge's x Serm. p. 211, 212, 220, 221. O.T.

P p p

S c h o

SCHOLIUM I.

As *image-worship* was expressly forbidden to the *Jews*, in numberless passages of their law and prophets, so it was charged as an immorality upon the *Gentiles*, *Jer.* x. 2, 3, &c. *Acts* xvii. 29, *Rom.* i. 21—25. *1 John* v. 21.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Many have inferred from *Matt.* v. 33, 34. and *James* v. 12. that oaths are in all cases forbidden to *Christians*: but it is evident this prohibition can only refer to swearing in *common conversation*.

1. Because otherwise Christ must have charged all swearing as an *immorality* in its own nature, for he says, *whatsoever is more than this comes of evil*: now as swearing was in some cases expressly required by the *Mosaic law*, (*Vid. Lev.* v. 1. *Numb.* xxx. 2. *Exod.* xxii. 11.) we cannot imagine that Christ would have condemned it universally in such terms as these.

2. Because Christ answered when interrogated upon oath, *Matt.* xxvi. 63, 64. *Mark* xiv. 61.

3. Because *St. Paul*, who must no doubt be instructed in the will of Christ, does in several of his writings make use of expressions equivalent to an oath, at least much more than *yea* and *nay*, *Rom.* i. 9. *1 Cor.* xv. 31. *2 Cor.* i. 18, 23. *Gal.* i. 20. *Phil.* i. 8. *1 Thess.* ii. 5.

4. Because the lawfulness of oaths on great and important occasions seems to be granted, *Heb.* vi. 13—17. compare *Rev.* x. 5, 6. *Deut.* xxxii. 40.

5. There are other passages in Christ's sermon on the mountain, which in order to make a rational and consistent sense must be interpreted in as great a latitude, as we here suppose in that passage, on which the argument against swearing is built, *Matt.* v. 39—42. compare *1 Tim.* v. 8.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 21.

Tillotf. Serm. vol. i. N^o. xxii. p. 212
—215.

Besse's Def. of Quak. p. 202—212.

Dodd. Fam. Expos. vol. i. § 39. not. b, i, k.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is debated whether those sorts of falsehoods, which are called *officious lies*, i. e. such as seem in their immediate consequence to tend to the advantage rather than the detriment of mankind, be forbidden in scripture. To prove them unlawful, the following places are urged, *Col.* iii. 9. *Eph.* iv. 25. *Rev.* xxi. 8. *Rom.* iii. 7, 8. On the other hand it is urged, that some instances of such falsehood are mentioned in scripture with approbation rather than blame, *Exod.* i. 19, 20. *Josh.* ii. 5. compared with *Heb.* xi. 31. *Judges* iv. 18, &c. compared with v. 24—26. *2 Kings* vi. 19. But it may be answered, that where there does evidently appear to have been a falsehood in the preceding cases, (which perhaps

perhaps in the last there was not,) it is by no means plain that the falsehood was approved by God, though the *faith* with which it was mixed, and which was the leading principle in the main series of action referred to, be applauded. That in some instances, persons are allowed not to have been bound by their oaths, is readily confessed, *i. e.* where the things which they swore to do were in themselves unlawful, or when the oath is taken by those who were not regularly in this respect *sui juris*, or where the oath was made on a false supposition, occasioned by the fraud of those who expected to receive advantage from it, 1 Sam. xxv. 22, 23. Numb. xxx. 4, 5. Josh. ix. 7, 14, 15.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. xiii. § 4.

Turret. vol. iii. Loc. xi. Quæst. xx. § 8—18.

Shuckf. Hist. vol. ii. p. 212—216.

Leland against Tindal, vol. i. p. 248—250.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Divorce, except in cases of adultery, appears to be so expressly forbidden by Christ, Matt. v. 32. xix. 3—9. (compare 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11.) that it is strange it should ever have been disputed among Christians. To say, as some have done, that *τροπεία* does in the general signify any great crime, is very arbitrary; for though it is frequently put for *idolatry* in scripture, it is then plainly used in a metaphorical sense, in which it is represented as a breach of something analogous to a marriage covenant between God and Israel: compare Ezek. xvi. 8, 15, &c. Nevertheless many divines of great note have maintained, that in case of obstinate desertion in one of the parties, the other is thereby set at liberty, since the very primary end of the marriage covenant is defeated; and have thought the case to be expressly determined by St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 10—15. But it is to be remembered, that this determination can only be applied, when it is not in the power of the party injured to procure the return of the other by any legal process. It may be alledged, it is so difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the decision of our Lord, and with what Paul says, ver. 11. that perhaps it may be more adviseable to understand the *liberty* spoken of, as relating to a liberty of continuing to live apart, without eagerly soliciting a return to the party, by whom the Christian had been on a religious account thus injuriously dismissed. But it may be replied, that ver. 11. above, determines on the case of the believing wife having voluntarily withdrawn, and not on that of her being divorced by her husband. If the party that had committed the injury married another, as that was adultery on Christ's decision, there could be no doubt, but in that case the injured party was at liberty to marry again.

Milton of Divorce, l. ii. c. xvii, xviii.

p. 43—47.

Puff. de Jure, l. vi. c. i. § 23, 24.

Bucer of Divorce, apud Milt. p. 162,

163.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lx. § 39.

Galeacius Caracciolus's Life, c. xxi, xxiv,

xxv.

Calvin in Loc.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It has been debated, how far *polygamy* was allowed in the old testament, or whether it were not rather condemned: *Mal.* ii. 14—16. has been urged in that view, and some have apprehended this to be the sense of *Lev.* xviii. 18. But it may be answered, that the precept of marrying the brother's widow, which was not limited to the case of the succeeding brother's being a single man, might require polygamy in some cases, and that the providing for it so expressly in others, (*Deut.* xxi. 15. *Exod.* xxi. 10.) plainly shews the law is not to be interpreted in this sense: and indeed one can hardly imagine, that had polygamy been regarded as adultery in the sight of God, he would have favoured the patriarchs who lived in it with such intimate converse and friendship; not to insist on the argument from 2 *Sam.* xii. 8. seeing *ver.* 11. may seem a sufficient reply. The decision of Christ, *Matt.* xix. 4—6. and that of the apostle, 1 *Cor.* vii. 2. does indeed plainly shew that it was not to be practised by Christians, and *Matt.* xix. 9. especially intimates it to be a kind of *adultery*, *i. e.* some breach of the *seventh* commandment. Compare *Matt.* v. 28. Nevertheless, it is nowhere expressly declared, that if a person, who before married several wives, were converted to christianity, he must be obliged to put away all but the first; it seems that the Holy Spirit judged it sufficient to discountenance polygamy by such intimations as those above mentioned, and also by declaring those who practise it incapable of the ministerial office, which was certainly a proper brand of infamy set upon it, 1 *Tim.* iii. 2.

Owen's Theol. l. v. c. x.

Bower's Hist. of the Popes, vol. i. p.

381, 382. Not.

Whitby on Mark x. 11. Note c.

| Baxter's Works, vol. iv. p. 122.

| Reflect. on Polyg. p. 7—15, 29. & Diff. iv, v.

SCHOLIUM 6.

That *incest* was condemned under the old law as an immorality of the heathens, *Lev.* xviii. 24—27. and is also in one instance spoken of by the apostle with great abhorrence, 1 *Cor.* v. 1, 13. is evident: but there is a great deal of room to debate, how far those degrees of *affinity* and *consanguinity*, within which it was unlawful for the *Jews* to contract marriage, are to be a rule for *us*. The chief question is about the lawfulness of marrying a *brother's wife*, which the express precept for doing it in *some* cases proves not to be a natural immorality, though it were forbidden in others: yet from *Lev.* xviii. 18. it may well be questioned, whether the marrying two sisters *successively*, were by the *Mosaic* law forbidden; though where the civil law of a country forbids such marriages, it is certainly much better to avoid contracting them.

Grot. de Jure, l. ii. c. v. § 13, 14.

| Blount's Oracles of Reas. p. 135—151.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It is most evident, that scripture requires obedience to governors, *Rom. xiii. 1—6. Tit. iii. 1. 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14, 17.* but it has been the subject of great dispute how far these precepts extend. All grant that they cannot oblige us to do any thing in obedience to the magistrate, which is contrary to the divine law: compare *Acts iv. 19.* but many have maintained *unlimited passive obedience*, and the unlawfulness of *resistance* in subjects upon any consideration whatsoever. The controversy is too large to be fully examined here, but the following general remarks may be of use, when enquiring into it.

1. That it is in itself very unlikely, that so benevolent a scheme as that of the gospel should be so calculated, as necessarily to destroy the civil rights of mankind, and to enslave free nations, depriving the subject of those privileges which express contract had given them, in those countries, where either a monarchy or aristocracy was limited by law; so that it may reasonably be expected, that very strong proofs be brought of this, before a thing so improbable can be admitted.

2. That there are many general prohibitions in scripture, which common sense requires us to explain with some limitations. *Vid. Schol. 2.*

3. The apostles did no doubt intend to teach Christians, that they ought to be very cautious how they disturb a government; and if any circumstances arise, in which it appears probable, that resistance will occasion more evil than good to the public, then the texts quoted above enforce the obligation which Christians are under, by the general laws of the gospel, as well as those of nature, cautiously to forbear it.

4. The chief argument on which the apostle insists, *Rom. xiii.* will not infer unlimited passive obedience.

5. Christianity was in the apostle's time in so weak a state, that Christians, as such, might be under some obligation to further admission than in all cases can now be required; and it would have been an hazardous matter, and perhaps liable to great abuses and scandal, if the apostles had entered nicely into various circumstances, and stated the case when resistance is, and when it is not lawful; which, under so unrighteous and tyrannical a government as the *Roman*, might easily have been interpreted as sedition: it was therefore prudent to rest in such general advices and cautions to obedience, as to be sure do commonly though not universally oblige.

6. Nevertheless, if it should on the whole be acknowledged, that subjects are in all cases bound to submit to the *supreme* power, (which is not by any means proved from the texts above quoted,) yet it would not follow from thence, that where the supreme legislative power is, as among us, divided among *many* persons, all the other branches of it, and all the people subject to it, must therefore universally submit to him, in whom the supreme *executive* power is lodged; *i. e.* that the
king

king is to be obeyed, without and against the consent of his *parliaments*.

Atterbury Concio ad Clerum.

Hoadly's Lett. to Atterb.

— *on Government*, p. 192—194.

Blackw. Serm. N^o. iv.

Hoadly's Tracts, N^o. vi.

Blackw. Ans.

Hoadly's Reply.

Grot. de Jure, l. i. c. iv. § 7. N^o. 8—15.

§ 13.

Sachev. Trial.

Trial of the Seven Bishops.

SCHOLIUM 8.

LECT.
CXCI.

Few Christians have questioned the lawfulness of war, but the *Quakers* deny it, and urge *Matt. v. 38—41. Rom. xii. 17—21. and Matt. xxvi. 52.* For an answer to the *first* of these texts, see *Schol. 2.* As to the *second*, it is granted that *revenge* is there forbidden, but if any circumstances shall arise, in which we are persuaded, that by resisting evil and endeavouring to punish the aggressor, the public good will be promoted, resistance may be made, and punishment executed, without any degree of *malice* against the offenders. And as to *Matt. xxvi. 52.* our Lord cannot be understood, *q. d.* “they that have recourse to the sword, shall perish by the righteous judgment of God,” since war had been so often undertaken, and prosecuted in its greatest rigour, by an express divine command in the old testament: it must therefore be considered, only as a determination on this particular case, to which our Lord seems to have applied a proverbial expression among the *Jews*, that those who are readiest to meddle with weapons of war are often the first that fall by them, and prove the occasion of their own destruction.—On the other hand, the following scriptures are often referred to, as countenancing if not vindicating arms, *Luke iii. 14. Matt. xviii. 10. Acts x. 1, &c.* But it is an argument of much greater importance, that the doctrine we have here been opposing would make every desperate villain irresistible, and consequently would give up all the property and lives in a city or province to one such person; and this, even though the person denying resistance or war should allow of *magistracy*; for the decree of the magistrate against such a one could not regularly take place, till he has been brought to a trial, which on this hypothesis he could not be, or till he proceeded for want of such appearance to an *outlawry*, and then it could not be executed, without such a forcible attack upon that person as this principle opposes. The common law therefore of benevolence to society requires an assault on such a person, which does not imply any such malevolence to him, as is inconsistent with the christian temper in its greatest heights.

Grot. de Jure, l. i. c. ii. § 7—10. c. iii. § 3. | Bessé's Def. of Quak. p. 212—224.

It must indeed be allowed, that many of the *Primitive* Christians scrupled the lawfulness of war, but they were not uniform in their opinions about it; and

and if they had, no certain argument could have been drawn from thence. See what *Moyle* and *King* have written upon this subject, in the curious controversy about the *Thundering Legion*.

SCHOLIUM 9.

The office of *magistracy* appears so absolutely necessary, in order to preserve the peace of society, (Vid. *Prop.* 64, 69.) that it may justly be wondered, especially considering the passages quoted, *Schol.* 7. that any should have imagined it unlawful for a Christian to bear such an office. The chief texts urged in defence of so absurd a notion are *Matt.* xx. 25. *Mark* x. 42. *Luke* xxii. 25. but it is plain our Lord there only intends to discourage the ambitious temper prevailing among the apostles, which inclined them to contend about that secular power which was not designed for any of them. Were the interpretation here opposed to be admitted, it would follow, either that there must be no magistrate at all in christian countries, which would be their utter dissolution and ruin, or else that magistrates who are *not Christian* must be established among them, which is in itself very absurd, and directly contrary to the whole of the apostle's reasoning, *1 Cor.* vi. 1, &c. compare *Isa.* xlix. 23.

Atterb. Serm. vol. ii. p. 89—91. | *Limborch's Theol.* l. v. c. lxiii. §. 1—18.

SCHOLIUM 10.

It is plain that the genius of the gospel leads so strongly to the exercise of love and benevolence, that we can never believe that *persecution* for conscience sake, which seems in the nature of things so irrational and so mischievous, (*Prop.* 77.) should make a part of that scheme, unless it were very expressly asserted: but this is so far from being the case, that hardly so much as the shadow of an argument for persecution can be produced from the whole new testament, and many passages of it are most directly contrary to it, *Luke* ix. 55, 56. *2 Tim.* ii. 24—26. *2 Cor.* x. 4. *Isa.* xlii. 3. see also *Matt.* xiii. 30. and it is no contemptible argument, which is drawn from the silence of the new testament, as to any use which might be made of the secular power to enforce the truths of christianity; for though it may be objected, that in the apostle's time few Christians were possessed of such power, yet it might have been convenient, that some provision should be made against the time when that power might come into their hands, since there would otherwise be apparent danger of abusing it. To which we may add, not only that *Sergius Paulus* was a magistrate when converted, but that the power of masters over their slaves was so absolute, that they might on what penalties they pleased have obliged them to profess their own religion, yet there is not the least intimation, that christian masters were to take any such advantages.

On the other side, the arguments drawn from *Luke* xiv. 23. (compare *Luke* xxiv. 29.) and *John* xxi. 15. not to mention *Acts* x. 13. are so ridiculous, as hardly

hardly to deserve a particular examination. The chief argument from the *new* testament, is that drawn from the corporal severities which were sometimes exercised by the apostles: see *1 Cor.* v. 5. *Acts* v. 5. xiii. 11. *1 Tim.* i. 20. but it is evident that punishments *miraculously* inflicted on those that opposed the gospel, had in their own nature such a tendency to convince mens *understandings*, as those inflicted by the *magistrate* in an ordinary way cannot possibly have. From the *old* testament, besides the argument taken from the penal laws of *Moses*, (which was considered above, *Prop.* 120. § 6.) some have urged *Isa.* xlix. 23. but this can only intimate, that christian princes should by all regular methods endeavour to promote the gospel, and can never prove persecution to be one of those methods. As to the argument from *Job* xxxi. 28. it may be granted, that *Job* intimates by this, that there was in his time in *Arabia* a law which punished idolatry, and that he approved it; at least, that he should have approved it, if such a law had been enacted: but it will not by any means follow from hence, that if there were such a law, it was of *divine* authority, or that if he approved of it, it was therefore *right*; for it is plain that in some instances *Job* had expressed himself in a very improper manner, and is not to be considered as under a plenary inspiration. As to *Zech.* xiii. 3. which indeed is one of the strongest texts of its kind, it may be replied, either that the peculiar law against idolatry in the land of *Israel* shall continue, after the restoration of the *Jews*, God being still their temporal king; or else, (which I should rather think,) that some converted *Jews*, warmed with a zeal for the gospel, but not thoroughly instructed in the gentleness of its nature, shall be ready with their own hands to put to death their own children, if they should oppose it, upon a mistaken notion that *Deut.* xiii. 1, &c. would be a warrant to them in so doing: but that these converted *Jews* should be under an infallible guidance in all their judgments and actions, is no where intimated in scripture by any argument, which would not as well prove the infallibility of the whole christian church.

Stephens's Calculation, p. 280.

Limb. Theol. l. vii. c. xx. § 23—27.

Dadd. Sermon on Persecut. p. 33—36.

PROPOSITION CXLVII.

LECT. The obligation of the precepts contained in the new testament continues so long as the reasons on which they are founded continue, and ceases when the observation of any particular precept is inconsistent with another of a more general nature, or of greater importance for promoting the essential branches of virtue.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Many precepts are delivered in such a manner, that they must necessarily admit of some exception, in order to reconcile them with each other, and with the

PROP. CXLVII. *The prohibition of eating blood considered.*

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the natural law of God, founded on the mutual and immutable relation of things. Vid. Prop. 146. Schol. 2 & 8.

2. The law of *Moses*, which is delivered in as general and universal a style as the precepts of *Christ*, was in some instances violated, without any crime, by those who were still in general under the obligations of that law, 2 *Chron.* xxx. 17—19. (which seems not so proper an instance as some have thought, see *ver.* 20.) 2 *Sam.* xxi. 9, 10, 14. compared with *Deut.* xxi. 23. *Matt.* xii. 1—6. *John* v. 8, 9. *Luke* xiii. 15. *Hos.* vi. 6.

Stillingfleet's Orig. Sac. l. ii. c. vii. § 3.

3. When two precepts become inconsistent, one of them must necessarily lose its force; and it is plainly fit that the more particular precepts should give way to the more general, and that which is of less to that which is of greater moment, *Rom.* xiii. 8, 9. *Matt.* xii. 17.

1—3. 4. *Valet propositio.*

Witsii Ægyptiaca, l. ii. c. xvi. § 5.

COROLLARY.

Precepts, which depend upon reasons peculiar to one age or people, do certainly lose their force in other ages, and where other people only are concerned.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this head we may properly refer the eating of *blood*, which was forbidden to *Noah*, and to his descendants, *Gen.* ix. 4. (to which some have added *ver.* 5. without reason, compare *Exod.* xxi. 28. and *Ezek.* iii. 18.) and by *Moses* to the *Israelites*, *Lev.* xvii. 14. which prohibition in both instances seems to have had a view to the use of sacrifices in divine worship, and to have been intended as a mark of respect to the altar, at which the blood of every victim was presented before God, as a solemn acknowledgment that he was the Lord of life, *ibid.* *ver.* 10—12. The eating of *fat* was also forbidden in several of the same words, and on the same principles; compare *Lev.* iii. 17. vii. 22—27. Blood was also forbidden to *Christians* in the apostles days, *Acts* xv. 29. not merely as Lord *Barrington*, and after him Dr. *Benson* have supposed, to those who before their conversion had been *profelytes of the gate*, (a distinction, by the way, on which these authors lay a very disproportionate stress) but to *all Christians* whatsoever; because the *Jews* had so strong an aversion to it, that they could not have been persuaded to hold civil or religious communion with those who used it, *Acts* xv. 20, 21. so that it seems even in those days, (at least by any thing we can learn from any apostolic decree) had there been any christian nation, among whom there were no *Jews*, since the institution of sacrifices ceased, the use of blood would have been an indifferent thing: compare *Rom.* xiv. 14.

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1 *Tim.*

1 Tim. iv. 4. Matt. xv. 10, 11. and should a considerable number of *Jews* be now kept out of the christian church by that alone, it would still be the duty of those *Christians* among whom they dwelt to forbear the use of it, on the principles stated by the apostle, 1 Cor. viii. *per tot.* Rom. xiv. 15—22. Many have indeed thought, that there was a *moral evil* in eating blood, supposing that it tends to make men savage, and pleading from its being joined with *fornication*, which is certainly an immorality. But not to say, that *πορνεία* is by many supposed to signify, marrying within those degrees of consanguinity or affinity which were prohibited by the *Mosaic* law; it is plain there are some things in their own nature indifferent, from which *Christians* in the *Jerusalem* decree were required to abstain. As for things *strangled* they seem to stand much on the same foot with things that *died of themselves*, from which the blood could not be taken, while it could properly be called *the life*, yet the *Mosaic* law expressly allowed strangers to eat of these, *Deut.* xiv. 21. which surely it would not have done, if there had been any natural immorality in it. But it is yet more important to observe, that this very decree in question joins things *sacrificed to idols*, in the list of what it prohibits, together with *fornication*, though the apostle expressly allows these, when they might be used without giving offence, 1 Cor. viii. 1—9. The argument, from the tendency which blood has to make men savage, may be allowed as concluding against eating raw flesh; but that does not seem to be referred to in the apostle's precept under consideration, though some think it is in the precept to *Noah*. To say, that this abstinence from blood is a little instance of mortification, which God enjoins to all *Christians*, in order to shew his supreme power over all their enjoyments, as he forbade one tree to *Adam* in paradise, is merely an arbitrary assertion; since there is not the least hint in scripture of its being forbidden for any such reason, but other reasons are assigned, which are of much less general concern and obligation.

Spencer says, blood was forbidden in reference to some *heathen* superstitions, in which, as he largely proves, it was often not only offered, but tasted by *Idolaters*; and that the prohibition ceases now, there being no further danger of them: but it seems the apostles themselves did not think of this reason, or lay so much stress upon it, as on the probability of offending the *Jews*, *Acts* xv. 19—21.

<i>Hooker's Eccles. Polity</i> , l. iv. § 11. p. 188—190.		<i>Rev. exam. with Cand.</i> vol. ii. Diff. i & ii. and <i>Vindicat. pass.</i>
<i>Barrington's Miscel. Sac.</i> vol. ii. Diff. iv.		<i>Spenc. Diff. ap. Leg. Heb.</i> vol. i. p. 435,
<i>Benson's Hist.</i> vol. ii. p. 58—67.		<i>Ec. præf. c. iv.</i> p. 472, &c.

SCHOLIUM 2.

The *anointing the sick*, commanded *James* v. 14, 15. was in the apostles days a symbol of *miraculous* healing, *Mark* vi. 13. and therefore the reason of the precept ceasing, its obligation must cease with it.

<i>Burn. on Art.</i> xxv. p. 265—269.		<i>Whist. Life</i> , vol. ii. p. 473 & 653—658
<i>Cassand. Consult.</i> p. 192—194.		SCHO-

SCHOLIUM 3.

The *imposition of hands* in ordination seems also to depend upon the same foundation. It is certain that it was in the apostles time the means of conveying some extraordinary gift, *Acts* viii. 18. 1 *Tim.* iv. 14. but as those gifts are now ceased, the chief reason for observing this rite ceases with them. Nevertheless, as it has been an ancient rite of blessing, where no extraordinary gifts were conferred, (*Matt.* xix. 15. *Gen.* xlviii. 14.) and seems a natural way of *designing* or pointing out the person prayed for, it may innocently be retained as a thing *indifferent*, but it is by no means to be *imposed*, or represented as of so important and essential a nature, that the validity and usefulness of man's future ministry should be supposed to depend upon it in any degree.

Clarke's Annotat. on Matt. xix. 15. | *Morrice's Dial. on Social Rel.* p. 163—165.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Some who have apprehended the precept, *Rom.* xiii. 1—4. did require unlimited passive obedience to magistrates, have thought it was not intended for a rule to Christians in all ages, but was peculiar to the primitive times, when the Christians were few and weak, and idolatrous princes would gladly snatch at any opportunity or excuse for inflicting punishments on the whole body of them, and would have been ready to strain any passage in the apostolic writings to make them speak the language of sedition and treason. It must be allowed, that at least many of the *primitive Christians* did understand the text as forbidding all resistance; but that will not prove that the *apostle* did really mean it so, it being very easy to find instances of their mistaking the original sense of scripture, and putting some far more unnatural constructions upon it than this in question.

<i>Grot. de Jure</i> , l. i. c. iv. § 8. with <i>Gro-</i>	<i>Baxt. Life</i> , vol. i. p. 368—372.
<i>nov. Notes.</i>	
<i>Tertull. Apol.</i> c. xxxv—xxxvii. with	
<i>Reeves's Notes.</i>	<i>Daille's Use of the Fathers</i> , part ii. p. 49—59.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Dr. *Clarke* thinks the cautions which our Lord gave against *carefulness*, in his sermon on the mount, *Matt.* vi. 25, &c. belonged only to the apostles, and were intended to incline them to cast themselves entirely upon an extraordinary providence, without any care of their own. But there is no sufficient reason to admit this interpretation, since,

1. It is probable this sermon was first preached before the apostles were chosen. (Vid. *Doddridge's Fam. Expos.* vol. i. § 53. not. (a), p. 325.)

2. The same caution is else-where given to *all* Christians, *Phil.* iv. 6. 1 *Pet.* v. 7.

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3. It is connected with things of universal concern.
4. It is enforced by arguments common to all; and
5. It is inferred from the impossibility of serving God and Mammon.
6. The apostles themselves were not to neglect proper means of providing for themselves, where providence gave them an opportunity for it: compare *Luke xxii. 35, 36. Acts xx. 34.*

Clarke's Post. Sermon. vol. iii. p. 116, | Blair on Christ's Sermon on the Mount, vol. Ec. Oe. i. Diff. ii, iii.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Though there can be no good works of *supererogation*, *i. e.* which no law requires, because we are always required to do our best in religion, (*Matt. v. 48. xxii. 37. 2 Cor. vii. 1.*) yet there are some rules given in scripture, which admit of so many exceptions, that it was not convenient to deliver them in the general form of precepts, so that they are rather to be considered as *counsels*, particularly such as relate to a *single life*, *Matt. xix. 12. 1 Cor. vii. 26, 36, 38.* yet to those whose circumstances such passages suit, they are as obligatory as any of the most express and universal commands; (compare *Matt. xix. 12, 22.*) to others they are not obligatory at all: (*Acts v. 4.*) every one must therefore judge for himself in the sight of God, as to his own particular concern in such precepts; and on this principle *1 Cor. ix. 16—19.* may well be explained.

PROPOSITION CXLVIII.

To enumerate the most considerable *means* of virtue recommended in the scripture, or deducible from principles which are laid down there.

LEMMA.

LECT. CXCVIII. Several of the particulars mentioned are not to be regarded merely as the *means* of virtue, but also as in themselves *essential branches* of our duty; but they are here introduced in the view of that influence they have upon other things, which is very great.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. A familiar acquaintance not only with the doctrines and precepts, but likewise with the historical part of scripture, will be very subservient to our improvement in virtue, *Acts xx. 32. Rom. xv. 4. 1 Cor. x. 11. James i. 21. 2 Tim. iii. 15, 16. Col. iii. 16. 1 Pet. ii. 2.*

2. We are cautiously to avoid, not only those things which are in themselves evidently sinful, but those which have the appearance of evil, and may be the probable means of ensnaring us or others, *1 Thess. v. 22. Prov. xxiii. 31. Matt. vi. 13.*

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3. Fervent and constant application to God in secret and social prayer, *Matt.* vi. 6. vii. 7. *Eph.* vi. 18. *Phil.* iv. 6. *1 Thess.* v. 17, 18. *1 Tim.* ii. 8. *Heb.* iv. 16. xiii. 15.

4. Christians are to assemble together for the public worship of God, that thereby a solemn profession of religion may be made, that their affection to each other may be testified and cultivated, and that such instructions may be given as may tend to improve their minds in knowledge and holiness, *Heb.* x. 25. to which may be added the scriptures quoted under the following steps.

5. It will evidently tend to render such assemblies more useful than they could otherwise be, that there should be some persons appointed stately to preside over them; and who for that purpose should apply themselves with greater diligence than others to the study of divine things, and take pains to cultivate a habit of speaking concerning them in public in the most instructive and edifying manner, as well as to investigate and state the evidence of christianity, the sense of scripture, and particular difficulties which may occur, and occasion scruples in mens minds, either of a speculative or practical nature: not to insist upon the great advantage societies may receive by the inspection of such officers, and their fraternal admonitions, as particular occasions may require.

6. It is proper that such persons should in a solemn manner be set apart to this work, and recommended to the divine assistance and blessing, in their entrance upon any place in which they intend to labour, not only by the private Christians of that society, but by neighbouring ministers, as there may be opportunity, and especially by some more advanced in life and experienced in the work; which is warranted by various passages in the apostolic writings, whereby the preceding heads are also confirmed. See *Rom.* x. 13—17. *2 Tim.* ii. 2. *Tit.* i. 5—9. *1 Tim.* iii. 1—13. *Acts* xiv. 23. xx. 28. *Matt.* xxviii. 19, 20. *Col.* iv. 17.

7. It will conduce to the advancement of virtue, that on the one hand, great care should be taken to enquire into the character and abilities of those who are chosen to such offices, and to exclude or remove those who behave in a vicious and scandalous manner; and on the other, when any are chosen to them, and while they behave well in them, they should be treated with all due respect, and a decent provision made for them and their families; partly as an equivalent for their labours, and for their resigning those secular advantages which learned and able men might promise themselves in other callings, and also as an encouragement to them to pursue their sacred work with chearfulness, being freed from those distracting cares, to which they would otherwise be exposed, and animated by that token of respect and affection in those committed to their care: *Phil.* iv. 10, 11, 17. nor are ministers to be blamed and despised, who accept such maintenance; especially since ordinarily, if left destitute of it, they would be unable to contribute to the relief of the necessitous, which they of all men, (*cæt par.*) ought to be most ready to do, *Acts* xx. 34, 35. *1 Cor.* ix. 4—18. *Gal.* vi. 6. *1 Thess.* v. 12, 13. *1 Tim.* v. 17, 18. *Heb.* xiii. 7, 17.

Barclay's Apol. Prop. x. p. 329—333. | *Ree's Right of Maint. pass.*
Besse's Vind. § 7. p. 127—140. | *Mandeville's Free Thoughts*, p. 276—280.

8. As

8. As the maintenance of ministers, and the relief of the poor, who belong to every society, and therefore are to be peculiarly regarded by them, will necessarily require some care and attendance, it is plainly fit that there should be some in christian assemblies, whose peculiar business this should be: and with regard to these officers, as well as those in a superior station, care should be taken that they may be persons of blameless characters, and that they have such capacities as may fit them for the discharge of their office: respect is likewise to be shewn them, proportionable to their usefulness to the societies they belong to, and to the circumstances of life in which they are, *Acts* vi. 1, &c. *1 Tim.* iii. 8—12.

Watts on the Constit. of the Christian Church, App. Disc. N^o. ii.

9. Hardly any thing can have a happier influence upon the improvement of a virtuous and religious life in all its branches, than a due regard to the mediatorial offices of Christ; and we are encouraged, by the example of good men in scripture, as well as by other considerations, to pray to him for those blessings which we are sure he is under his mediatorial character commissioned and empowered to grant: (compare *Acts* vii. 59, 60. *2 Cor.* xii. 8. *Phil.* ii. 10. *John* v. 23. *Heb.* i. 6. *Rev.* v. 12, 13.) and in all our addresses to the Father, we are habitually to regard him as dwelling in Christ, and manifesting himself to his people in gracious dispensations through him, *John* xvi. 23, 24. but to address ourselves to Christ *only* in prayer, omitting the mention of the Father, is contrary to the precepts and example of scripture, and indeed to the whole tenour of it; and is indeed overthrowing the whole mediatorial scheme, while the greatest zeal for it is pretended.

Turret. Loc. xiv. *Quæst.* xviii. § 7, 28.

Emlyn's Tracts, N^o. ii. p. 27, 28, 31.

Ed. 1731.

Boyse's Works, vol. ii. p. 30—44.

Burnet on the Art. p. 48, 49.

Clarke on the Trin. part ii. *Prop.* 53, 54.

Burnet's Script. Doct. Trin. p. 95.

Shuckford's Connec. vol. i. p. 291—294.

Dodd. Fam. Expos. vol. i. *Pref.* p. 5—7.

10. It is also of great importance in order to our improvement in religion, that we should maintain an habitual sense of the need we have of the influences of the Holy Spirit of God, which are to be sought in earnest prayer, attended with a solicitous concern to cherish those good impressions on the mind, of which we have reason to believe he is the author, *Rom.* viii. 11, 13, 14. *Eph.* iv. 30. *Gal.* v. 16, 18, 25. And though there be indeed no example or precept concerning the *worship* of the Holy Spirit in scripture, under a distinct personal character, yet if the preceding propositions relating to his divinity be allowed, there is evidently a foundation for it in the nature of things. Compare *Matt.* xxviii. 19. *2 Cor.* xiii. ult.

Evans's Christian Temper, vol. i. p. 329—343.

11. So far as the divine image appears in any creature, we are to express our veneration for it, as a means of promoting virtue in ourselves, as well as an immediate exercise of it; and we may allowably ask the *intercession* of other good men for us: but as we do not certainly know that any invisible being whatsoever, excepting God and the great appointed mediator, Christ Jesus, do hear our prayers at all times and in all places, nor can be sure of it with regard to any particular time or place, it is proper to address our prayers only to God in and through Christ, and not to any inferior invisible being, how great and excellent soever, 1 Kings viii. 39. Rev. ii. 23. Col. ii. 18. Judges xiii. 16. Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 8, 9.

Turret. Loc. vii. Quæst. ix. § 17.

Tennison of Idol. c. x. p. 222, 223.

Burnet on the Art. p. 223—231.

Hutchinson's Serm. p. 265.

Lowman on Revelation, p. 231, 232.

Brevint's Saul and Samuel at Endor, c. iv.

12. The worship of *images* has been recommended by many, as a proper means of raising devotion: but images representing God do naturally tend to debase our ideas of him, and images of Christ may easily lay a foundation for idolatry in weak and ignorant minds. The worship of *saints* and *angels* by images is superseded in the preceding step; and most of those apologies, which the *Papists* make for their image worship, seem to have been borrowed from some of the more intelligent of the *heathen* writers, who could not be stupid enough to imagine that the images themselves were divine, though they did suppose the extraordinary presence of some invisible agent in them or near them, and apprehended that the peculiar favours of that invisible agent would be conferred upon those who honoured the image for his sake.

More's Theol. p. 420—423.

Burnet on Ari. p. 209—219.

Tennison of Idol. p. 269—275. part ii.

13. As natural reasons mentioned above recommend *fasting* in some circumstances and on some occasions, so many passages in the old testament expressly require it, and that on principles common to all nations, Joel ii. 12, &c. Jonah iii. *pass.* It is likewise favoured by Matt. vi. 16. where Christ seems to take it for granted that his disciples would practise it, as also 1 Cor. vii. 5.

Bennet's Christian Orat. vol. ii. p. 18—25.

SCHOLIUM I.

That form of prayer, commonly called the *Lord's prayer*, seems to have been given, in our Lord's sermon on the mount, Matt. vi. as a *directory*, whereas in CXCIV. Luke xi. 1. Christ seems in compliance with the request of the disciples to have given it as a *form*. Some have urged that the *second* and *fourth* petition of that prayer, could be intended only for temporary use: but it is most evident, that such a sense may be put upon those petitions, as shall suit all Christians in all ages;

ages; for it is always our duty to pray, that Christ's kingdom may be advanced in the world; and to profess our daily dependence on God's providential care. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe, that Christ meant to enjoin it so absolutely upon all his disciples, that they should be obliged constantly to use this form, or even to dispose their prayers in this method; and that great zeal which is to be found in some Christians, either for, or against it, is to be lamented as a weakness, and it will become us to do all that we can, to promote on each side more moderate sentiments concerning it. The omission of the name of Christ in that prayer, compared with *John* xiv. 13, 14. shews that this prayer is not to be ordinarily used alone, without either introduction or explication. If the conciseness and variety of the expressions be, as some have thought, an objection against the use of it, this objection might have taken place from the beginning; nevertheless, it is a good argument, why those who use it should attentively study it, and why it should be often reviewed and explained: perhaps it can no where be viewed to greater advantage, than in the pious Archbishop *Leighton's* explication of it, or in the *Assembly's catechism*, in proportion to the number of words used.

Hebden's Diff. on the Lord's Prayer.

Mede's Diatribe on Matt. vi. 9.

King's Enq. l. ii. c. ii. § 6.

Watts on Prayer.

Guyse's Paraphr. and Not. on Matt. vi.

13.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is evidently reasonable and important, that when we pray, it should be with a firm persuasion of the goodness of God, as well as his power, and with a dependence upon the truth of his promises: but as for that firm persuasion of obtaining the particular blessings we ask, which some have called a *special faith in prayer*, it might indeed be an essential condition of the miraculous effects of prayer in the early ages of christianity; but it is very difficult to determine, how far it may now be rational and well grounded, when we are asking for blessings, which are merely of a temporal nature, and which God has not by the tenour of the covenant of grace obliged himself to grant to all his people; at least it cannot be matter of universal duty, and can only take place in correspondence to some extraordinary impressions made on the mind, the nature and kind of which is perhaps intelligible only to those who have experienced them. Vid. *Prop.* 140. *Schol.* 7. and the references there. Vid. *Mark* xi. 24. *James* i. 6. *1 Tim.* ii. 8.

Calamy's Life of Howe apud Op. vol. i. p. 86—88.

SCHOLIUM 3*.

It is debated whether public *Liturgies* ought to be established for the use of christian assemblies. Some have pleaded for it as necessary, and urged Christ's

* See on this Subject Dr. *Taylor's Scripture Doctrine of Prayer*, and *A Letter to a Dissenting Minister on the expediency of forms*, with Mr. *Brekell's* answer, Edition 2d.

concurring in those forms of prayer which were offered in the *Jewish* synagogue, as an argument for mens submitting to them. To what was said above, *Prop.* 76. *Schol.* 3. we may add the following remarks.

1. It appears in fact, by the manner in which the worship of God is discharged in those christian congregations where liturgies are not used, that it may generally be expected, (through the common assistance of the Spirit of God, in consequence of proper care and application on the part of ministers,) that the church is never like to be destitute of teachers, who may carry on that part of worship in a decent and edifying manner; especially when due care is taken in the education of those that are intended for the service of the sanctuary.

2. Nevertheless, as it may so happen, that some persons may be employed in the ministry, who may not have a talent and capacity for extemporary prayer, it is not at all improper that some forms should be provided for the use of such, if they chuse to have recourse to them.

3. But to impose any particular form of prayer, upon all ministers, and upon all congregations, without regarding their abilities on the one hand, or their sentiments on the other, is certainly putting a great hardship both on ministers and private Christians; and those who do it had need produce strong evidence that they are the appointed legislators in the church of Christ, if they expect unlimited submission to them.

4. To confine ministers to a form, so as to exclude their offering any prayers but those prescribed, is so apparently absurd, that it has not (that I know of) been practised, at least in any protestant church.

5. As for the *Jewish* prayers now used in the synagogues, there is no reason to believe they are so old as our Lord's time, and it is certain, that some of them are such as he could not concur in, even though we should grant him to have been present in places where they were used; and all that can be inferred from hence seems to be this, that the use of a form of prayer is not alone a sufficient reason for Christians to separate from such assemblies, which will be readily granted: and it is very hard, if no allowance is to be made for a more abundant effusion of the Spirit of God under the gospel, than under the *Mosaic* law. *Rom.* viii. 2.

Bull's Works, vol. iii. p. 558—564.

Bennet, Robinson, and Clarkson on Liturg. pass.

Peirce's Vindication, part iii. c. iv.

Prideaux's Connect. vol. i. p. 374—379.

Occasional Paper, vol. iii. N^o. iii.

Le Clerc on Matt. vi. 7. and *Ham.* *ibid.*

Baxter's Works, vol. iv. p. 168. b.

Limborch's Theol. l. v. c. xxvi. § 28.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Bishop *Bull*, and some others, have urged the probability of liturgies being of apostolic institution, 1 *Tim.* ii. 1, 2. is produced very weakly for this purpose, since it may so well be interpreted as a general direction for prayer, and it is certain the quotation from *Prosper* cannot prove the contrary. What looks

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most specious for this purpose, is the agreement of many ancient liturgies in the *sursum corda*, the exhortation to give thanks to God, with the responses, and the doxologies to Father, Son, and Spirit, together with what he calls the prayer of oblation of the christian sacrifice in the holy Eucharist, the ἀπολαγίς, or renunciation of the flesh, the world and the devil in baptism, with the συνλαγίς, or joining ourselves to Father, Son, and Spirit; which harmony it is said there could not have been, if there were not some general foundation in apostolic appointment. But to this it is answered,

1. That the antiquity of all these liturgies is very dubious; nay, several of them are most evidently spurious: and it is certain, if they were forged, many of them might come from the same hand.

2. That the agreement in many of these things is not so entire, as is here supposed.

3. That where there is indeed an agreement, it might be derived from primitive custom, though there were no liturgies.

4. That the extraordinary degree in which the primitive Christians were assisted by the Spirit, made it less necessary there should have been any.

5. That several directions given by St. Paul to the *Corinthians*, 1 Cor. xi. 14. make it probable there were none, and that he did not think it necessary there should be any.

6. That the silence of the apostles as to this important fact, supposing it were a real fact, is surprising.

7. It is highly improbable that a diversity of liturgies should have been made in the ancient church, if they had any composed by the apostles.

8. That many passages in ancient writings seem to intimate the contrary practice to have prevailed early, particularly the expression of ὁση δύναμις, and *sine monitore*: and Basil, to whom a liturgy with a prayer of consecration for the eucharist has been ascribed, declares that no such form was or ever ought to be composed.

Bull's Serm. vol. iii. N°. xiii. p. 541 | *Robinson's Ans. to Bennet, p. 297—354.*
—558. | *Clarkson on Liturgies.*

DEFINITION XCII.

LECT. THE CHURCH OF CHRIST is a society, consisting of all those who profess CXCIV. to believe in him as a teacher sent from God, and to form their worship and conduct according to what they apprehend to be his institutions.

SCHOLIUM I.

The church of Christ here defined, is that which is commonly called the *catholic*, and consists of many smaller societies, all agreeing in the general profession of subjection to him, though greatly diversified as to the particular forms of worship and discipline.

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SCHOLIUM 2.

The word *ἐκκλησία*, used to express *church* both in the *Latin* and *Greek* languages, does in the general signify any assembly of men, and sometimes is applied even to such assemblies, as were not in a regular manner called together, though its etymology expresses *being called out from others*, as indeed assemblies generally are, either more or less expressly, *Acts* xix. 32, 39, 41. It generally signifies in the new testament "a number of Christians met together in one place," and sometimes "the whole body of the faithful," *Matt.* xvi. 18. xviii. 17. *Acts* viii. 3. ix. 31. xx. 28. *Eph.* v. 23, 25, 29, 32. *Rom.* xvi. 16. *1 Cor.* xvi. 19.

Old Whig, N^o. lxxiii.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Divines have often distinguished between the *visible* and the *invisible* church. All those, and only those belong to the *visible* church, who submit to the christian institutions, worship in christian assemblies, profess their faith in Christ, or are descended from such as do, and are yet in their infancy; though upon this foundation it must be allowed there are various degrees of visibility in church-membership: but the *invisible* church consists only of those who are true believers in Christ, according to *Def.* 82. or, as perhaps some would chuse to state it, who have such habits and dispositions, as are necessary in order to their preparation for future happiness, whether they be or be not regularly gathered into the church.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It evidently appears from the preceding definition and scholia, that the supposition of a *visible head*, with whom all the members are to hold communion, is by no means necessary in order to constitute such a *unity* as is essential to the church of Christ: their professed union to Christ is as real a bond of unity, as a professed union with and subjection to any *living man* could be, and is that upon which the apostles makes it evidently to depend, *Eph.* iv. 16. *Col.* ii. 19. *Gal.* iii. 28.

PROPOSITION CXLIX.

To take a more particular survey of the various kinds of *public officers*, which are, according to the institution of Christ, appointed in his church.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. It has generally been acknowledged, and was more particularly proved, *Prop.* 148. *gr.* 5, 6. that Christ has appointed certain officers, whose business it is to instruct his people, and to direct them in their spiritual affairs; with

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respect to which office they are frequently called *pastors* or *shepherds*, *Acts* xx. 28. *Eph.* iv. 11, 12. *1 Pet.* v. 2, 4.

2. These officers are frequently called *Elders* and *Presbyters*, as the *Jews* used to call those who presided in their ecclesiastical or civil assemblies; and from their office of *overseeing* the people, the name of *ἐπισκοποι* or *Bishops*, was also given them; and whatever alteration might afterwards be made in the sense of that word, and whatever *distinction* might early be introduced between bishops and presbyters, as signifying two different ranks of ministers, (of which hereafter) it is certain that in the *new testament* the words are used *promiscuously* *. Vid. *Phil.* i. 1. *1 Tim.* iii. 1, &c. compared with *Tit.* i. 5—7. *Acts* xx. 17. with 28. *1 Pet.* v. 1, 2. Bishop Hoadly and Dr. Hammond do both of them allow this; and it is Dr. Hammond's opinion, that there were only presbyters, (or bishops,) and deacons, in each church at first, *i. e.* one *overseer* called a *Presbyter* in each, to whom *assistants* and inferior officers were afterwards added, who in process of time took the name of *deacons*, while the presidents were by way of distinction called *Bishops*. But this does not agree with *Acts* xiv. 23. xx. 17. *Tit.* i. 5. which proves there were *several* elders in a place; and this indeed has been generally granted to have been the case *at first*; but it has been asserted, that the apostles, in their *last visitation*, settled one of the presbyters or bishops of a place over the rest: but whether they at that time or ever at all established such a distinction of names and offices, as had not before been known, will be afterwards enquired.

Boyle's Works, vol. i. p. 81, 82.

Hoadly of Episc. c. ii. p. 383—404.

| *Hammond on Acts* xi. 30.

3. It appears that another kind of officers, called *deacons*, were used in the christian church, by the appointment of the apostles: and a parity of reason, at least in some degree, will require that the christian church should have some such officers among them still, whether they be or be not called by the same name, which plainly signifies *servants* of the church. (*Matt.* xxii. 13. *John* ii. 9. *Greek.*) Vid. *Prop.* cxlviii. gr. 8. *Acts* vi. 1—8. *1 Tim.* iii. 8—13.

4. There were some circumstances in the primitive church, which made it peculiarly proper, that there should be some *women* appointed to take care of the entertainment of strangers, to attend the sick, and assist at the baptizing women; these were generally at least *widows*, *1 Tim.* v. 9—11. and seem to have been called *deaconesses*, *Rom.* xvi. 1. (*Greek.*) This office is not altogether so needful now as it was then; and whether the office or name should be retained, is to be referred to the judgment of particular societies, upon a view of their own circumstances.

Neal's Hist. of New Eng. Append.
Nº. iv. c. vii. § 2.

| *Collins of Free-Think.* p. 93.

| *Bingham's Antiquities*, l. ii. c. xxii.

* See on this subject Dr. Stevenson's sermon at the ordination of Mr. Moses Alway.

SCHOLIUM I.

There were in the succeeding ages of the christian church many new officers introduced into it, whose very names were unknown in the most primitive times: which were, for instance, *patriarchs*, *exarchs*, *archbishops* or *metropolitans*, *archdeacons*, *subdeacons*, *acolyths*, (a kind of *vergers* to the bishops) *exorcists*, *catechists*, *singers*, *doorkeepers*, the *copiatæ* or *fossarii*, who had the care of funerals, the *parabolani*, who took care of the sick, the *defensores* and *œconomi*, a kind of *church-wardens*, of which the first took care of land and houses, the latter of money appropriated to charitable uses; to which we may also add the *cellulani*, scandalous as their original was. Concerning most of them see

<i>Lampe's Eccles. Hist.</i> l. ii. c. iv. § 10.	<i>Bingham's Antiquities</i> , l. iii. c. ii, iii, iv, vi, vii, viii, ix, xi, xii.
<i>King's Constitut.</i> l. i. c. v. § 2, 3.	
<i>Bower's Hist. of Popes</i> , vol. ii.	

SCHOLIUM 2.

Of the manner in which the *Hierarchy* was formed under *Constantine*, during the pontificate of *Sylvester*, agreeably to the *civil* polity then established in the empire, and the *civil dioceses* into which he divided the *four prefectures*, see *Bower's Hist. of the Popes*, vol. i. p. 99—110.

DEFINITION XCIII.

Those are said to maintain the *DIVINE RIGHT OF DIOCESAN EPISCOPACY*, who assert that Christ has appointed an order of ministers in his church, superior to the pastors of particular congregations, who are to exercise the highest acts of jurisdiction, especially *ordination*, *excommunication*, and *confirmation*: these they suppose to be properly speaking the *successors* of the apostles, in such a sense as no other ministers are; to whose authority therefore neighbouring churches with their pastors are to submit themselves, in all matters which are not apparently contrary to the will of God.

Bingham's. Orig. l. ii. c. iii.

SCHOLIUM.

Those who hold every *pastor* to be so a bishop or overseer of his own congregation, as that no other person or body of men, have by divine institution a power to exercise any superior or pastoral office in it, may properly speaking be called, (so far at least,) *congregational*: and it is by a vulgar mistake, that any such are called *Presbyterians*; for the *presbyterian* discipline is exercised by *synods* and *assemblies*, subordinate to each other, and all of them subject to the authority of what is commonly called, a *general assembly*.

Scotch Confess. and Directory, c. xxxi.

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PROPOSITION CL.

LECT. To propose and consider the principal arguments which are brought in defence of *diocesan episcopacy*, both from the scriptures and the primitive fathers.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. The arguments from *scripture*.

I. Some argue that the nature of the office which the apostles bore was such, that the edification of the church would require they should have some successors in those ministrations which are not common to gospel ministers. It is answered, that as their office was such, as to require extraordinary and miraculous endowments for the discharge of many parts of it, it is impossible that they can have any successors in those services, who are not empowered for the execution of them as the apostles themselves were: and it is maintained, that so far as ordination, confirmation, and excommunication may be performed without miraculous gifts, there is nothing in them but what seems to suit the pastoral office in general, unless further arguments can be brought to prove, that Christ has limited them to some superior order of ministers. Vid. *Prop.* 117. *Cor.* 4.

Boyse of Episc. p. 270.

| *Barrow's Works*, vol. i. p. 595.

2. It is pleaded, that *Timothy* and *Titus* were bishops of *Ephesus* and *Crete*, whose business it was to exercise such extraordinary acts of jurisdiction, as are now claimed for diocesan bishops, 1 *Tim.* i. 3. iii. *pass.* v. 19—22. 2 *Tim.* ii. 2. *Tit.* i. 5, &c. iii. 10. (not to mention the *postscripts* of these epistles which are evidently spurious.)—To this it is answered, that *Timothy* and *Titus* had not a stated residence in these churches, but only visited them for a time, 2 *Tim.* iv. 9—13. *Tit.* iii. 12. It also appears from other places, in which the journeys of *Timothy* and *Titus* are mentioned, that they were a kind of itinerant officers, called *Evangelists*, who were assistants to the apostles; for there is great reason to believe the *first* epistle to *Timothy* was written prior to those from *Rome* in the time of *Paul's* imprisonment, as some think the *second* was also. To which we may add, that it seems probable at least, that they had very extraordinary gifts to furnish them for their superior offices, 1 *Tim.* iv. 14. *Eph.* iv. 11. 2 *Tim.* iv. 5. And though *Timothy* was with *Paul*, when he took his leave of the *Elders of Ephesus*, (*Acts* xx.) the apostle gives not the least hint of any extraordinary power with which he was invested; nor says one word to engage their obedience to him; which is a very strong presumption, that no such relation did subsist or was to take place: at least it is a certain proof, that *Paul* did not think it was necessary to leave a bishop in a place, when making his last visitation to it; for that he at least *thought* that this would be his

his last visitation at *Ephesus*, is undeniably plain from *Acts* xx. 25, 38. Compare *Rev.* ii. 4, 5.

Witsii Vita Timoth. apud *Meletemata*.

Whitby's Pref. to Tit. pass.

Benson's Prop. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 167—170.

Owen's Script. Ordin. c. ii. p. 11—38.

Pearson Op. Post. Diff. i. c. ix. § 5—9.

p. 75—84.

3. Some have argued from the mention of *angels*, *i. e.* as they understand it, of *diocesan bishops*, in the seven churches of *Asia*, particularly the angel of *Ephesus*, though there were many ministers employed in it long before the date of that epistle, *Acts* xx. 17, 18. But it is certain, that for any thing which appears in our Lord's epistles to them, (*Rev.* ii. iii.) they might be no more than the pastors of single congregations, with their proper assistants. Some have urged the use of the word *αποστολοι*, 2 *Cor.* viii. 23. (*Greek*) compared with *Phil.* ii. 23. (*Greek*) but it so plainly refers to their being sent by some churches upon a particular occasion, that it is strange any stress should be laid upon it. Compare 1 *Kings* xiv. 6. *Septuagint*.

4. It is urged that some of the churches, which were formed in large cities during the lives of the apostles, and especially that at *Jerusalem*, consisted of such vast numbers, as could not possibly assemble at one place: compare *Acts* xxi. 20. It is answered, 1. That the word *μυριαδες* may only signify *great numbers*, and may not be intended to express that there were several times *ten thousand* in an exact and literal sense; compare *Luke* xii. 1. (*Greek*.) 2. That no sufficient proof is brought from scripture, of there being such numbers of people in *any particular place* as this supposes; for the *myriads* of believing *Jews*, spoken of in the preceding text, as well as the numbers mentioned, *Acts* ii. 41. iv. 4. might very probably be those who were gathered together at those great feasts from distant places, of which few might have their stated residence in that city: compare *Acts* viii. 1. 3. If the number were so great as the objection supposes there might be, for any thing which appears in scripture, *several bishops* in the same city, as there are among those who do not allow of diocesan episcopacy several *co-ordinate pastors*, overseers, or bishops: and though *Eusebius* does indeed pretend to give us a catalogue of the bishops of *Jerusalem*, it is to be remembered, how the Christians had been dispersed from thence for a considerable time, at and after the *Roman war*, and removed into other parts, which must necessarily very much increase the uncertainty, which *Eusebius* himself owns there was, as to the succession of bishops in most of the ancient sees.

Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. ii. c. xxxv.

l. iii. c. iv, v.

Grot on Acts xviii. 17.

Reeve's Apol. vol. i. *Pref.* p. 21—34.

Original Draught, p. 37, 38.

Boyse of Episc. apud Op. vol. ii. p. 289

—299.

Jenk. of Christian. vol. ii. p. 493.

SECT. II. Arguments from antiquity.

I. The assertors of Diocesan episcopacy plead,

1. That *Clemens Romanus* intimates this, when he recommends to the *Corinthians* the example of the *Jewish church*, where the *High-priest*, *ordinary priests* and *Levites*, knew and observed their respective offices. To this it is answered, that the high-priest may signify *Christ*, else this parallel would rather imply, that the christian church must be subject to some one *visible head* as the *Jewish* was, and then *presbyters* and *deacons* may answer to priests and Levites. This interpretation is the more probable, as *Clement* never expressly mentions presbyters and bishops as *distinct*, nor refers the contending *Corinthians* to any one ecclesiastical head, as the center of unity, which he would probably have done, if there had been any diocesan bishop among them; nay, he seems evidently to speak of *presbyters* as exercising the episcopal office: see the 39th *section* of his *epistle*.

2. As for *Irenæus*, I meet with no passage produced from him, to prove that bishops and presbyters were *distinct*. The word *presiding presbyter* is evidently used to signify the highest officer in the *Roman church*, in a noble fragment preserved, *Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. v. c. xxiv. p. 248*. He does indeed mention the succession of bishops from the apostles, which is reconcileable with the supposition of their being *parochial*, nor altogether irreconcilable with the supposition of *joint pastors* in those churches. *Iren. l. iii. c. iii. p. 232*.

3. *Ignatius* is much insisted upon as a most express witness. It is allowed, that in many places he expressly distinguishes between bishops and presbyters, and requires obedience to bishops from the whole church, (presbyters not excepted) in very strong terms: but as he often supposes each of the churches to which he wrote to meet in *one place*, and represents them as breaking *one loaf*, and surrounding *one altar*, and charges the bishop to *know* all his flock *by name*, not excepting even the servants of it, it is most evident that he must speak of a *parochial* and not a *diocesan* bishop.

4. *Polycarp* exhorts the Christians at *Philippi* to be subject to the presbyters and deacons; he urges the presbyters to impartial judgment, &c. but says not one word of any *bishop* as being then at *Philippi*, nor gives any directions about choosing one: so that it should seem this church, as well as that at *Corinth*, was governed by joint presbyters or *Copastors*.

5. *Justin Martyr* certainly speaks of the *president*, whom we may allow to have been distinguished from the presbyter, though *Justin* does not mention that distinction; but he represents this president as present at every administration of the eucharist, which he also mentions as always making a part of their public worship, so that the bishop here intended must have only been the pastor of one congregation.

6. *Tertullian* speaks of *approved elders*, as presiding in christian assemblies, and glories over the *Marcionites*, that they could not produce a catalogue of their bishops in a continued succession from the apostles, as the orthodox Christians could: but it cannot be proved that he speaks of a *diocesan*, since all that he says might be applied to a *parochial* bishop.

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7. *Clemens Alexandrinus* says, "that the order of bishops, priests, and deacons is according to the rank and dispensation of angels:" but as he mentions only *angels* and *archangels* without descending into any more subordinations, it is not easy certainly to determine how far he intended to assert the power of the bishop over the presbyter; much less can it be inferred from hence, that the bishops of whom he speaks were any thing more than *parochial*.

8. *Origen* speaks distinctly of bishops and presbyters, but unites them both as it seems under the common name of *priests*, saying nothing of the power of bishops as extending beyond one congregation, and rather insinuates the contrary, when he speaks of offenders as brought before *the whole church* to be judged by it.

9. The *Apostolic Constitutions* do indeed very frequently distinguish between bishops and presbyters, and assert the subjection of the latter to the former, as a matter of divine institution: but not to insist upon the evidence there is, that these Constitutions were at the earliest a forgery of the *fourth* century, (Vid. *Prop.* 103. *Schol.* 5.) there are many passages in them, which shew that the bishops there spoken of could not stand related to a great number of churches; for they expressly decree, "that the deacons give nothing to the poor without the bishop's consent," and "that the bishops should see to it, that the same person did not receive charities twice in a week, unless the case were very urgent:" they also refer continually to the bishop's assembling with his people in acts of joint devotion; and the liturgies contained in these constitutions generally suppose the bishop present, and assign him some peculiar office in each service, and especially in the celebration of the Lord's supper.

10. *Cyprian* does indeed speak of the bishop as joining with and presiding over the bench of presbyters, in giving judgment in cases in which the church was concerned: but though he himself was a person of such distinguished sense, and though we have so many large epistles, wherein he gives directions about the manner in which the church under his care was to be managed in his absence, as well as relates several occurrences in which he was concerned while he was at *Carthage*; yet it is remarkable, that he gives no intimation of his having had the charge of more than *one* congregation: he speaks of two *readers* whom he alternately employed, which were capable of being heard by the whole church, and he expressly mentions his people as joining with him in acts of communion and discipline, not by representatives but in their own person.

11. It is allowed that in succeeding ages the difference between bishops and presbyters came to be more and more magnified, and various churches came under the care of the same bishop: nevertheless *Jerome* does expressly speak of bishops and presbyters as of the same order; and *Gregory Nazianzen* speaks of the great and affected distinction made between ministers in prerogative of place, and other *tyrannical* privileges, (as he calls them) as a lamentable and destructive thing.

King's Constit. of the Church, l. i. c. ii—iv.

Boyle of Episc. c. ii. ap. Op. vol. ii. p. 205—258.

Original Draught, c. ii.

Milton's Prose Works, p. 285--294.

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COROLLARY 1.

The distinction between bishops and presbyters does not appear of earlier date than the time of *Ignatius*, § 2. *gr.* 1 & 2.

COROLLARY 2.

This distinction does not appear to have been of *divine* institution, and Dr. *Hammond* in effect allows this, as was observed *Prop.* 149. *gr.* 2.

COROLLARY 3.

There was little or no conformity between *primitive* episcopacy, even as it was in the *second* and *third* centuries, and that *diocesan* episcopacy, which is established in the church of *England*, and in *Popish* countries.

COROLLARY 4.

Those reformed churches abroad which have not diocesan, may notwithstanding retain the true primitive episcopacy: nevertheless it is to be observed, that they have *superintendents*, and some of a still superior order, nearly answering to our bishops and archbishops, but with this difference, that it is not pretended their authority is of divine original, nor their existence by any means essential to that of a church; but they are acknowledged to be a kind of officers, set over the church by the civil magistrate: and indeed the constitution of the church of *England* is such, that its bishops are properly the *King's officers*, and it is not in the power of any number of them to make another, without him.

Towgood's Append. to his Lett. to White.

COROLLARY 5.

The main and most important controversy relating to episcopacy, is that which concerns the *extent* of the bishop's charge.

COROLLARY 6.

To assert in the general, that diocesan bishops have such a right to determine all indifferent matters in the church, that private Christians and ordinary ministers must in conscience submit to their dictates, how contrary soever they may be to their own relish and sentiments, and that none may preach who are not authorized by them, is building a vast superstructure upon a very weak and precarious foundation.

COROLLARY 7.

The *dissenting* churches in this realm are to be justified in the liberty which they take, of forming themselves into separate congregations, independent on the
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the authority and jurisdiction of that diocese within whose province they live; especially when submitting to them must in effect be attended with this important additional circumstance, of owning them to be instituted by Christ, as well as with a conformity to certain rites and ceremonies, and forms of discipline, which in themselves considered, separate from any supposed authority appointing them, appear less *expedient*, though they should not be urged as absolutely *unlawful*.

SCHOLIUM 1.

There seems reason for saying, (as in the last corollary) that the established church of *England* demands, that the diocesan bishops should be owned in effect as officers instituted by Christ: for though this be not asserted in the *articles* of the church of *England*, yet in the book of *ordination*, (to which assent must be declared, as well as to the *common prayer*) it is expressly said, "that it is evident to all men diligently reading the holy scriptures, &c. that from the apostles time there has been this order in Christ's church, bishops, priests, and deacons, as several officers;" and it is sufficiently plain from the whole system of ecclesiastical government, that *bishops* must here signify *diocesan* bishops, and not merely pastors of a particular congregation.

LECT. CXCVII.

Calamy's Life of Baxter, vol. i. p. 222—224.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is easy to apprehend, how episcopacy, as it was in the primitive church, with those alterations which it afterwards received, might be gradually introduced. The apostles seem to have taught chiefly in large cities; they settled ministers there, who preaching in country villages or smaller towns increased the number of converts: it would have been most reasonable, that those new converts, which lay at a considerable distance from the large towns, should, when they grew numerous, have formed themselves into distinct churches, under the care of their proper pastors or bishops, independent on any of their neighbours; but the reverence which would naturally be paid to men who had conversed with the apostles, and perhaps some desire of influence and dominion, from which the hearts of very good men might not be entirely free, and which early begun to work, (3 *John* ver. 9. 2 *Thess.* ii. 7.) might easily lay a foundation for such a subordination in the ministers of new erected churches to those which were more *ancient*; and much more easily might the superiority of a pastor to his assistant presbyters increase, till it at length came to that great difference, which we own was early made, and probably soon carried to an excess. And if there was that degeneracy in the church, and defection from the purity and vigour of religion, which the learned *Vitringa* supposes to have happened between the time of *Nero* and *Trajan*, it would be less surprising, that those evil principles, which occasioned episcopal and at length the *Papal* usurpation, should before that time exert some considerable influence.

Vitringa's Observ. l. iv. c. vii, viii.

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SCHOLIUM 3.

It might be very expedient, upon the principles of christian prudence, that, where it can be accomplished, every *pastor* of a *large* congregation should still have *assistent* ministers; and some *presidents* among the pastors of *different* congregations, when they are meeting about any public business, is what common sense dictates in such circumstances: and if instead of a *chair-man* chosen for that particular time and occasion, some person of experienced, approved fidelity and ability, should be appointed to exercise some stated over-sight over a few of the neighbouring congregations, it might perhaps be attended with such consequences, as would render such a sort of discipline not only tolerable, but eligible. Something of this kind was projected in archbishop Usher's plan for the reduction of episcopacy, by which he would have moderated it in such a manner, as to have brought it very near the *presbyterian* government of the *Scotch* church; the weekly *parochial vestry* answering to their *church-session*; the *monthly synod*, to be held by the *Chorepiscopi*, answering to their *presbyteries*; the *diocesan synod* to their *provincial*, and the *national* to their *general assembly*. The meeting of the *dean* and *chapter*, practised in the church of *England*, is but a faint shadow of the *second*, the *ecclesiastical court* of the *third*, and the *convocation* of the *fourth*.

Hist. of Nonconf. p. 339—344. | *Hall's Modest Offer*, ap. *Op.* p. 582—586.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It seems there was not a perfect uniformity among all the primitive churches in this respect; the power of the *bishops* seems to have prevailed early in *Rome*, that of the *presbytery* at *Alexandria*, and at *Carthage*, such a discipline as comes nearest to that which is now called *congregational*.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It seems to be solidly argued from 1 *Tim.* v. 17. that there were in the primitive church some *elders*, who did not use to *preach*: nothing very express is said concerning them; only it seems to be intimated *James* v. 14. that they *prayed with the sick*. It may be very expedient, even on the principles of human prudence, to appoint some of the more grave and honourable members of the society to join with the pastor in the over-sight of it, who may constitute a kind of *council* with him, to deliberate of affairs in which the society is concerned, and prepare them for being brought before the church for its decision, to pray with the sick, to reconcile differences, &c. but there does not seem any sufficient warrant for making them a kind of *judicatory*, to whose decisions the rest of the society is to submit; and those rules relating to *presbyteries*, *classes*, *provincials*, and *general assemblies*, which are determined by the

the constitution of the church of *Scotland*, most evidently appear to be at best merely matters of human discretion, and to have no express foundation in the word of God; nor can we trace the existence of such ruling elders higher than *Constantine's* time.

Maurice Social Rel. Dial. iii. p. 143

—148.

Whitby on 1 Tim. v. 17.

Blond. de Jure Pleb. pass.

Thornd. of Rel. Assemb. c. iv. p. 96, 97.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is a very precarious and uncomfortable foundation for christian hope, which is laid in the doctrine of an *uninterrupted succession* of bishops, and which makes the validity of the administration of christian ministers depend upon such a succession; since there is so great a darkness upon many periods of ecclesiastical history, insomuch that it is not agreed, who were the *seven first* bishops of the church of *Rome*, though that church were so celebrated; and *Eusebius* himself, from whom the greatest patrons of this doctrine have made their catalogues, expressly owns, that it is no easy matter to tell who succeeded the apostles in the government of the churches, excepting such as may be collected from *St. Paul's* own words. See *Euseb. quoted Prop. 150. §. 1. N^o. iv.* Contested elections in almost all considerable cities make it very dubious which were the *true* bishops, and decrees of councils, rendering all those ordinations null, where any *simoniacal* contract was the foundation of them, makes it impossible to prove, at least on the principles of the *Romish* church, that there is now upon earth any one person, who is a legal successor of the apostles, and renders hereditary right as precarious in ecclesiastical, as it certainly is in civil affairs.

Calamy's Life of Baxter, vol. i. p. 122

—134.

Independ. Whig, N^o. vii, viii.

Chandler's Serm. against Pop. p. 34—37.

ap. Salt. Hall Lett.

Calamy's Def. of Nonconf. vol. i. p. 162.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Mr. *Jones* has undertaken to prove at large, that the ordination of our *English bishops* cannot be traced up to the church of *Rome* as its original; that in the year 668, the successors of *Austin* the Monk (who came over *A. D.* 596,) being almost entirely extinct, by far the greatest part of the bishops were of *Scottish* ordination by *Aiden* and *Finan*, who came out of the *Culdee* monastery of *Columbanus*, and were no more than *presbyters*; though, when the princes of the northern nations were converted by them, they made them *bishops*, (*i. e.* gave them authority over the clergy,) and took other bishops from amongst their converts. So that deny-

nying the validity of *presbyterian* ordination, shakes the foundation of the episcopal church of *England*.

Jones on the Heart, § 9 *. | *Bede's Eccles. Hist.* l. iii. c. iii—v. *præf.* p. 266, &c.

PROPOSITION CLI.

It is the duty of *Christians* to observe *one day in seven*, and the *first* of the week, as a day of religious *rest*, and *publick worship*.

DEMONSTRATION.

LECT. *Prop.* 76. gr. 6. | I. Natural religion requires, that there should be certain seasons of solemn public worship, universally agreed upon among the members of the same society; but it does not determine how often they should occur, nor what proportion of our time should be employed in them.

2. Were there no intimation from the word of God upon this head, it would nevertheless be decent to pay some regard to the laws and usages of our country, so far at least as to abstain from such public labours as they forbid, and to assemble at some place of public worship; and (*cæt. par.*) at times so recommended rather than at other times: which will afford one evident reason for the observation of the *first* day of the week among us.

Wright on the Sabbath, p. 165—168.

3. God appointed for the *Jews* the observation of a *weekly sabbath*, *Exod.* xvi. 23. xx. 8—11. and the *rest* there appointed, is said to be in commemoration of God's having *rested* the *seventh* day from his work of creation.

3. | 4. This may be considered by us as an intimation of the *proportion* of time to be given by us to a religious rest, and so much the rather, as the observation of *one day in seven* seems to have been appointed to *Adam* in innocence, *Gen.* ii. 3. which it is unnatural to understand by way of *prolepsis*. Compare *Heb.* iv. 3, 4.

Wotton's Miscellany, vol. i. p. 291—293.

Nor is it improbable, that this might lay a foundation for dividing time into *weeks*, as so many of the ancient nations did. Compare *Gen.* viii. 10, 12. xxix. 27. l. 10. See the references to *Grotius* and *Selden*, under *Prop.* 109. gr. 2.

Strauchii Chronol. l. ii. c. ii. § 13. | *Watts of Holy Times*, &c. p. 5—10.
Allix on Script. vol. i. c. vii. p. 35—43. |

5. The peculiar place which this command had in the *Mosaic* law, as being a part of the ten commandments delivered by God's own voice from mount

* See *An account of the churches in Great-Britain*, in answer to *Jones*, by the bishop of St. Asaph. Sinai,

Sinai, and written as with his own hand on tables of stone among moral precepts of the highest importance, may further recommend it to some distinguishing regard.

1, 2, 4, 5. 6. It seems expedient, that we in this country, and other Christians, should observe one day in seven to the religious purposes above-mentioned; and so much the rather, as our engagements to the service of God are so great, and we are excused from those solemnities which the *Jews* observed at the feasts of the passover, pentecost, and tabernacles, besides other sacred times.

7. The apostles, who bore such eminent offices in the church, and were the appointed interpreters of the will of Christ, though they did observe the *Jewish sabbath*, resting, that they might not give offence, as well as for the opportunity of meeting and preaching to the *Jews* attending in their synagogues, *Acts* xiii. 14, 15, 42, 44. xvi. 13. xviii. 4. did also observe the *first day* as a day of religious worship, which, (waving *John* xx. 19, 26.) appears from *Acts* xx. 7. *1 Cor.* xvi. 2. hence this was called the *Lord's day*, *Rev.* i. 10. as it might very properly be, since on this day Christ rose from the dead, and the Spirit probably descended on the apostles. Dr. *Whitby* also contends for that argument from *Heb.* iv. 3. (Vid. *Whitby in Loc.*) but it seems not convincing.

8. The most ancient writers in the christian church agree in assuring us, that the observation of the *first day* prevailed early and constantly in it. *Ignatius* calls this *the queen of days*: *Melito* wrote a book concerning it. *Justin Martyr* and *Tertullian*, in their *apologies*, speak very expressly of stated christian assemblies held on this day; not to mention *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and many more: and *Pliny* likewise speaks of it as the sacred day of the Christians, a very few years after the death of St. *John*. Now we can hardly imagine that such an observation should so early and universally have prevailed, (for we find not that it was ever disputed,) had not the apostles directed to it.

Baxt. Works, vol. iii. p. 768—775. | *Watts* *ibid.* p. 72—76.

Wright on the Sab. p. 145—150.

9. There is no command in the new testament whereby Christians are obliged to observe the *seventh day*, but on the contrary, the apostle plainly intimates that it is abolished, *Col.* ii. 16.

7, 8, 9. 10. There is reason to believe, that the weekly sabbath now to be observed by Christians, is not the *seventh day* but the *first*. Compare gr. 2.

6, 10. 11. *Valet propositio.*

Morer on the Sabb. Dial. i. p. 44, 54,

56. *Dial.* ii. p. 109, 205, 206.

Barclay's Apology, Prop. xi. § 4.

Burnet on the Art. vii. p. 103, 104.

Barrow's Works, vol. i. p. 504—509.

Wright on the Sabbath, c. i. § 4, 5. p. 24.

—35.

Strauchii Chron. l. ii. c. ii. § 11.

Hallet on Script. vol. iii. Dis. ii. p. 166.

—186.

S C H O-

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT.
CXCIX.

Against the *fourth* step of the preceding demonstration it is pleaded, that we do not find that the sabbath was observed by the *patriarchs*; and some have thought that when it is mentioned, *Exod. xvi. 23.* it is intimated that it was before unknown by the *Israelitish* nation, *ibid. ver. 25—27.* It is answered,

1. That the texts quoted above will not prove that the *Israelites* knew nothing of the sabbath, but on the contrary they rather seem to refer to it as a thing known.
2. That if the *Israelites* in *Egypt* had neglected the sabbath, as it is probable (through the oppression of their enemies) they were forced to do, yet the patriarchs might have observed it, though that circumstance in their lives be not mentioned; and the *Israelites* might remember it, and esteem it a circumstance peculiarly grievous in their oppression, that they were forced to work on a sacred day, a consideration which would tend to perpetuate its remembrance, if it were ever known.
3. The observation of the sabbath is said by some to have been one of the *seven precepts of Noah*; though the authority of those from whom the account of these *seven precepts* is derived, must be acknowledged so dubious; that no great stress can be laid upon them, especially as some do not reckon the sabbath among those precepts.

Seld. de Jure, l. i. c. x. p. 116.

4. The sabbath might be observed as a day of some extraordinary devotion, though not as a day of such strict rest as was afterwards enjoined to the *Jews*.
5. Supposing the silence of *Moses*, in the very short account he gives us of the ancient patriarchs, to be ever so entire upon this head, no certain argument can be drawn from thence; for upon this principle we might argue, that the patriarchs had no stated time for the worship of God, which is very incredible; and also that the *Jews* did not observe the sabbath from *Moses* to *David*, since in the history of all that time, there is no mention of that day; as in the fifteen hundred years between the birth of *Seth* and the deluge no mention is made of sacrifices, and yet we have reason to believe they were practised in that period.
6. If it should be granted, that the observation of the sabbath was diffused among the antediluvian patriarchs, it cannot be argued from thence, that it was not instituted at the creation; the heads of the *Abrahamic* family were so remarkable for their devotion, that the strict observation of the sabbath in their days might be the less necessary.

Owen on Heb. iv. 2. Exer. ii. § 9, 10, 13—16.

Morer's Dial. ii. p. 102, 103, 148—156, 162—167, 206—208.

Patriarchal Sabbath, pass.

Heylin's Hist. of the Sab. part i. c. i, ii, iii.

Wotton's Misc. vol. i. N°. iv.

Watts on Holy Times, &c. p. 10—16.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Against the argument drawn from the *fourth* commandment, *gr.* 5. some have argued, that the pronouncing those words from mount *Sinai* with an audible voice was no proof of their extraordinary and universal obligation, since God seems to have intended to have spoken the whole law in that manner, had not the terror of the people prevented, *Exod.* xx. 18, &c. *Deut.* v. 23—28. But it is answered, 1. That God's beginning with those precepts was some intimation of their importance, especially as he well knew the fears of the people would prevent his going on to utter more in this audible manner; and indeed *Deut.* xi. 22. intimates a pause immediately after the uttering those words; otherwise there would have been no decent room for the people to have spoken as they did. 2. His engraving those ten commandments on tables of stone in a miraculous manner, and ordering them to be laid up in the ark, is a plain intimation of their peculiar weight, and a singular distinction worthy our regard. 3. The connection in which this precept stands with others, which all allow to be of the highest moment and universal obligation, is to be considered as an argument that it is not merely ceremonial.

Hallett on Scrip. vol. i. p. 152—160.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Nevertheless we allow, that the observation of the sabbath is not to be urged as of universal obligation, merely because it is to be found in the *Jewish* decalogue, and that its place there only obliged the *Jews*; since in the preface to those ten commandments, their deliverance from *Egypt* is urged as a reason for observing them, and the *fifth* commandment is enforced by promises peculiar to the *Jews*: not to insist on the addition, *Deut.* v. 15. which is probably to be considered as the words of *Moses*, not of God, and a comment on the fourth commandment, rather than a part of it.

Hallett ibid. p. 161—174.

| *Baxt. Works*, vol. iii. p. 778—781.

Mr. *Joseph Mede* conjectures, that the day of the *Jewish* sabbath was changed in the wilderness; which he endeavours to prove, by shewing that they travelled on the *seventh* day before the first of those sabbaths which we find they observed; compare *Exod.* xvi. 1, 22—26. and some have taken occasion from hence to assert, that the *patriarchal* sabbath was different from the *Jewish*, supposing *monday* to be the day on which God begun the creation; which, if it were, the *patriarchal* sabbath will be the same with what is now the *christian* *. But to this argument it is answered, 1. That the *sixth* day spoken of in the fore-

* See Dr. *Chandler's* two discourses on the institution of the sabbath.

cited text is not the *sixth* from the *fifteenth* of the month, but from the day on which the *Manna* began to fall, which might be the *first* in the week; or in general that it might signify the *sixth* of the week, whenever the manna began to fall: and, 2. That allowing it were (as *Mede* supposes) the *sixth* from their journey on the *fifteenth*, it will not prove a *change* in the sabbath; but only that *before* the giving the law on mount *Sinai*, a greater liberty of travelling on necessary occasions was allowed on the sabbath: not here to insist on the possibility there is, that the journey they took on the *fifteenth* day of the month might be only the *beginning* of their march from *Elim* to *Sinai*, and perhaps no more than would *after* the giving of the law have been allowed; nor to urge, that upon the signal given by *the cloud*, they might have marched on any future sabbath; as by special command sacrifice was offered in places not generally allowed by the law.

Mede on Ezek. xx. 20. p. 55—57.

Patriarch. Sab. p. 83—85. apud

Wotton's Misc. vol. i. p. 211, 212.

Hallet on Script. vol. iii. p. 105—108.

L'Enfant Introd. to the New Test. p. 152

—159. French, p. 128—134.

SCHOLIUM 4.

That the sabbath is an institution peculiar to the *Jews*, some have argued from *Deut. v. 15. Exod. xxxi. 13—17. Ezek. xx. 20. Neh. ix. 13, 14.* Dr. *Wright* has endeavoured to prove from *Luke xiii. ult.* that it was also intended to oblige *Christians*; but he seems to forget that the persons spoken of there were then *Jews*.

Wright on the Sab. p. 29. Ed. 2.

SCHOLIUM 5.

The rigour of the *Jewish* sabbath is by no means to be brought into the *christian* constitution, since there is such a silence in the new testament upon that head.

Watts ibid. p. 20—24.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Some have insisted on an observation both of the *seventh* and the *first* day; as imagining that the *fourth* commandment, in its most literal sense designing the particular *time* as well as the *proportion*, is obligatory upon all *Christians*. But it has been answered, that in arguing thus they are but little consistent with themselves: since that commandment requires *six* days of *labour*, as well as *one* of *rest*. Compare *Schol. 3. and Dem. gr. 9.*

Baxter's Works, vol. iii. p. 803, 804.

SCHOLIUM 7.

It signifies little at what *hour* the sabbath is *begun*, if one day be allotted to it. It is plain from *Jerome*, that some ancient Christians, (as some foreign protestants now do) returned to their secular employments and diversions on the evening of the *Lord's day*; but then they began their sabbath on the *saturday evening*: and we are the less to wonder if the primitive Christians took some liberty this way, since they had public worship three days in the week besides, viz. *tuesday*, *thursday*, and *saturday*.

Wright on the Sab. p. 10—13.

Morer's Dial. ii. p. 233—238.

| *King's Enquiry*, l. ii. c. vii. § 11. c. viii.
§ 2.

SCHOLIUM 8.

As it is impossible certainly to determine which is the *seventh* day from the creation, and as (in consequence of the spherical form of the earth, and the absurdity of the scheme which supposes it one great plain,) the change of place will necessarily occasion some alteration in the time of the beginning and ending of any day in question, it being always at the same time, some where or other, sun-rising and sun-setting, noon and midnight; it seems very unreasonable to lay such a stress upon the particular day, as some do, or to require any stronger argument than those assigned above, *gr.* 7, 8, 9. for the *change* of it from the *seventh* to the *first*: it seems abundantly sufficient, that there be *six* days of labour, and *one* of religious rest, which there will be upon the *christian* as well as the *Jewish* scheme.

Watts ibid. p. 49—58.

Wallis on the Sab. p. 79—85.

| *Fabricii Biblioth. Græc.* vol. ii. p. 609—
612.

SCHOLIUM 9.

One reason, why the abolition of the *seventh* and observation of the *first* day is no more plainly declared in the new testament, might be out of regard to the *Jewish* Christians, who could not without great difficulty and inconvenience have come immediately into a total change, or strictly have observed both; and this may answer the argument from *Matt.* xxiv. 20.

Watts ibid. p. 58—62, & 65—71.

DEFINITION XCIV.

Those rites of the christian institution, which were intended to be solemn *LECT.* tokens of our accepting the gospel covenant, peculiar to those who did *CC.* so accept it, and to be considered by them as tokens of the divine acceptance, on that supposition may properly be called SEALS OF THE COVENANT.

T t t 2

P R O.

PROPOSITION CLII.

The law of Christ requires that all who believe the gospel should be baptized; *i. e.* should be separated from unbelievers, and joined to the visible christian church, by being solemnly washed with water; which washing is on the one hand, to signify their faith in Christ, and resolution of holy obedience, and on the other, to confirm their faith in the gospel-promises of pardon, sanctification, and eternal life.

N. B. The proposition is to be understood only as speaking of persons as yet unbaptized; and it will afterwards be enquired, whether it extends to those to whom this rite in its main parts at least has been already administered, whether in infancy, or upon a pretence of faith at riper years.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Our Lord expressly appointed that believers should in a solemn manner be washed with water; *Matt.* xxviii. 19. *Mark* xvi. 16. to which there may also be some allusion, *John* iii. 5. this is further confirmed by *Acts* ii. 41. viii. 12, 37. xxii. 16.

2. That this is to express faith in Christ in those who are baptized, and solemnly to declare their resolution of openly professing his religion and cultivating real and universal holiness, (their obligation to which is hereby confirmed,) appears from *Rom.* vi. 3, 4. *1 Pet.* iii. 21. *Eph.* v. 26. and *Tit.* iii. 5. has generally been added to this catalogue, as referring to baptism, but of that more hereafter.

3. That God did hereby give to believers a token of the forgiveness of their sins, according to the terms of the gospel covenant, does also appear from *Acts* ii. 38. xxii. 16. *Tit.* iii. 4—7.

1, 2, 3, 4. It appears that Christ instituted such an ordinance as baptism, for the purposes mentioned in the proposition, to those who should believe his gospel.

5. There is no reason to apprehend, that this was peculiar to the apostolic age; since the reasons on which it is founded are common to all ages; and our Lord seems to intimate its perpetual continuance in the church, *Matt.* xxviii. 20.

4, 5, 6. *Valet propositio.*

Baxt. Inf. Church Memb. p. 341—343. | *Berry-street Lect.* vol. ii. p. 193—200.
Barclay's Apology, Prop. xii.

COROLLARY I.

It is evidently a prostitution of the ordinance of baptism, to administer it to any adult person, who does not make a credible profession of his faith in Christ and subjection to the gospel.

COROLLARY

COROLLARY 2.

It is the duty of those by whom baptism is to be administered, to make diligent inquiry into the character of those whom they admit to it; whether they have a competent knowledge of the gospel, and give reason to believe they will behave in a manner becoming members of the christian church.

COROLLARY 3.

It is fit that baptism should be administered only by the teachers and ministers of the church, where their assistance can be had; not only because it appears that these were the persons by whom it was administered in the new testament, but because (*cet. par.*) they must be most capable of judging who are the fit subjects of it. Vid. Cor. 2.

COROLLARY 4.

There is a sense in which baptism may be called a *seal* of the covenant of grace; for though the benefits of the covenant are secured to every believer by the death of Christ, which was the great foundation of it, yet baptism plainly appears by the proposition to answer to definition 94, which is the sense in which *circumcision* is called the *seal of the righteousness of faith* by the apostle, Rom. iv. 11. and *God's covenant in the flesh*, Gen. xviii. 13.

Baxt. and Bedford's Letter, ap. Baxt. of Church Memb. p. 347—366.

COROLLARY 5.

Baptism is not to be *repeated*; since it is a right of initiation into Christ's church; and though it will afterwards appear, that vicious members are to be cast out, yet there is no hint in scripture, that when re-admitted they are to be baptized again: compare 2 Cor. ii. 6—8. Nevertheless, consistently with this, those persons might be baptized in the name of Jesus, as the Messiah *already come*, who had before been baptized by John and his disciples into the general expectation of a Messiah *shortly to be revealed*. Compare Acts xix. 5.

Burn. on Art. xxvii. p. 275, 276. | Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxix. § 6, 8, 11.
Wall of Inf. Bapt. part ii. c. v. § 5, 6. | Bens. Prop. Christian. vol. ii. p. 142, 143.

COROLLARY 6.

Though it be allowed not essential to baptism, that the names of Father, Son, and holy Ghost should be expressly pronounced, since sometimes mention is only made of baptizing into the name of Christ, as above; yet considering how express Matt. xxviii. 19. is, it seems highly expedient these names should generally be used; and the forecited text Acts xix. 2, 3. seems plainly to prove that

that the name of the Spirit was generally at least expressly mentioned in christian baptism: and it seems essential to the ordinance, that every adult person receiving it should be instructed in the distinct characters of each of these sacred persons in the work of our redemption, and should solemnly profess a correspondent regard to each.

Wits. Œcon. Fœd. l. iv. c. xvi. § 16. | *Hooker's Eccles. Polity, l. v. § 58, 61.*
Tillot's Works, vol. i. Sermon lxx. p. 513.

COROLLARY 7.

The *naming* the baptized person is by no means any part of this institution, and when it is used, is to be considered as an address to the person, calling him by his name, rather than as the manner of giving a name to him; though it is very probable, the custom of naming a child at baptism might arise from the practice of the *Jews* at their *circumcision*, *Luke i. 59—63. ii. 21.*

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. The *Quakers* assert, that *water* baptism was never intended to continue in the CCI. church of Christ, any longer than while *Jewish* prejudices made such an external ceremony necessary; which they argue from that passage, in which *one* baptism is spoken of as necessary to Christians, *Eph. iv. 5.* which say they must be a baptism of the *Spirit*. But from comparing the texts mentioned above, it will plainly appear, that *water-baptism* was instituted by Christ in more general terms than will agree with this explication. That it was administered to all the *Gentile* converts, and not confined to the *Jews*, appears from *Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.* compare *Acts x. 47.* that the baptism of the Spirit did not supersede *water-baptism*, appears to have been the judgment of *Peter*, and those that were with him: so that the *one* baptism spoken of seems to be that of *water*, the communication of the Holy Spirit being only called baptism in a figurative sense. As for any objection which could be drawn from *1 Cor. i. 17.* it is sufficiently answered by the preceding verses, and all the many texts, in which, (in epistles written long after this) the apostle speaks of *all* Christians as baptized; and argues from the obligation of baptism, in such a manner as we can never imagine he would have done, had he apprehended it was the will of God it should be discontinued in the church. Compare *Rom. vi. 3, &c. Col. ii. 12. Gal. iii. 27.*

Besse's Defence of Quakerism, § 15. | *Gale's Sermons, vol. ii. N°. viii.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Mr. *Emlyn*, and several of the *Socinians* have maintained, that baptism was and is only to be used by those who are converted to christianity from a different profession, the pollutions of which are considered as washed away by it:

it: and they assert, that though the children of such converts were to be baptized with their parents, all that descended from them after they were initiated into the christian church were to be considered as baptized in them; and the practice of *profelyte baptism* among the *Jews* is urged, as what must direct the apostles to such an interpretation of the words of Christ, *Matt. xxviii. 19.* It is answered,

1. That the antiquity of this practice of *profelyte baptism* among the *Jews* is a matter of considerable debate: yet upon the whole, there is so much probability on the side of the fact, from the tenour and genius of the *Mosaic* law, as well as from some incontestible passages in very early *Jewish* writers, that this answer is hardly to be supported.

2. That supposing it to be older than our Saviour's time, the apostles might not know all the rules relating to it, any more than common mechanics amongst us know the laws of the naturalization of foreigners; especially considering the afflicted state of the *Jews* at that time, which was such, as would not be likely to invite strangers to incorporate with them; so that perhaps instances of this seldom occurred; and the many *washings* among the *Jews* might make this rite as applied to *profelytes* less taken notice of; especially as it might seem so very inconsiderable, when compared with the *circumcision* of males, which also necessarily attended their *profelytism*. What the *Rabbies* say of the extraordinary solemnity with which this rite was to be administered, is far from being authentic evidence.

3. It is probable some of the rules of *profelyte baptism* did not prevail among them so early, particularly that which supposed that all natural relations were cancelled by it. It may therefore be difficult certainly to determine, what was exactly the custom in this respect; and if we were to allow it to be such as the *Rabbies* in after ages describe it, then it can never be imagined that our Lord would direct his apostles in all respects to conform themselves to it; and if not in all, who can say exactly in how many?

4. Though it is acknowledged, that we do not meet with any instance in the earliest primitive antiquity, in which the baptism of any child of christian parents, whether infant or adult, is expressly mentioned; yet it is certain, that Christians in general have always been spoken of, by the most ancient fathers, as *baptized persons*; and the apostles, when writing to christian churches planted many years before the date of their respective epistles, argue with the members of them from the obligation which their baptism brought upon them, in such a manner as would lead us to conclude, that they were baptized in their own persons: and it is also certain, that as far as our knowledge of primitive antiquity reaches, no unbaptized person received the Lord's supper; which yet was an ordinance, none will deny that the descendants of Christians received. Dr. *Benson* adds, that on this supposition *genealogies* would be of great importance in religion, contrary to what *St. Paul* intimates; nor can we reasonably think, God would put our

our right to christian communion upon a fact, the evidence of which might sometimes be so obscure, as the baptism of some remote ancestor.

Emlyn's Previous Question.

Gale's Sermons, vol. ii. N^o. ix.

Benson on 2 Tim. p. 134—136.

Whist. Life, vol. i. p. 367, 368.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Mr. *Joseph Mede* supposes, not without some considerable appearance of reason, that baptism has a reference to washing a new-born infant from the pollution of the birth. Compare 1 *Pet.* iii. 21. *Tit.* iii. 5. compare *Ezek.* xvi. 4, 5.

Mede's Diatribe on Tit. iii. 5. apud Op. p. 63, 64.

SCHOLIUM 4.

As to the necessity of baptism, some seem to have laid too great a stress upon it, as if it were absolutely necessary in order to salvation, grounding their argument chiefly on *John* iii. 5. *Mark* xvi. 16. nevertheless it will be readily allowed, that for any to abstain from baptism, when he knows it is an institution of Christ, and that it is the will of Christ that he should subject himself to it, is such an act of disobedience to his authority, as is inconsistent with true faith.

Wall on Inf. Bapt. part ii. c. vi.

Hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. v. § 59, 60.

Calvin's Institutions, l. iv. c. lxx. § 22.

— on *Gen.* xvii. 14.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Some have supposed, that God has connected with the administration of baptism some certain degree of the effusion of his Spirit, which the person baptized (*cæt. par.*) would not otherwise have received, and which always remains with the baptized persons, till forfeited by some act of wilful sin: but the proof from scripture seems very deficient on this head. The effusion of the Spirit on the baptized seems chiefly, if not only to refer to some *miraculous gift* conferred upon them, not always attended with saving grace: and all that we can reasonably promise ourselves from such an institution is, that on complying with this, as with any other evangelical precept, we may more cheerfully expect the blessing and presence of God with us in our christian course: nevertheless, God does not seem to have bound himself to this or any other ordinance whatsoever, in such a manner that extraordinary immediate influences should necessarily and inseparably be connected with it.

Clarke's Ess. on Bapt. p. 11—13. | *Bennet's Christian Orat. vol. i. p. 326—329.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

Mr. *Dodwell* carried the notion mentioned above so far as to suppose, that there goes along with the administration of baptism, if the person administering it

it be duly ordained, a certain *immortalizing Spirit*; whereas persons dying unbaptized are not immortal: and though Mr. *Hallet* does not assert it in express terms, he seems to intimate something very like it, when he expressly says, "that circumcision was that which gave the infant a right to immortality and eternal life, and that baptism in this very respect comes in the room of circumcision; yet that no infants are miserable in a future state."

Dodw. Script. Acc. of Rewards, § 24, | *Hallet on Script. vol. iii. p. 299—311 &*
47. | 333.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Upon the principles of the *third* and *fifth Schol.* above, many have maintained, that baptism is the christian *regeneration*, urging for that purpose *John* iii. 5. *Tit.* iii. 5. and the use of the word in primitive christian authors, where it is certain it has that sense: but we answer,

1. That if by *regeneration*, we are to understand that which makes a man a child of God, and an heir of eternal life, according to the promises of scripture, it is certain from the whole tenour of scripture, (*Vid. Prop. 137 & 145.*) that baptism *alone* is not sufficient for this purpose: and it is plain in fact, that persons may be baptized, while they continue unrenewed and liable to divine condemnation.

2. That the utmost which the forecited text in *John* can signify is, that a person in order to his being a regular member of the christian church must be baptized, having received the purifying influences of the Spirit: and if *λὴρον παλυσενείας* in *Titus*, be rendered *of the laver of regeneration*, and explained of baptism, it can only signify the *laver* in which *the regenerate* are to be washed; and it would be as absurd to say, *Christians are regenerated by that*, as it would be to say, *Christians are generated or born in the water*, with which the pollution of the womb is washed away.

3. That on this principle, regeneration in adult persons is a necessary *preparatory* to baptism, (as it is certain holiness is by the argument in the proposition) and therefore must be something *different* from it.

4. That nevertheless, as in the earliest days of the primitive church, persons being brought to embrace christianity were immediately baptized, the time of their baptism and that of their conversion being spoken of as one, and as the time when they were as it were born into a new world, and joined to the family of God's children, it is no wonder that the *action*, by which they testified that change so lately made, should sometimes be put for that *change* itself: and thus *illuminati* also signifies the same with baptized persons; not that they were illuminated by baptism, but because they were generally baptized as soon as enlightened with the knowledge of christianity; and it is plain that the word *παλυσενείας* is often put for *any great change*.

Suicer's Thesaur. in verb. παλυσεν. & illuminat.

Cicero ad Atticum, l. vi. Let. vi.

Waterland on Regen. pass.

Dodd. on Regen. Sermon. i. p. 29, 30.

& Postscript. to the Pref. Ed. 2.

Hebden on Regeneration.

U u u

P R O.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

LECT. To enquire whether the *immersion* of the whole body be an essential circumstance in baptism, or whether it may be administered by *sprinkling* or pouring on water.

SOLUTION.

1. In favour of *immersion* it is pleaded, that the word βαπτίζω, being derived from βαπτω, properly signifies to *plunge*: on the other hand it is urged, that in this diminutive and derivative form, it may signify *any* method of *washing*, and is sometimes used in scripture for washing things which were not dipped in water, but on which it was poured: compare *Luke* xi. 38. *Mark* vii. 4. and those scriptures in which the pouring out of the Spirit is called baptism; *Acts* i. 5, 8. xi. 15, 16, & *sim.* to which some add *1 Cor.* x. 2. and observe that βαπτίζω is never used for baptism.

Dr. Dan. Scott on Matt. xxviii. 19.

2. It is pleaded, that *plunging* alone represents our being *buried* with Christ in baptism, and consequently that this ceremony is essential: compare *Rom.* vi. 4. *Col.* ii. 12.

Ans. It is allowed that there is in this passage an allusion to that mode of baptism, which then generally prevailed: but in the institution of that ordinance, there is no declaration that it was chiefly designed to represent this; and persons were baptized, before it was generally known that Christ should die and arise from the dead. Our being *cleansed from sin* seems the thing primarily intended; which may well be represented by *pouring on* water: and as this more naturally represents the *pouring out of the Spirit*, the *sprinkling us with it*, and the *sprinkling of the blood of Jesus*, it may answer as valuable purposes as that mode, which more expressly represents a *death* and a *resurrection*.

3. The most considerable argument in favour of immersion is, that it was practised in the primitive ages. Several texts in the new testament plainly declare this, *Matt.* iii. 6, 16. *John* iii. 23. *Acts* viii. 36—39. and it appears by the *Fathers*, that this was at least generally retained, till *clinic* baptism, i. e. a baptism of the sick in their beds took place.—To this it has been answered, (waving Mr. *Morrice's* and Mr. *Hebden's* attempt, to prove that baptism by immersion was never certainly used in any one instance,) 1. That though immersion might *generally* be used, there are some cases in which it is dubious, whether the person were plunged or sprinkled: such great numbers were converted and baptized at the day of *pentecost*, that some think it would have been almost impossible to have plunged them all; nor can it be supposed, that being many of them strangers, and far from their own habitations, they had that change of raiment with them, which decency, conveniency, and safety would have

have required on that supposition. The *Jailor* and his family were baptized in the night: compare *Acts* xvi. 33. x. 47. 2. As some circumstances attending the institution of the *passover*, not being essential, were afterwards varied, *Exod.* xii. 11. and as some who insist on immersion, allow a change in some circumstances as to the administration of the *eucharist*, both as to time and gesture, and the form of the elements, we may on the same principles allow of some variation here from what was generally practised at first, especially as the coldness of the climate, and the general disuse of bathing among us seems to require it.

<i>Wits. Œcon. Fœd.</i> l. iv. c. xvi. § 13, 14.	<i>Turret. Loc.</i> xix. <i>Quæst.</i> xi. § 12.
<i>Wall of Infant Bapt.</i> part ii. c. ix.	<i>Berry-street Lect.</i> vol. ii. p. 205—207.
<i>Gale against Wall, Lett.</i> iii, iv. v.	<i>Shaw's Trav. Pref.</i> p. 4.
<i>Wall against Gale</i> , p. 96—137.	<i>Guyse's Par. on the New Test.</i> vol. i. p. 12*.

COROLLARY I.

It will appear from hence, that they who practise baptism by immersion, are by no means to be condemned on that account; since on the whole that mode of baptism is evidently favoured by scripture examples, though not required by express precept.

COROLLARY 2.

Nevertheless, considering how little stress is laid on what is merely ceremonial and circumstantial in the christian dispensation, considering how effectually the main ends of the ordinance may be secured without immersion, and how weak some of the arguments for its universal obligation are, those who approve and practise it ought at least to be candid towards those who differ from them; and act without sufficient warrant, if they separate from such acts of communion with them, as they might otherwise esteem proper expressions of mutual love, and of their common hope in the gospel.

SCHOLIUM.

In answer to the argument hinted at above, from the *coldness of our climate*, it has been urged, that, till within these few centuries, baptism by *immersion* was the general practice here in *England*, as it is to this day in *Russia*: and where any particular case required such a precaution, *warm* water might be used instead of cold.

Wall's Defence, p. 144, 145, 403—408.

* See Mr. *Towgood's* pamphlet on the mode of baptism.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

LECT. To give a brief view of the chief arguments for and against *infant baptism*,
 CCIII. *i. e.* applying that external rite described *Prop.* 152. to infants, so far as they
 are capable of receiving it.

SECT. I. The arguments for it are chiefly these.

Arg. I. The precepts of Christ concerning baptism were to be explained, by the custom prevailing among the *Jews* in his time: now, as when *profelytes* came over to the *Jewish* religion, the children were baptized with the parents, the apostles would naturally conclude, that children were included in the general commission, *Matt.* xxviii. 19.—It is answered,

1. That there is some uncertainty, whether *profelyte* baptism were used by the *Jews* in our Saviour's time.—On the whole, if infant baptism were used in *profelyting* persons to judaism, it might be natural for the apostles to think of it in making *profelytes* to christianity; and though it should be acknowledged, that at first they might not certainly know, whether the children born after their parents baptism should or should not be baptized, (it not being a point wherein their duty was immediately concerned,) it might nevertheless be afterwards revealed to them, as contained in that commission they then received, as we know the preaching the gospel to the Gentiles was, though they did not at first know that their commission extended to it.

2. That if it did prevail, on the principles of the *pædo-baptists*, it could not be intended as an entire model for baptism; since it would then dissolve the nearest relations contracted before baptism, and would render it unjustifiable to baptize the children born after their parents baptism.—It is replied, it might be a model in the *leading* circumstances, though not in others of a more minute kind.

Arg. II. The apostles are said to have baptized *whole families*, *Acts* xvi. 15, 33. *1 Cor.* i. 16. and therefore probably infants among the rest.—It is answered,

1. That it is not certain there were any infants in those families.

2. If there were, it is reasonable to believe, that when it is said *whole families* were baptized, it is only meant, that the ordinance was administered to those of the family, that were the proper subjects of baptism; and it is the more reasonable to acquiesce in this interpretation, because *whole houses* also are said to believe, *Acts* xvi. 32, 34.

Arg. III. Our Lord says, *Mark* x. 14. speaking of infants, *of such is the kingdom of heaven*: which some understand, *q. d.* the rights and privileges of the christian church belong to such.—It is answered, the word *τοιοῦτοι* there used may signify, not those that are infants in *age*, but persons who in the temper and disposition of their mind resemble the simplicity and innocence of children, which the connection seems to favour.

Hallet on Script. vol. iii. p. 322, 323.

Arg.

Arg. IV. Circumcision, as applied to *Abraham*, was a seal of the righteousness of faith, *Rom. iv. 11.* or a token of his being accepted of God as righteous upon his believing; and confirmed a covenant, by which spiritual and eternal blessings were promised to him, as our Lord argues, *Matt. xxii. 31, 32.* and the apostle *Heb. xi. 16.* in both which places it is strongly declared, that for God to call himself the God of *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, implies his providing for them the blessings of a future state. The apostle does also expressly assert, that Christians are the children of *Abraham*, as they are heirs of the blessings promised to him, *Rom. iv. 11—17. Gal. iii. 6—18, 29.* Now forasmuch as the seal of this covenant was by God's express command to be applied to infants, *Gen. xvii. 1—4.* it not only shews, that there is no absurdity in supposing the seal of the covenant of grace to be so applied, but lays a foundation for a strong presumption, that the children of believers under the christian dispensation should not be cut off from this conditional, though not absolute, token of the divine favour to them, at least without some express declaration in the New Testament for that purpose: yet we are so far from finding any declaration, that the contrary seems to be strongly intimated, *Acts ii. 39.* and *Rom. xi. 17, &c.* where the apostle representing the Gentiles as grafted upon the stock of the Jewish church, and the Jews as hereafter to be grafted on their own stock, seems likewise further to imply, that the privileges of the seed of believers were still the same. Some also urge *Jer. xxx. 20.* and *Isa. lxv. 23.* as expressly declaring that children should be put upon the same foundation under the gospel as under the law; which indeed the passages do appear to intimate.—To this it is answered,

1. That circumcision was to the seed of *Abraham* only a seal of a temporal covenant: but this is sufficiently confuted by what has been already observed. So that on the whole it appears, that as circumcision sealed to Jewish infants their inheritance in the land of *Canaan*, and title to the peculiar privileges of the Jewish nation, on condition of their observing the *Mosaic* law; so it likewise assured them, that if they imitated the faith of *Abraham*, they should, though they had no perfect righteousness of their own, be finally accepted of God, as their father *Abraham* was; which was not a promise of the *Mosaic* law, tho' (as the apostle justly argues in the above-cited, *Gal. iii. 17.*) that law could not abrogate it. See *John vii. 22.*

2. It is pleaded, that the Jewish dispensation, being more imperfect, is not to be made the model of the Christian. But it is replied, we ought to have strong reason to believe the latter less favourable than the former, before we grant that in any article it is so. If it be objected, that infant baptism is no benefit, it will be considered afterwards.

3. To the argument drawn from *Acts ii. 39.* it is replied, that the words may be understood, *q. d.* "your seed in every generation shall on their believing receive those spiritual blessings, which are now by the gospel offered to you; and your sons and daughters shall at present receive the extraordinary communications of the Spirit, foretold in *Joel* and displayed in us." But the latter

latter part of this paraphrase does not seem to suit with what is added, *to all those that are afar off*, which some would explain, "even to all those (*i. e.* of "your descendants,) that are at the remotest distance;" though I should rather think it signifies, "to those among the Gentiles which shall be converted, "as well as to you." It is also to be considered, what interpretation a Jew would naturally put on these words.—Much the same reply and remarks may be applied to the other texts.—Some urge *Gal. iii. 28.* as a further illustration of this argument; supposing it a clear proof that baptism came directly *in the room* of circumcision; that being the only instance, except the priesthood, (from which *women* are by the gospel excluded, *1 Cor. xiv. 34. 1 Tim. ii. 12.*) in which there was a distinction made by the law between persons of different sexes, and *Col. ii. 11, 12.* has also been urged, as expressly asserting that baptism is *christian circumcision*: but it may be replied, it only signifies that baptism obliges us to that *mortification*, which is the true christian circumcision*.

Watts's Harm. of Div. Disp. c. iv. p. 29—34.

Arg. V. The words of the apostle, *1 Cor. vii. 14.* are pleaded, as having a direct reference to infant baptism; since *holy* often signifies those that might be admitted to sacred rites, and *unclean* those that were to be excluded from them, *Exod. xix. 6. Lev. xxi. 6, 7. 2 Chron. xxiii. 6. Ezra ix. 2. 1 Sam. xxi. 5.* compared with *Exod. xix. 15. Lev. xi. 24, 25.* and the sense will be, *q. d.* "were "not the matrimonial converse of a believer and unbeliever lawful, the church "would not encourage the bringing such children to be baptized, which yet we "know it does." But other interpretations are brought; particularly

1. That *holy* may signify legitimate, and *unclean*, bastards. But this, besides that it is an unusual sense of the words, would make the argument very weak, and be almost proving *idem per idem*.

2. That it may intimate the prospect of the conversion of the unconverted parent, and consequently of having the children bred up Christians. But they might be so educated, even though the heathen parents were not converted, which would entirely enervate this answer.

Hallet, vol. iii. p. 325—329.

LECT. CCIV. *Arg. VI.* Some have apprehended, that they have been able to trace such intimations at least of infant baptism, in the earliest ages of the church, as may to a high degree of probability prove it an apostolic, and consequently divine institution†.

1. *Hermas* says, "the baptism of water is necessary to all."

* See on this argument *Dr. Taylor* on the covenant of grace.

† See on this subject, (besides *Wall* and *Gale*,) *Towgood's* baptism of infants a reasonable service, p. 30—48. with the controversy between *Dr. Gill* and *Mr. Breckell*.

Ans.

Ans. The *pastor of Hermas* is a visionary book, the genuineness of which is far from being certain; but allowing it to have ever so much weight, this will only prove, that baptism is necessary to those who are the proper subjects of it; but cannot determine that infants are so.

Wall of Inf. Bapt. part i. c. i.

2. *Irenæus* (*adv. Hæret. l. ii. c. xxxix.*) mentions *infants* among *the regenerate*, i. e. the baptized, as the word generally signifies in his writings.

Ans. We have only a *Latin* translation of this work, and some critics have supposed this passage spurious: or allowing it to be genuine, it will not be granted, that *to be regenerate* always in his writings signifies *baptized*; nor is it certain, how far the fathers extended the period of infancy: but this last answer can be of no avail, as he distinguishes infants from *parvuli* and *pueri*.

Wall ibid. c. iii.

Gale against Wall, Ep. xii

| *Watts's Def. c. xii. p. 282—288, & 315—356*

3. *Justin Martyr* speaks of some, “who had been made disciples from their infancy:” but this may only refer to their having been early instructed in the principles of the christian religion.

Just. Mart. Works, p. 62. B.

| *Reeves's Apol. vol. i. p. 39.*

4. There is indeed a remarkable passage in *The questions and answers to the orthodox*, (*Quest. lvi. p. 424.*) which most evidently mentions infant baptism in as express terms as possible, enquiring into the different states of those children, who were and who were not baptized, at the general resurrection. But though these questions are ascribed to *Justin Martyr*, and are no doubt of considerable antiquity, there is no evidence that he was the author of them, nor can their age be so exactly ascertained, as on this occasion and many others one could desire.

5. It is allowed there are many passages in *Origen*, that expressly refer to infant baptism; but they are chiefly to be found in those translations of his *Greek* works which were done by *Ruffinus* and *Jerome*, who made some very bold alterations according to their own judgment and taste: but this is not applicable to all the passages brought from him. And it is to be remembered, that he was born of christian ancestors, as his father having been martyred in the year 202, when *Origen* himself was 17 years old, the remoter Christians of his family must probably have been nearly contemporary with the apostles. It may be added, that the translations of *Jerome*, which are often referred to on this occasion, were by no means so lax as those of *Ruffinus*.

Wall's Append. p. 13.

| *Wall's Defence, p. 372—383.*

6. *Cyprian*

6. *Cyprian* is allowed by all to speak expressly of infant baptism, as generally used in the church: but it is justly answered, that he speaks as expressly of infant communion in the *eucharist*; and consequently that the divine original of the latter may as well be argued from him as that of the former; yet almost all pædo-baptists allow that to be an innovation.

7. *Tertullian* advises parents to defer the baptizing their children, except where their lives were in danger; which plainly shews it was used in his time. This the anti-pædo-baptists allow, and suppose the practice arose first in *Africa*, and then came generally to prevail else-where, from the mistaken apprehension that baptism was absolutely necessary to salvation.

8. In the *Apostolic Constitutions*, which are allowed to be an *ancient*, though not divine book, there is express mention made of infant baptism as commanded by Christ, in *Matt. xix. 14.*

Apost. Const. l. vi. § 16. p. 364.

It is replied, that so many superstitions are introduced in this book, that there is no reason to rely much on its authority: and that in the ritual of baptism, *l. viii. § 8.* there is no rubric for infant baptism, nor any form to be used in performing that office: but it is answered, this being only the rubric for *weekly worship*, there is no rule for baptizing any, the prayers relating only to those already baptized; and those words of the deacon, § 12. *Let the mother receive the infant*, makes it plain, that *infant communion*, as well as infant baptism were then used; which indeed enervates any arguments that are brought from the supposed antiquity of these *Constitutions*.

Chapm. Manner of Bapt. p. 27—40.

Jacks. Cred. of Script. l. ii. § 1. c. v.

p. 258—262. ap. Op. l. ii. c. v.

vol. i. p. 190—193.

Peirce on the Euch. p. 77—81.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxviii.

Taylor's Pract. Disc. p. 286—297.

Towgood's Inf. Bapt. a reasonable Service.*

LECT. SECT. II. Arguments against infant baptism †.

CCV.

Arg. I. It is pleaded, that infants are incapable of complying with the terms required in order to baptism, *i. e.* repentance and faith, and of receiving those instructions which Christ directed as previous to it, *Matt. xxviii. 19.* compare *1 Pet. iii. 21.*

It is answered, that those instructions and conditions were only required of those who were capable of them: thus, had Christ sent his apostles to proselyte men to the *Jewish* religion, he might have said, "go proselyte all nations, circumcising them in the name of the God of *Israel*, and teaching them to observe all things which *Moses* had commanded." As for the word *μαθητευσατε*, which some understand of *preaching* previous to baptism, it may signify,

* See also on this subject *Fleming's Plea for Infants*, with the *Appendix* and his *Defence*.

† See *Burroughs's* two discourses on positive institutions, N^o. ii.

make disciples, and that infants may be comprehended under that name, some have argued from *Acts* xv. 10.

Gale against Wall, Ep. vii, viii. | Whitby on Matt. xxviii. 19. with his Dissert.

Arg. II. It is said that infants are incapable of receiving any benefits by baptism, and consequently that the ordinance is exposed to contempt by applying it to them.

It is answered, 1. That it may be on many accounts both useful and comfortable to the *parents*, for whose sake it might perhaps be chiefly ordained. 2. That it may lay a foundation for serious and affecting addresses to the children, as they grow up: compare *Deut.* xxix. 10, 11. And by the way we may observe the difference between the expression there, and those used *Neb.* x. 28. which seems to have its foundation in the particular engagements relating to *marriage*, and in those relating to the one third part of a *shekel*, which they seemed voluntarily to impose upon themselves as an annual tribute, on which account it was natural to assemble the *adult* only. 3. That being thus entered into Christ's visible church, they have a share in the prayers offered for that church in general: to which some have added, that it is proper the ministers and elders of each respective society should maintain some particular inspection over the children belonging to it, to which inspection their being baptized may give them some additional title. But it is by a very particular turn of thought, that Mr. *Morrice*, in his dialogues, argues, that such relation to the church may bring them within the reach of its *censures*, in case of gross misbehaviour, which if allowed may be a considerable benefit: but perhaps it may be urged, that the counter-part to this is admitting them to the Lord's table, if they do nothing to deserve censure. 4. That considering circumcision as a seal of the covenant of grace, both this and the preceding argument would have lain as strongly against applying *that*, as applying *baptism* to infants. And indeed it is plain from that institution, as also from Christ's being baptized himself, that an ordinance may be sometimes administered to those, who are not capable of *all* the purposes for which it was originally instituted, and which it may answer to some others.

Baxt. Works, vol. iv. p. 135—138.

Calvin's Inst. l. iv. c. xix. § 4.

Taylor's Pract. Disc. p. 297—300.

Morrice's Social Rel. Dial. viii.

Arg. III. The *silence* of the New Testament upon this head, is further urged as an argument against infant baptism: it being said to be improbable, that if Christ had intended it, he should not have *commanded* it as expressly as *Moses* commanded circumcision.

It is answered, that *consequential* arguments are to be allowed their weight, as appears from our Lord's proof of a resurrection, *Matt.* xxii. 31, 32. And it has been pleaded on the other side, that had Christ intended to have *cut off* the infant seed of believers under the *christian* dispensation from any privileges, which

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they

they enjoyed under the *Mosaic*, he would have expressly declared it, or at least have guarded against any thing, that looks like an encouragement to expect and claim them, which from § 1. it evidently appears he has not.

Taylor *ibid.* p. 284—286.

Arg. IV. The silence of the primitive *Fathers* upon this head has been much insisted upon; and it is said, that some passages in them strongly *oppose* infant baptism, particularly that of *Justin Martyr*, in which he says, that a profession of faith is necessary in order to baptism; which notion gave occasion to the use of *sponsors*, when infant baptism was introduced.

It is replied, that *Justin* speaks of the *adult*, or may consider the confession of the sponsor as the child's, being made in his name; which is the more probable, as subsequent *Fathers* use the same language, long after infant baptism was confessedly the prevailing practice.

Wall's *Def.* p. 401.

| *Hooker's* *Eccles. Pol.* l. v. § 64. p. 335—340.

Tertullian is known to have declared against infant baptism, except in case of danger. *Gregory Nazianzen* advises to defer it till three years old. *Basil* blames his auditors for delaying it, which implies there were then many unbaptized persons among them; but these might not perhaps have been the children of christian parents; which answer may also serve to the argument brought from the case of those, who, like *Constantine*, deferred baptism to their death, on a foolish apprehension that all sins committed after it were unpardonable. It is indeed surprising that nothing more express is to be met with in antiquity upon this subject; but it is to be remembered, that when infant baptism is first apparently mentioned, we read of no remonstrance made against it as an *innovation*; and that as we have no instance of any persons expressly asserted to have been baptized in their infancy, so neither of any children of *christian* parents baptized at years of discretion; for it is certain *Constantine's* father did not profess himself a Christian, till long after he was born.

Euf. Vit. Const. l. i. c. xvi, xix. l. | *Gale's* *Epist.* ix.

iv. c. lxii.

| *Wall of Inf. Bapt.* part i. c. viii. & xi.

COROLLARY.

Since there is so great an obscurity on the question, and so many considerable things may be advanced on both sides, it is certainly very reasonable that Christians, whose persuasions relating to infant baptism are different, should maintain mutual candour towards each other, and avoid all severe and unkind censures on account of such difference.

Berry-street Lect. vol. ii. p. 206—208.

Drieb. de Bapt. c. iii. *præf.* § 13, 14.

| See *Wall, Gale, Rees, Stennet, Russel, &*

Baxter, on this Subject, passim.

S C H O-

SCHOLIUM.

A further question, distinct from any yet handled, may arise concerning baptism, *i. e.* whether it is to be repeated, if it have been received by those who were not the proper subjects of it. It seems that it *should not*; since it is evident, that when persons have been cast out of the christian church for their immoralities, the apostle, in the directions he gives concerning their re-admission on repentance, does not direct their being rebaptized; nor does *Peter* hint any thing of that kind to *Simon Magus*, *Acts* viii. 20, &c. and perhaps had the contrary principle been admitted and encouraged in scripture, difficulties might have arisen, which it was best to avoid, and too great a stress have been laid on what was merely ritual. As for the argument urged from *Acts* xix. 1—5. it is certain it cannot authorize the repetition of christian baptism, since that of *John* could not be so called; and it is certain that the person there spoken of had not been baptized so much as by *John* the baptist himself, or in a manner agreeable to the exact tenour of his baptism.

Drieberg de Bapt. & Cæn. c. iv. § 1—6. | Whiston's Life, vol. ii. p. 485—487.

PROPOSITION CLV.

The law of Christ requires, that Christians throughout all ages of the church should in a solemn manner eat bread and drink wine in their religious assemblies, as a commemoration of his death, and a token of their engagements to him, a pledge of the blessings of his covenant to be imparted to them, and a badge of their mutual affection to each other. L E C T. CCVI.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. Christ did in a solemn manner set apart bread and wine after the paschal supper, distributing each to his disciples for the purposes afterwards to be mentioned, *Matt.* xxvi. 26—28. *Mark* xiv. 22—26. *Luke* xxii. 14—20. *1 Cor.* xi. 20, &c. compare *Acts* ii. 42, 46.

2. *Matthew*, *Mark*, *Luke* and *Paul* in the forecited places agree, that this rite was intended for a commemoration of Christ, and a representation of his body broken and his blood shed; which must intimate, that we are hereby publicly to own that we are not ashamed of avowing ourselves the disciples of a crucified master, and that we desire to impress our minds with a scene of such great and awful importance.

3. As the abovementioned writers agree, that Christ, in delivering the cup, declared it to be the new covenant of his blood, or a token and representation of that covenant which was established by his sufferings; this must imply, that those who would attend the institution aright must consider the nature of this

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covenant, must consent to the demands of it, and in so doing may cheerfully expect the blessings communicated by it.

4. As eating and drinking together is a social action, and as by the preceding step eating and drinking in this ordinance represents our common relation to Christ, it does by consequence remind all Christians of their intimate relation to each other; and the apostle also represents it in this view, 1 Cor. x. 16, 17.

Elfner's Observ. vol. ii. p. 106—108.

5. That this rite was intended for *continued* use in the church of Christ, appears from the early testimonies of *Pliny*, *Justin Martyr*, *Ignatius*, and all the oldest writers, who assure us, that it was in fact practised even from the apostles time; as also from *St. Paul's* declaring, that hereby *we shew forth the Lord's death till he come*, 1 Cor. xi. 26. And it may further be argued, from the ends of the ordinance specified above; for if it were necessary for those who saw Christ suffer, or lived in the age when that great transaction past, thus to commemorate his death, and in this solemn manner to renew their engagements, when the assistances and evidence arising from the extraordinary communications of the Spirit were so peculiar; if it were necessary by this token to express and cherish their mutual love, when there were such peculiar bonds of endearment, arising from their being a little number so severely suffering in the same cause, it is certain that we, who do not enjoy any of their advantages, must much more need it for the like ends.

1—5. | 6. *Valet propositio.*

Barcl. Apol. Prop. xiii.

Besse's Apol. p. 297—322.

Justin Martyr, p. 97, 98.

Hale's Post. Tracts, p. 39, &c.

Hoadly's plain Account, pass.

Whist. Prim. Eucharist.

COROLLARY I.

There cannot be a *change* of the elements of bread and wine into the substance of Christ's body and blood, as the *Papists* maintain; because, waving all the absurdity with which such a doctrine is pregnant, and the many instances in which a thing is said *to be*, what it is only intended to *represent*, (see *Gen. xvii. 10. xli. 26. Ezek. v. 5. Dan. vii. 23. John xv. 1. x. 9. 1 Cor. x. 4. Rev. xvii. 9.*) if these elements were the very body and blood of Christ, they could not be *the commemoration* of it, which nevertheless we have shewn above that they are.

Hoadly, ibid. p. 24—31.

COROLLARY 2.

There cannot be a propitiatory sacrifice offered to God in this ordinance; because it is the commemoration of that sacrifice, which is frequently said to be offered *once for all*, *Heb. ix. 26—28. x. 10, 14.*

Hoadly, ibid. p. 47—57.

| *Bret against Hoadly, p. 69—89.*

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COROLLARY 3.

Considering the ends for which this ordinance was instituted, it is plain that it ought to be approached with great solemnity and serious consideration: and though the charge of *examining themselves* given to the *Corinthians*, 1 *Cor.* xi. 27. does indeed refer peculiarly to the gross immoralities which prevailed among them in this respect; yet the words are expressive of a *general* duty: but the gospel lays down no directions as to the *time* to be spent in preparation, which to be sure in different circumstances may and ought to be different; nor does it appear that any Christian, who in the general behaves agreeably to his profession, need scruple to use this ordinance on a few minutes recollection, when he has an opportunity to do it.

Burnet's four Disc. p. 327—329.

COROLLARY 4.

Those who are guilty of such scandalous immoralities, that we cannot reasonably believe they are in good earnest in their christian profession, ought not to be encouraged to approach this ordinance, till they have discovered the sincerity of their repentance by the reformation of their lives.

Burn. on the Art. p. 289, 290.
Limb. Theol. l. v. c. lxxii. § 16.

| *Humphries's Free Admiss. and Drake's Bar,*
pass.

COROLLARY 5.

It follows from the preceding corollary, that those who behave in so profligate a manner, as to bring a disgrace upon their christian profession, ought on proper conviction to be excluded, by the society to which they belong, from the participation of this holy ordinance, till they give sufficient proof of their repentance: by this means they may perhaps be reformed, others warned, the honour of religion secured, and a friendly communion of Christians in this institution promoted. Accordingly, we find that this has been customary among the churches from their earliest foundation; and is evidently countenanced, and indeed in effect required by the following scriptures, 1 *Cor.* v. 3—7, 9—13. 2 *Thess.* iii. 6, 14. 1 *Tim.* i. 20. 2 *John* v. 10, 11. It is allowed indeed, that *the delivering to Satan* mentioned 1 *Cor.* v. 5. may probably refer to some *diseases* inflicted by a *miraculous* power; (compare *Prop.* 117. N°. ii. § 1.) but the apostle's general rule in the concluding verses of that chapter, must by a parity of reason prevail, where the extraordinary power is ceased.

Turret. Loc. xviii. Quæst. xxxii. § 15.
Limb. Theol. l. vii. c. xviii. § 27, 28.

| *Hooker's Eccles. Polity, l. v. § 68. p. 368*
—371. l. viii. p. 410.

COROL-

COROLLARY 6.

Any constitution, by which any member of the christian church, how great soever his rank may be, shall be rendered incapable of being excommunicated if he behave amiss, is inconsistent with the scripture plan: and any constitution, by which *temporal* punishment shall be inflicted upon those who fall under the censure of a church, in consequence of such censure, must in like manner be an incumbrance, rather than advantage for the proper exercise of discipline.

Dissenting Gentleman's Answer to White's first Letter.

COROLLARY 7.

The Lord's supper is a *seal* of the covenant of grace, in the sense stated, Def. 94. compared with gr. 3. of the above demonstration.

Hoadly's Plain Acc. p. 164—172.

COROLLARY 8.

LECT. The church of *Rome* has been guilty of a most sacrilegious usurpation, in de-
CCVII. nying the use of the *cup* to the laity in this ordinance.

Burrough's View of Pop. p. 76—83.

COROLLARY 9.

Solitary masses, i. e. the celebration of the Lord's supper in secret by the priest alone, are to be condemned, as inconsistent with one part of the design of this ordinance, *i. e.* its being a pledge of mutual love among Christians. (Vid. gr. 4.) Nevertheless, if a few should join with a sick person in receiving it in private, in some cases it may be very allowable, as not liable to this objection.

Cass. Consult. p. 218—225.

COROLLARY 10.

To make the receiving this ordinance a *qualification* of admittance to any office in or under the civil government, is evidently a profanation of the ordinance itself: not to insist upon the natural iniquity of excluding peaceable and loyal subjects from places of trust and profit, merely on account of their religious opinions.

Abernethy's *Reasons for the Repeal of the Test*, with his *Discourse on its Nature and Consequences.* | Occasional Pap. vol. ii. N°. iv.
Old Whig, vol. i. N°. xli.

COROL-

COROLLARY II.

The custom of administering the Lord's supper to *condemned criminals* just before their execution, is both absurd and dangerous; as there is generally little room to imagine they can be suitably qualified for it; and it is natural for them to consider it as a token that they are already in a state of pardon and acceptance, which may prevent their employing the few remaining moments of life, in a manner suited to their circumstances, and may harden others in such vain and presumptuous hopes:

Old Whig, N^o. lxxv.

SCHOLIUM I.

It plainly appears, from the most credible account of the primitive church, that the Lord's supper was used much more frequently among them than with us, and that it made a part of their public worship every Lord's day.

Peirce on the Euch. p. 174—177.

Erskine on freq. Commun. pass.

Baxt. vol. 1. p. 470. b.

Calv. Inst. l. iv. c. xvii. § 44—46.

Witsii Econ. Fæd. l. iv. c. xvii. § 33.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some have objected against our translation of *Matt. xxvi. 26.* (compare *Mark xiv. 22.*) where we render *ευλογησας* *blessed it*, whereas they suppose it signifies Christ's *giving thanks* to God when he brake the bread: compare *Luke xvii. 22.* *1 Cor. xi. 24.* whence they infer, that the *consecration* of the elements has no foundation in the original institution. As for the text in question, it must be allowed to be ambiguous; but as the word [it] must be understood after [brake,] though it be not expressed, there is the less reason for censuring our translation; especially since the apostle so expressly speaks of our *blessing the sacramental cup*, *1 Cor. x. 16.* which cannot without great violence admit of Bishop Hoadly's interpretation, *q. d.* "the cup over which we bless or adore God." That may with great propriety in the language of scripture be said *to be blessed*, which is in a solemn manner set apart from a common to a sacred use, *Gen. ii. 3.* and we may be said *to bless it*, when we solemnly pray, that God may attend it with such influences from above, as may make it the occasion of edification to our souls. Compare *Mark xi. 9, 10, 11.*

Hoadly's Plain Acc. p. 32, 33.

Bret against Hoadly, p. 19—27.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is greatly to be lamented, that Christians have perverted an ordinance, intended as a pledge and means of their mutual union, into an occasion of discord.

cord and contention, by laying such a disproportionate stress on the *manner* in which it is administered, and the *posture* in which it is received. As to the latter, a *table* posture seems most eligible, as having been used by Christ and his apostles, and being peculiarly suitable to the notion of a sacred feast, in which as children we are invited to attend the board of our heavenly Father, and feast as it were upon the great sacrifice: and *kneeling*, which was never introduced into the church till *transubstantiation* was received, may prove an occasion of superstition. Nevertheless, provided it be not absolutely imposed as a term of communion, it will be the part of christian candour to acquiesce in the use of it in others by whom it is preferred. It appears that *standing* was at least frequently used in the christian church, *viz.* always on the *Lord's day*, and between *Easter* and *Whitsuntide*.

King's Enq. part ii. c. vi. § 7.

Peirce's Vind. of Diff. part ii. c. x. p.
489—501.

Burnet's four Disc. p. 321—327.

Hooker's Eccles. Polity, § 68. p. 244.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Whether the Lord's supper should be administered at *noon*, or in the *evening*, is a question of very small importance. It is true our Lord instituted it in the *evening*, but probably later than our assemblies are ordinarily held. The primitive Christians often communicated in the *morning* before day; the reason of which probably was, that they made it the last act of their worship, and assembling by night for fear of their persecutors, and spending most of the night in reading, preaching, prayer, and singing, the celebration of the Eucharist would naturally be driven off till morning. This shews however, that they did not lay any great stress upon the time.—Some urge that *dinner-time* being our chief meal answers to the *supper* among the *Jews*. Perhaps the evening suits best with the convenience of religious retirement immediately after it. But it is most reasonable to refer it to the judgment of ministers and people of particular societies; and it is very absurd to contend eagerly on either side the question.

Watts's Holiness of Times and Places, p. 83.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Mr. *Peirce* has at large contended for the admission of *infants* to this ordinance; pleading the use of it even unto this day among the *Greeks*, and in the *Bohemian* churches till near the time of the reformation; but especially from the usage of the *ancient* churches, as it appears from many passages in *Photius*, *Augustin*, and *Cyprian*: his proof from the more ancient Fathers is very defective. His arguments from *scripture* chiefly depend upon this general medium, that Christians succeeding to the *Jews* as God's people, and being grafted upon that stock, their infants have a right to all the privileges of which they are

are capable, till forfeited by some immoralities, and consequently have a right to partake of this ordinance, as the *Jewish* children had to eat of the passover and other sacrifices: besides this, he pleads those texts, which speak of the Lord's supper as received by *all* Christians.

The most obvious answer to all this, is that which is taken from the incapacity of infants to *examine themselves*, and *discern the Lord's body*. But he answers that this precept is only given to persons capable of understanding and complying with it, as those which require *faith* in order to baptism, are interpreted by the pædo-baptists.—As for his argument from the *Jewish* children eating the *sacrifice*, it is to be considered, that this was not *required*, as circumcision was; the males were not necessarily brought to the temple till they were twelve years old; (compare *Luke* ii. 42.) and the sacrifices which they eat of were chiefly *peace-offerings*, which became the *common food* to all that were clean in the family, and were not looked upon as acts of devotion, to such a degree as our Eucharist is; though indeed they were a token of their acknowledging the divinity of that God to whom they had been offered: compare *1 Cor.* x. 18. and even the *passover* was a commemoration of a *temporal* deliverance; nor is there any reason to believe, that its reference to the Messiah was generally understood by the *Jews*.

On the whole, where *infant baptism* appears dubious, it ought certainly to be an argument against *infant communion*; because the objections that are made to the *former*, lie with yet greater weight against the *latter*; and because the *disuse* of infant communion prevents many of the inconveniencies that may be apprehended from the practice of baptizing infants. It is certain there would be more danger of a contempt arising to the Lord's supper, from the admission of infants, and of confusion and trouble to other communicants: so that not being *required* in scripture, it is much best to omit it. When children are grown up to a capacity of behaving decently, they may soon be instructed in the nature and design of the ordinance; and if they appear to understand it, and behave for some competent time of trial in a manner suitable to that profession, it would probably be adviseable to admit them to communion, though very young; which by the way might be a good security against many of the snares to which youth are exposed.

Pearce's Ess. on the Euch. p. 76—146, | *Wits. Œcon. Fœd.* l. iv. c. xvii. § 30—32.
 & 171—183. | *Taylor's worthy Communic.* p. 147—157.

SCHOLIUM 6.

The foundation of the practice mentioned in the preceding scholium, seems plainly to have been a mistaken apprehension of the absolute necessity of this ordinance in order to salvation; which doctrine was built upon an erroneous interpretation of *John* vi. 53. which, with the preceding and following passages, we have not quoted above, for the explication of the scripture doctrine

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of the Lord's supper, since they will make so good a sense, if we suppose them only to relate to believing regards to Christ, as the great support of the spiritual life. Compare *John* vi. 63.

SCHOLIUM 7.

LECT. CCVIII. Many have stated the doctrine of this ordinance, so as to represent it, as if it were a kind of *charm*, and have supposed that some extraordinary communications of divine influence are universally annexed to it, or at least to a regular and serious attendance upon it; which has been grounded in a great measure on *John* vi. 54, 55. together with some very high things which the Fathers have said of the efficacy of it. But if we follow scripture alone, it will only appear to be an instituted means of our communion with God, in a regular attendance on which we may hope that God will meet us and bless us, as in other ordinances of divine institution; but cannot say that he has invariably tied himself up to it, nor does experience agree with such a notion. Vid. *Prop.* 152. *Schol.* 5.

Letter to a Lord, p. 10—12.

Clarke's three Disc. Eff. ii. c. vii. § 1.

p. 150—154.

Taylor's worthy Communic. p. 47, 48, 59—62.

SCHOLIUM 8.

It must be allowed, that it was an ancient usage in the christian church, to mix *water* with the sacramental wine, in commemoration of the water mingled with blood which came out of Christ's side, *John* xix. 34. and it is urged, that the *Jews* mingled water with the cup of wine which they drank at the passover. Yet this circumstance does not seem essential to the ordinance, more than the particular hour or posture used by Christ and his disciples: and the blood of the grape is mentioned alone, as that to which the institution refers, though there might happen to be some water then mingled with it.

Whist. Prim. Euch. Obs. 17. p. 97—100.

Witsii Econ. Fœd. l. iv. c. xvii. § 8—12.
Whiston's Life, p. 483, 484.

SCHOLIUM 9.

When the scripture doctrine relating to baptism and the Lord's supper is attentively considered, it will appear, that there is no foundation for drawing any objection from them against the truth of christianity; since the rites themselves are so simple, and their natural tendency to promote good impressions on the mind so obvious: and it is greatly for the credit of the gospel, that these in their scriptural simplicity should be compared with the rituals of other religions, as delivered to us by the most authentic writers: (*Prop.* 96. *Cor.*) as it

PROP. CLV. Sacraments defined: how many of them.

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it is also to the credit of the *protestant* cause, that they should be compared with those numerous, perplexing, absurd, and idolatrous additions, which the church of *Rome* has made to them, whereby each of them is rendered the least part of itself.

Picart's Relig. Ceremonies of all Nat. | *Leland against Tind. vol. i. c. iv.*
vol. i. p. 323—346. | *Fost. against Tind. c. v. p. 310—314,*
Geddes's Misc. vol. iv. p. 201—225. | *327—331.*

DEFINITION. XCV.

The ordinances which were instituted by Christ, to be used by *all* Christians as seals of the covenant of grace, (*Def. 94.*) may properly be called SACRAMENTS.

COROLLARY.

Baptism and the Lord's supper are sacraments. Compare *Prop. 152. Cor. 4. Prop. 155. Cor. 7.*

SCHOLIUM I.

The controversy, whether there be any more sacraments than these, is evidently a question about words. If our definition of it be admitted, it is certain that neither *baby orders*, (as they are called) nor *matrimony*, nor *extreme unction*, are christian sacraments; since all allow, that at least the two former were not intended for *all* Christians, and there is no proof that the *anointing the sick* was to continue longer than the gifts of healing; nor was that properly speaking *extreme unction*, which is a ceremony merely of human device.

The *cross* in baptism, as some have stated it, seems to have much of the nature of a sacrament, only that it wants a divine institution.

Hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. v. § 65.

The definition of sacrament which some have given, *i. e.* "an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace," is very obscure; unless it supposes some divine influence of an extraordinary nature inseparably annexed to the outward sign; and if this be the meaning of it, there is reason to question whether there be any sacrament at all. Compare *Prop. 152. Schol. 5. Prop. 155. Schol. 7.*

Limborch's Theol. l. v. c. lxvii.

SCHOLIUM 2.

When the doctrine of *confirmation*, as stated by the church of *England*, is compared with their definition of a sacrament, it must be acknowledged to be one, distinct from baptism and the Lord's supper: for the laying on the hands

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of the bishop upon a person professing to take his baptismal covenant upon himself, is a visible sign of his receiving the Holy Ghost, which must be an inward and spiritual grace: and it agrees with all the parts of *our* definition, excepting that it is not *an institution of Christ*; for the imposition of the apostles hands, by which the visible gifts of the Spirit were communicated, (*Acts* viii. 14—18.) is something of so different a nature, that it can never be made a just foundation for continuing this rite in the view in which it is practised.

Clarke's Ess. on Confirm. p. 40—56.

Calamy's Life of Baxter, p. 237.

Hoadly's Reas. of Conf. p. 74, 75.

Calamy's Def. vol. ii. p. 268, 269.

Picart's Relig. Ceremonies, &c.

Hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. v. § 66.

Answer to White's second Lett. p. 14.

S C H O L I U M 3.

The *Pepish* doctrine of *penance* depends entirely upon a supposition, that there is a certain order of men, who, by virtue of an authority derived from the apostles, and so from heaven, may efficaciously absolve men from the guilt of sin, appointing such a punishment to satisfy the divine justice as they shall think proper, on the penitent's submitting to which, the sentence of absolution is passed, and the favour of God sealed to him, as his repentance has been expressed by it. This would indeed be a *sacrament*, were it of divine institution: but it is built chiefly on absurd interpretations of *Matt.* xviii. 18. and *John* xx. 23. of which see *Prop.* 117. *Cor.* 1 & 5. And by what authority such absolutions are pronounced, as the *English* liturgy prescribes, it becomes those who venture to act upon it very seriously to consider: as also how such a practice can be reconcileable with the essential principles of the protestant religion.

Answer to White, ibid. p. 14—17.

Scudder's Christian Daily Walk, p. 42

—46.

Ostervald Exerc. Min. p. 303, 304.

Mandev. Free Thoughts, p. 148, 149.

S C H O L I U M 4.

Some have thought that Christ, in washing his disciples feet, instituted a christian sacrament, taking the word *sacrament* not strictly in our sense, but in general for a religious rite instituted by Christ, and have urged *John* xiii. 13—15. as express words of institution: but they may be fairly understood, as a general declaration of the obligation which Christians are under to condescend to each other. And it is to be considered, that in cold countries the washing each others feet would be a troublesome rather than friendly office; nor are any traces of such a religious rite among Christians to be found in the New Testament, or the most primitive writers: compare *1 Tim.* v. 10. which plainly intimates this office was not performed by *all*, for then it would not have been made a distinguishing character.

D E F I.

DEFINITION XCVI.

One person, or event, or institution in the divine dispensations, of which an account is given us in the word of God, may be said to be TYPICAL of another and greater person, or event, afterwards to appear, when there is a remarkable *resemblance* between the former and the latter, whether that resemblance be or be not known by the manifestation of the latter.—This may be called the *theological* sense of the word, and τυπος has sometimes that signification in scripture; though it is there used in some variety of senses, sometimes expressing a *model* of a thing exhibited before the thing itself whose type it is, and sometimes the *copy* made from thence, and sometimes simply a *resemblance*, without determining it to either of the former senses. Compare *John* xx. 25. *Rom.* v. 14. *Acts* vii. 43, 44. *1 Pet.* iii. 21. *1 Cor.* x. 11. *Heb.* viii. 5. *Phil.* iii. 17. LECT. CCIX.

COROLLARY.

It evidently appears from the reasoning of the apostle in his epistle to the *Hebrews*, and from comparing the history and œconomy of *Moses* with the whole New Testament, that there were many things in the *Jewish* dispensation which were in this sense typical of Christ and gospel blessings: how far the resemblance might be revealed to some saints under the Old Testament, we cannot certainly determine; but the observation of that resemblance may be a confirmation of our faith, as it is a proof of the unity of design running thro' the Old Testament and the New, as was observed above, *Prop.* 97. gr. 5. *Prop.* 112. *Cor.* 1.

SCHOLIUM 1.

It may be an agreeable employment to the pious mind, to trace out the resemblance between Christ and several persons mentioned in the Old Testament, and to observe how the deliverances brought to the people of God by them are exceeded by those brought by Christ; though there should be no apprehension at all that any of the *Jews* were before Christ's appearance taught to look on such persons as *types* of him.

Doddridge's x Serm. N°. i. ad fin.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Considering how expressly *St. Paul* says, that the Holy Ghost signified spiritual blessings by some of the ceremonies of the *Mosaic* law, (*Heb.* ix. 8.) and comparing it with several of those passages in the writings of *Moses*, *Isaiah*, and other prophets, which refer to the Messiah, and the spiritual blessings to be obtained by him, it will appear probable, that the evangelical references of several Old Testament types might be revealed to them, which might

might probably be one great foundation of that exalted pleasure which they found in their public ordinances and scriptures. Compare *Psal.* xxv. 14. cxix. 18. 1 *Pet.* i. 10, 11. compare also *John* viii. 56. which will be to the present purpose, whether Dr. Warburton's peculiar interpretation of the words, hinted at *Prop.* 120. *Schol.* gr. 1. be or be not admitted.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. v. p. 193

—201.

Sykes of Christian. p. 201.

Limb. Collat. Script. Jud. iii. *Quæst.* i.

Nº. ii. *Resp.* iii. *Quæst.* i. c. ii—iv.

PROPOSITION CLVI.

No one is by the christian dispensation obliged to obey any part of the *Mosaic* law, as such, any more than he would have been if that law had never been given.

DEMONSTRATION.

1. The greatest part of the *Mosaic* law appears to have been of a temporary nature; part of it being intended to typify the Messiah and his kingdom; (*Def.* 96. *Cor.* & *Schol.* 2.) many of its precepts being of a local nature, which could not be observed any longer than the temple of *Jerusalem* was standing, and the *Jews* inhabited their own land; partly as a great multitude of their laws were peculiarly suited to their particular circumstances, and intended (as was observed before) to prevent the danger of idolatry, which they might otherwise have learnt from their neighbours: (*Prop.* 122. *Sol.* § 1.) to all which we may add, that it would have been impossible that all the nations of the earth, or even such distant nations as those already constituting the christian church, should obey some of the *Mosaic* precepts, particularly those relating to their yearly feasts, to which some have supposed the apostle refers, *Gal.* iv. 26, 27.

Sykes of Christianity, c. xiii. p. 179—205.

Witsii Ægypt. l. iii. c. xiv. § 1—17.

Schema Sacrum, p. 253.

Warburton's Julian.

1. The ancient prophets foretold that the Messiah, when he appeared, should introduce a new dispensation and more perfect law, and should abrogate that of *Moses*: compare *Jer.* xxxi. 31, 32. with *Heb.* viii. 6—13. *Dan.* ix. 27. *Jer.* iii. 16. *Psal.* cx. 4. *Heb.* vii. 11—19. To which we may add all those texts which declare, that under the Messiah the *Heathen* nations should be incorporated with the *Jews*, and live under the same gracious institution; which could not possibly be effected without an alteration in the *Mosaic* law: (as was observed gr. 1.) compare *Isa.* xix. 19—25. *Jer.* iii. 17. *Mic.* iv. 2. *Mal.* i. 11. to which we may add that celebrated text *Deut.* xviii. 18, 19. which seems to express that a new legislator should arise.

3. The apostle expressly asserts the abolition of the *Mosaic* law. See the whole epistles to the *Galatians*, *Romans* and *Hebrews*, as also *Rom.* xiv. 14.

2 *Cor.*

2 Cor. iii. 9—11. Eph. ii. 14, 15. Col. ii. 14—17. 1 Tim. iv. 4. and Christ also intimated it: compare Matt. xv. 11. John iv. 21, 23, 24.

4. The destruction of the temple, and its lying so many hundred years in ruins, whereas even the Babylonish captivity was in comparison so short, and the worship at Jerusalem even then not totally interrupted, while the temple continued desolate; (compare Isa. xli. 1—5. with 2 Kings xxv. 8, 9.) together with the loss of the Jewish genealogies, and their ignorance of the signification of some words in their own law, especially the names of some of the unclean animals, may afford a probable argument that their law is abolished.

1 & 2 & 3 & 4. 5. Valet propositio.

Collins's Literal Scheme, p. 251—267.	Boyle's Theol. Works, vol. iii. p. 146.
Hooker's Eccles. Pol. l. iii. § 11.	Locke on Eph. ii. 15.
Wits. Œcon. Fœd. l. iv. c. xiv. § 7—54.	Berrim. at Boyle's Lect. Serm. xix.—xxi. Limb. Collat. Resp. iii. Quæst. iv. c. v.

COROLLARY.

Those precepts which were delivered by the Jewish prophets, and perhaps also all kinds of positive laws instituted before the gospel, are as much abrogated as the law given by Moses himself. Vid. Matt. xi. 13.

SCHOLIUM I.

To this it is objected, that there are several scriptures of the Old Testament, in which the perpetuity of the Mosaic law is asserted in the strongest terms; v. g. Gen. xvii. 13. Exod. xii. 14, 17, 24. xxxi. 16, 17. Deut. xxxix. 29. and a multitude of the like texts; to which may be added Jer. xxiii. 17—22.

To this it is replied, that the Jews must and do allow, that the phrases there made use of and rendered for ever often signify a limited duration; v. g. 1 Sam. i. 22. (compared with Numb. iv. 3, 23, &c.) Deut. xv. 17. and Exod. xxi. 6. (compared with Lev. xxv. 41.) Jer. ii. 20. (compare 1 Mac. xiv. 41.) and some think עולם may be rendered for the age, i. e. so long as this age or dispensation shall continue, supposing it distinguished from the age to come, or the Messiah's kingdom: compare Matt. xii. 32. Heb. ii. 5. to which we may perhaps add Isa. ix. 6. It is certain the Jews themselves cannot vindicate some of these prophecies as true, without having recourse to such solutions as may be sufficient to answer this objection: compare Mal. i. 11.

Berriman at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. Serm. xviii.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It has also been objected, that Christ directly declares against a purpose of abrogating the Mosaic law, even in its least precepts, Matt. v. 17.

It is answered, that the law and the prophets sometimes signify the moral precepts; (compare Matt. xxii. 40.) and as to the rest, Christ could not properly be

The apostles allowing a conformity to the Mosaic law justified. PART IX.
 be said to *destroy* those institutions, which he so fully answered, as to set the purpose and wisdom of them in the most advantageous light; though, having *fulfilled* them, they were of course *superfeded*.

Limb. Collat. Resp. ad Script. iii. Quest. i. c. v. p. 202, &c.

SCHOLIUM 3.

The apostles indulged the *Jews* in the observation of the *Mosaic* law, and thought it proper themselves in some instances to conform to the institutions of it; but they did it upon prudential considerations, not allowing the necessity of it in order to salvation, but strongly contending for the liberty of Christians in this respect, see *Acts* xvi. 3. xxi. 20—26. compare *Acts* xv. 29. To which we may add, that while the *temple* continued standing, and before the destruction of *Jerusalem*, the ceremonial and political law were so interwoven with each other, that it was undoubtedly expedient for converted *Jews*, dwelling in *Judea*, to comply with and observe those institutions; and the apostles compliance with *sacrifices* in particular might be owing to this view of them, as a kind of tribute paid to God, under the character of their *king*; and was perfectly consistent with what the apostle so often declared, concerning the freedom of the *Gentiles* from this yoke, and the absolute necessity that *Jews* and *Gentiles* should seek their justification and salvation by Christ alone. So that the great clamour which *Morgan* raises upon this head, as if *Paul* and *Barnabas* on the one side, and all the rest of the apostles on the other, preached a different and inconsistent gospel, seems very unreasonable.

Both maintained the *Mosaic* law to have been of divine authority, and recommended a prudential regard to it in *some* instances and degrees; but neither maintained its absolute necessity, nor directed to a dependance upon it for righteousness, as appears from the whole tenour of the epistles.

Burn. on the Art. p. 100, 101.

Morgan's Mor. Phil. vol. i. p. 54—81, 361, &c.

Leland's Answer to Morg. vol. i. c. xiv. p. 399—425.

Chapman's Euseb. vol. ii. c. ii. p. 129, &c.

SCHOLIUM 4.

The precepts which Christ gave *Matt. v. 21, &c.* are a part of God's natural law; and were contained in those precepts of *Moses*, which our Lord there sets himself to explain and vindicate: so that they are not in general to be looked upon as institutions peculiar to the christian religion, as appears from the manner in which they are introduced, *Matt. v. 17—20.* compare *Rom. vii. 7.*

Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, l. i. c. ii. § 6.

Gronov. Not. in Loc. Dodd. Fam. Expos. in Loc.

The END of the NINTH PART.

PART

P A R T X.

Containing the Scripture Doctrine of GOOD and BAD ANGELS, and of a FUTURE STATE, which concludes this Work.

P R O P O S I T I O N C L V I I .

THE scripture assures us, there are many created Spirits distinct from men, L E C T. who have a permanent existence, and who from their office are called CCX. *angels*; some of whom are and will continually be holy and happy, whereas others are in a state of apostasy and misery.

D E M O N S T R A T I O N .

1. That there are many spirits, who have a permanent existence, and from their office are called *angels*, appears from *Matt.* xxiv. 36. xxvi. 53. *Acts* xxiii. 6—8.

2. That these spirits are distinct from men, or from human souls, appears from *Job* xxxviii. 7. *Psal.* viii. 5. *Heb.* xii. 22.

3. That some of these spirits are and will continue in a state of holiness and happiness, appears from *Matt.* xviii. 10. xxv. 31. *Luke* ii. 13, 14. xv. 10. xx. 36.

4. That others of them are in a state of apostasy and misery, is evident from *Matt.* x. 1. xxv. 41. *Mark* v. 8, 9. *John* viii. 44. *James* ii. 19. *2 Pet.* ii. 4. *1 John* iii. 8. *Jude* 6.

1, 2, 3, 4. 5. *Valet propositio.*

Angelographia, c. i. § 4. p. 23. c. iii. § 3. p. 51.

S C H O L I U M I .

As it was observed above, *Prop.* 86. gr. 3. & *Schol.* that the *heathens* had among them some notion of the existence of benevolent spirits superior to men; so it seems, from some passages cited there, that they were also persuaded of the existence of *evil demons*; and indeed many of those deities which they worshipped, were, according to their own mythology, so vicious and so malignant, as to resemble devils rather than good angels. See the references under the scholium quoted above.

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SCHOLIUM 2.

It is certain that the word *αγγελος* in the New Testament does not always signify one of those beings whom we call *angels*, but that it frequently imports no more than *messenger*, and is on this account applied to *men*, *James* ii. 25. *Luke* vii. 24. ix. 52. to which many commentators think *Acts* xii. 15. should be added: and Mr. *Gough* contends that the word is to be taken in this sense in that celebrated text, *1 Cor.* xi. 10. which he supposes to refer to the spies who were sent into christian assemblies by their enemies, who would severely expose any indecencies observable among them.

Gough's Dissertation in Loc.

In like manner the word *διαβολος* does sometimes signify a *false accuser*, or a wicked person of the human species, *2 Tim.* iii. 3. *Tit.* ii. 3. *John* vi. 70. to which may perhaps be added *1 Tim.* iii. 7. but *Jude* 6. is by no means to be added to the instances above, as some have supposed.

Hutchins. of Witchcraft, p. 252—254. | *Delude of Spirits*, p. 78—87.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is a singular notion of Mr. *Lowman*, that, according to the *Hebrew* language, not only intelligent beings or spirits are called angels, but every thing that either notifies any message from God, or executes his will, and in particular all visible appearances in material symbols, as fire, air, winds, and storms: *Psal.* civ. 4. compare *Exod.* iii. 2, 4. xiii. 21. xix. 19. whence by the way he observes, that it is not necessary to suppose, that *Jehovah* and the *angel of Jehovah* mean two distinct spirits, the one God, the other a ministering spirit: compare *Gen.* xlviii. 15, 16. but the last of these texts very ill agrees with his hypothesis; for surely *Jacob* would not pray that the *flame of fire* might bless his grand children: and the apostle's quotation of *Psal.* civ. 4. in *Heb.* i. 7. determines it to a sense different from what this learned writer would give it.

Lowman's Civ. Gov. of the Heb. Append. p. 45—48.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is a very peculiar conjecture of Mr. *Fleming*; but it seems by no means to be sufficiently supported, that all the good angels, who have ever been employed as messengers of God to the inhabitants of earth, had been the spirits of departed saints; and particularly, that the angel who appeared to the shepherds, *Luke* ii. 3, &c. was the spirit of *Adam*, attended by all those of his race who were then in a state of glory, who constituted the heavenly choir there spoken of, which sung that sublime anthem on the Redeemer's birth. It is true

PROP. CLVIII. *Conjectures concerning the fall of the angels.*

539

true that the *Jews* had a notion among them, that the departed spirits of good men officiated as angels, which may perhaps be referred to in the forementioned *Acts* xii. 15. (Vid. *Philonis Jud. Op.* p. 131. & 286. and *Fam. Expos.* vol. iii. in *Loc.* and *Waterland's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 90, 91. But *Heb.* i. 14. compared with *Matt.* xxv. 31. where all the angels are so expressly distinguished from the whole human race, then brought to their final judgment, plainly demonstrates this author to be in a great mistake, when he carries this peculiar thought to such an extravagant height.

Flem. Christology, vol. i. p. 78—81.

SCHOLIUM 5.

The scripture does not particularly inform us, what was the sin, by which *Satan* and his confederates fell from their original state of holiness and happiness: some have conjectured, that it might be their aspiring to some higher dignity than God had assigned them, and think that on that account they are said, in the place cited above, *not to have kept the state or principality they were under*, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐλάβον, and for this reason *pride* may be called *the condemnation of the devil*, supposing the devil there to be signified, 1 *Tim.* iii. 6. And forasmuch as it is hardly to be imagined, that they would dispute the throne with God, some have conjectured, that their crime might be refusing that homage to the *Logos*, which God required of the angels: (*Heb.* i. 8.) and they have pleaded, that this supposition illustrates the harmony and beauty of the divine conduct, in making use of Christ as the great agent in destroying *Satan's* kingdom among men, and finally in condemning *Satan* to that punishment, to which he and his confederates are reserved.

Boysse's Works, vol. i. p. 266, 267.
Reynolds of Ang. p. 14—28.

Milt. Par. Lost, l. v. ver. 577—710.
Hunt's Hist. Div. Rev. p. 312—317.

PROPOSITION CLVIII.

To enumerate the chief properties of *good angels* mentioned in the scriptures. LECT. CCXI.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. They are immortal, and do not propagate their species, *Luke* xx. 36.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 189. b.

2. They are in a state of being superior to that of man, even in his original dignity and glory, *Psal.* viii. 5.

3. They are endued with extraordinary degrees of knowledge and wisdom, which are no doubt continually improving by their long experience, 2 *Sam.* xiv. 20.

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4. They

4. They are endued with extraordinary power, *Psal.* ciii. 20. *2 Thess.* i. 7. compare *Gen.* xix. 11. and *2 Kings* xix. 35. (which is strangely interpreted by Sir Isaac Newton, as referring to *Tirshakab* king of *Ethiopia*. Vid. *Newt. Chron.* p. 282.) besides many other instances of the like kind mentioned in scripture.

5. They have not such gross bodies as ours: compare *Luke* xxiv. 39. with *Heb.* i. 7. *1 Cor.* xv. 50. compare *Dan.* ix. 21, 23.

6. There are various orders of angels, *Jude* 9. *1 Thess.* iv. 16. *Dan.* x. 13. *Rev.* xii. 7. compare *Eph.* i. 21. *1 Pet.* iii. 22. *Col.* i. 16.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 192. b. | *Burnet's Archeol.* p. 410, 411.

SCHOLIUM I.

Mr. *Joseph Mede* argues from *Zech.* iv. 10. *Rev.* i. 4. iv. 5. v. 6. viii. 2. that there are *seven archangels*: but the passages referred to rather afford an occasion of conjecture, than a foundation of clear and convincing argument. Compare *Job* xii. 15. *Zech.* vi. 5.

Mede's Diatribe on Zech. iv. 10. ap. *Op.* p. 40—43.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Whether angels be or be not entirely incorporeal, is a question which we are not capable of determining: many have thought, that it is the prerogative of the Divine Being alone to be wholly separate from matter; and some have urged, that the manner in which Christ, the Lord of angels, is confessedly united to it, affords a probable proof that they have some body: the offices assigned them at the judgment day do likewise favour this hypothesis, and especially the forming the blessed after the resurrection into one society with them: compare *2 Kings* ii. 11. vi. 17.

Cleric. Pneum. § 11. c. i.

| *Burn. de Stat. Mort.* p. 170—172.

SCHOLIUM 3.

It is exceeding probable, that angels were created before the earth; which seems strongly to be intimated *Job* xxxviii. 4, 7. the arguments brought to prove the contrary from *Gen.* ii. 1. and *Exod.* xx. 11. are sufficiently answered, by observing that the *heavens* there spoken of may be supposed only to signify the *atmosphere*, or at most the *luminaries* of the firmament. It is also urged, that things done before the creation of our world are represented as *eternal*; but the limited sense of the word *eternal* is a sufficient reply. Compare *Prop.* 156. *Schol.* 1.

Angelographia, c. i. § 2. p. 48, 49.
Whiston's Theory, p. 9—13.

| *Bull's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 447—454.

PROPOSITION CLIX.

To enumerate the chief properties of *wicked angels*, who are mentioned in scripture.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. That they are spirits of a very impious and malignant character, and the inveterate enemies of God and mankind, appears from the whole series of scriptures relating to them, particularly those enumerated above.

2. Nevertheless, that they retain some considerable traces of their former knowledge, appears from 2 Cor. ii. 11. xi. 3, 14. Eph. vi. 11. Rev. iii. 24. and no doubt their skill in all the methods of deceit and mischief must be vastly improved by so long experience.

3. They are likewise possessed of considerable degrees of power, though still under a divine restraint, Matt. iv. 5—8. xii. 29. Mark v. 4—13. Eph. ii. 2. vi. 12.

4. It appears there are various orders of evil angels, who are united under one head, from the malignity of his nature called *Satan* and *the devil*, Matt. xii. 24. xxv. 41. Eph. ii. 2. vi. 12. Col. ii. 15. Rev. xii. 7.

Gilpin on Tempt. part i. c. iii. p. 19, 20. Oth. Ed. p. 10—13.

COROLLARY 1.

There is great reason to adore the goodness of God in setting such bounds to the operations of these potent and malevolent spirits, as to prevent their doing that mischief to which they are naturally inclined, and which might otherwise soon turn earth into a chaos and field of blood: compare Job i. & ii. Matt. viii. 31.

COROLLARY 2.

Seeing there is something in the thought of such agents as these, which tends to imprecise the imagination in a very powerful manner, great care ought to be taken, that *children*, from the first notice they have of the existence of such beings, be taught to conceive of them as entirely under the controul of God.

Watts's Catech. p. 109, 110.

COROLLARY 3.

We may infer, that they are most certainly mistaken, who maintain that all the texts relating to the devil are to be interpreted in so figurative a sense, as to signify merely the irregular propensities of men's minds, denying the real existence of any such malignant invisible beings as are commonly supposed;

to

to which hypothesis the story of Christ's temptation is alone an apparent and sufficient answer; not to mention the many texts, in which opposition to *Satan* is represented as the great design of Christ's appearance. Compare *Wisd.* ii. ult.

Doddridge's Fam. Expos. vol. i. § 35. not. b. p. 211. Ed. 1.

SCHOLIUM 1.

Bishop *Sherlock* thinks, that the design of several passages in the book of *Job*, is to assert the superiority of God to *Satan*, the great principle of evil; and thus in particular he beautifully explains *Job* xii. 16. and xxvi. 13. compare the *Septuagint*, προσάγμασι δὲ ἐθανάτωσε δράκοντα ἀποσάινν.

Sherlock on Proph. p. 242—247. | *Warburt. Occas. Remarks*, part i. p. 66—69.

SCHOLIUM 2.

As to the manner in which God cast the devils out of heaven, there is no express account of it in scripture. What is said, in the preceding passage of *Daniel* and the *Revelations*, of an opposition between angels, particularly those of *Michael* and the *Dragon*, has led some to imagine, that God made use of the agency of good angels in expelling the evil: but if he did so, we cannot imagine any such resistance on the part of evil angels, as would occasion any pain or terror to those who on this hypothesis were the executioners of divine vengeance upon them.

Clarke's Post. Serm. vol. i. p. 223—231. *Oct.* p. 140—143. 12mo.

PROPOSITION CLX.

To enquire how far good angels are concerned in human affairs.

LECT.
CCXII.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. They are in the general the holy ministers of divine providence with regard to the children of men, *Zech.* iv. 10. i. 10. (compare *Rev.* v. 6.) *Dan.* x. 13, 20. xi. 1. 1 *Thess.* iv. 16.

2. They are in a peculiar manner the guardians of the saints; and are not only the means of preserving them from danger, but likewise the instruments of conferring many blessings upon them, *Heb.* i. 14. *Psal.* xci. 11, 12. xxxiv. 7. to which add many historical passages in the Old and New Testament, see *gr.* 4, 5.

3. It seems that the care of angels over good men extends beyond this mortal life, and that they are appointed to conduct their separate spirits to their seats of future glory, *Luke* xvi. 22.

4. They

4. They have often been made use of as the instruments of inflicting judgments upon wicked men, *Gen.* xix. 11. *Psal.* lxxviii. 49. (compare *Exod.* xii. 23.) *2 Sam.* xxiv. 15, 16, 17. *2 Kings* xix. 35. *Acts* xii. 23.

5. The Old Testament gives us an account of the appearance of angels to *Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Moses, Gideon, Manoah, David, Elijah, Elisha, Daniel,* and other prophets. In the New Testament, we read of their appearance to *Zachariah, Joseph, Mary,* to the shepherds, to Christ, to *Mary Magdalen,* and the other women at Christ's sepulchre; to *Peter, Paul, Cornelius, John, &c.* in most of which cases they seem to have presented themselves and disappeared on a sudden: but the manner in which they now interpose in human affairs is by an invisible agency; and perhaps much may be done by the changes they produce in the weather, and by the impressions they may be enabled to make on our nerves and animal spirits, whereby such thoughts may be suggested, and such affections excited or moderated in the mind, as may greatly promote the happiness of good men, and subserve the schemes of divine providence.

Burnet on Art. p. 32.

Hallet on Script. vol. ii. p. 258—264.

Bishop Bull's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 485—491.

Jennings's Abridg. of Dr. Mather's Life,
p. 105—111.

Seed's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 144—147.

6. It seems to be intimated, that they are present in christian assemblies, *1 Cor.* xi. 10. to which some add *1 Tim.* v. 21. Some also argue this from the representation of angels in the ornaments of the tabernacle and temple, *Exod.* xxvi. 31. *1 Kings* vi. 23—26, 35. and from *Eccles.* v. 6. compare *Luke* xv. 10. and *Eph.* iii. 10. but this last text may much more properly be understood of the observations which angels make on God's dealing with the church in general, than on what they can be supposed to learn from the discourses of those that officiate in its public offices.

Mede on Eccles. v. 1. *apud Op.* p. 345—347. | *Tillotson's Works,* vol. ii. p. 157.

COROLLARY I.

It appears from hence, that angels must have a very extensive knowledge of human affairs; but we cannot conclude that they are capable of certainly discerning *our thoughts*: it seems the peculiar prerogative of God fully to know *them*. Nevertheless, angels may, from external circumstances, and perhaps in particular from the alteration of the countenance, if not a view of what passes in the brain and animal spirits, be able to form very probable conjectures.

Gilp. on Tempt. c. iv. p. 25—28. *Oët.* | *Goodwin's Child of Light,* p. 65—67.
p. 22—25.

COROLLARY 2.

It appears, from comparing this proposition and the 157th with several passages in *Plato, Strabo, Tully, Seneca, Plotinus, Maximus Tyrius, Hierocles, Jam- blicus,*

blicus, and *Plutarch*, besides some other heathen writers, chiefly of the *Platonic* sect after Christ's time, that the *heathens* had a notion of the nature and offices of their inferior deities, very nearly resembling the *Jewish* and christian doctrine of angels; and indeed the name of *angels*, and even of *archangels*, sometimes occurs in their writings. And it seems probable, that the wiser part of their philosophers, who believed the existence of one supreme God possessed of infinite perfections, made themselves the easier in conforming to and encouraging the popular superstition, under an apprehension, that on the one hand, there were some beings in nature and office something resembling those whom the people worshipped, (though they held their tales of them to be idle and vain,) and on the other, apprehending that it might be very dangerous to the political interest of states, to have endeavoured entirely to change their religious views; from which the fate of *Socrates*, and the sentence passed on *Alcibiades*, might also do much to deter them, out of regard to their own personal security. Compare *Rom.* i. 20, &c.

Tillard's Reply to Warb. c. iv. p. 248
—272.

Cowper's Life of Socrates, l. v. not.
13. p. 166—168.

The Knowl. of div. things by Rev. only,
p. 239, 240.

Ramsay's Principles, vol. ii. p. 394—397.

SCHOLIUM I.

Some have thought, that not only every *region*, but every *man* has some particular angel assigned him as a *guardian*, whose business it is generally to watch over that country or person; and, besides general arguments from the passages quoted above, in the *second* step of the preceding *Solution*, they especially urge *Matt.* xviii. 10. *Acts* xii. 15. but the argument from both these places is evidently precarious; and it seems difficult to reconcile the supposition of such a continued attendance with what is said of the stated residence of these angels in heaven, and with *Heb.* i. 14. where *all* the angels are represented as ministering to the heirs of salvation: though as there is great reason to believe the number of heavenly spirits is vastly superior to that of men upon earth, it is not improbable that they may as it were relieve each other, and in their turns perform these condescending services to those whom the Lord of angels has been pleased to redeem with his own blood. But we must confess that our knowledge of the laws and orders of those celestial beings is very limited, and consequently that it is the part of humility to avoid dogmatical determinations on such heads as these. Compare *Col.* ii. 8.

Peirce on Heb. p. 32, 33.

Reynolds of Angels, Quæst. xxviii. p. 171.

Cleric. Pneum. Sect. ii. c. iii, iv. § 4.

Bull's Serm. vol. ii. p. 492—507.

Crellius de Deo, c. vi. § 21, 22.

Limb. Theol. l. ii. c. ii. § 20, 21.

Waterland's Serm. vol. ii. p. 90, 91.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is questioned how far angels may be instrumental in working miracles, LECT. CCXIII.
and when they are so, how far they may be said to work them by their own natural power. That God used the ministration of angels in several of the miracles wrought by Christ, may perhaps be intimated *John* i. 51. but supposing this, and also supposing that on these occasions they only exerted a power equal to what was naturally their own, these events would nevertheless be truly miraculous, because they acted out of their own ordinary sphere, and interposed in circumstances in which God does not commonly allow them to interpose. *Prop.* 90. § 3.

Gilpin on Tempt. part I. c. v. § 34. | *Chandler of Mir.* p. 17, 18.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Some have thought that angels may have some concern in suggesting extraordinary dreams; many instances of which there are undoubtedly in scripture: (compare *Matt.* i. 20. ii. 13, 19.) and some remarkable instances have occurred in later ages, mentioned by very credible authors; among which see

Sir Henry Wotton's Life, p. 10—12. | *Walton's Lives*, p. 95—99.
apud | *Marc. Anton. Medit.* l. i.

SCHOLIUM 4.

It is likewise questioned, how far departed saints may be employed in services to our world, like those which the angels perform, and how far they may be acquainted with the concerns of the church here. Some suppose that acquaintance to be very considerable, and argue from *Rev.* xix. 10. xxii. 9. vi. 9, &c. To the two former texts it is answered, that the words may be rendered, *q. d.* "I am thy fellow servant, and *the fellow servant* of thy brethren:" to the latter, that there is no intimation that the spirits of the martyrs were particularly acquainted with what then passed on earth, but only that they were waiting for some singular triumph of the divine vengeance over the enemies of the church, not yet discovered to them. It may indeed make it probable that some great events relating to the church are revealed to them; though whether by immediate revelation from God, or the report of angels conversant with our world, and the spirits of the faithful more lately departed from it, we do not certainly know: however, it by no means amounts to a proof of such a circumstantial knowledge, as will warrant our address to them in *prayer*; against which protestants have frequently urged *Isa.* lxiii. 16. though the context proves the argument from thence very inconclusive. It is enough that there is no

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foundation for such addresses, though it should be granted there is no particular prohibition of them.

Fleming's Christ. vol. i. p. 73—78. | *Bull's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 460—476.

PROPOSITION CLXI.

To enumerate the chief of those instances in which *evil* spirits concern themselves with human affairs.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Urged by a principle of enmity to God, and envy and malice against mankind, they do their utmost to seduce men into sin; and for that purpose are no doubt employed in studying men's tempers, and making accurate observations on the various circumstances and occurrences of their lives, 2 Cor. ii. 11. iv. 4. xi. 3, 14, 15. Eph. ii. 2. vi. 11, 12, 16. 1 Thess. iii. 5. Matt. xiii. 19. 2 Thess. ii. 9, 10. 1 Pet. v. 8. Luke xxii. 31. (compare 1 Chron. xxi. 1.) Zeck. iii. 1, 2. Acts v. 3. John xiii. 2, 27. (compare 1 Thess. ii. 18.)

2. They are sometimes made use of as the instruments of divine providence, to inflict calamities on the children of men: but all these their malicious attempts are over-ruled by the superior wisdom and goodness of God, to answer the purposes of his government, Luke xiii. 16. 1 Cor. v. 5. Job i. 2. 1 Tim. i. 20. (to which some add Dan. x. 13, 20.) Heb. ii. 14, 15.

Howe's Works, vol. ii. p. 360, 361. | *Shepherd of Angels*, p. 130, 131, 135.
Homer's Odyss. l. v. ver. 394—397. | 136.

3. They carry on their attempts on mankind in a secret and invisible manner, something correspondent to that in which good angels carry on their purposes of benevolence and friendship.

Leff. Orien. Phil. l. i. c. xvii. p. 214—221. | *Gibb. on Tempt.* part i. c. ix.

4. Nevertheless, they sometimes interpose in a more open and apparent manner; or at least in times past they have been permitted to do so; particularly in the instance of demoniacal possessions, oracles, magic, witchcraft, and violent suggestions, of which we shall more particularly speak in the following scholia.

SCHOLIUM I.

LECT. It has been an opinion generally received, that the devil has sometimes entered into the bodies of men, and afflicted them in a severe and dreadful manner, by a supernatural agency upon them; and it is evident that many passages in the New Testament, taken in their most obvious sense, appear greatly

greatly to favour such a notion. But Mr. *Joseph Mede* and Dr. *Becker* have long since pleaded, that these demoniacs were only *lunatics* or *epileptics*; and a learned author, generally agreed to be Dr. *Sykes*, has lately revived the notion, in a discourse, entitled *An enquiry into the demoniacs mentioned in the New Testament*, which has occasioned a great deal of debate: and the late celebrated physician, Dr. *Mead*, has since declared himself on that side of the question, in his late book on the *diseases* mentioned in scripture*. It seems therefore not improper to give a brief review of the most considerable arguments which are urged on both sides the question.

SECT. I. In defence of Mr. *Mede's* opinion, it is observed and pleaded,

1. That the word *demon*, as used among the ancients, properly signifies *the soul of a dead person*. Now it would be palpably absurd, to suppose that the departed spirits of wicked men are permitted to perform such operations as are pretended in this case.—It is granted that the word has *sometimes* this signification, but it is plain, and Mr. *Mede* allows it, that it is not *universally* so, as was observed above; nor indeed is this by any means its most common sense; for though those whom the *Heathens* worshipped were dead men, yet their worshippers did not generally acknowledge it, but looked on the assertion as atheism, or at least great impiety. (*Prop.* 86. *gr.* 3. & *Schol.*) Vid. *Cypr. Op.* p. 12. *Ed. Fell.*

Pegge's Exam. of the Inquiry, præf. p. 4—7.

2. That among the *Heathens*, *lunacy* and *epilepsy* were ascribed to the operation of some demon upon such patients, who therefore were called from thence *Cerriti* and *Larvati*.—But it is answered, that the question is, whether the *Heathens* did not in the general represent the matter as it really was, though they might err as to the particular agent by whom they might suppose such persons to be agitated.

3. That it is not only probable, but certain, that the *Jews* had the same notion; for which the case of *Saul* when melancholy is urged, and those known passages from *Jos. Ant.* l. viii. c. ii. § 5. and *Bell. Jud.* l. vii. c. vi. § 3. to which are added *Matt.* xi. 18. xvii. 14, 15. *John* vii. 20. viii. 48, 52. x. 20. where *demoniacs* and *lunatics* seem synonymous terms. The same also is urged from the account given of those said to be demoniacs, whose symptoms are the same with *lunacy* and *epilepsy*.—But it is answered, that where *lunacy* and being possessed with the devil are here mentioned as the same thing, it is perfectly consistent with the notion, that some peculiar kinds of *lunacy*, and those on the whole the worst, were the effect of diabolical operation.

4. That it was by no means necessary for Christ to change the usual language, and correct these mistakes in philosophy, any more than those relating to the *Ptolemaic* system in astronomy.

* Dr. *Lardner* has also yet more lately appeared as an advocate for this opinion, in his three discourses on this subject.

5. That the miracle of a cure by speaking a word, was as really great and valuable in one case as in the other.

6. That it is advantageous to the christian cause to interpret these histories thus; because we can give no account why there should have been more demoniacs just in the age in which Christ lived, than at any other time.

SECT. II. In defence of the common notion, it is answered and pleaded as follows,

1. That the foundation of the contrary scheme, § 1. gr. 1. is entirely precarious; as it is certain the *Heathens* had a notion among them, of evil spirits *distinct* from human souls: and if they had not, it would be very unreasonable to make their notion of demons the standard, by which to interpret the sense of the word in the New Testament, especially since the passages quoted from the Old Testament make very good sense on the common interpretation. Compare the *Greek* translation of *Deut.* xxxii. 17. *Psal.* xci. 6. xcvi. 5. cvi. 37. *Isa.* xiii. 21. xxxiv. 14. lxv. 11. See *Pegge ubi supra*, and *Trommii Lexic. in verb. δαιμονιον*.

2. It is plainly the doctrine of the New Testament, hinted at also in the Old, that there is a number of apostate spirits, who fell from heaven, under *Satan* their leader, who makes it his great business, probably in concurrence with them, to do all the mischief he can both to the bodies and souls of men. Vid. *Prop.* 157. gr. 4. *Prop.* 159. & 161. gr. 1, 2.

3. That the demons spoken of in scripture as possessing the bodies of men, are there represented as also the associates of *Satan*, and Christ's triumph over the demons is continually represented as a triumph over *Satan*, *Matt.* xii. 24—27. *Luke* x. 17, 18. xiii. 16. *Acts* x. 38. *James* ii. 19. *Rev.* xii. 7, 9. xvi. 13, 14. xx. 2.

4. Such facts are recorded concerning the demons mentioned in the New Testament, as could not possibly have been true on the contrary hypothesis: v. g. their owning Christ to be the Messiah, beseeching him not to torment them, breaking chains, and especially driving the swine into the sea, which there is no reason to believe that two mad-men would have attempted, or could possibly have effected.

Doddridge's Family Expositor, vol. i. § 70. (not. b, i) p. 428, 429. Ed. 1.

5. The manner in which Christ speaks to them, plainly shews they were really demoniacs; not only *rebuking* them, (which indeed is also said of *fevers* and *winds*;) but calling them unclean spirits, asking them questions, commanding them to come out, &c. It is very mean and unworthy to suppose him merely to have humoured mad-men in any case, and much more in this: and the answer § 1. gr. 4. is by no means sufficient, because this is supposed by those on the other side the question to be a mischievous notion; yet it is plain his own apostles were suffered to continue in it, even after the descent of the Spirit, for they expressly assert the person in question to have been actually and really *possessed*; nor can one imagine how they could assert this in plainer and less ambiguous terms.

6. It

6. It is not allowed to have been so singular a case as the objection supposes, considering the account which has been given of possessions by many credible persons, especially the writers of the primitive church. See *Prop.* 114. *Dem. gr.* 5. and *Schol.* 4. and the references there.

| *Whist. Account of Demoniacs.* | *History of the Surey Demoniac.*

7. We can conjecture some probable reasons, why more frequent possessions might be permitted in Christ's time, than were known before or since; *v. g.* to punish the *Jews*, who were addicted so much to magic, (compare *Acts* xix. 13, 18, 19.) to convince men of the reality and malice of evil spirits, that they might be alarmed at their danger, and so prepared for the gospel; to illustrate the power of Christ in his triumph over them, and to give a convincing specimen of his future compleat victory. *Prop.* 159. *Cor.* 3.

8. Nevertheless, were the cause utterly unknown to us, it would not become us for that reason alone to deny the fact. Who can say, why *Satan* is permitted to have so much power over men's souls, as many of the forecited scriptures do plainly express?

Inquiry into Script. Demon.

Farther Inq. and Review.

Ess. on Demoniacs.

| *Defence of it.*

| *Twell's Examinat. and Defence.*

| *Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. vol. i. p. 281—288.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

We readily allow, that there might be a great deal of artifice in the *ora-LECT.* *cles of the Heathens*, so much celebrated by their writers; which appears from *CCXV.* the dubious language in which they were often delivered, from the instances in which clear predictions were contradicted by the event, from the apparatus made use of in consulting many of them, whereby the imagination of the suppliant or inquirer was greatly disordered, and from the servile flattery they used to princes and conquerors, and the machinery and contrivance in some of the scenes and images from whence the oracular voice proceeded: (concerning all which consult *Vandale* on all these subjects, or *Fontenelle's* elegant abridgment of him,) and there is great reason to believe, that the ignorance or superstition of the populace would make them an easy prey to artifices of this kind.—Nevertheless, considering how expressly devils are said to have been worshipped by the Gentiles, *1 Cor.* x. 20, 21. and how supposable it is, that many of them might, by their extraordinary sagacity and experience, form probable conjectures with regard to future events, and discern present things at such a distance as they could not be known by the inquirer; and likewise considering the circumstances recorded by some credible historians, for which none of the opposite particulars recorded by *Vandale* can fully account, it seems reasonable to believe,

lieve, that in *some* of those oracles there was a supernatural interposition of evil spirits; (compare *Acts* xvi. 16—18.) especially when we compare what is said of *demoniacal possessions* under the former scholium, and of *magical operations* under the next.

Biscoe at Boyle's Lect. c. viii. § 2. vol. i. p. 294—300.

Yet we cannot, without stronger proof than can be pretended, suppose that God would frequently permit these interpositions to be apparently miraculous, considering how great a confirmation they would give to idolatrous worship; and it is plain in fact, that after christianity appeared, they were in very little credit, and both *Tully* and *Plutarch* assure us, they began to decline before that time. See *Prop. 113. Schol. 4.* and the references there.

Vandale de Orac.

Fonten. Hist. d'Oracles, pass.

Plutarch de cess. Orac.

Cicero de Div. l. i. p. 182.

Gilpin of Tempt. p. 35, 36.

Essay on Insp. p. 294—310.

Raleigh's Hist. of the World, l. v. c. v. § 1.

Blackw. Inq. into the Life of Hom. p. 190—208.

Aretæus Cap. de Morb. acut. l. ii. c. iv. ad fin. p. 17. Ed. Boerh. with Boerhaave's Notes.

Weston's Inq. c. vi. p. 175—236.

Rollin Hist. Anc. vol. v. p. 28—46. Fr.

Brown's Vulg. Errors, l. vii. c. xii.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Many have rejected all stories of *magical operations*, performed by a combination with the infernal spirits, or of diabolical appearances; as being either the dreams of a disordered imagination, the contrivance of art, or the vain fictions of those who aimed at nothing but imposing on mankind.—There is great reason to believe this to have been most frequently the case: yet it must be acknowledged, that some stories of this kind come attended with evidence which it is difficult to answer, particularly the dying confession of some said to have been concerned in them; and it is strange to observe, what an agreement there is in many circumstances, among those who have believed and reported such facts, where the scenes have been most distant, and the persons in education and religion most different from each other. It is however certain, that *Satan* appeared in a visible form to *Christ*, and that he animated the body of a serpent in the *first temptation*: it is also exceeding probable, there was some supernatural appearance to *Saul*, 1 *Sam.* xxviii. notwithstanding the solution which some have endeavoured to find, in the supposed artifice of *throwing the voice*, which we can hardly suppose to have been common to all the *εὐλασπισμοί*.—The main objection against the supposed reality of such phænomena is, that being miraculous they would establish the worship of the devil, on the principles laid down above. But no proof can be brought, that such facts were ever done in attestation of a falsehood: the utmost

utmost they can be supposed to prove is, that the devils are beings of great power and knowledge, not that they are the proper objects of our worship, dependance, and obedience; and it may be added, that the purposes to which they seem to have interposed have generally been so malignant, as sufficiently to prove they are *evil* demons, and as such to be denounced and detested: and such appearances, where christianity is known, should be considered as confirming rather than weakening it; since the existence, power, and malice of *Satan* make so great a part of the christian scheme: where the gospel is unknown, natural religion might teach men, that there is a sovereign almighty being of the most benevolent nature, and consequently that these mischievous beings were to be detested as his enemies, whatever power they might have, from which he would not fail to protect those that should faithfully serve him. Compare 2 *Thess.* ii. 9—12.

Crellius de Deo, c. vi. p. 22.

Hutch. of Witch. pass.

Le Clerc's Pneum. § 2. c. v.

Baxt. of Christian. part i. c. xiv. § 20.

Gage's Surv. of West-Ind. p. 381—389.

Spekt. vol. ii. N^o. cxvii.

Tavernier's Voyages, vol. ii. p. 44, 45.

Farth. Inq. p. 84—89.

Reply to Inq. p. 79—82.

Neal's Hist. of New Eng. vol. ii. c. xii. p. 124—170.

Young on Idol. vol. ii. p. 37—46.

Waterland's Serm. vol. ii. N^o. xiv. p. 267—281.

Weston's Inq. c. vii. p. 237—281. *præs.* p. 268—270.

Becker's World bewitched, l. xii. c. iii.

Glanville's Sadducismus Triumph. *passim.*

SCHOLIUM 4.

The scripture doctrine of *Satan* makes it probable, that many of those horrible thoughts, which sometimes come with an almost irresistible impetus into the minds of pious persons, are of diabolical original; which is in some measure confirmed, by what has been observed of the subtilty, with which atheistical and sceptical arguments have sometimes been presented to the mind, even beyond the natural genius of the person assaulted by them.

Bunyan's Pil. Prog. p. 75, 76.

Gilpin on Tempt. part iii. c. vii.

Burn. Spir. Life; ap. Scougal, p. 139—141.

SCHOLIUM 5.

There is no greater evidence of the degeneracy which a rational mind, even with great degrees of sagacity and ability, is capable of, than the implacable malice of those wicked spirits, and the obstinate malignity with which they are opposing the cause of God in the world, though they are sure that opposition will end in their own confusion and ruin.

Doddridge's Fam. Expos. vol. i. p. 145. *Ed.* 1.

SCHOLIUM 6.

Those who professed magical arts, under the various forms of them, were by the law of *Moses* condemned to death, *Exod.* xxii. 18. *Deut.* xviii. 9—11. and as *idolatry* was generally the foundation of these professions, there were some reasons for their being punished peculiar to the *Jewish* dispensation. And indeed it seems fit, that in christian communities, persons making such pretensions should be discouraged; since they have an evident tendency to take off men's minds from a dependance upon God, to indulge malignant passions, and at best to fill them with vanity and superstition. But it may be questioned, how far the professors of such arts are to be punished by the magistrate. We allow, that it is not his province to punish offences against God as such; (*Prop.* 77.) and consequently a contract with *Satan*, considered merely in this view, is not by human laws to be made penal: but if it be proved that real mischief either to the persons or properties of men be done in consequence of such a contract, the person who can be proved to have done such mischief is certainly answerable for it; and if (which is generally the case) those predictions are only artifices to impose on simple people and get money from them, the idle pretenders are plainly a pest to society, and may as justly be punished as those who keep gaming-houses, brothels, &c. Vid. *Prop.* 50. *Schol.* 3.

Hutch. of Witchcr. c. xii. p. 147—154. | *Gilp. on Tempt. part* i. c. v. p. 29—32.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Certain vain ceremonies, which are commonly called *charms*, and seem to have no efficacy at all for producing the effects proposed by them, are to be avoided; seeing, if there be indeed any real efficacy in them, it is generally probable they owe it to some bad cause; for one can hardly imagine, that God should permit good angels in any extraordinary manner to interpose, or should immediately exert his own miraculous power on trifling occasions, and upon the performance of such idle tricks as are generally made the condition of receiving such benefits.

Limb. Theol. l. v. c. xxxv. § 3.
Weemse, vol. iv. p. 52, 53.

| *More's Immort. of the Soul, l.* iii. c. xii.
§ 3, 4.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Concerning the vanity of what is commonly called *Judicial astrology*. Vid. *More's Theol. Works, p.* 240—251.

PROPOSITION CLXII.

LECT. To enquire into what shall pass at the end of this world, so far as scripture gives
CCXVI. us an account of it.

SOLU-

SOLUTION.

1. The Lord Jesus Christ shall descend with visible pomp and majesty, attended by the blessed angels, who will probably be employed as the instruments of some loud and extraordinary sound, called *the trumpet of God*, or *voice of the archangel*: this appearance shall be attended with the resurrection of the dead, *Matt.* xxiv. 30, 31. xxv. 31, 32. xxvi. 64. *John* v. 28, 29. *Acts* iv. 2. xxiii. 6. xxiv. 15. *1 Cor.* xv. 12, &c. *1 Thess.* iv. 14—16.

2. In this resurrection, the bodies of the saints shall in a glorious, though unknown manner, be transformed into the resemblance of the glorified body of Christ; shall be raised above those miseries and temptations to which, by virtue of their constitution and situation, they are now exposed, and rendered fit to serve the soul in all the entertainments and employments of the heavenly state, *Matt.* xiii. 43. *1 Cor.* xv. 42—49. *Phil.* iii. 21.

3. Those saints who are found alive at this appearance of Christ shall be caught up with those new-raised, to meet him; and their bodies shall undergo a change correspondent to that of those who are dead, *1 Cor.* xv. 50—54. *1 Thess.* iv. 17.

4. All mankind both good and bad shall in a solemn manner appear before Christ, that their lives and characters may undergo a strict examination, in order to determine their final state, *Acts* xvii. 31. *Rom.* ii. 16. *2 Tim.* iv. 1. *2 Cor.* v. 10. & *sim.*

5. The consequence of this judgment will be a sentence of absolution to all the righteous, and condemnation to all the wicked, (in which latter sentence the evil angels shall also be included;) and this on each side will be succeeded by the immediate execution of it, the righteous being received into a state of compleat and everlasting happiness, and the wicked cast down to everlasting misery, *Matt.* xxv. 31—46. *Mark* ix. 43—49. *Rom.* ii. 5—10. *2 Cor.* iv. 17, 18. *2 Thess.* i. 7—10. *2 Tim.* iv. 8. *1 Pet.* i. 4—7. iv. 13. v. 4. *1 John* iii. 2.

COROLLARY 1.

There is great reason to believe that the saints will be made perfect in holiness, without which we cannot conceive how they could be compleatly happy; and indeed the perfection of their character in their final state is expressly asserted, *Eph.* v. 27. *Col.* i. 22. *Heb.* xii. 23. *Jude* ver. 24.

COROLLARY 2.

It plainly appears from the passages referred to above, and especially *gr.* 5. that the compleat happiness of the saints is to commence from the resurrection, as also the compleat punishment of the wicked: but how far there is reason to believe, that the one and the other are immediately after death

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in a state of happiness or misery, far beyond what they are then to receive, we shall enquire below, *Schol.* 9.

<i>Goodwin's Works</i> , vol. v. part iii. c. xiii, xiv. p. 90, &c.	<i>Boyse's four last Things</i> , ap. <i>Op.</i> vol. i. p. 301, 302.
<i>Whitby on 2 Tim.</i> iv. 8. & <i>2 Pet.</i> ii. 4.	<i>Limborch's Theol.</i> l. vi. c. x. § 4.
<i>Flem. Christol.</i> vol. iii. p. 527—532.	<i>Howe's Bless. of the Righteous</i> , c. x. p. 117. & ap. <i>Op.</i> vol. i. p. 519—522.
<i>Watts's Death and Heav.</i> p. 188, 189.	

SCHOLIUM I.

There are many passages in the Old Testament, which either obscurely hint at the resurrection of the body, or immediately refer to it; v. g. *Job* xix. 23—27. *Dan.* xii. 2. to which many have added *Isa.* xxv. 8. xxvi. 19. *Hos.* vi. 2. xiii. 14. compare *Ezek.* xxxvii. 1—14. To these texts Dr. *Hodges* has added several others, which he interprets as referring to the resurrection, particularly *Job* xiv. 14. xxi. 30—32. xxix. 19, 20. xxx. 22, 23. But all his efforts will only at best prove these words may be so rendered and explained, whereas they all make very good sense upon the common interpretation. See *Hodges's Elibu*, c. iv. *præf.* p. 212—214, 230—240.

<i>Sherlock on Propb.</i> p. 255—277.	<i>Grey on Job</i> , <i>Pref.</i> p. 14, 15.
<i>Patrick on Job</i> xix. 25.	<i>Brown's three Serm. in Loc.</i>
<i>Warb. Div. Leg.</i> vol. ii. p. 543—548.	<i>Birch's Life of Mr. Boyle</i> , p. 295—297.
<i>Lime-street Lect.</i> vol. ii. p. 394—406.	

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some have not only doubted whether these texts express the resurrection of the body, but whether there be any where in the Old Testament any reference to a future state at all. The case in a few words appears to be this. The *Mosaic* covenant contained no promises directly relating to a future state; probably, as Dr. *Warburton* asserts and argues at large, because *Moses* was secure of an equal providence, and therefore needed not subsidiary sanctions taken from a future state, without the belief of which the doctrine of a universal providence cannot ordinarily be vindicated, nor the general sanctions of religion secured: yet, as real piety must imply some views to such a state, it seems evident that good men even before *Moses* were animated by them, (*Heb.* xi. 13—16.) as he himself plainly was; (*ibid.* ver. 24—26.) and that the promises of heavenly felicity were contained even in the covenant made with *Abraham*, (which the *Mosaic* could not disannul,) we have shewn before: (see *Prop.* 154. § 1. gr. 4.) Succeeding providences also confirmed the natural arguments in its favour, as every remarkable interposition would do. And when general promises were made to the obedient, and an equal providence relating to the nation established on national conformity to the *Mosaic* institution, and not merely to the gene-

general precepts of virtue, (which must always make a nation happy;) as such an equal providence would necessarily involve many of the best men in national ruin, at a time when, by preserving their integrity in the midst of general apostasy, their virtue was most conspicuous; such good men in such a state would have vast additional reasons for expecting future rewards, beyond what could arise from principles common to the rest of mankind: so that we cannot wonder that we find in the writings of the prophets many strong expressions of such an expectation, particularly *Gen.* xlix. 18. *Psal.* xvi. 9—11. (compare *Acts* ii. 25—31.) xvii. ult. xxiii. ult. xxxvi. 9. xlix. 14, 15. lxxiii. 17—27. *Prov.* x. 2, 28. xi. 7. xii. 28. xiv. 32. xv. 24. xxi. 16. *Eccles.* iii. 15, 16, 17, 21. vii. 12, 15. viii. 12—14. xi. 9. xii. 7, 13, 14. *Isa.* iii. 10, 11. *Ezek.* xviii. 19—21. to which catalogue may be added the texts quoted above, *Schol.* 1. The same thing may also be inferred from the particular promises made to *Daniel*, *Dan.* xii. 13. to *Zerubabel*, *Hag.* ii. 23. and to *Joshua* the high-priest, *Zech.* iii. 7. as well as from those historical facts recorded in the Old Testament, of the murder of *Abel*, the translation of *Enoch* and *Elijah*, the death of *Moses*, the story of the witch of *Endor*; and from what is said of the appearance of angels to, and their converse with good men. Vid. *Prop.* 149. gr. 5*.

Against this interpretation of the preceding texts it is objected, that *bringing life and immortality to light* was the peculiar glory of christianity: compare 2 *Tim.* i. 10. with Dr. *Hodges's* explication, (*Elibu*, p. 252.) But waving this interpretation, we answer, 1. That many of the passages above are ambiguous, though most reasonably explained of a future state. 2. That in others there might be room to doubt, whether they express any thing more than the hope these good men in fact had, without determining that it was built on any express revelation. 3. That where there was an express message from God, the consequence, as including a future state, was to be inferred from comparing the inequalities of present providences with that general declaration. 4. That no such passages contain a promise of final, everlasting, and immutable happiness even to the spirits of good men; 5. Nor of a resurrection to their body: nor 6. Does it at all affect any but the *Jews*; so that when Christ in his own person, and that of the apostles, declared a future state of endless happiness or misery of the whole person, awaiting *all* men, it may well be called bringing life and immortality to light, when compared with any former dispensation.

Leland against Morg. vol. i. c. xi. p. | *Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 553—568.
338—345.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Those who have thought that the resurrection of the body might be demonstrated, as at least probable from natural principles, have pleaded,

* See on this subject *A Dissertation on the religious knowledge of the ancient Jews and Patriarchs*, &c. by Mr. *Stephen Addington*. Printed for J. Payne, 1757.

1. That considering on the one hand the immortality of the soul, and on the other that the body was originally designed to make up a part of the man, it would seem improbable that one part should be utterly destroyed, especially after so short a duration, shorter indeed than the period of many other animal and vegetable bodies. But those who insist upon this argument seem to have forgotten, that the sentence of death introduced by sin has changed the original state; not to insist upon it, that from the light of nature we might perhaps apprehend the union of our souls to these bodies a punishment.

2. They plead that a more glorious display of the divine justice will be consequent upon a resurrection than can otherwise be supposed. But it is certain, the almighty power of God might without this make it apparent to all human creatures, that virtue was universally rewarded, and vice proportionably punished: and none can pretend to say, how far the honours of the divine judgment would necessarily require a more public and sensible triumph.

3. Many have urged the reasonableness of making the body partake of rewards and punishments, as it has partaken of duty or guilt. But it is only in a figurative sense, that it can be said to be the subject either of virtue or happiness.

4. The Fathers commonly argued from the succeeding daily and yearly resurrection to be observed in the natural world. This was indeed a very just proof to the *Heathens*, with whom this controversy chiefly lay, that a resurrection from the dead was possible, and the fabulous story of the phoenix was as fine an illustration of it as can be imagined. Vid. *Solinus*, cap. xxxiii. p. 63. with *Salmasius's* notes, vol. i. p. 548, &c. But we cannot certainly infer from thence, that God will effect it: so that it seems to be peculiar to a divine revelation, to give convincing evidence of the resurrection of the body. Vid. *Prop.* 82. *Schol.* 6. and the authors quoted there.

Plato's Phædo, § 14, 15.

Pearse on the Creed, p. 375, 376.

Watts's Death and Heav. p. 228—232.

SCHOLIUM 4.

LECT. CCXVII. It is much debated, how far the body to be raised will be *the same* with that laid in the grave, and it is a question of much greater difficulty than importance.

It may be observed,

1. That the raised body cannot be entirely the same mass, *i. e.* cannot consist just of the same particles without either addition or diminution. The continual changes that pass in the body during life would render this raised body of a monstrous size, if all those particles that had ever been vitally united to it, *i. e.* had made a part of it while living, were then to be restored; which yet might seem as necessary, as that just that number should be restored which were laid in the grave: and besides this, the different state of bodies laid in the grave, some vastly overgrown, others much emaciated, others only of infants, others maimed,

maimed, *i. e.* deprived of some of their limbs and members, would occasion such a diversity of size and forms at the resurrection, as there is no reason at all to imagine, and it would be insufferable to suppose.

2. Some have imagined, that there is some part of the brain, so exceeding small as to be invisible, which is in its own nature incorruptible; and that the uniting this to the same soul to which it was before united will occasion an identity of the whole man. But it is neither certain that there are any such incorruptible particles, nor can we see how the identity of these particles would make the raised body the same that was laid in the dust.

3. Many have supposed that there may be some *stamina*, which are the same in every distinct human body from its birth to its death, only in different circumstances dilated by the fluids to different degrees, and that these are of such a nature, as never to pass from being the stamina of one body to become the stamina of another: which hypothesis, though it be not entirely clear of its difficulties, yet if it be allowed possible, will shew the possibility of giving to each what may properly be called *his own body*, even when, as in the instance of canibals, and no doubt in many others, the same particles at different times make a part of different human bodies.

4. The scripture speaks, not merely (as Mr. Locke maintains,) of the resurrection of *the dead*, but also of the resurrection of *the body*, in such terms, as at least strongly to intimate, that it may properly be called the same body which was laid in the grave, on some material account, though the organization of it shall no doubt be greatly changed, in such a manner as is to us at present unknown, *John* v. 28. *Rev.* xx. 13. *1 Cor.* xv. 35—38, 42—44, 53. *Phil.* iii. 21. to which we may without scruple add *Rom.* viii. 11.

More's Theol. p. 154, 155.

Phœnix, vol. i. p. 68—80.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. part ii. Prop. xiii. p. 316—319.

Locke's Lett. to Stillingfl. Op. vol. i. p. 484—498. or the Notes at the End of the Essay, l. ii. cap. xxvii.

Nieuwentyt's Rel. Phil. vol. i. Contemp.

xvi. § 9. Cont. xxviii. § 13.

Keil's Essay on Blood, p. 20, 21.

Pearson on the Creed, p. 380—383.

Wintringham's Exility of the Vessels of the Body, p. 29—44.

SCHOLIUM 5.

It is not possible for us to determine, how far the language in which our Lord describes the judgment-day, *Matt.* xxv. and else-where, may be *literal*, and how far *figurative*. There seems no reason to believe, that every individual word and action shall be particularly examined in all its circumstances, witnesses heard, refuted, &c. for were this to proceed according to the method of human courts, it would make the judgment day millions of years longer than the whole period of the earth's duration has been; neither can we depend upon it that those *excuses* will actually be made, which are represented, *Matt.* vii. 22.

XXV.

xxv. 24. & 44. no doubt every particular of men's conduct will be weighed, in order to fix their character and their state; and the proceedings of that day will be attended with such convictions of conscience, impressed upon the unhappy creatures condemned in it, as effectually to supersede such pleas, or any other they could be supposed capable of making: but it is probable this last expression, as well as those of *opening the books*, Rev. xix. 12. are to be taken figuratively.

Sherlock on Judg. cap. iv.

Young's Serm. vol. i. p. 320—324, 328—333.

SCHOLIUM 6.

It is expressly said, that *evil spirits* are reserved to the judgment of the great day, Jude ver. 6. 2 Pet. ii. 4. 1 Cor. vi. 3. in which there will be a more apparent propriety, if Dr. Hunt's conjecture concerning the fall of the angels be true, which is, that those angels, before they fell, had in their former state some peculiar relation to our system, and that they were in the number of those who attended the *Shekinah*, while Adam was in paradise; but by drawing off forsook their post, out of a principle of rebellion against the Son of God, or of envy to mankind, whom they thought unworthy the guardianship and attendance of such noble spirits.

Hunt's Essay on various Dispens. ad fin.

SCHOLIUM 7.

LECT. CCXVIII. Many precarious conjectures have been formed concerning the place, in which good men shall dwell after the resurrection: some have thought it to be *beyond the starry firmament*; and some of the ancients imagined that their dwelling would be in *the sun*, from a mistaken interpretation of Psal. xix. 4. which they rendered, as the LXX. and *Valgate*, *He has set his tabernacle in the sun*: but the nature and appearance of the sun, especially considering the spots on his face, so easily expose the weakness of this hypothesis, that it deserves no manner of regard. Mr. *Whiston* supposes the *air* to be the seat of the blessed, at present at least, and imagines that Christ is at the top of the atmosphere, and other souls nearer or more remote from him, according to the degree of their moral purity, to which he imagines the specific gravity of their inseparable vehicles to be proportionable: a scheme so evidently precarious, that it seems hardly worth while particularly to examine it.

Whiston at Boyle's Lect. Append.

But Mr. *Hallet* has endeavoured to prove at large, that they will dwell upon *earth*, when it shall be restored to its paradisaical state; and the substance of his arguments is this. Saints on their death go to *heaven*, (2 Cor. v. 8.

Phil.

Phil. i. 23. compared with *Acts* iii. 21.) which place is likewise called *paradise*, *Luke* xxiii. 43. *2 Cor.* xii. 2, 4. but after the resurrection there shall be a *new earth*, upon which shall descend the *new Jerusalem*, a city to be formed in heaven, and from thence brought down and fixed upon earth, *Rev.* xxi, xxii. compare *2 Pet.* iii. 13. and he supposes this is all that is intended by such expressions, as *1 Pet.* i. 4. *Heb.* x. 34. *John* xiv. 2. and he confidently asserts, that *heaven* does no where in scripture signify a place where good men shall dwell after the resurrection. He urges that many singular advantages attend this hypothesis, *v. g.* it shews the reason why the *body* shall be raised, and it affords the best interpretation of *Matt.* v. 3, &c. but as for those passages, *Isa.* lxv. 17, &c. lxvi. 22, &c. he apprehends that these are only *allusions* to the abode of the saints after the resurrection, but do *immediately* refer to the restoration of the *Jews* to their own land, and its extraordinary fruitfulness and pleasure, which he supposes by various strong figurative expressions to be compared to the final abode of the blessed. Many objections lie against this scheme, too obvious to need a particular mention: the chief are these,

1. One can hardly imagine any city upon earth capable of containing the whole number of God's people, especially considering the great triumph of the christian cause to be expected in the latter day, (of which see *Prop.* 112. *Schol.* 4.) the great multiplication of the inhabitants of the earth, which will probably be connected with it, and the probable reason there is to hope, that all who die in infancy, (which is at least one third of the whole human species,) or at least all the deceased infants of the righteous, may belong to the number of the elect: and if this, or any thing like it, be the case, it is probable that the whole face of the earth would not be able, conveniently, if at all, to contain so great a number; and to say that the size of the earth shall be increased, or the dimensions of the glorified body contracted, would be so groundless and improbable a conjecture, that this ingenious writer, wide as he suffers his thoughts to expatiate, has not seen fit so much as to mention it.

2. It is difficult to conceive, how the inhabitants of such a fine city upon earth, should by any means be *equal to the angels*, which yet scripture declares that they shall be, *Luke* xx. 36.

3. The notion of *the perpetual day* there to be enjoyed, without the sun, seems very ill to suit the apprehension of this our planet's being the seat of that glory, *Rev.* xxi. 23—25.

4. With the thought of a perpetual abode on earth, seem to be connected several other mean ideas, which will by no means suit the exalted description given of the heavenly state: least of all therefore can we imagine, that Christ and the holy angels are to have their perpetual abode here; yet it is expressly said, that saints are to be *for ever with the Lord*, *1 Thess.* iv. 17. that they shall be *caught up to meet him in the air*, (which would be very unnecessary and strange, if they were immediately to descend to earth again,) and that *he will come to receive them to himself, that they may be where he is*, *John* xiv. 2. which on this hypothesis must be a very improper expression.

5. That

5. That the scriptures, on which this hypothesis is founded, are capable of another and very different interpretation; as will appear by consulting the most celebrated commentators upon them, and particularly Mr. Lowman, on those chapters of the *Revelations* which are the main support of Mr. Hallet's scheme.—On the whole, the place of the blessed is a question of little importance; and if we believe the description of their happiness given in scripture, we may cheerfully pursue and expect it, though we cannot answer a multitude of curious questions relating to the circumstantialia of it.

<i>Hallet on Script.</i> vol. i. p. 191—210.		<i>Drieberg de bon. nov. Fœd. c. xii. § 22</i>
vol. ii. p. 167—174.		—34. p. 185, &c.
<i>Enty against Hallet</i> , p. 174—200.		

SCHOLIUM 8.

There have also been various conjectures, equally uncertain, concerning the place of the damned. The ancients generally supposed it was a region of fire, near the centre of the earth: others have supposed it might be a comet, where the extremes of heat and cold, in its access to and recess from the sun, would be equally tormenting; and they suppose the latter to be signified by βρυγμος οδοντων, *Matt.* xxii. 13. which they would render the chattering of the teeth; but *Matt.* xiii. 43. sufficiently overthrows that criticism. Mr. Swinden endeavours to prove at large, that hell is seated in the sun, chiefly pleading that this is the grand repository of fire, that its horrible face when viewed by a telescope suits the description given of the burning lake, and that being in the center of the system, it might properly be said that wicked men were cast down into it. How this is reconcileable with what is said of its being outer darkness, I think he has not attempted to shew. It seems a great objection against each of these hypotheses, that if either of them be admitted, we must allow a vast number of hells, if, as this author himself supposes, the fixed stars be suns; and it seems extremely improbable, that as soon as a system is created, a seat of torment should be prepared for its inhabitants.—Others, by directly the counterpart to Mr. Hallet's hypothesis, have imagined that earth would be the seat of the damned, and that when left in the flames of the last conflagration, wicked men would be cast down into it, supposing some peculiar propriety that the place of their sin should be that of their punishment: but it is something improbable, this should be the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels, *Matt.* xxv. 41. On the whole, we must here likewise confess our ignorance, and shall be much better employed in studying how we may avoid this place of horror, than in labouring to discover where it is.

<i>Swinden of Hell</i> , c. vii.		<i>Reynolds's Ang. World, Quest.</i> xxix. p.
<i>Dawes's Serm. on Hell</i> , N°. iii. p. 14.		178.

SCHOLIUM 9.

Some have thought, that during *the intermediate state* between death and LECT. the resurrection, the soul shall be entirely *insensible*, which they suppose to be CCXIX. the natural consequence of its separation from the body. But the contrary seems to be evident with regard to *good men*, from the following scriptures, *Matt.* xvii. 3. *Luke* xxiii. 42. *2 Cor.* v. 6, 8. *Phil.* i. 21, 23, 24. to which some add *1 Pet.* iii. 19. *Heb.* xii. 23. and with greater certainty *Matt.* x. 28. compare also *Acts* vii. 59. *John* v. 24. & *sim.* *Rom.* viii. 10, 11, 38: *2 Cor.* v. 1, 2. xii. 2, 3, 4. *1 Thess.* iv. 14. v. 10. *Rev.* vi. 9, 10. *2 Pet.* i. 13, 14. And that the *Jews* before Christ's time had this notion, is at least probable from *Wisdom* ii. 2—4, 23, 24. iii. 1—5. iv. 7—15. v. 14, 15. though it is certain, that about the time of the *Maccabees*, a resurrection from the dead was expected, however they came so confidently to embrace the persuasion of it, and the most considerable rewards of good men and punishment of sinners were supposed to commence from this grand period, *2 Mac.* vii. 9—11, 14, 23, 29. xii. 43. xiv. 46. *Judith* xvi. 17. And by a parity of reason, we may conclude the like with regard to the *wicked*, compare *Luke* xvi. 22, 23. and it seems plain, as the human mind is constituted, that the expectation of immediate blessedness or misery, as soon as ever death has done its office, increaseth those arguments for virtue, which are taken from the future state. The most considerable arguments against this are brought from *Isa.* xxxviii. 18. *Psal.* xxx. 9. cxv. 17. *Eccles.* ix. 4—6. to which some have answered,

1. That the existence of the soul in a separate state might be a truth unknown to the Old Testament saints. But if we suppose it to be a truth, and yet at the same time allow that in these passages they declared the contrary, we evidently give up the plenary inspiration of this part of scripture: most therefore have chosen to reply,

2. That the texts quoted above relate to the inactive state of the body in the grave, and the removal of the soul from all intercourse with this world, and all capacity of doing any thing for the service of God here, which they were peculiarly solicitous about. This reply may properly be made with regard to the two first of the scriptures quoted above, and will appear of the greater weight, considering the distinguished character and circumstances of *David* and *Hezekiah*, (*Hervey's Med.* vol. ii. p. 26, 27. *not.*) and as for the passage in *Ecclesiastes*, if the same reply be not admitted with regard to that, it seems so directly to contradict the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, that those who believe that doctrine, and also believe the plenary inspiration of *Solomon*, or even that he believed and taught it, (as in this book he seems to have done) must suppose it the speech of an *Epicure*, introduced by a sudden *prosopopœia*; which if it be allowed, destroys the force of all objection from it. Compare the texts quoted from *Ecclesiastes*, *Schol.* 2.

2. As to that objection which is taken from such passages of scripture, as refer to the general judgment, as the time when good men enter on their happiness and the wicked on their misery, (many of which are quoted *Prop.* 162. *gr.* 5.) see *Cor.* 2. and the references there; from whence it will appear, that such scriptures have an important sense, consistent with what we have advanced here for the existence of our thinking powers in a separate state.—It may be further objected, that the apostle says, “we shall receive according to what we have done *in the body*,” but on the supposition of the soul’s existing in a separate state, the time in which many lived in the body will have been but a very inconsiderable part of their whole duration, whereas justice would require the whole to be regarded (compare 2 *Cor.* v. 10.) It is answered, God may suspend our probation upon what time of our existence he pleases; and that it is very supposeable, that both good and bad men may after death go into such a sort of state, as may not suit probation, but make a part either of reward or punishment; and whatever can be objected against this, would affect the immensely greater part of our existence, which those who deny the separate state must allow to pass after the final sentence.

Witsii Econ. Fæd. l. iii. c. xiv. § 14—

24.

Baxter’s Saints Rest, part ii. c. x.

Ditton on the Res. p. 480—483.

Howe’s Works, vol. i. p. 517—519.

Not.

Phoenix, vol. ii. p. 333—335.

Goodman’s Prod. Son, p. 344—347.

Watts’s World to come, vol. i. *prelim.*

Disc. pass.

Bishop Bull’s Works, vol. i. *Serm.* iii. p.

83—114. *pres.* p. 95—99.

Hartley on Man, part ii. *Prop.* xc. p. 402, 403.

SCHOLIUM IO.

There is great reason to believe, that the happiness of the blessed does in some measure arise from the converse of each other: compare *Heb.* xii. 22. 1 *Thess.* ii. 19, 20. nor do those texts, which speak of the favour of God as the final portion of the blessed, (*Psal.* xvii. *ult.* lxxiii 25, 26. 1 *Cor.* xv. 28.) at all interfere with this; seeing God will undoubtedly be owned and enjoyed in all those holy entertainments which arise from the company of angels and glorified saints: and the degree in which he makes benevolent spirits upon earth useful to each other, and the angels serviceable to saints here, as well as the social nature of man, gives additional weight to the argument taken from the passages quoted above, and leaves no doubt concerning the justice of the assertion.

Turret. Loc. xx. *Quest.* xi.

Limb. Theol. l. vi. c. xiii. § 16.

Butler’s Anal. p. 200.

SCHOLIUM II.

That there will be various degrees of future happiness, according to men’s various attainments in virtue, and the different degrees of service here performed,

PROP. CLXII. *Various degrees of future happiness and misery.*

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formed, appears not only from the justice of God, which seems evidently to require this; and from the nature of things, which would in the same external circumstances render the wisest and most virtuous the happiest; but likewise from express scriptures, such as *Dan. xii. 3. Matt. x. 41, 42. xix. 28, 29. Luke xix. 16—19. Rom. ii. 6. 1 Cor. iii. 8. 2 Cor. v. 10. ix. 6. compare Gal. vi. 9. 1 Cor. iii. 14, 15. to which we may perhaps add 1 Cor. xv. 41, Matt. v. 10—12. 2 Cor. iv. 17.* To this it is objected,

1. That the rewards of the heavenly state are represented as equal, *Matt. xx. 7—10.* It is answered, that the parable refers to the calling of the Gentiles into equal church privileges with the *Jews*, else there would be no room to represent some as murmuring against the rest, since such a temper is plainly inconsistent with the character and happiness of the blessed. It is objected,

2. That as all believers have a perfect righteousness in Christ, the degree of glory, being the reward of that alone, must be equal.

Ans. Though all are accepted for the sake of Christ, and all equally justified from the guilt and condemnation of sin through him, yet there may be room for such a diversity of rewards as was mentioned above; which being expressly asserted, no conclusion from any hypothesis whatsoever ought to be advanced in opposition to that doctrine.

The like diversity of degrees with regard to future *punishment*, may be inferred from a parity of reason, and also from comparing *Matt. x. 15. xi. 22. Luke xii. 47, 48.*

Limb. Theol. l. vi. c. xiii. § 12, 13, 24,

Witsii. Econ. Fæd. l. iii. c. xiv. § 39,
40.

Watts's Death and Heaven, p. 112—
130.

Mede's Diatribe on Matt. x. 41. ap.

Op. p. 84, &c.

Boyle's Works, vol. i. p. 293—298, ap.

Four last Things, Sermon xxiii.

Bishop Bull's Serm. vol. i. Sermon iii, p.
279—314.

SCHOLIUM 12.

It may not be improper here to mention the doctrine of the church of *Rome*, LECT. relating to *purgatory*, which is in short this: That it is a fire, where the souls CCXX. of good men remain in torment for a certain time, which torments are in their degree equal to those endured by the damned, till they have by these sufferings satisfied for the guilt of *venial* sins they had committed, or *mortal* sins of which they had truly repented. For the support of this strangely incoherent doctrine, they chiefly urge *1 Pet. iii. 19. Matt. v. 25, 26. xii. 32. 1 Cor. iii. 10—15. xv. 29.* As for the arguments drawn from *Zech. ix. 11. Mal. iii. 2. Job xiv. 19—22.* they are so trifling as hardly to deserve mention. On the other side, the protestants plead *Isa. lvii. 2. Rev. xiv. 13. Luke xvi. 22. xxiii. 43. 2 Cor. v. 8.*—For the fuller discussion of this point, see the notes in the *Fam. Expos.* on the texts cited; but we wave it here, and content ourselves with observing the *silence* of scripture upon this head, which, had the doctrine been true, must

be very unaccountable; seeing so important a part of charity would, upon the supposition of its truth, arise from thence, to which we have no exhortation. It is also derogatory from the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction; and it has so great a tendency to encourage men's hopes of finding mercy, in consequence of something to be done for them hereafter, when they are in their graves, that it ought by no means to be admitted upon such shadows of proof, as those laid down above; especially when the *Romish* doctors teach, that one mere act of *attrition* before death delivers a man from mortal guilt, and sends him to purgatory, where it is not possible he should lie any longer than the resurrection, and from whence, if rich, he may be very quickly freed by the prayers of survivors.

Limb. Theol. l. vi. c. x. § 10—22. | *Bull's Serm.* vol. i. N°. iii. p. 114—126.
Burn. on Art. xxii. p. 197—205. | *Fleury's Catechism*, vol. ii. § 250.

SCHOLIUM 13.

With the doctrine of purgatory, will fall that of *praying for the dead*, which is chiefly founded upon it, and for which the chief text the *Papists* plead, is 2 *Maccab.* xii. 40, &c. To which it is sufficient to answer, that we shewed before, *Prop.* 124. that no regard is to be paid to that book, as divinely inspired. If *Judas Maccabeus* did indeed offer such a sacrifice, it was probably not to atone for the *dead*, as the author foolishly concludes, but rather to avert the wrath of God from the *living*, lest, as in the case of *Achan*, the rest of the people should have suffered for the crimes of their brethren.—They also urge 2 *Tim.* i. 16—18. which yet can have no weight, because it does not appear that *Onesiphorus* was then dead.

Burn. on Art. p. 201, 202. | *Limb. Theol.* l. v. c. xxvi. § 19—21.

That the *commemoration* of the dead, which prevailed in the third century of christianity, was not *praying* for them, is very evident. Compare *Juricu's Pastoral Letters*, N°. ix. p. 188—196.

SCHOLIUM 14.

It is exceedingly difficult exactly to determine, what we are to understand by *Christ's giving up the kingdom to the Father*, at the end of the world, of which we read 1 *Cor.* xv. 24—28. Some have thought that it means no more, than Christ's presenting the church to the Father in compleat glory, even then acknowledging, by some public and solemn declaration, his own subjection to the Father, and derivation of the mediatorial kingdom from him. But as this does not appear a very natural interpretation, others have said, that Christ shall then give up his commission, as a general does, when that war is concluded, for the management of which he has received it, and shall remain as one of his

his brethren: in which interpretation *Witsius* and *Crellius* do strangely agree. Against this is objected, the perpetuity of Christ's kingdom, so often declared; or, (if that be answered by the ambiguity of the word made use of in declaring it,) the glory which must necessarily result to the human nature of Christ, in consequence of its intimate and personal union with the Deity. On the whole, it seems probable that some peculiar authority, which Christ has received from the Father, of managing the affairs of this world for the salvation of his redeemed, will then be solemnly resigned, as the earth itself will then pass away; so that there will in the nature of things be no more room left for the exercise of such a kind of authority: and it will evidently appear, by the process of the great day, that the destruction of the earth, is not a calamity coming upon it while under the Redeemer's care, but a catastrophe to which he appoints it, as having closed all that administration which he proposed at first, when he undertook the management of it. Nevertheless it is reasonable to believe, that he will for ever remain as the glorified head both of elect angels and men, *Eph. i. 10.* the latter being then received to the abode of the former, and incorporated into the same society, and united into one kingdom with them, in such a manner as had not before been known; and that Christ will exercise over the whole kingdom such a mild and gracious government, as suits the dignity of his nature, and the greatness of those services, which he has performed for the Father; though he shall not then be the medium of their approach to and converse with God in the same manner that he now is: but they, being by the resurrection fully delivered from all the penal consequences of sin, shall have nearer access to God, and yet more intimate communion with him, than they ever before had, whether during their sojourning here upon earth, or even during the abode of their separate spirits in the unseen world.

Turret. Loc. xiv. Quæst. vii. § 10.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. iii. p. 1267

—1274.

Witsii in Symb. Exercit. x. § 40—44.

Crellius in loc. ap. Op. vol. i. p. 331—

333, 339, 340.

Berrin. at Boyle's Lect. vol. ii. Sermon. xii.

PROPOSITION CLXIII.

To enquire into the most probable things which are said, to prove or disprove the eternity of hell-torments.

LECT.
CCXXI.

SOLUTION.

SECT. I. The arguments to prove them *eternal* are chiefly these.

I. That the infinite majesty of an offended God adds a kind of infinite evil to sin, and therefore exposes the sinner to an infinite punishment: but as the limited nature of the creature can only bear a finite degree of misery, in any finite duration whatsoever, therefore it must extend to an infinite duration, and the creature must ever be paying a debt, which he will never perfectly have dis-

discharged.—To this it is answered, that there cannot be an infinite degree of evil in the punishment of a finite being. But it is replied to this answer, that the enormity of any action is in part to be estimated by the dignity of the person against whom it is committed, and the greatness of those obligations which the offender lay under to him. On these principles, in human judgments, actions, in other respects the same, are punished in very different degrees, and striking a *prince* is made capital, whereas striking an *equal*, might be sufficiently punished by a small fine. But it may be replied, that the argument here is not from the dignity of the person abstractedly considered, but from the interest which the public has in the safety of the prince, which could not be secured without this extraordinary guard set upon it. It is further objected to this argument, that it would make all sins equal, whereas both scripture and reason prove that there are different degrees of guilt, proportionable to the different circumstances attending them: compare *Prov. 162. Sabol. 11.* To this it is answered, that where the *duration* of punishment is equal, there may be such a difference in the *degree*, as may be correspondent to the degree of the crime; and if this answer be not allowed to be satisfactory, it will be difficult to say how the doctrine of different degrees of eternal rewards can be vindicated, as consistent with itself; yet this is allowed by all who urge the objection, and is by all parity of reason to be supposed in the very foundation of it.

Whitby's App. to 2 Tbes. i.

| Berry-str. Lect. vol. ii. p. 559—562.

2. That whatsoever reason requires a *temporary* hell, will also require an *eternal* one, *v. g.* the display of God's wisdom, holiness, justice, majesty, and power, his regard to his injured Son and Spirit, his violated law, and rejected gospel, his abused patience, slighted promises, despised threatenings, &c. the labours of his servants, the ministry of his angels, and the impression it may make on the inhabitants of happy worlds, to whom the punishment of the damned may be an instructive spectacle.—It is replied, that all those ends might as well be effected, by supposing a perpetual succession of criminals delivered over to temporary punishment, as by the eternal punishment of each individual; and that, even without this, the remembrance of what guilty creatures had suffered might answer this end: but it may be suggested on the other hand, that if we believe an eternity of future happiness, and that the punishments of the damned will ever come to a period, the time will come, when the whole duration of them will bear less proportion to the time in which happiness has been enjoyed, than a moment to a thousand years; and consequently, that the whole series of punishment will be as it were an evanescent thing, by which all the purposes abovementioned will seem to cease.—It is further alledged, that if this argument will prove any thing, it will prove that every offence, which is punished at all, must be punished to the utmost even of almighty power; since it seems, that the greater as well as longer the punishment is, the more effectually must it answer these ends: on the contrary, may not some good end possibly

possibly be answered, by the cessation or mitigation of punishment, as well as by its continuance; and if our conjectures were to take place here, might it not redound to the glory of Christ, if for his sake the punishment of the damned were to be brought to a period, even though it might have been consistent with the divine justice to continue it longer, and even to continue it for ever?

Reynolds's Ang. World, p. 301—306.

3. It is urged, that the government of the world will require God to threaten eternal misery; since nothing less than the apprehension of that will keep men from the violation of his laws, as appears in fact; and if eternal punishments are once threatened, the justice, truth, and wisdom of God will require, that they be actually inflicted, correspondent to that threatening. The *latter* part of the argument will be considered under the next head; to the *former* it is replied, 1. That if the apprehension of punishment not eternal does not deter men from sin, the only reason is, because it is not sufficiently attended to; so that the fault lies upon men's inconsideration, and not on any deficiency in the sanctions of the divine law, provided the punishment be greater than any pleasure or advantage to be derived from the sin forbidden under that penalty. 2. It is plain in fact the threatening of eternal punishment does not prevent sin, which seems in a great measure to overthrow the foundation of this argument: if it be said, it does a great deal more towards it than could otherwise have been done, it is answered, 3. That eternal punishments, inflicted by perfect wisdom and compleat rectitude, seem so incredible, that the threatening is on that very account disregarded. But this answer seems false in fact; since the generality of wicked Christians profess to believe the eternity of them, and build their hopes and false quiet, not on the prospect of seeing the period of them after some far distant revolution of ages, but on some general notion of the divine mercy, and some scheme which they form of escaping them, either by a death-bed repentance, or by some religious hypothesis, which substitutes something else instead of a truly pious and holy temper, in such a manner as to supersede it. And further, if it afterwards appear, that God has threatened eternal punishments, such an answer as this is in effect a bold reflection upon his wisdom, as if he did not understand the constitution of human nature, and so, like some weak and angry men, had bent the bow till it broke. The most solid answer to all the preceding arguments is, that we cannot pretend to decide *a priori* in this question, so far as to say that the punishment of hell must and will certainly be eternal; but if it afterwards appear that the scriptures declare they shall be so, these considerations may serve to balance the difficulties urged on the other side of the question, from principles of the light of nature; and indeed on the whole, it seems that it can only be determined by divine revelation.

Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 60—65. & 135. b. vol. iv. p. 189.

4. The

LECT. 4. The scripture has expressly declared, in a variety of the most significant
 CCXXII. phrases, that the torments of hell shall be eternal, *Matt.* xviii. 8. xxv. 41, 46. *Mark* ix. 43—49. *2 Thess.* i. 9. *Jude* ver. 13. *Rev.* xiv. 11. xx. 10. To this it is replied, 1. That it is not certain that the word rendered *eternal*, *everlasting*, &c. is to be taken in its utmost extent; it often signifies no more than a very long time, or a time whose precise boundary is to us *unknown*. *Prop.* 156. *Schol.* i. It is answered, that the same language is used, and that sometimes in the very same place, to express the eternal happiness of the righteous, and the eternal misery of the wicked; and that there is no reason to believe, especially where it stands in so close a connection, that it should express two such different ideas; and moreover, that the texts produced on this account in the scholium referred to above are taken from the *Old Testament*, for as to that, *Jude* ver. 7. it may refer to a future punishment; and the expression *εις της αιωνας των αιωνων*, as used, *Rev.* xx. 10. is so strong, that if it does not express a proper eternity, it will be difficult to produce any scripture that does; nor can any instance be produced of its being put for a *finite* and limited duration; compare *Psal.* cxxxii. 14. lxxii. which is an instance that of all others comes nearest to it. *Vid. Trommii Concord. Græc. ad. verb. αιων & deriv.* 2. It is pleaded, that, granting eternal punishments are *threatened*, it does not follow that they must be *executed*, since the faithfulness of God will allow him to dispense with his *threatenings*, though not with his *promises*, as particularly in the case of *Ninevah*. It is replied, that where God has not only forbid any sinful action on such a penalty, but has expressly declared that he will execute that penalty, and that he will not suspend the execution of it on any condition; though we could not say his *faithfulness* would be impeached by acting in a different manner, yet it would be hard to vindicate his *veracity*, especially since he must know, even when he published the threatening, that it could not be executed, without the greatest injury offered to the moral perfections of his nature. It also seems inconsistent with his *wisdom*, to have pronounced such threatenings as these, and yet to have given mankind reason to believe that he will not and cannot execute them, which this objection supposes he has given; for a threatening, which the person threatened knows another cannot fulfil, is the vainest and most contemptible thing one can imagine: and it is here particularly worth observing, that *Matt.* xxv. 41—46. is such a *prediction* of a future and most solemn fact, as cannot with any decency be suspected, and yet cannot on this hypothesis be accounted for. Compare *Prop.* 79. *Schol.*

Dawes on Hell, Sermon. iv.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. v. p. 100, 101, 104—108.

Tillotson, vol. i. *Sermon.* xxxv.

Watts's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 146—148.

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. p. 360—363.

Clarke's Post. Sermon. vol. i. N°. iv. ad fin.

Watts's World to come, part ii. *Disc.* xii.

Horberry of Future Punishment, c. i.

Rymer of Rev. Rel. part i. c. vii.

SECT. II. The chief arguments against this doctrine are these,

Arg. I. That it is inconsistent with the *justice* of the divine being, to inflict eternal punishment, for offences committed in so short a space of time. It is answered,

1. That God gives us our choice, and his proposing to us eternal happiness on the one hand, is an equivalent for inflicting eternal misery on the other. But this seems to be taking the question for granted, rather than proving the justice of this appointment.

2. That, considering the infinite majesty and glory of God, none can say, how long he may continue to punish a creature, who has wilfully violated his laws, and that our feeble understandings are incapable of judging concerning the rights of the divine government in such a point. But it is said, that the *former* part of this reply may be admitted, and yet the eternity of these punishments denied, *i. e.* we may conclude they will come to a period, though none can say *when*; and that the *latter* part is not answering the difficulty, but acknowledging it to be unanswerable. It is replied, that it is only denying the pretended axiom, "that eternal punishments must be unjust," to be a self-evident proposition: and it should farther be considered, that in order to determine the proportion between the punishment and the offence, it is of great importance, that the *consequence* of crimes be taken into the estimate we make of their guilt.

3. That if there be an obstinately sinful temper remaining, men may by new guilt be for ever exposing themselves to new punishment. But it is answered, 1. That upon this hypothesis, if granted, the eternal punishment of the damned could not properly be said to be inflicted upon them for sins *done in the body*; since the time will come, when the punishments inflicted for such sins, (let them be supposed to endure ten millions of years,) will be less, when compared with the duration of the punishments inflicted for their after obstinacy and rebellion, than a moment is to all those years. This supposes the damned in a kind of probationary state; and it is hard to conceive, how it should be possible for them to contract guilt by obstinacy and impenitency, if there were not a possibility of their repentance, and some room to obtain mercy upon that repentance, which is not allowed on this hypothesis.

4. It is further urged, in answer to this objection from the divine justice, that the perpetuity of the future misery of the damned is the necessary result of the constitution of things, in consequence of which human souls are naturally immortal, and vicious habits, after they have taken a certain degree of rooting in the mind, become incurable; so that nothing can prevent the eternal misery of an impenitent sinner, but a miraculous interposition of God's divine power, either to change his character, or destroy his existence, which there is no reason to expect: and this obviates the last reply, as it supposes the moral state of agency to be ended, when that of final punishment begins.—To this it may be replied, 1. That this constitution is owing to a divine appointment; and that as the perpetual agency of God is required to support the soul, so likewise to form those painful impressions of mind, which arise from the exercise of con-

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scious reflection and tormenting passions; just as there is the uniform agency of providence in that gravitation, and animal sensation, by which a particle of gravel wounds and tortures the ureters, or other canals of the body, in passing through them; so that if it had been unjust for God to make a sinner for ever unhappy, he could not have chosen and appointed such a constitution. 2. That the scripture doctrine asserts a state of corporeal punishment, which must imply something external, and cannot be solved by any observations made on the constitution of the human mind, in comparison with the irregularity of the passions, and final exclusion from all happiness: so that none can have a right to urge this plea, but those who admit the hypothesis of Dr. *Whitby*, which is mentioned in the second scholium below. To which it might be added, 3. That as God can with infinite ease annihilate any spirit, it will remain a question, why he makes all souls immortal, when the eternal misery of many must be the consequence, and does not rather universally determine to annihilate, when existence is more grievous than non-existence, and when he knew vice to be naturally incurable.

Horberry of Fut. Punishment, c. iii. p. 158—212.

Arg. II. It is said to be inconsistent with the *goodness* and *mercy* of God, to make so many creatures, who he knew would be eternally miserable; and to leave them in such circumstances, as those in which it is plain they are left, if all who die impenitent pass into everlasting torment. To this it is answered,

1. That, as we have endeavoured to shew above, God has given them sufficient means for their everlasting happiness, so that their misery is to be charged not upon him but upon themselves.

2. That God is to be considered under the character of a moral governor, and therefore, in order to approve his goodness, he must consult, not so much the happiness of any particular person, as what may upon the whole be for the benefit of all that moral kingdom over which he presides, and may at the same time suit the majesty and honour of his government: now, for any thing we certainly know, the everlasting misery of some sinful creatures may be the most effectual means of answering these ends, in harmony with each other.

3. That we are not on the whole to judge of the triumph of divine bounty and mercy, merely by what we see on earth, or the state in which the inhabitants of it are left, any more than we are to judge of the magnificence, bounty, and clemency of a prince, by seeing the manner in which the inhabitants of a rebellious city are treated. For any thing we certainly know, the number of wicked and miserable may bear a smaller proportion to that of holy and happy creatures, than a grain of sand does to the whole body of the sun.

Arg. III. It is further objected, that how minute soever our rank, number, or figure in the creation may be, that if God intended man for happiness, as he certainly did in the original constitution of his nature, it would be inconsistent with his *wisdom*, to suffer his main end to be frustrated,

ed, in the eternal misery of the greater part of the species. It is answered,

1. That we do not know that the greater part of mankind are eternally miserable: perhaps all *infants* may be saved, and such universal virtue may hereafter prevail, for succeeding, and those very long-lived and fruitful generations, as shall turn the balance of number, even among the *adult*, on the side of religion and happiness.

2. That it may be much questioned, whether it is proper to say, that the ultimate end of God in the creation of man, was the final happiness of the greater part of the species. This principle must prove every individual person to be intended for it, or it proves nothing; for the human species may be no more in the works of God, than an individual to the whole human race; yet it is most apparent in fact, that *all* are not, and consequently that God did not intend the happiness of *each*, as his final end, in the creation of each, unless we will grant that end to be disappointed: so that it seems much safer to say, that he intended to put all into such a state, that nothing but their own abuse of their liberty should prevent their happiness, than that all or even the greater part should eventually obtain it.

Limb. Theol. l. vi. c. xiii. § 22.

Ray's three Disc. p. 435—453.

Phoenix, vol. ii. p. 459—475.

Whitby on Heb. vi. 2. not. d.

Burn. de Stat. Mort. p. 283—312.

Dawes on Hell Torment. Sermon. vi.

Tind. Christ. as old, &c. cap. iv.

Leland against Tind. vol. i. p. 284—299.

Whist. of Hell Torment.

Watts's World to come, part ii. Disc. xiii.

Seed's Sermon. vol. ii. p. 97—118.

COROLLARY I.

It must be acknowledged, on the review of these arguments, that there is at least so much force in those urged on the affirmative side of the question, and in the solution given to preceding objections, as to render it both imprudent and unsafe to go out of the way of scripture on this head; or to explain those expressions in such a manner, as positively to determine, that future eternal punishments in strict propriety of speech are not to be apprehended. It is plain the chief hazard lies, in representing the state of the damned less miserable than it may in fact prove to be; and we must have very low notions of scripture, if we do not think fit to follow it in this affair.

LECT.
CCXXIII.

Lucas of Happiness, vol. iii. p. 283—286.

COROLLARY 2.

From the doctrine of the eternity of future punishments, compared with all those glorious demonstrations of the divine holiness and goodness which are contained in scripture, especially when taken in comparison with all the solemn

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protestations,

protestations, with which God charges the misery of sinners upon themselves, (see *Prop.* 139. *Schol.* 4.) we may infer a very convincing additional argument in favour of *Prop.* 16. *i. e. the natural liberty of the will*, beyond what the light of nature will afford. (See *ibid.* *Schol.* 7.) For that such a being, who is said *not to tempt any one*, and even *swears that he desires not the death of a sinner*, should irresistibly determine millions to the commission of every sinful action of their lives, and then with all the pomp and pageantry of a universal judgment condemn them to eternal misery, on account of those actions, that hereby he may promote the happiness of others, who are or shall be irresistibly determined to virtue in the like manner, is of all incredible things to me the most incredible. Hence most who have held the doctrine of necessity, have denied the eternity of future misery; but in proportion to the degree of its duration and extremity, the objection will still be cogent.

SCHOLIUM I.

It has been debated, whether there be properly *material fire* in hell: the chief arguments on each side are these. In proof of the *affirmative* it is said,

1. That *fire and brimstone* are represented as the ingredients of their torment, and that the *smoke* of them is said continually to go up, *Rev.* xiv. 10, 11. xx. 10. It is answered, that fire in this place may only signify *the raging desire*, or any other violent agony of the mind, and that there is no more reason to interpret it of material fire, than there is to understand *an animal* ever living in that flame, by *the worm that never dies*, which nevertheless most expositors who believe a material fire understand of the stings and reproaches of *conscience*. It is probable the phrases used by Christ, particularly *Matt.* ix. 43—49. may allude to *Isa.* lxvi. ult. which may immediately express the terrible slaughter made on the enemies of God's people in the latter day, our Lord intending by this allusion to assert, that the punishment of the wicked in hell should be infinitely more dreadful. Compare *Judith* xvi. 17. *Eccles.* vii. 17.

Drieberg de Statu Hom. fut. p. 167—169.

2. That as the *body* is to be raised, and the whole man to be condemned, it is reasonable to believe, there will be some *corporeal* punishment provided, and therefore probably material fire. Some have answered, that God can give a most acute sense of pain, without any external apparatus for that purpose, and that a perpetual *fever* might render an embodied spirit as exquisitely miserable, as any external fire could do.

Against the supposition of such a fire, it is urged,

1. That the body would quickly be consumed by it: but it is obvious to answer, that God might give it such a degree of fixedness and solidity, or might in the course of nature provide such recruits, as should prevent its dissolution. Compare *Mark* ix. 49. *Fam. Expos. in Loc.*

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2. That the fire, into which the damned are sent, is said *to have been prepared for the devil and his angels*, who cannot be subject to the action of material fire: but this goes upon the supposition of their being so entirely incorporeal, as to be united to no material vehicle, which is a supposition that none can prove. *Prop. 158. Schol. 2.*

3. That a material fire would be inconsistent with that *darkness*, which is said to attend the infernal prison. It is answered, that darkness might be metaphorical, or might refer to that *fast*, from which sinners are supposed to be excluded, (compare *Matt. xxii. 13. xxv. 30.*) and the gloomy horror and despair which shall surround them; nor could the terrible glare of such supposed flames be properly expressed by what is so amiable to the eye as light.

On the whole, it is of very little importance, whether we say there is an external fire, or only an idea of such pain as arises from burning: and should we think both doubtful, it is certain God can give the *mind* a sense of agony and distress, which, though it be not analogous to any of those perceptions which the nerves convey from external objects now surrounding us, should answer and even exceed the terror of those descriptions we have now been examining: and care should certainly be taken to explain scripture metaphors, so as that hell may be considered as consisting more of mental agony, than bodily tortures.

Dawes's Sermon on Hell, N^o. iii. p. 13. | *Swindon of Hell, cap. iv.*
Baxter's Works, vol. ii. p. 190. a. | *Granada's Memorial, p. 67—69.*

SCHOLIUM 2.

Dr. *Whitby* thinks that the bodies of the damned, after the resurrection, shall be cast into a burning lake, where they will all at length be utterly consumed, though probably by slower degrees than such bodies as ours would be, on account of some alteration to be made in their contexture, when raised from the dead. The separation of the soul from the body, occasioned by this terrible execution, he supposes to be in the strictest propriety of speech *the second death*, and that, after it, the *soul*, being in its own nature immortal, will forever subsist in a separate state, and must be unutterably miserable, as the natural consequence of exclusion from heaven, and of all those guilty passions which it will carry along with it into this state. But this seems hardly consistent with those scriptures, which represent, not merely the *punishment* of the wicked, but the *fire* in which they are tormented, as *everlasting* and *unquenchable*, and insist on this unquenchableness as a most important circumstance in the punishment of the damned, which on this hypothesis it could not be; for these separate spirits would be very little concerned in the question, whether the fire in which their bodies had been consumed were afterwards put out, or still kept burning. It is urged also that *Rev. xx. 14.* is directly contrary to this hypothesis. And by the way it may be observed, that *adns* spoken of here, may be the same with that visionary person represented as following death, *Rev. vi. 8.* and their being both *cast into hell* might signify expressly, that there should be

be *no more death* properly so called, and consequently no separate state ever to succeed.

His main argument is, that this hypothesis makes the future punishment to the wicked eternal, not in consequence of any particular act of divine judgment towards them, but as the result of the natural constitution of things. Nevertheless, since he allows God to have been the author of that constitution, and to have known all the particulars arising from it, it will (as was hinted and urged above, *Sol. § 2. N. i. gr. 4.*) be as hard to account for a *general constitution*, whereby creatures are made perpetually miserable, as for a *particular interposition* with regard to each; or rather, (on the principles laid down, *Prop. 32.*) the difference between the one and the other is verbal rather than real.

Whitby's Annot. vol. ii. p. 481—487. | Horberry on Fut. Punish. p. 107—112.

SCHOLIUM 3.

LECT.
CCXXIV.

Origen, and some modern writers, particularly Dr. *Hartley*, (in his late treatise, entitled *Observations on Man*;) and Chevalier *Ramsay*, have apprehended, that at length all the damned, not excepting the fallen angels and *Satan* the head of the apostasy, will be so reformed by the discipline of their punishment, as to be brought to real repentance and piety; upon which they will not only be released from their prison, but admitted to partake with the blessed in everlasting happiness. Those scriptures, in which God is said *to desire and will the salvation of all*, as well as the preceding arguments in the *second section*, supposed to demonstrate the absurdity of eternal punishments, compared with the arguments both from reason and scripture in proof of the immortality of the soul, are urged to this purpose. But these scriptures admit of so just an interpretation another way, that there is little reason to entertain such an apprehension; and all that was urged under the *first section* of the proposition lies yet more directly against *this* hypothesis, than against that of the *annihilation* of the damned, after they have endured punishment of some determinate time, the length of which might be proportionable to their respective offences. And it must be added, that the whole tenour of scripture lies against this hypothesis; since it represents the judgment-day, as that in which the final states of men are to be irreversibly determined: compare *Rev. xxii. 11. Matt. xxvi. 24.* and nothing can be more dangerous, than to encourage sinners to hope, that though they should reject the gospel, and run into the commission of all kinds of wickedness, how aggravated soever, yet the time will come, when they shall outlive all the evils they are to endure on that account, and that they shall throughout all eternity be happy beyond all conception, in consequence of this temporary punishment. This representation seems utterly to subvert the whole gospel scheme; and if any hypothesis stands in need of such a support, nothing can be more

more reasonable than to reject it, unless we are determined to throw aside christianity itself.

Leibnitz Theodice, vol. i. p. 83—85.

World unmasked.

Hartley on Man, vol. ii. Prop. xciv. p. 419—437.

White's Restitut. of all Things.

Ramsay's Princ. vol. i. Prop. lviii. p. 430

—438. vol. iii. p. 325—354.

Trav. of Cyrus, vol. ii. p. 145—155. Oct. p. 248—252. Ed. 12mo.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Whiston*, in order (as it seems) to get clear of the argument for the eternity of hell-torments, from those texts of scripture, which speak of them in the same language as of the eternal duration of heavenly felicity, has thought fit to intimate his doubts concerning the *latter*, as well as to declare his disbelief of the *former*, though he owns its duration shall be much *longer*.—But most of the natural arguments for the immortality of the soul plead strongly against the supposition of the annihilation of good men, after having existed many millions of ages in a state of virtue and happiness: it seems not to suit our natural notions of the divine goodness and justice, to imagine he will annihilate them, though no offence has been committed to forfeit his favour: and Mr. *Whiston* himself does not intimate any apprehension of their falling into sin and condemnation, and so going a perpetual round of probations. We may add, that such a supposed revolt would be utterly inconsistent with what the scripture asserts, of the care of Christ over his people, and the security especially of their heavenly state; as well as with what it says of the compleat happiness of that state, which could not consist with the apprehension of annihilation, though the time when it was to be expected were or were not particularly known. But Mr. *Whiston* does not stop here: he in effect intimates, that the time may come, when *Christ* also himself shall cease to be; so that the Redeemer himself and all his redeemed, according to his hypothesis, may at length be blotted out from among the works of God: a thought, so inconsistent with the doctrine of Christ's deity, as laid down above, and on the whole so shocking, that merely to mention it seems sufficient to expose the absurdity of the principle, from whence it could follow.

Whiston's Etern. of Hell Torm. p. 96, 97.

PROPOSITION CLXIV.

To give a brief view of the scripture doctrine of the *general conflagration*, which shall attend the last judgment.

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SOLUTION.

1. Scripture assures us in the general, that this earth in its present form will not be perpetual, but shall come to an end, *Psal.* cii. 25, 26. & *sim.*

2. It further tells us, that this dissolution of the world shall be by a general conflagration, in which all things upon the face of the earth shall be destroyed, by which the atmosphere shall also be sensibly affected, as in such a case it necessarily must be, *2 Pet.* iii. 5—7, 10, 12. where, from the connection of the words, the opposition between the conflagration and the deluge, as well as the most literal and apparent import of the phrases themselves, it is plain they cannot, as Dr. *Hammond* strangely supposes, refer to the desolation brought on *Judæa* when destroyed by the *Romans*, but must refer to the dissolution of the whole earth.

Hammond in Loc.

| *Ray's three Disc. N°. iii. c. ii. p. 303—310.*

3. The scripture represents this great burning, as a circumstance nearly connected with the day of judgment, *2 Pet.* iii. 7. compared with *2 Thess.* i. 7, 8. *Heb.* x. 27. *1 Cor.* iii. 12, 13. and it is probable there may be an allusion to this in several passages of the Old Testament, such as *Psal.* xi. 6. l. 3. xcvi. 3. *Isa.* xxxiv. 4, 8—10. lxvi. 15. *Dan.* vii. 9, 10. *Mal.* iv. 1. *Zeph.* iii. 8. *Deut.* xxxii. 22. to which many parallel expressions might be added, from the canonical and apocryphal books.

4. It is not expressly declared how this burning shall be kindled, nor how it shall end; which has given occasion to various conjectures about it, the chief of which will be mentioned below.

Burnet's Theory, l. iii. c. xii.

| *Whiston's Theory, l. iii. c. v.*

SCHOLIUM I.

The *Heathens* had some notion of such a conflagration; particularly *Pliny* the elder, who thought there was such a tendency in nature to it, that he wondered it had not happened long ago; and the *Stoics*, who seem to have thought fire the first principle of all things, or the supreme God; but they held that there would through all eternity be certain periodical conflagrations and renovations of nature, in which by a certain fatal necessity, the same persons and same events should in an endless series be produced.

Marc. Anton. l. v. § 13. Gatak. Notes.

Orig. contra Cels. l. iv. p. 208, 209.

Inq. into the Phil. Doctr. of a Fut. State, p. 87—91.

Burnet's Theory, l. iii. c. ii, iii.

| *Ray's three Disc. N°. iii. c. iv.*

Grot. de Verit. l. i. § 22. p. 81.

Plin. Nat. Hist. l. ii. c. cvii.

Campbell's Necess. of a Rev. p. 271, 272.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Some on the contrary have thought a conflagration impossible, on account of the great quantity of liquids which are to be found in the earth, sea, and atmosphere. But it is answered, 1. That the earth may be heated to such a degree, that all these may be evaporated; of which the state of comets, in their nearest access to the sun, seems to be in fact a proof. 2. That the air is sometimes so heated, that fire is soon kindled in it, which cannot be extinguished without great difficulty. 3. That though no natural cause could be assigned, the miraculous power of Christ, or agency of his angels, may suffice: and indeed on the whole it seems, that we could not from natural causes certainly infer that there would be a conflagration; and consequently, what some of the ancients have so confidently said of it, is to be regarded chiefly as a *tradition*. Vid. *Prop.* 21. *Schol.* 2.

More's Theol. Works, p. 159—166.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Dr. *Thomas Burnet* supposes that many natural causes will concur, as the occasion of this burning: v. g. that many dry summers preceding it will render the face of the earth combustible in an uncommon degree; that volcanos will break out in many places, and that there will also be an eruption of that central fire, which Dr. *Woodward*, and some others suppose to have been lodged in the bowels of the earth at the creation: (*Woodw. Nat. Hist. part* iii. § 1.) and he particularly conjectures, that one violent eruption, preceding the general conflagration will swallow up the city of *Rome*, and perhaps all that tract of land, which is called *the state of the church in Italy*; which event he thinks is intimated *Rev.* xix. 20. But it seems a strong objection against this supposed gradual approach of a conflagration, that our Lord describes the day of judgment as coming at an *unexpected* season; and supposes men in such a state of sensuality and luxury, as one could hardly imagine an earth so desolated and ruined would be capable of affording materials for. *Luke* xii. 39. (compared with *2 Pet.* iii. 10.) xvii. 26—30. *1 Thess.* v. 2—4.

Burnet's Theory, l. iii. c. vi—x.

SCHOLIUM 4.

Mr. *Whiston* supposes that a comet will be the cause of the conflagration, as it was of the deluge; which it may effect, either by drawing the earth into the sun, in its *descent* towards it, or (which he supposes more probable) in its *ascent*, when heated by the sun, drawing off the vapours, emptying the seas, inflaming the air, and perhaps the surface of the earth, or at least operating upon it so far as to make way for that action of the *central fire*, which he supposes

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would of itself be sufficient to produce a conflagration, were it not balanced by a proper degree of moisture and of cold. And indeed such alterations, the access of a comet, so heated as some have been, would naturally produce, even though it should not pass close to the earth. He supposes the comet, seen in the year 1680, may be the executioner of the divine vengeance upon the earth, in some of its revolutions; but when that will be, he pretends not to determine. But if the possibility of calculating this period by astronomical observations be admitted, it seems inconsistent with what is said in *Mark* xiii. 32. and elsewhere, of the absolute uncertainty of the time when this great event will come to pass, and may perhaps afford an objection against that part of the scheme, which in other branches of it appears very probable.

Whiston's Theory, l. iv. c. v. § 90—92.

SCHOLIUM 5.

What will become of this earth, after this burning is kindled and has done its work, it is hard to determine. Some have thought it would continue inflamed, and so become the seat of the damned: others have imagined it would rise like a phoenix out of its ashes, which hypothesis will more particularly be considered in the next proposition: and some imagine its annual motion will be so disturbed, that it will become a comet, and continue for some time in that state; till possibly the approach of some other heavenly body may so alter its motion, and correct its excentricity, as to reduce it again to a planetary state: and it is said, we know not but this may be the case with regard to many other planets and comets; and that perhaps, as the dissolution of one *animal body* supports the growth of another, so dissolving *systems* may with immense variety support and form others. But this is a very precarious conjecture, and would intimate a wider extent of natural and probably moral evil in the universe, than one would be forward to allow; for the conflagration of a planet can hardly be conceived to happen, without the ruin of its inhabitants. Some have thought *Rev.* xx. 11. xxi. 1. some argument for this hypothesis; but it must be owned to be a very precarious one, considering how different an interpretation these words may admit of.

Burnet's Theory, l. iv. c. viii, x.

SCHOLIUM 6.

The order assigned for this conflagration is not expressly determined in scripture; but it seems probable, that it will be *after* Christ's appearance, rather than *before* it; since it is expressly said, that some believers should be found *alive* at Christ's coming: which plainly shews, that no such calamity will then have befallen the earth, as must destroy the whole human race, which a conflagration probably would. Therefore, comparing 2 *Pet.* iii. 10—13, with 1 *Cor.* xv.

51, 52. there seems reason to conclude, that, on our Lord's appearing, the living saints, together with the dead now raised, will be caught up to meet him, the bodies of the former undergoing some great, yet gentle, and probably delightful change, to make them fit for a celestial life: but as for the wicked, whether they will be judged and condemned before this fire is *kindled*, after it is *spent*, or while it *continues*, is not expressly asserted: perhaps, by the righteous judgment of God, those found alive may be left to die by these flames, of which they will be the more worthy, considering the peculiar aggravation attending their crimes, in consequence of those circumstances which will hereafter be represented. Vid. Prop. 166.

SCHOLIUM 7.

Bishop Burnet thinks, that the action of this fire upon the bodies of the dead would have some *natural* efficacy, to render the particles of them more pure and fixed, and so to fit them for an immortal life. But it is not easy to understand this efficacy, or to reconcile this hypothesis (so far as it may relate to the righteous) with what is said in the preceding scholium, and with 1 *Thess.* iv. 15. where it is expressly asserted, "that the living saints shall not be changed before the dead in Christ are raised;" so that on the whole, if there be any thing at all in this conjecture, it must only relate to the bodies of the *wicked*.

Burnet on the Art. p. 66.

SCHOLIUM 8.

Mr. Fleming also supposed, that the conflagration would attend Christ's first appearance to judgment; and would not only precede the general resurrection, but also the change of those who were found alive. He thought the most eminent saints would immediately be caught up and changed; that the wicked, who were then alive, would (as was intimated at the end of the *sixth* scholium) be burnt to death by the last fire; and that persons in the main good, but whose characters were attended with some remarkable imperfections, would feel in proportion to those imperfections some different degrees of pain and terror on this occasion; which he supposes to be intimated, when it is spoken of as the peculiar privilege of some good men, that *they should not be hurt by the second death*, Rev. ii. 2. and that *it should have no power over them*, Rev. xx. 6. He seems to think, that something like this would also be the case of those true Christians, who were before dead in the like imperfect state of virtue and holiness; for he fancied the resurrection would be accomplished, before the conflagration was entirely over, and to this he refers that disputed passage, 1 *Cor.* iii. 15. Origen taught a doctrine nearly resembling this; but he extended the efficacy of this *purging fire* in some degree to the most eminent Christians, not excepting the apostles themselves: and this by the way was the first *purgatory*

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taught in the christian church.—But this order is directly contrary to 1 *Thess.* iv. 15. and the texts referred to above will so easily admit of a different interpretation, that few will believe, in consequence of his arguments from them, that Christ should appear to torment them and terrify great numbers of those, whom he immediately intended to raise to perfect glory and felicity, and most of whom had dwelt with him in the holiness and happiness of the intermediate state.

Flem. Disc. on the Millen. apud Chriftology, vol. iii. p. 44, 45. | *Bull's Sermons, vol. i. p. 124, 125.*

PROPOSITION CLXV.

LECT. To state the hypothesis of those who assert, that after the conflagration
CCXXVI. there shall be a *renovation of the earth*: and to enumerate the chief scriptures
which they urge in support of that assertion.

SOLUTION.

1. Dr. *Thomas Burnet* and Mr. *Whiston* concur in asserting, that the earth will not be entirely consumed; but that the matter of which it consists will be fixed, purified, and refined; which they say will be the natural consequence of the action of fire upon it: though it is hard to say, what such a purification can do, towards fitting it for its intended purpose; for it is certain, a mass of chrystal or glass would very ill answer the following parts of this hypothesis.

2. They suppose, that from these materials thus refined, as from a second chaos, there will by the power of God arise a new creation; and that the face of the earth, and likewise the atmosphere, will then be so restored, as to resemble what it originally was in the paradisaical state; and consequently, to render it a more desirable abode for human creatures than it at present is; and they urge for this purpose the following texts, viz. 2 *Pet.* iii. 13. (compare *Isa.* lxv. 17. lxvi. 22.) *Matt.* xix. 28, 29. (compare *Mark* x. 29, 30. *Luke* xviii. 29, 30.) *Psal.* cii. 25, 26. *Acts* iii. 21. 1 *Cor.* vii. 31. *Rom.* viii. 21.

3. They agree in supposing, that in this new state of things there will be no sea, *Rev.* xxi. 1.

4. Mr. *Whiston* also supposes, that the comet, which will occasion the conflagration, coming on the east side of the earth, will impress a force upon it, by which its diurnal motion will be impaired to such a degree, as that the remainder of it will only suffice to carry it round its own axis once, while it dispatcheth its course in the ecliptic; the consequence of which will be, that one hemisphere will have perpetual day, and the other never see the sun at all: but the want of that he supposes will be supplied by some bright luminary, which shall appear fixed in the zenith of that hemisphere, and which may therefore be called *the glory of the Lord*. He also supposes, that the attraction of the comet, will

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occasion a final separation of the *moon*, which will be no longer necessary, *Rev.* xxi. 23—25. xxii. 5.—Dr. *Thomas Burnet* conjectures, that the renovation of the earth will in a great measure be occasioned by correcting the obliquity of its axis, and causing it to remain at right angles with the ecliptic: but Dr. *Keil* has admirably proved, in his *Examination of the Theory*, that this would be a mischief to the earth, rather than a benefit. And, besides all the other inconveniencies and difficulties attending this part of Mr. *Whiston's* hypothesis, that of continual summer and day, at least in that hemisphere towards the sun, seems to be of great weight: and if the earth were supposed to be hereafter removed so far from the sun, as to render such a degree of heat tolerable, the degree of light on that hemisphere must be proportionably diminished.

5. They both suppose that the earth, thus beautified and improved, shall be inhabited by those who shall inherit the first resurrection, and shall here enjoy a very considerable degree of happiness; though not equal to that which is to succeed the general judgment; which judgment shall, according to them, open when those *thousand years* are expired, mentioned *Rev.* xx. 4, &c. 1 *Thess.* iv. 17. compare *ver.* 15. which passage is thought by some to contain an insinuation, that *Paul* expected to be alive at the appearance of Christ; which must imply an expectation of being thus raised from the dead before it: but it is answered, that the expression, *we that are alive* may only signify, “those of us that are so,” speaking of all Christians as one body, 1 *Cor.* xv. 49—52.—It is remarkable, that Dr. *Hartley* has declared it as his opinion, that this Millenium shall consist of a thousand *prophetical* years, where each *day* is a year, *i. e.* of 360000 years, pleading that this is the language used in other parts of the *Revelation*.

Hartley on Man, vol. ii. p. 400.

Whiston's Theory, l. iii. c. v. p. 288—

291. l. iv. c. v. p. 452—456.

Burnet's Theory, l. iv. pass.

Keil's Exam. of Burnet, c. iv.

SCHOLIUM I.

It seems an invincible objection against this hypothesis, which places the Millenium *after* the conflagration, that the saints inhabiting the earth after the *first* resurrection are represented as distressed by the invasion of some wicked enemies, who are called *Gog* and *Magog*, *Rev.* xx. 7—9. *Ezek.* xxxviii, xxxix. Now forasmuch as the whole race of mankind must be destroyed from the face of the earth by the conflagration, if not miraculously removed from it, it is impossible to account for the existence of those wicked men on the renewed earth; not to mention the difficulty of saying, what would become of those good men who were found alive at the conflagration, who cannot all be supposed worthy of the first resurrection; nor can we imagine they would be changed to dwell here. It is difficult, with respect to the forementioned objection, either to suppose, that some of the saints shall be perverted, or that the wicked shall be raised before their time, as it seems, purely to afflict God's people. To solve this objection, Dr. *Burnet*, on *Glanville's* wild principles, is driven

driven to the wretched expedient, of supposing a race of earth-born men to spring like mushrooms out of the ground.

Burnet's Theory, vol. ii. p. 311—316.

Campbell's Necess. of Rev. p. 273.

Glanville's Lux. Orientalis, p. 142—146. ap.

Lowman on Rev. xx. 8.

SCHOLIUM 2.

Though Mr. Fleming does not entirely agree with Dr. Burnet and Mr. Whiston in all the foregoing particulars, yet he interprets *Rev.* xx. 6. as referring to a proper resurrection: he supposes that what happened *Matt.* xxvii. 52. was a pledge of this: and (by the way) he conjectures, that the most celebrated saints of the Old Testament times then arose, and ascended with Christ to heaven; (forgetting, as it seems, the strong objection against this from *Acts* ii. 29.) Agreeably to this, he apprehends, that the saints, who are to be the subjects of the first resurrection, will perhaps appear to some of the inhabitants of this earth, which may be a means of reviving religion among them; yet will not have their abode here; but that during the thousand years in which the kingdom of Christ shall have its highest triumph on earth, they shall be rejoicing with him in heaven, in a state of happiness far superior to that which they enjoyed in the separate state, yet not equal to what is to be expected after the general judgment. To this peculiar privilege of the martyrs and some other eminent saints he supposes St. Paul to have referred, *Phil.* iii. 9—11. in that very emphatical phrase, (especially according to the *Alexandrian* reading, which is well attested by several other copies,) τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, and he lays it down as a general rule, that ἐξανάστασις or ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν, whenever either of them is used, signifies this first resurrection from among the rest of the dead; and on this foundation, he gives a peculiar but very precarious turn to *Luke* ii. 34. xx. 35, 36. *John* xi. 25, 26. *Acts* iv. 2. xxvi. 23. *Rom.* i. 4.

Fleming on the first Res. pass. præf. p. 29, &c. 68—82.

SCHOLIUM 3.

LECT.
CCXXVII.

Mr. Ray agrees that there will be a renovation of the earth, and though he does not grant, as some have supposed, a resurrection of the same animals that once lived upon it, (as well seeing there would not be room to contain them) yet he supposes that other like animals will be created anew, as well as like vegetables, to adorn the earth and to support the animals, only all in higher degrees of beauty and perfection than they have ever before had: but he pretends not to determine, whether the earth, thus beautified and adorned, as he supposes, after the general resurrection, shall be the seat of a new race of men, or only remain as the object of contemplation to some happy spirits, who may behold it, though without any rational animals to inhabit it, as a curious plan of the most exquisite mechanism; which last seems

to be a very wild, as well as the former a very precarious hypothesis; and would make all the supposed bounty of God bestowed upon it perfectly insignificant and useless.

Ray's Disc. N. iii. c. ii. p. 412—415. | Nat. Displ. vol. i. part ii. p. 290, 291.

SCHOLIUM 4.

The patrons of the *millenary* scheme, as laid down in the proposition, plead, not only that there was among the *Stoic* philosophers a tradition of the renovation of the earth, (Vid. *Prop. 164. Schol. 1.*) but also that it was generally asserted by the christian Fathers. But Dr. *Whitby* supposes the Millenium to refer entirely to the prosperous state of the christian church after the conversion of the *Jews*, when the fulness of the Gentiles shall also flow into it; denying that such a tradition did ever universally prevail, the chief authority of which rests on a passage of *Ireneus*, where he relates it as a report of *Papias*, a person generally esteemed of but little credit: and indeed it is certain, that the account he gives of the matter does by no means agree with that of *Burnet* and *Whiston*, and contains some particulars too gross to be admitted on such slender evidence.

<i>Iren. Hæres. l. v. c. iii. p. 497, 498.</i>	<i>Burn. Archæol. l. i. c. xii. p. 236—240.</i>
<i>Whitby of the Millen. c. i.</i>	
<i>Burnet's Theory, l. iv. c. v, vi.</i>	
	<i>Ray's three Disc. ubi sup. p. 406.</i>

SCHOLIUM 5.

Dr. *Whitby* endeavours to invalidate all those scripture proofs, which *Burnet*, *Whiston*, and *Ray* have urged in favour of their respective schemes, especially the two former, and further pleads against it,

1. That it would be a great detriment to the glorified saints, to be brought down to dwell upon earth, in the most pleasing form which it can be supposed to put on.

2. That it is inconsistent with the description which the scripture gives of the resurrection, and the change to be made in the body that shall be raised.

3. That it is contrary to the genius of the christian religion, to suppose it built on temporal promises.

To the *first* of these objections it may be replied, that none knows to what degree the earth may be beautified and adorned, or to what happiness the saints might arrive, when free (as this hypothesis supposes they will be) from all moral and penal evil. To the *second*, that the account of the spirituality of the saints bodies after the resurrection is to be understood, as referring to the general resurrection only; and may be consistent with supposing, that some saints shall at first be raised in a less perfect state, (as we know some few who have already been raised were,) who shall at the consummation of all things undergo a proper

proper change. To the *third*, that though it is the genius of the christian religion, to govern its professors by *faith* rather than sight, nevertheless, as this *first* resurrection is the object of faith, there is no absurdity in supposing it to be promised; especially since all agree, that there will be some pleasure in heaven suited to the corporeal part of our nature, and *Whitby* himself allows, that there are promises of great temporal prosperity made to the church in the latter days.

On the whole, the most considerable argument against the literal interpretation of the passages in question, arises from the nature of the book of the *Revelations*, which is so plainly figurative in the greatest part of it, that it seems reasonable, on principles of analogy, to suppose it to be so here, and to interpret this resurrection, as a revival of the *cause*, rather than of the *persons*; and the rather, as the resurrection of the *two witnesses*, mentioned *Rev. xi. 11.* is generally acknowledged to be meant in this figurative sense: but the expression of *the rest of the dead*, is hard to be explained even with this key.

Whitby on the Millen. c. iii, iv.

| *Lowman on the Rev. p. 242—247.*

SCHOLIUM 6.

Mr. *Worthington* has advanced a scheme, very different from any of these writers in the main, though in some circumstances resembling theirs; which is, that the gospel, being intended to restore the ruins of the fall, will gradually meliorate the world, till by a train of natural consequences, under the influence of divine providence and grace, it is restored to a paradisaical state: he supposes this plan is already advanced through some important stages, of which he thinks the amendment of the earth's natural state at the deluge (which with Dr. *Sherlock* he maintains) to have been a very considerable one. He considers all improvements in learning and arts, as well as the propagation of the gospel among the *beaten* nations, as the process of this scheme; but he apprehends, much greater advances are to be made, about the year of Christ 2000, when the Millenium will commence; which shall be, according to him, such a glorious state as *Whitby* supposes, but with this additional circumstance, that, after some interruption from the last effects of wickedness by *Gog* and *Magog*, this shall terminate in the yet nobler state of *the new heaven*, and *the new earth*, spoken of *Rev. xxi, xxii.* which he supposes will be absolutely paradise restored; in which all natural and moral evil shall be banished from earth, and death itself shall have no further place; but good men shall continue in the highest rectitude of state, and in the greatest imaginable degree of terrestrial felicity, till the coming of Christ and universal judgment close this beautiful and delightful scene, perhaps several thousands of years hence. Indeed he seems to intimate some apprehension, that the consummation of all things will happen about the year of the world 25920, the end of *the great year*, as the *Platonics* called it, when the equinoxes shall have revolved.

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But the reasonings, by which these conjectures are supported, are, on the one hand, too diffuse to be represented, and on the other, too superficial to need to be confuted here.

Worthington of the Extent of Redempt. pass.

PROPOSITION CLXVI.

Briefly to survey the chief prophecies of scripture, relating to the *conversion* of the *Jews*, and its consequences with regard to the *Gentile* world.

LECT.
CCXXVIII.

SOLUTION and DEMONSTRATION.

1. Though the *Jews* have for many ages been rejected by God, and driven out from their ancient inheritance, and though, during their dispersion, they have generally expressed an obstinate and implacable aversion to christianity, and indeed a great disregard to all true morality and religion; it is foretold, that they will at length embrace their own Messiah, whom they now reject, and thereupon be taken into the divine favour and covenant anew, *Rom.* xi. 11—36. *Isa.* xlv. 17, 23—25. *liv. per tot.* lx, lxii, lxv, lxvi. *Jer.* xxxi. 31—34. *Hos.* iii. 4, 5. *Zech.* xii. 9. xiii. 1. and many scriptures quoted below.

2. On their conversion, they shall, by a train of wonderful providences, be gathered together from the countries in which they are now scattered, and conducted to their own land, where they shall become a prosperous and honourable, as well as a religious nation, *Isa.* xxvii. 12, 13. *Ezek.* xi. 17—21. xxxvi. 24—28. xxxvii. 21—28. xxxix. 25—29. *Hos.* i. 10, 11. *Amos* ix. 14, 15. *Zech.* xiv. 10, 11, 21.

3. Whereas, on their settlement in their own land, some enemies shall make an assault upon them, some celebrated victory over such enemies is foretold, *Isa.* lxvi. 16, 24. *Ezek.* xxxviii. 39. *Joel* iii. 9—14. *Zech.* xiv. 1—15. *Rev.* xx. 8—10. to which we may perhaps add *Isa.* lix. 19. *Micah* iv. 11, 13. *Zeph.* iii. 8.

4. This interposition of God, in the methods of his providence and grace, for the recovery and defence of the *Jews*, shall make such impressions on the *Gentiles*, as to be a means of bringing in the fulness of them, *Isa.* xlix. 6. *Rom.* xi. 12, 15, 25, 26. See the passages quoted *gr.* 1.

Burnet's App. ad Stat. Mort.

Whitby of the Millen. c. ii.

Scott's Christian Life, vol. iii. p. 1166
—1172.

Clark on the Promises, p. 243—285.

Powell's Concord. Append. ad fin.

Lardn. Circumst. of the Jews, p. 65—72.

SCHOLIUM I.

When the context of most of those places referred to is examined, it will appear, that few, if any of them can justly be applied to the restoration of the

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the *Jews* from the *Babylonish captivity*; especially considering, how expressly their regard to *David* their king, *i. e.* to *Christ*, is mentioned, as previous to those gracious appearances of *God* in their favour; and also how expressly it is promised, in some of those passages, that the *Jews*, after the restoration referred to in them, shall *never* be rooted out of their land *any more*.

S C H O L I U M 2.

It is not improbable, that *Deut.* xxx. 1—6. and many other places in the pentateuch, refer chiefly to this greatest dispersion of the *Jews*, and their *final* restoration; though most of the phrases there used are such, as suited all the eminent deliverances *God* wrought out for them, so that each of those deliverances might be looked upon as an accomplishment of this prediction; nevertheless, those treated of in the proposition, being the greatest events of the kind, it seems reasonable to consider this prophecy of *Moses* as chiefly centering in them, though comprehending the other as types or models, which preserves a unity of sense and design, as much as any interpretation whatsoever can do: and indeed the passage referred to above seems a general prophecy, that upon their return to *God*, they should always be delivered, with an intimation, *ver.* 6. that, through *God's* gracious operation, this happy turn should be the final catastrophe of their nation. Compare *Prop.* 112. *Cor.* 1.

Jackson's Credibility, l. i. part ii. § 3. c. x. p. 169. | *Patrick in Loc.*
Ec. 4to. ap. *Op.* l. i. c. xxvii. vol. i. p. 123. |

S C H O L I U M 3.

How far the form of government and religion among the *Jews*, may, upon their restoration to their own land, be changed from what it originally was, we cannot certainly say: but it is exceeding probable, that so much of their ancient law will continue in force, as can be reconciled with the genius of the christian religion; and that *God* will raise up some divinely inspired prophets among them, with a full declaration of his mind and will in relation to a variety of questions, which we have not light enough to decide: and some have thought, that *Elias*, *i. e.* *John* the baptist, (of whom the Old Testament prophesied by that name) will then be raised from the dead, and bear a considerable part in the glorious work of converting and settling them, *Jer.* iii. 15. *Mal.* iv. 5, 6.

Jeffries's Review, p. 142.

| *Mede on Mark* i. 14. *Op.* p. 98, 99.

S C H O L I U M 4.

Some have supposed, that the ancient *patriarchs* will then be raised from the dead; and *Lord Barrington* in particular thinks, (as *Irenæus* formerly did,) this supposition necessary for vindicating the truth of *God*, in promising to them,

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as well as to their seed, the land of *Canaan*, which they never in their life-time possessed: he thinks likewise, that this is the easiest way of clearing up our Lord's argument for a resurrection, from God's calling himself *their God* after their death, *Matt.* xxii. 31. and the parallel places. But it is certain our Lord's argument will be conclusive without this; and the land might be said to be given to the patriarchs, as they were secured by the divine promise, that their *seed* should possess it: and if the *Hebrew* particle *'* be rendered *even*, as it often is, all shadow of an argument from this promise will be removed. Compare *Isa.* lvi. 5. *Ezek.* xx. 11. *Psal.* li. ult. *Mic.* ii. 13. where it is thus rendered.

Barrington's Ess. of Div. Disp. p. 84— | *Iren. Hær. l. v. c. xxxiii. p. 495.*
92. with Notes.

SCHOLIUM 5.

Some have apprehended, that several extraordinary miracles shall be wrought to assist the *Jews* in their return, *Mic.* vii. 15. particularly, that the rivers shall be dried up which would oppose their passage, (*Isa.* xi. 15, 16. *Zech.* x. 11. compare *Rev.* xvi. 12.) that others shall be opened in dry places through which they are to march, (*Isa.* xli. 17, 18. xliii. 19, 20.) and that Christ himself shall appear in person among them, to lead them on in a considerable body, (*Isa.* lii. 12. lviii. 8. *Hos.* i. 10, 11. *Mic.* ii. 12, 13.) But it is certain several of these texts may admit of a different interpretation, and may perhaps be only figurative expressions of their being the objects of God's peculiar care and favour: nevertheless, should these events actually happen, there would be great reason to believe, that an all-seeing God, whose work is always actually before him, referred to them in such predictions.

SCHOLIUM 6.

A late writer has given it as his opinion, that the *Jews* shall be restored to their own land, and live for some time in great prosperity there, under the *Mosaic* œconomy and law, the Lord being their king, *before* they become Christians: which he argues, partly from the latter part of the prophecy of *Ezekiel*, concerning the building of a temple, which must be intended for such a ritual as the *Mosaic* law appointed; in connection with several other passages referred to above, predicting the observation of such rites, (compare *Zech.* xiv. 16.) and partly from the *order* of the events foretold, *Zech.* xii, xiii. But it is answered, 1. That this is in the nature of things improbable. 2. That *Ezekiel's* temple may be mystically explained; or, that even under christianity, some *Jewish* rites may in that place be restored. 3. That great absurdities would follow, from supposing all the events described in *Zech.* xii. & xiii. to follow each other, in the order there laid down, and among the rest, Christ's death would happen, after they had looked to him whom they had pierced.

Restor. of Jews and Israelites, p. 57.

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SCHOLIUM 7.

As for the *time*, when these glorious scenes shall open on the christian church, commentators and other critics have been much divided among themselves. Some passages in the *Revelations* seem to fix the beginning of them at the distance of 1260 years from the rise of *Anti-christ*, *Rev.* xii. 6, 14. xi. 2, 3. (compare *Dan.* xii. 7.) but the main difficulty lies in fixing the date of that *rise*. Most protestant writers have dated it from the year 606, when Pope *Boniface* III. first assumed the title of *universal bishop*; conferred upon him by *Phocas*, ending *A. D.* 1866. But Mr. *Fleming*, and after him Sir *Isaac Newton*, and Mr. *Lowman*, fix it about the middle of the eighth century, *A. D.* 756, when *Pepin* invested Pope *Stephen* with the *temporal* dominion of *Rome*, and the neighbouring territories, on the ceasing of the exarchate of *Ravenna*; which is the more probable, as the other *horn*s mentioned in the context, are plainly *temporal* kingdoms: and as this happened near 666 years after *John* saw the vision recorded in the *Apocalypse*, *A. D.* 90, that seems the most probable interpretation of the *number of the beast*. Sir *Isaac*, (after *Irenæus*, l. v. c. xxx.) refer it to the numeral letters of the word $\Lambda \text{A} \text{T} \text{E} \text{I} \text{N} \text{O} \Sigma$ and the *Hebrew* $\text{ת} \text{ , } \text{ , } \text{מ} \text{ , } \text{ו} \text{ , } \text{ר}$, which
 $\begin{array}{cccccccc} 30 & 1 & 300 & 5 & 10 & 50 & 70 & 200 \end{array}$
 $\begin{array}{cccccccc} 400 & 10 & 10 & 40 & 6 & 200 \end{array}$
do each of them make 666, and supposes that the *mark* of the beast is the *sign of the cross*, *Rev.* xiii. ult. On this hypothesis, that period will end in the year 2016.

Mr. *Maurice* dates the rise of the beast from the year 606, (which he supposes was 666 years after the *Romans* possessed *Judea*, when the rise of the *fourth monarchy* there must begin) and adding to this number the 1260 days, (or years) with 30 more for the *languishing* state of the anti-christian glory, and 45 for the pouring out of the vial, which was to be attended with its *utter ruin*, he fixes the end of this period in the year 1941. (Compare *Dan.* xii. 7, 11, 12.) And by the way he observes, that as the *Turks* ruined the eastern empire, *A. D.* 1453, and are to continue *an hour, a day, a month, and a year*, (see *Rev.* ix. 15.) *i. e.* according to the *Julian* reckoning, 396 years, they shall fall, *A. D.* 1849, and that after 17 years triumph, Anti-christ shall come to his end, *i. e.* begin to fall, *A. D.* 1866, which coincides with the former period, and so confirms it. Compare *Dan.* xi. 36—45. *Maurice's Serm. of Tribes appearing*, &c. p. 54. *Not.*

Mr. *Fleming*, computing the last-mentioned time, *Rev.* ix. 15. by *prophetic* years, makes it 391, and refers it to another event, *viz.* to the taking of *Constantinople*, in the year 1453, which was just that distance of time from the uniting the four *Turkish* kingdoms under one head.

Fleming of the first Resur. p. 136.

We shall conclude this scholium with observing, that when *three years and an half* are supposed equal to 1260 days, it plainly goes upon the supposition, that the

the *prophetic* year, which probably was the ancient year, (see *Whiston's Theory*, l. ii. p. 144—182.) consisting of twelve months of 30 days each, *i. e.* of 360 days, is made use of. And if it be, the *end* of the period when Anti-christ is to fall should be reckoned by the same year; which will make an alteration in all the computations above, and will reduce the fall of Anti-christ, on *Fleming's* hypothesis, to *A. D.* 1998, and on the common, to *A. D.* 1848. And if upon the same principles, the 666 years be reckoned by *prophetic*, not *Julian* years, it will amount to very little more than 656 *Julian*; which, if the above hypothesis were to be allowed, will fix the date of the *Revelations* to about the year 100.

<i>Flem. Christol.</i> vol. iii. p. 103—120.		<i>Lowman on Rev.</i> p. 142—145.
<i>Newton on Proph.</i> p. 284.		<i>Pyle on Rev.</i> xiii. 18. p. 103.
<i>Burnet's Life of Bishop Bedel</i> , p. 10—		<i>Iren. & Not. in Loc. cit.</i>
12.		<i>Le Clerc and Hammond in Loc.</i>

PROPOSITION CLXVII.

To give a summary view of Mr. Lowman's late celebrated and valuable scheme for interpreting the book of the *Revelations*.

SOLUTION.

1. He proves that the *seven epistles*, contained in the *second* and *third* chapters, LECT. are not prophetic, but relate to the state and circumstances of the seven churches CCXXIX. to whom they are directed, at the time when this book was written. Com-
pare *cap.* i. 19.

2. He supposes the remainder of the book, to be a prophetic representation of the most remarkable events, which were to befall the christian church, from that time to the consummation of all things; rejecting those schemes, in which, by various fanciful synchronisms, the *seals*, *trumpets*, and *vials* are represented and expounded, as successive representations of the same event.

3. He considers the *fourth* and *fifth* chapters, as only introductory to the prophetic part of the book; and justly observes, (as Sir *Isaac Newton*, and many other good commentators had done,) that there is in the scenery here, and all along, a beautiful reference to the *temple worship*.

Newton on Proph. part ii. c. ii.

4. He divides the remainder into *seven periods*: the *first* of which, represented by the *seals*, shews, according to him, the state of the church under the *Heathen Roman* emperors, from *A. D.* 95 to 323. And here, he more particularly explains the *first seal*, (*Rev.* vi. 2.) of the triumph of christianity over *Jewish* and *Heathen* oppression: the *second*, (*ver.* 3, 4.) of the judgments of God on the *Jewish* persecutors, under *Trajan* and *Adrian*: the *third*, (*ver.* 5, 6.) of the
famine

famine in the time of the *Antonines*: the *fourth*, (ver. 7, 8.) of the pestilence and other calamities, which befell the empire, in the reigns of *Maximian*, *Valerian*, and the intermediate *emperors*: the *fifth*, (ver. 9—11.) of the persecution under *Dioclesian*, A. D. 270 to 298: the *sixth*, (ver. 12—17.) of the commotions of the empire, from *Maximian* to *Constantine*: the *seventh chapter*, i. e. the sealing of the 144,000, he interprets of the numerous converts to christianity, which happened between this and the second period, (vii. 1—8.) in the triumphs of which, the heavenly world is beautifully represented as rejoicing, (vii. 9—12.) The *seventh seal* is only introductory to the *trumpets*.

5. The *second period*, which is that of the *trumpets*, (cap. viii, ix.) according to Mr. Lowman, relates to what was to happen in the christian church from *Constantine*, A. D. 337 to 750, when the *Mahometan* conquest ceased in the west.—More particularly, the *first trumpet*, which produced *hail and fire mingled with blood*, (cap. viii. 7.) he refers to the bloody wars which happened in *Constantine's* family, A. D. 337 to 352: the *second*, of the *burning mountain*, (ver. 8, 9.) to the invasion of *Italy* by the northern nations, and the taking of *Rome* by *Alaric* king of the *Goths*, A. D. 359 to 410: the *third*, of the *star of Wormwood*, (ver. 10, 11.) the succeeding ravages of *Italy*, and founding the *Gothic* kingdom there, A. D. 412 to 493: the *fourth*, of *darkening the sun, moon, and stars*, (ver. 12.) to the wars in *Italy* between the *Goths* and *Justinian's* generals, which ended in erecting the exarchate of *Ravenna*, A. D. 493 to 558: the *fifth trumpet*, of the *locusts from the bottomless pit*, (ix. 1—12.) to the rise and increase of the *Mahometan* religion and empire, till checked by internal divisions, A. D. 568 to 675: the *sixth*, of *loosing the four angels and flaming horsemen*, (ver. 13—21.) to the *Saracens* invading *Europe*, and ravaging it; till their defeat by *Charles Martel*: the *seventh trumpet* is only introductory to the *vials*.

6. The *third period*, according to him, represents the state of the church and world, in the time of the last head of the *Roman* government, i. e. under the *Pope*, for 1260 years, viz. from A. D. 756 to 2016. (Vid. Prop. 166. Schol. 6.) This grand discovery, being introduced by the solemnity of a peculiar message from God by an angel, (cap. x.) is first described by general representations of the temple, and the witnesses; (cap. xi.) then of the woman in the wilderness; (cap. xii.) then by a monstrous wild beast, signifying the new Roman and persecuting power. (cap. xiii.) The xivth chapter is, according to him, an episode, containing strong representations of the happiness of those who should preserve their integrity, and the general purpose of God to bring vengeance in due time upon this wicked and persecuting power. The xvth contains the appearance of the seven angels with the vials, and a song of celestial praise on that account. Then follows the pouring out of the vials, (cap. xvi.) each of which he expounds of some great judgment upon the *Papal* kingdom. The first, (xvi. 1, 2.) on the earth, of the wars in the family of *Charles* the great, by which it was ruined, A. D. 930 to 988: the second, (ver. 3.) on the sea, of the effusion of blood in the holy war, A. D. 1040 to 1190: the third, (ver. 4—7.) on

on the rivers and fountains of water, of the civil wars between the *Guelphs* and *Gibelines*, when the *Popes* were driven out of *Italy*, *A. D.* 1200 to 1370: the fourth, (ver. 8, 9.) on the sun, of the long wars in *Italy*, *Germany*, *France*, and *Spain*, occasioned by schisms in the popedom, *A. D.* 1378 to 1530: the fifth, (ver. 10, 11.) on the seat of the beast, he explains of the reformation, *A. D.* 1560 to 1650: the sixth, (ver. 12—16.) of drying up *Euphrates*, he supposes yet to come; and conjectures it may be some invasion of the *Pope's* dominions from the east: the seventh, (xvi. 17, &c.) of the final destruction of *Rome*. The following chapters, (xviii—xix.) are assurances and descriptions of this final ruin, given by angelic messengers to *John*, and consist of songs of praise on the occasion: and in the last, *Christ* is represented as leading an army out of heaven to effect this grand event.

7. The fourth period is that of a thousand years, or the *Millenium*, in which the church will be in a most prosperous state, *A. D.* 2000 to 3000: (*Prop.* 165. *Schol.* 4. 5.) so that, according to him, the seventh chiliad is to be a kind of *sabbath*.

Ainsworth on Gen. i. 31.

Burnet's Theory, l. iv. c. iii. p. 209, 210.

Plutarch de Iside & Osir. § 47. ap. *Worthington on Redempt.* p. 211—213.

8. The fifth period is the renewed invasion of the enemies of the church, for a short time, not defined, but which is to end in their final extirpation and ruin, *cap.* xx. 7—10. (Compare *Prop.* 166. *gr.* 3.)

9. The sixth period is the general resurrection and final judgment, *cap.* xx. ver. 11—15. which terminate

10. In the seventh grand period, in which the saints are represented as fixed in a state of everlasting triumph and happiness in the heavenly world, *cap.* xxi. 1—5.

11. The conclusion of the book confirms the truth of all; and deduces the grand moral which runs through it, *viz.* that though the church of *Christ* is to struggle with great difficulties, he will support it in the midst of all, and make righteousness and truth finally victorious.

Pyle's Ded. and Pref. to Rev.

SCHOLIUM I.

On the whole; it must be acknowledged, that there is a beautiful resemblance between the prophetic representations, and the events supposed to be correspondent to them in many particulars; and the historical facts are represented with great learning and judgment by this excellent author: yet the correspondence is not in all respects so clear as might be expected, nor can we sometimes say, why those in question are represented by one of the emblems, rather than by another. Yet after all, he has finely illustrated many passages, by similar phrases from the prophetic books of the Old Testament, in which he

is quite unequalled; and has made out so much, especially with respect to the *first*, and the beginning of the *third* period, as evidently proves the book to be a glorious confirmation of christianity, and well worthy our most attentive study.

SCHOLIUM 2.

It is to be observed, that the book of the *Revelations* does not contain a view of things and persons *really existing*, but merely a view of what passed in the *imagination* of St. *John*; in which scene, there were plainly some allegorical persons, v. g. the animals, by a mistake called *beasts* in our translation; and it is on these principles, that the representation of the *New Jerusalem*, under the figure of a city coming down from God, is to be explained.

SCHOLIUM 3.

Dr. *Hartley*, (in his *Observations on man*, vol. ii. p. 366—372.) supposes, that all present civil and ecclesiastical governments will be dissolved; and that, as other churches have copied after the *Babylonish* whore, they will in their degree partake in her plagues.—And the author of the *Critical notes on some passages of scripture*, (printed for *Davis*, 1747.) thinks, that when *Babylon* shall be brought to utter destruction, that event will be a signal to the ten kingdoms, that their dissolution is also approaching. (*Crit. Notes*, p. 14, 15.) These ten kingdoms he reckons, 1 *Scotland*, 2 *Great-Britain*, 3 *Germany*, south of the *Elbe*, 4 *France*, 5 *Spain*, 6 *Lombardy* with *Istria*, *Sardinia* and *Corfica*, 7 the *Popes patrimony*, with *Romania* and *Tuscany*, 8 the two *Sicilies*, 9 *Pannonia* or *Hungary*, and 10 *Illyricum*: supposing these two circumstances must meet, viz. that the kingdoms must all have made a part of the old *Roman* empire, and must also have been for a time devoted with the rest to the spiritual power of *Rome*, (*ibid.* p. 130, 131.) But it may seem surprising, that reformed countries should be involved in the ruin of the church, they have reformed from and protested against, compare *Rev.* xviii. 4. and it is evident that the particular division above is very precarious.

Newton on Proph. part i. c. vi.

PROPOSITION CLXVIII.

LECT. Christianity is not only attended with such external evidences, as are represented in the former part of this work, but with considerable degrees of *internal* evidence. Vid. *Def.* 70. Compare *Prop.* 95.

DEMONSTRATION.

Prop. 95. gr. 1. | 1. The most considerable doctrines of natural religion are so far from being contradicted, that they are established by the gospel; particularly

cularly those which relate to the being, perfections, and attributes of God, his universal providence, government, and a future state of rewards and punishments. *Prop. 95. gr. 1.*

Ibid. gr. 6. 2. The most important branches of those duties, which we owe to God, our fellow-creatures, and ourselves, are plainly described, and inculcated in the precepts of the gospel, *ibid. gr. 6.*

Prop. 96. Cor. 3. The ceremonial observances instituted in the gospel, are but few, and those evidently calculated to answer the great ends of practical religion.

Prop. 95. gr. 2. 4. The gospel discovers to us many particulars, of which the evidence on the principles of natural religion was dubious, and which a fallen creature might greatly and painfully doubt of; particularly the pardon of sin, however aggravated, on sincere repentance, and a state of compleat and eternal glory reserved for all that are sincerely virtuous, notwithstanding the imperfection of their present attainments, while it threatens to the vicious and impenitent final and everlasting punishment.

Ibid. gr. 3, 6. 5. The gospel discovers a rich variety of truths, relating both to Christ and the Holy Spirit, which by the light of nature alone we could not possibly have found out, but which, when they are known, tend greatly to encourage the mind, and strike in a very powerful manner on those principles of gratitude, which are the noblest sources of genuine and acceptable obedience.

Ibid. gr. 7. 6. As the apparent end of all is to promote virtue in general, so it is observable that this scheme of salvation, by faith in Christ, and through the free grace of God in him, together with what relates to the influence of the Divine Spirit upon our souls, has the most admirable tendency to promote humility, representing us as ignorant and guilty, polluted and enslaved, *1 Cor. i. 30.*

Ibid. gr. 4, 5. 7. It further appears, from a survey of the foregoing heads, that though many things yet remain mysterious and obscure, yet those, in which the regulation of our tempers and practice is most immediately concerned, are so plain as to admit of very little dispute.

1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7. 8. *Valet propositio.*

Clarke at Boyle's Lect. part ii. prop. x—xiii. | *Owen on the Spirit, p. 558—562.*

Le Blanc de autor. Script. part i. § 44, | *Barrow's Works, vol. ii. Serm. xvi.*

45. | *Howe's Works, vol. i. p. 203, 204.*

Baxt. Reas. of Christian. part ii. c. vi. | *Tillotson's Serm. vol. i. Serm. xlv.*

Reynolds's Letter to a Deist, p. 260— | *Burnet's 4 Disc. p. 3—8.*

272. | *Speet. vol. vii. N^o. 574.*

Bennet on Script. p. 171, 172. | *Owen's Div. Orig. Script. c. ii. § 15. c. iii.*

Prid. Lett. to the Deists, p. 215, 216. | *§ 16*.*

* See also on this subject Dr. *Duchal's* discourses on the presumptive arguments for the truth of christianity.

COROLLARY 1.

From hence it evidently appears, that they do much mistake the nature and design of christianity, who represent it as merely a republication of the religion of nature.

Warb. Div. Leg. vol. i. p. 5, 6.

COROLLARY 2.

It further appears, that we have great reason to bless God for a revelation, attended with so many important circumstances, and so excellently adapted to answer the necessities of mankind. *Matt. xiii. 16, 17.*

COROLLARY 3.

We may further argue, that an attentive study of the scriptures, and especially of the New Testament, may be an excellent means of establishing our faith in the scripture revelation. *Acts xx. 32.*

COROLLARY 4.

It appears from hence, that we shall serve the cause of virtue and piety in the world, by endeavouring all we can to establish the character and reputation of the New Testament; and that those schemes, which would represent the writings of the apostles, as merely their own private opinions; or the relations concerning Christ, as liable to the common imperfections which attend well-meant reports of long distant facts, must be very prejudicial to the cause of christianity, and of practical religion, so nearly connected with it.

Chubb's true Gospel, and Hallet's Answer.

COROLLARY 5.

It is highly proper, that the peculiarities of the gospel scheme should be much insisted upon by christian preachers: which may also further be argued, from the pomp of miracles, by which this revelation was introduced into the world, and which must have appeared unworthy the divine wisdom and majesty, if those things which were peculiar to it are of so little importance, as many seem to suppose. *Heb. ii. 3, 4.*

Watts's Redeemer and Sanct. § 3 & 7. | Jennings's Disc. on Preaching Christ, with
—Humble Attempt, &c. p. 30—38. | Frankius's Let. ibid.

COROLLARY 6.

It is of the highest importance, to fall in with the practical design of the gospel, and always to consider and represent it, not merely as an object of amusement

ment and speculation, but as a system of truths intended to sanctify the heart and to regulate the life, and thereby to train us up for the compleat happiness of a future state. *Matt. vii. 24—27. John xiii. 17.*

COROLLARY 7.

They who have experimentally felt the power of the gospel on their hearts, will have an additional evidence to confirm their faith, in proportion to the degree in which its efficacy has prevailed. *John vii. 17. 1 John v. 10.*

*Dodd. Let. to the Author of Christian. | Watts's Sermon, vol. i. N^o. i—iii.
not founded, &c. N^o. i. p. 25—27. |*

COROLLARY 8.

It follows from all, that to cultivate a devotional temper, and study as much as possible to enter into the spirit of the gospel, and to conform every action and every sentiment to the tenour of it, must be one of the most important branches of a proper furniture and preparation for the ministerial work. And God grant, that *this* remark may be deeply fixed on the memories and hearts of all that have studied this various course of Theological Lectures, *whatever else* be disputed or forgotten!

Watts's humble Attempt, § 1. p. 4—14. | Some's Method for reviving Religion.

Εξ αὐτῆς, καὶ δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα.

...and to regulate the life and thereby to train us up for the complete happiness
of a future state. Acts vii. 24-27. John xiii. 17.

CORINTHIANS

They who have experienced the power of the gospel on their hearts
will have an additional evidence to confirm their faith, in proportion to the de-
gree in which its efficacy has prevailed. John vii. 17. 1 John v. 10.

That the Lord is the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that the Lord Jesus Christ
is the Son of the Father, is a truth which is manifest to all eyes and ears.

CORINTHIANS

It follows from all this to cultivate a devotional temper, and daily to
be diligent to enter into the spirit of the gospel, and to consider every action
of our lives in relation to the glory of God, and to the good of our
neighbour. It is a great blessing and privilege to be the subject of the
gospel, and we must not neglect it. We must not be content with
a mere outward profession, but we must have the inward reality of
the gospel in our hearts, and in our lives.

It is the duty of every Christian to be diligent in the use of the means of grace, and to be
careful to avoid all that is inconsistent with the gospel.

...and to regulate the life and thereby to train us up for the complete happiness
of a future state. Acts vii. 24-27. John xiii. 17.



A CATALOGUE of the **AUTHORS** mentioned in this Work,
where the *Pages* only are referred to; with the *Editions* to which
the References are made, and the *Number of Pages* in the Volume *.

N. B. The design of giving the number of pages is to assist the reader in finding the pas-
sage by the rule of proportion in any other Edition, according to Mr. *Locke's* method.
But where a work consists of more than one volume, (to avoid confusion in mul-
tiplying figures) the pages in the *first* only are mentioned.
Where no Edition is specified, the *first* is always understood.

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* The editor is sensible this catalogue is neither so compleat nor so accurate as could be wished;
for though it was drawn up from the Author's library, yet many of the books referred to were
wanting, or the editions different. However, it is hoped, it will be some direction to the reader,
both as it may assist him in finding a passage in different editions, and as he will often find the
titles of books more fully expressed, which in the work itself were too much contracted.

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